Stimson Logo

South Asia Program

Kashmir

The Henry L. Stimson Center seeks a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue that takes into account the wishes of people living on both sides of the Kashmir divide. The requirements of a peaceful resolution are well known: The Government of India must honor its constitutional pledge to allow significant autonomy to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, and remove the heavy burdens imposed on the people of Kashmir by its security forces. The Government of Pakistan must cease supporting the violence perpetuated by militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir, while living up to its promises in "Azad" Kashmir. These actions are clearly interconnected, as it is difficult to envision how Kashmiriis will be free to go about living their lives in dignity and peace as long as infiltration facilitated by the Pakistan Army and security forces continues. And as long as infiltration and acts of terror carried out by militant groups that have a safe haven in Pakistan continue, there will continue to be a heavy Indian security presence in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.


Jammu and Kashmir is a very heterogeneous state. No solution that is proposed is likely to garner the support of all the diverse groups within the state. For a solution to have a chance of success, exacting conditions must be met, including the acceptance of that solution by India, Pakistan and China - as well as by a significant proportion of the people living within Kashmir. An independent Kashmir that encompasses much or all of the old princely state is likely to be unacceptable to its neighbors, and thus would not provide a basis for a peaceful solution.


The Stimson Center carries out field work in Kashmir to listen and learn from a wide range of opinion. The Center promotes indigenous efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue, but sees value in US initiatives, as well.

Background

The Kashmir dispute began with the creation in 1947 of the newly independent states of India and Pakistan, when the Hindu leader of the Muslim-majority princely state of Kashmir opted to accede to India as armed invaders from Pakistan were advancing on his capital, Srinagar. The resulting Indo-Pakistani war of 1947-48 divided the state, reflecting the status of forces on the ground. Since then, Pakistan has controlled “Azad” (Free) Kashmir and the adjacent Northern Areas, while India remained in control of two-thirds of the former princely state. The Karachi Agreement, signed by India and Pakistan in July 1949, formally established this cease-fire line (CFL) in Kashmir, which was supervised by a modest number of UN observers. In 1971, hostilities again broke out between India and Pakistan over the fate of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In July 1972, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement to end the third Indo-Pakistani war. Simla defined a Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir which, with minor deviations, followed the same path as the Karachi Agreement’s CFL. The Simla Agreement also called on both sides to respect the LoC “without prejudice to the recognized position of either side,” prohibited either side from unilaterally altering the LoC, and bound both countries “to refrain from threat or the use of force in violation of this Line.” The LoC is 720 kilometers long, running in a non-linear way over rugged terrain near Jammu in the southwest up to glacial heights of the Himalayas near China’s Sinkiang province in the northeast.

Terrain

The total area of the former princely state of Kashmir is 86,023 square miles, or about the size of the Korean Peninsula, Kansas or Great Britain. The territory is divided by a loc established in 1972 following the 1971 conflict between India and Pakistan. The Line of Control (LoC) replaced the former cease-fire line of 1949. India administers 53,665 square miles and Pakistan 32,358 square miles. The loc stretches approximately 450 miles from grid reference NW 605 550, at the termination of the international border thirty five miles west of Jammu, to NJ 980 420 in the Karakoram Range sixty-five miles southeast of Mount K2 and twelve miles north of the Shyok River.1 There is no definition of the LoC from that point northward toward Chinese territory. The terrain varies from flatland, hills and semi-tropical growth in the south, through increasingly steeper areas and the temperate vegetation of the Pir Panjal Range (with occupied military positions up to 14,000 feet) until, north of the Jhelum River, the higher ranges begin. The west-east section of the Line lies along and across mountain ridges, some over 18,000 feet, where any kind of movement is difficult and dangerous.

