Making the CTBT’s Valuable Benefits Permanent

September 19, 2011

Fifteen years ago, world leaders gathered at the United Nations to join in a celebratory signing ceremony for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  First in line was President Bill Clinton, who called the treaty's aim to end nuclear testing permanently "the longest sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control."

Since then, no permanent member of the UN Security Council has tested nuclear devices.  But India, Pakistan, and North Korea have, and the CTBT remains in limbo.  Its entry into force requires ratifications from no less than 44 specified countries.  Six -- the United States, China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Indonesia - have signed but not ratified.  Three -- India, Pakistan, and North Korea - haven't signed or ratified.  The CTBT could remain in limbo for a very long time.

The treaty's tortured entry-into-force provision was the handiwork of China, Russia, and France, whose leaders felt obligated to sign, but remained reluctant to end nuclear testing permanently.  They resolved this conundrum by giving other recalcitrant states vetoes over the treaty's entry into force.  No other treaty has had to run this fierce a gauntlet.  The 1963 treaty that stopped atmospheric testing required only three ratifiers: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.  The 1970 Nonproliferation Treaty required these three, plus any 40 states that wished to join them.  

The 15 year-long wait for the CTBT has been put to good use.  A Preparatory Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization and a Provisional Technical Secretariat have been established in Vienna.  They are working diligently to complete a global monitoring system and to dispense data that have undisputed value.  The treaty organization's monitoring network is almost 80 percent complete.  It currently consists of 254 monitoring stations and ten laboratories situated across the globe.  Monitoring is done by means of stations that detect motion, sound and radiation in the ground, water, or atmosphere that is evidence of nuclear testing.    

The capabilities of this global monitoring network were showcased after North Korea tested a nuclear device in October, 2006.  This test fizzled, producing a small fraction-of-a kiloton yield.  Nonetheless, signals of this test were immediately detected by seismic stations connected to the treaty organization's grid in Bolivia, the United States, Canada, Australia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Finland, Ukraine, Germany, and Norway. 

The United States also possesses a world-class monitoring system, but even Washington has found the test ban treaty organization's data useful.  Parts of the world do not take Washington's word as gospel when it comes to nuclear weapon-related developments in other states; the treaty organization's data can therefore help remove potential error in judgment as well as veils of artifice and deceit, all helpful in deterring covert nuclear tests.  

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization and its Provisional Technical Secretariat help produce valuable global services in other areas as well.  In 2005, treaty members mandated the organization to provide data directly to national tsunami warning centers to save lives and help mitigate disasters. The organization also has the capacity to serve public safety by tracking radiation released after nuclear plant accidents and venting from underground tests by outlier states. 

The treaty has generated valuable global services, but its monitoring system can atrophy while it remains in limbo.  While awaiting the entry into force of the CTBT, it makes good sense to ensure that these essential global services are permanent rather than provisional.

The most symbolic and effective way to do so is to remove the words "preparatory" and "provisional" from their letterheads of the Preparatory Commission and Provisional Technical Secretariat.  This step could be accomplished by a UN Security Council resolution or a collective decision by treaty signatories.

This step could help convince some participating states act to complete, maintain, and upgrade the treaty's monitoring network.  Outlier states, such as India, can demonstrate responsible nuclear stewardship by providing monitoring stations and data for the treaty.  New Delhi does not even connect to the treaty organization's tsunami warning system.

Other states that matter, including Pakistan, Brazil, Egypt, China, France, Israel, Iran, Great Britain, South Africa, Russia, and the United States, have yet to fulfill all of their pledges to the treaty's international monitoring system.  Beijing, for example, does not share its monitoring data to the treaty organization, unlike Washington and Moscow.

Some treaty supporters will argue that this step is a poor substitute for the treaty's entry into force.  They are correct.  But they are also unable to persuade enough Republican Senators in the United States to vote for the Treaty, or convince states like Egypt, Iran, India, Pakistan, and North Korea to come on board.  

It took France and China 22 years to join the Nonproliferation Treaty.  It is likely to take even longer for all of the 44 states to relinquish their vetoes over the CTBT's formal entry into force.  In the mean time, states that matter can reaffirm their commitment to end nuclear testing by making the treaty organization's essential global services permanent rather than provisional.

Photo Credit: Sophie Paris, United Nations, http://www.unmultimedia.org/photo/detail.jsp?app=1⟨=en&id=411/411974&key=15&query=comprehensive%20test%20ban%20treaty&sf