For Afghanistan, No Clear End in Sight

June 30, 2011

In his speech last Wednesday, June 22, President Obama announced his plan to withdraw 33,000 troops from Afghanistan by September 2012, leaving 70,000 troops on the ground. Responses to this decision have varied wildly.

Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the President's drawdown plan is risky, and advocated a less rapid withdrawal in order to secure long-term gains in Afghanistan. Nancy Pelosi (D-California), on the other hand, said that the hope was for a full drawdown of US forces sooner than what the President laid out, and "we will continue to press for a better outcome."

Security experts are divided. According to a poll conducted by National Journal[1], 53 percent believe the President's plan risks jeopardizing significant gains, 18 percent believe it leaves too many troops in Afghanistan, and 29 percent believe that President Obama's plan is sound.

But in spite of the large percentage of security experts who seem to advocate a smaller drawdown, American citizens and lawmakers are clamoring for the US to leave Afghanistan, and quickly. In the past few years, US public opinion about our involvement in Afghanistan has become increasingly negative, with recent polls indicating that 74 percent of Americans would like a partial or complete drawdown of troops, compared with 60 percent in 2010[2]. What it would mean to "win" the war in Afghanistan has not been clearly defined from the beginning, and the lack of concrete goals and an exit strategy are also disconcerting. Meanwhile, domestic concerns such as the national debt have turned both Republicans and Democrats toward a desire to withdraw from Afghanistan and focus attentions on domestic affairs.

There may be no way of "winning" this ten-year war, but what should our focus be at this point? President Obama has chosen a plan for a fairly moderate US withdrawal from Afghanistan that will satisfy at least some of the American desire to withdraw, and will hopefully allow us to secure long-term gains in Afghanistan. Here are some things to consider:

• US Goals: The goals outlined by President Obama in 2010 were to defeat Al Qaeda and stabilize the country so that it will not be a haven for terrorists. The question now, is: How much attention should we continue to commit to counter-terrorism? In other words, is it reasonable to expect that the US can achieve the goals set out by President Obama, or should we cut our losses and refocus our attention? At this point, it is not possible for the US to eliminate the threat of terrorism in Afghanistan. There has certainly been progress—progress that has made the lives of many Afghanis much safer—but in retrospect, it may not be enough to justify the costs of the war. It is unclear that such progress, furthermore, is sustainable; there is no clear end in sight.
• Afghani Security Forces: With plans to withdraw NATO forces from Afghanistan by 2014, there are two options to ensure that the Afghani security forces are able to protect civilians: the insurgency must be drastically diminished, or the Afghani security forces must improve dramatically. With 300,000 members, it is unlikely that the Afghan security forces will be able to maintain order unless one or both of these occur. The Afghani security forces need training, and many Afghanis are concerned about their safety from insurgents without US protection, while on the other hand, there is an overwhelming feeling of exasperation over the length of time US presence has endured. We must ensure that the Afghani security forces are well-trained and able to protect.
• A Political Solution: It is a major concern that Afghanistan cannot maintain a centralized and competent government that will give orders to promote civilian security to the security forces. There is also a good deal of warranted apprehension—from both Americans and Afghanis—about the leadership of Afghanistan's President Karzai, who has increasingly spoken out against the US and appears to be leaning toward a negotiation for peace with the Taliban. Of Afghanis polled by the Asia Foundation[3] in 2010, the most commonly mentioned shortcoming of the national government was corruption, at 37 percent.
• Diplomacy: With the US turning away from the war in Afghanistan, we must refocus our efforts to emphasize diplomacy and infrastructure. How much—and what—can be accomplished through nonmilitary, diplomatic operations? With budgeting concerns, outcry over the loss of American lives, and the upcoming Presidential campaigns, we are witnessing a shift of focus. We must continue to aid Afghanistan with diplomacy, building the education system, and health infrastructure. In FY2011, State/USAID. received $4.1 billion for Afghan operations after a budget request cut from $4.6 billion, and the request for FY2012 for Afghanistan is $4.3 billion. Without the support of the Afghani people, however, these efforts will be in vain.
• Afghan economy: US withdrawal could affect the Afghan economy very negatively, as it has become reliant on the presence of US troops over the past ten years. The World Bank estimates that 97 percent of Afghanistan's GDP comes from military-related and donor community spending, and Afghan salaries are inflated. If the US withdrawal sparks an economic crisis in Afghanistan, progress we have made there will certainly be lost. In spite of our current debt, continued funding for USAID and the State Department's foreign aid programs in Afghanistan will be essential to the country's wellbeing.
• Afghani Public Opinion: In the Asia Foundation's poll, 47 percent believed the country is "moving in the right direction," an increase from 42 percent in 2009 and 38 percent in 2008. Of the 47 percent with this positive perception in 2010, 38 percent cited strong security as the reason for their optimism. Furthermore, 81 percent of respondents said they agree with the democratic principle of equal rights of participation and representation.

Without the Afghani people's desire, our goals of a stable, democratic society cannot be achieved. As Gen. James L. Jones said in Stimson's most recent Chairman's Forum, "we can't want things for people that they don't want for themselves." It is unclear whether the US commitment in Afghanistan can achieve long-lasting gains, even without the drawdown of troops, and the American people have grown tired of this war. There does seem to be a desire within the Afghani people, however, for security and democratic rights. In order to avoid the risk of completely losing what we have gained, we should continue to invest in diplomatic operations in Afghanistan that are backed by a small—but highly trained—military presence.

[1] http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/national-security-insiders-equally-divided-over-obama-s-new-afghanistan-strategy-20110622

[2] http://www.langerresearch.com/uploads/1119a6%20Afghanistan.pdf

[3] http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2010survey.pdf