Engaging Iran on Afghanistan

April 03, 2012

As conditions deteriorate for western forces in Afghanistan, and as prospects for talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany appear brighter than before, it's time to refocus on engaging Iran as one of Afghanistan's most important neighbors.  Iran can affect the drawdown of international forces for good or ill; finding ways to cooperate with Iran during the transition could improve prospects for Iran playing a productive role in Afghan stability over the long run.

At first glance, there's no problem here.  Iran is invited and attends the international meetings organized by the Afghan government and key partners such as Germany (the Bonn International Afghanistan Meeting in December 2011) and Turkey (the "Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan" November 2011).  But Foreign Minister Salehi's comments at those meetings reveal a conceptual gap between Iran and the west.  For Iran, the regional approach of transferring at least some responsibility for aid and security to Afghanistan's immediate neighbors is the right strategy, but for Iran, it is an alternative to the international strategy favored by Washington and other key donors.  For those countries, the regional approach is a component of the international approach, not an alternative to it.  Here, as in other post-conflict regions, the neighbors of the weak state are often seen as having undue influence over parts of the territory and people and therefore their involvement has to be managed by more neutral parties and protocols.  

Iran sees the presence of any foreign forces as the source of instability in Afghanistan, and opposes the current plan for a "strategic partnership" between Washington and Kabul that would permit some form of US military presence in Afghanistan even after the withdrawal of the international force under UN auspices.  For Iran, such a presence signals US intentions to have the capability to invade or attack Iran to achieve the goal of regime change.  Public rhetoric to the contrary, this appears to be a deeply held assessment of Iranian leaders responsible for their country's national security.  It has led to Iran's inability to respond to US overtures to share information and begin to coordinate efforts on practical matters such as borders, foreign assistance and reconstruction, and strategies to reduce the production and illicit trade in narcotics. 

Iran and the United States share some basic and long-term interests in Afghanistan. Both hope to see a stable, representative government in Kabul that is not dominated or controlled by the Taliban, the Pashtu forces, or Pakistan, and that does not provide safe haven to terrorists.  They wish to see a government that is capable of providing basic services of security, health and education across the country, and to steer a steady course on the fundamental and pressing economic development needs of the country. 

Iran has already contributed to Afghan reconstruction in important ways, through infrastructure projects, energy, construction of schools and mosques, and investment in businesses in Herat in particular.  Its deepest interest is in the northern and western provinces, but it has a presence in Kabul and ranks as a major donor.  Of course Iran engages with other political groups, including the Taliban, and has supported, allegedly with lethal means, attacks on foreign forces.  While its support to Afghan insurgents is not on the scale of its activities in Iraq, engaging Iran in Afghanistan entails risks for US policymakers and requires them to overcome deep mistrust, in the interest of the strategic goal of Afghan stability.

US and ISAF officials have their hands full in Afghanistan these days, and are under pressure to accelerate the withdrawal and to reconfigure their footprint in the country.  The neighbors could well be asked by President Karzai to step in support local or provincial level Afghan forces beyond current discrete arrangements in border provinces.  The west will need to be agile to ensure that such activities do not undermine important work already done, and bolstering these emerging regional security partnerships with smart coordination of civilian reconstruction efforts would be wise.  Given a slight lessening of tensions in US-Iran relations, there seems to be a window for resuming US efforts to engage Iran on this front as well.

Laipson recently released "Engaging Iran on Afghanistan," a Stimson report that examines the US-Afghanistan-Iran triangle from the perspective of two distinct policy priorities: how to engage Afghanistan's neighbors constructively to maximize the chances for stability in that country after foreign troops withdraw, and how to create possibilities for US-Iran interaction on issues where there is at least some common or shared interest. Click here to read the full report.

Photo Credit: Pete Souza, Whitehouse.gov, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Obama_and_Karzai_chatting_before_dinner_in_March_2010.jpg