Expeditionary Diplomacy Could Save Lives in Sudan

February 15, 2011

On February 7th, Southern Sudan's Referendum Commission officially announced that 99% of Southerners voted for secession. The international community has made extraordinary investments to prevent a reigniting of civil war between the north and south, but the question remains whether that investment can prevent additional violence against civilians.  

This is the second of two Stimson spotlights on the challenges to and opportunities for the United States and the international community to protect civilians from atrocities in Sudan. The first spotlight outlined various flashpoints that could spur widespread or systematic violence against civilians. This piece looks at innovative US efforts to invest in local diplomatic capacity to prevent and respond to violence against civilians in Southern Sudan.

One week ago, Southern Sudan's Referendum Commission announced that 99% of Southerners voted for secession, and President Bashir accepted the South's decision. While many in Southern Sudan celebrated what they hope is a critical step to sustainable peace, others remained caught in conflict. Since the referendum, more than 100 civilians were reportedly killed and approximately 150 injured in Southern Sudan's volatile Jonglei and Upper Nile states.[1] These events are indicative of the kinds of conflict that are likely to take a toll on civilians during the year of Southern Sudan's transition to an independent state, and exemplify the need for innovative interventions to prevent and respond to violence against civilians.

Effective protection of civilians requires more than high-level diplomatic engagement and mediation often called for by advocacy organizations. Special Envoys and Ambassadors are critical components of mediating and mitigating tensions between the main party protagonists of a conflict, but in a war-torn environment like Sudan, threats against civilians are diverse; indigenous institutions often lack the willingness, authority or capacity to protect human rights. Moreover government officials or authorities may themselves be perpetrating violence against civilians by omission or commission. In sum, the number and diversity of protection challenges far outweigh the prevention and response capacity.

Adding to the challenge, local disputes can quickly escalate into wide-spread or systematic violence. For example, one report may ascribe the cause of a clash to cattle rustling, migration route disputes or tribal violence, but disputes over resource allocation and management have obvious political implications and are ripe for manipulation by cynical actors looking to seed conflict. As such, personal and local tensions can quickly escalate into state, national, or regional conflict, resulting in atrocities and large-scale displacements, with strategic implications.

Finally, diverse threats require unique, tailored responses. Effective prevention and response requires an in-depth understanding of why civilians are vulnerable; who is targeting the civilians, why, and how; what actions could effectively deter the violence and what are the possible negative consequences of the proposed interventions to civilians and how can those risks be mitigated. Such an analysis is necessary to understand whether the conflict can be prevented or mediated by a civilian response, whether a military component may be necessary, whether the local authorities/armed forces can address the situation or whether state-level, regional, or international efforts will need to be brought to bear.

As an example of the complex challenge of prevention and response, the recent incidents in Upper Nile state that appear to have resulted in more than 50 civilian deaths were reportedly the result of conflicts within a Joint Integrated Unit (JIU). JIUs were created per the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and include soldiers of the northern Sudan Armed Forces and the southern Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). JIUs have been the epicenter of violent clashes over the years and are sure to be a source of insecurity as their future, separation, and redeployment are decided. In Jonglei state, clashes between a former SPLA General George Athor Deng -- who incited a rebellion against the Government of Southern Sudan following contested election results in 2010 -- and the SPLA resulted in dozens killed last week. Southern Sudan's political environment is fractious and its army is a conglomeration of former rebel splinter movements and sizeable militias that serve at the pleasure of the highest bidder. Southern Sudan's political cohesion and monopoly of force will be severely tested as the focus on the common enemy of the north turns inward. Other incidents in Jonglei state reportedly involved cattle rustling and the abduction of children.  

Effective prevention and response requires additional diplomatic capacity of a different kind. The three challenges of multiple, diverse threats; the potential of conflicts to escalate quickly; and the need for tailored responses, requires a three-pronged approach:

• Investment in quality diplomatic capacity at the local level. This includes deploying capable personnel, preferably with extensive field experience and qualified and/or trained in the local language and culture, conflict analysis, atrocity prevention and response, security management/hostile environment training, and conflict negotiation and mediation.

• Effective integration of the local diplomatic capacity into national and global/strategic prevention and response strategies. Information from the local level on threats and vulnerabilities, and requests for action must be gathered, analyzed, and prioritized in a central location so that higher-level diplomats and policymakers can make decisions of whether, when, and how they should intervene to effectively diffuse local conflict that can escalate.

• Effective communication and coordination with other protection actors and stakeholders, including but not limited to the local communities, appropriate local government actors, other international diplomatic presence, the UN presence and NGO actors.

In the lead-up to the referendum vote, the US Administration put this model into action. Over the last year, the US has sent more than 20 representatives of the Civilian Response Corps and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to augment its footprint in Southern Sudan.  Some of these individuals are to be based in five of Southern Sudan's state capitals, which will become operating hubs for further outreach.

This expeditionary US diplomatic presence is tasked with identifying flashpoints for violence, building trust with local communities and government officials, and serving as a communication link to other actors to help prevent conflict. Rather than lead, this presence is intended to complement other US and international conflict prevention and response programs run by USAID, the US Office on Transition Initiatives, the EU and its member states, the UN peacekeeping operation, and agencies and international NGOs.

The US has some special advantages in playing this role, although some would argue that others have been on the ground longer and know the terrain better.  First, the US government is more likely to react quickly to information and asks relayed by its own employees, rather then its partners. Second, the United States has arguably the most influence of any single nation over the nascent Government of Southern Sudan. As such, the presence of a US government figure in a state capital could in itself serve as a deterrent to some of the sources of conflict and violence. 

At a time when security concerns and/or resource considerations have largely confined US civilian diplomatic presence to national capitals, this wholly civilian response is innovative and ambitious - but it is not foolproof.  Given the last week of violence, the learning curve will be steep and S/CRS will need to capture quickly best practices, lessons learned, and benchmarks to measure effectiveness. Such tools will be needed to translate learning smartly into practice as well as to convince skeptics in Congress that civilian capacity is worth continued investment.

Twenty-five years ago this month, the US Senate ratified the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Last year, the Administration prioritized prevention of and response to atrocities in the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review and most recently, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. Today's US civilian response in Southern Sudan is one effort that could move the United States closer to turning its rhetorical commitment to prevention and response into reality.

Photo Credit: Soldiers of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) redeploy to form a new Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) battalion with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), under the terms of the agreement of the Abyei road map, July 2008 by Tim McKulka (UN Photo ID 183440)

[1] See Reliefweb: http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MCOI-8DYEV9?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=sdn;  http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MCOI-8DYEV9?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=sdn; and http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/JDUN-8DX9AC?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=sdn