Spotlight
Can Goldwater-Nichols Reforms for the Interagency Succeed?
April 19, 2007
Over the past decade, American national security officials and experts have repeatedly characterized interagency processes as "broken." The inability of departments and agencies to implement national security policies in a coordinated and integrated manner has been cited across a wide range of incidents and policy areas, from the September 11th attacks to post-invasion Iraq, and countless others. This has led to calls for interagency reform modeled after the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (or "Goldwater-Nichols"), from the 9/11 Commission Report, the Iraq Study Group Report, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Peter Pace, as well as other think tanks and individuals.
It is unlikely that reforms modeled after the Goldwater-Nichols Act alone would be sufficient to correct our national security interagency problems. In fact, it is possible that such reforms would not have a significant long-term positive impact. Interagency problems may not be amenable to intradepartmental solutions-in this case, from the Department of Defense.
Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 in an effort to improve military advice to civilian leaders, reform defense procurement and budgeting, and enhance the effectiveness of military operations. A key, but not singular, element for achieving these objectives was by strengthening joint military professionalism across the military services. The bipartisan legislation represented the culmination of the defense reform movement that marked the early 1980s.
Compared to other government reorganizations, such as the National Security Act of 1947 or the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Goldwater-Nichols was modest in scope. The drafters emphasized reallocating authorities among existing offices over the creation of new offices or institutions. They also established both top-down and bottom-up incentives for military officers to seek assignments in joint billets. Goldwater-Nichols' measured approach alienated some ardent defense reformers at the time, but it has also been the basis for the Act's success in the two decades since its passage.
Goldwater-Nichols' successful promotion of joint military professionalism, in both operations and advice, is seen by some as a model for promoting an integrated interagency perspective and operations across national security institutions. Advocates of interagency reform have recommended such measures as establishing interagency task forces, creating interagency professional education programs, and requiring interagency assignments prior promotion to senior ranks, among other proposals.
These and other interagency reform proposals cannot have a positive impact akin to Goldwater-Nichols unless other larger, systemic issues are addressed as well. Most important is the issue what office or institution is assigned the authority and responsibility for implementing the new reforms. Other associated issues or responsibilities would include whether the office or institution can establish metrics and enforce compliance across the requisite national security departments and agencies. In other words, this is the fundamental question of "who owns the interagency?" The most logical place to assign such a role would be the National Security Council, although it was not designed to perform this function. Further, historical precedent and the routine change in administrations present additional challenges to expanding the NSC.
This issue illustrates the difficulty of applying intradepartmental solutions to interagency problems. Ultimately, Goldwater-Nichols succeeded because the top civilian and military leadership in the Defense Department were determined to implement the legislation. Had other leaders no been so inclined, the new authorities in the 1986 legislation would have languished, like previous reforms in 1953 and 1958. The institutions to implement Goldwater-Nichols already existed; they didn't have to be created or even significantly enhanced by the legislation. This is the principal challenge that interagency reform will have to overcome if it to succeed.
Dr. Peter Roman is a senior associate at the Stimson Center and directs the Domestic Preparedness program. He serves as the Director of Research for Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.LLIS.gov), the national network of Lessons Learned and Best Practices for emergency response and homeland security professionals.