Spotlight
Elections and Violence in West Africa: Can ECOWAS Peacekeepers Help?
May 12, 2011

Nigeria's April 16th election has been hailed the most credible since its return to civilian rule in 1999, yet rioting, displacement and heavy civilian casualties in the north have rapidly polarized the country. Post election violence in Nigeria and earlier, in Cote d'Ivoire, has overwhelmed an already turbulent and fragile region. These skirmishes have reignited concerns about the progress of African sub-regional peacekeeping and its ability to protect civilians from election-related violence. By the end of 2011, seven of the 15 nations in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will have held Presidential or Parliamentary elections. Any ensuing conflicts would further test the capacity and resolve of ECOWAS forces.
Civilians in the Crossfire
Nigeria is Africa's most populous nation and home to over 150 million people and 250 ethnic groups. In the north, young Nigerians revolted in response to Goodluck Jonathan, a Southern Christian's, victory over northern Muslim Muhammadu Buhari. As fighting spiralled, hundreds of civilians were beaten, shot and stabbed, some hacked with machetes and some burned to death. Churches, mosques, shops and homes were set ablaze. Rampant looting, theft and mayhem prevailed in many areas. More than 500 civilians died and thousands more were displaced.
Although election-related violence in Nigeria was not as severe as in Cote d'Ivoire, both countries suffer from acute economic inequality and both have a predominantly Muslim north and a predominantly Christian South. Both countries are encountering fervent debates on citizenship and 'true nationality.' In Nigeria, groups believing to be "native sons" by virtue of their ancestry have viciously attacked those perceived as non-citizens. (1) In Cote d'Ivoire, former President Laurant Gbagbo supported the nationalist concept of 'Ivoirite' or being a 'true Ivorian' when he openly refused to acknowledge northerners as 'true Ivorian.' (2) The result was targeted attacks against specific ethnic or "foreign" communities.
The chaos in Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire powerfully illustrates how elections can exacerbate underlying religious, economic and cultural tensions. With four remaining ECOWAS elections scheduled for 2011, a contested vote in one of these remaining states could ignite further bloodshed, testing sub regional peacekeeping capacity and willingness to protect civilians.
Peacekeeping in West Africa
As recent history attests in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria, atrocities in West Africa can quickly bleed into neighboring countries. Throughout the turbulent 1990s, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) demonstrated a strong resolve to deploy peacekeepers when conflicts paralyzed the region. Though ECOMOG received criticism for human rights abuses in the field, the international community also praised ECOMOG for it's proactive stance.(3)
Progress
The peacekeeping paradigm in West Africa has transformed since the early days of ECOMOG. First, Africa has made significant progress over the past decade in regionalizing its peace and security architecture. The transformation from the now obsolete Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union shifted focus from principles of 'non-interference' to principles of 'non-indifference', reflecting African leaders' willingness to prioritize human security and human rights. In 2008, ECOWAS created the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), moving from 'an ECOWAS of States' to 'an ECOWAS of the Peoples.' Both progressive peace and security mechanisms demonstrate African leader's willingness to prioritize human security.
Under the auspices of the African Union, the continent is divided into five Regional Economic Communities (RECs), each with its own sub regional standby brigade. Together, these regional brigades make up the African Standby Force (ASF).
The ECOWAS Standby Force (referred to as the ESF or ECOBRIG) (4) is ECOWAS' military/peacekeeping arm. It is comprised of a Main Brigade (MB) and rapid reaction Task Force (TF), which can deploy in 14 days. Similar to other regional brigades, the ESF has extensively tested battalion logistics and interoperability through a series of Command Post Exercises (CPX), however, neither the ESF nor any of the other four REC's have been deployed to a real time conflict.
Challenges
To date, progress on African peace and security has focused primarily on creating concepts, institutions and frameworks. The operationalization of such concepts requires further consideration. Major obstacles hinder regional and sub regional peacekeeping progress, including, inadequate and inconsistent funding, equipment and staffing shortages. Other challenges include:
- Training Capacity: Current training models are not designed to equip troops with the required knowledge to protection civilians on the ground. Training is bound by host nation requirements, thus priorities differ from member state to member state.
- Competition among ECOWAS Member States/Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs): Most ECOWAS TCCs are not equipped to carry a heavy peacekeeping burden. In the future, influential member states like Nigeria and Ghana may find it difficult to strike a balance between obligations to UN peace operations and their own sub regional commitments. Competition over resources and donors could also create tense dynamics.
- Collaboration Between ECOWAS and the AU: Lack of collaboration between the AU and ECOWAS, has led to insufficient information sharing. Sub regional efforts could potentially undermine African Union integration efforts, which could shape Africa consensus around collective security mandates. Collaboration between the RECs, the AU and UN has also been lacking.
The unparalleled number of elections taking place this year in Africa, seven in West Africa alone, increases the likelihood of violence against civilians. Emerging trends suggest that lower intensity conflicts will become the norm in Africa - a fact recently confirmed in Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria. ECOWAS' efficacy and resolve could be tested sooner than anticipated. As work continues to operationalize regional and sub regional peacekeeping, rapid deployment and civilian protection elements will be critical.
[1] Brookings: Elections and Violence in Nigeria: The Question of Citizenship in Sub Saharan Africa.
[2] Christian Science Monitor 'Five Key Reasons, Ivory Coast's Elections Led to Civil War' http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0406/Five-key-reasons-Ivory-Coast-s-election-led-to-civil-war/The-Ivoirite-campaign-and-the-Young-Patriots
[3] Alex Okunnor, "Africa's Shining Example" African Studies Quarterly | Volume 4, Issue 1 | Spring 2000 http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1.pdf (accessed 1 May 2011)
[4] The term 'ESF' and 'ECOWAS' refer to the ECOWAS Standby Force and are used interchangeably throughout this piece
Photo Credit: United Nations (UNMIL Photo/Kanalstein, Feb. 2007)