Status of Forces and Observers

Since 1950, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) is insufficiently staffed and equipped to monitor conditions along the Line of Control (LoC). India maintains that the mandate of UNMOGIP has lapsed. The United Nations continues to maintain a token force of approximately forty-five UNMOGIP inspectors on the Pakistani side. It is virtually impossible for UN inspectors and outsiders to assess competing Indian and Pakistani claims over responsibility for the many cease-fire violations of small arms and artillery exchanges across the LoC. An insurgency in Indian Kashmir, sparked in 1989 after years of political and administrative misrule, fueled by Pakistani support across the LoC, has led the Indian government to substantially increase the presence of armed forces in the state. Pakistani assertions of the size of Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir have been substantially inflated, and India does not provide details of its military and paramilitary deployments. Some reports estimate that India deploys approximately 400,000 combined army and paramilitary forces in Kashmir, most of which are stationed in the interior, 80,000 of which are deployed along the LoC. Pakistani forces deployed along the LoC are reported to number in the 40,000-50,000 range. Various Kashmiri insurgent groups and “guest militants”combined now may number between 4,000 to 5,000 active combatants.

Nuclear Dangers

Since the insurgency flared, small arms fire and shelling by both sides across the Line of Control (LoC) have been a common occurrence, but successive Indian governments have refrained from carrying out “hot pursuit” across the Line. The war on terrorism waged by the United States could, over time, lead to a reassessment of India’s policy of restraint, if provocations continue within Kashmir. After the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, some analysts and policy makers in both countries believed that the days of uncertainty and strategic miscalculation were over. Proponents of the Bomb asserted that nuclear deterrence had been achieved and neither side would dare use a nuclear weapon against the other. Others in South Asia and abroad warned that the possession of nuclear weapons would encourage limited or low-level conflicts. This view was proved right in May 1999 when Pakistan surreptitiously deployed troops on the Indian side of the LoC above Kargil. Though the intent of the Kargil plan is still not entirely clear, the damage that the ensuing war dealt to India–Pakistan relations was all too apparent. The casualties of the Kargil war were high given the relatively localized nature of the conflict. According to official Indian reports, the Indian Army and Air Force suffered 474 killed and 1,109 wounded. Pakistani casualties are difficult to determine since the army has officially denied any involvement. India took great pains to stay on its own side of the LoC, despite the fact that it would mean higher casualties and an uninterrupted supply line for Pakistani troops on the heights. Pakistan eventually relented with encouragement from Washington. Similar success at controlling escalation during future conflicts in Kashmir is far from guaranteed. For more information about nuclear dangers and nuclear risk-reduction in South Asia, please refer to the sections entitled Reducing Nuclear Dangers in South Asia and Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia.

Confidence-Building Measures and Kashmir

Although India and Pakistan have negotiated several CBMs to prevent miscalculation and to control escalation, these measures have been implemented poorly. For example, a “Hotline” exists between high-ranking military officers, but this channel has previously been used perfunctorily—or at all—in times of increased tension, when it is most needed. Notification thresholds for troop movements are set very high— at the division level and above—limiting their utility. Even with such high thresholds, notifications have been circumvented on occasion by not moving all elements of a division at the same time, thereby avoiding the requirement to notify. CBMs also have been negotiated to avoid airspace incursions. These “no fly” zones are extremely narrow, however, and are periodically violated. No CBMs have been negotiated to prevent firing across the LoC. Informal arrangements exist for military sector commanders across the LoC to communicate and to de-escalate tensions. India and Pakistan have therefore used CBMs more as “competition-building measures” than as confidence-building measures.

While India and Pakistan agreed to pursue a number of confidence-building and nuclear risk-reduction measures in a Memorandum of Understanding at the Lahore Summit in February 1999, the Kargil conflict stymied progress in these areas. Pakistan continues to emphasize the primacy of Kashmir over all other bilateral issues with India while India insists on engaging in a composite dialogue with a broad basket of confidence-building measures addressing trade, military activity, and travel.


1 See A Delineation of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir Resulting from the Cease-fire of 17 December 1971 in accordance with the Simla Agreement of 2 July 1972,@ signed by representatives of the two armies on 11 December 1972. The text of the Simla Agreement is available in the appendix of Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak, eds., Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), 251.