South Asia Program
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A Stimson Center-led delegation meets with Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai to discuss nuclear issues in January 2006. From the left, Air Commodore (and former Stimson Center Visiting Fellow) Khalid Banuri, Dan Poneman of the Scowcroft Group, General Kidwai, Leonard Spector of the Monterey Institute, Stimson co-founder Michael Krepon, and Neil Joeck of the Lawrence Livermore National Labs.
Stimson Center Releases Case Study of
US Crisis Management in South Asia
Stimson Center posts India-Pakistan Prenotification Agreement
Agreement Text
Full Timeline of Indo-Pak Confidence Building Measures
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The Stimson Center’s South Asia Program The Stimson Center has nurtured confidence-building and nuclear risk-reduction measures in South Asia through workshops with knowledgeable and well connected Indian, Pakistani, and US participants; private meetings with key officials in all three countries; research and publications; public forums in Washington; and a Visiting Fellows program. Whatever form the Center’s programming takes, its function is the same: to encourage the consideration of useful ideas that could provide short-term relief from potential dangers and the long-term basis for a durable peace. Many good ideas have been incubated in trilateral India-Pakistan-US workshops. The most symbolic of these measures was the opening of the Kashmir divide to permit people-to-people exchanges and trade. The opening of a bus link between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, announced in February 2005 and initiated in April 2005, opened the doors to other CBMs. Subsequently, India and Pakistan agreed to initiate a bus link between Lahore and Amritsar, as well as a rail link between Rajhastan and Sindh. In October 2005, New Delhi and Islamabad agreed to pre-notify ballistic missile flight tests. There is still much work to be done, as the peace process on the Subcontinent is far from secure. The domestic environment within Pakistan is shaky. Extremist groups within Pakistan continue to operate with seeming impunity. Bomb blasts at sensitive sites within India continue to erode trust and shrink the space for creative diplomacy. The Subcontinent remains a very unstable, shock-prone region. One possible shock could be an act of nuclear terrorism. The Stimson center’s programming objectives during 2006 and 2007 are to push the envelop on confidence-building and nuclear risk-reduction measures between India and Pakistan; and to add as much insulation as possible against the possibility of new shocks on the Subcontinent. More specifically, the Stimson Center’s South Asia programming has four primary guidelines: First, keep pushing for India and Pakistan to demonstrate responsible nuclear stewardship by negotiating and implementing in good faith confidence building and nuclear risk-reduction measures. While circumstances will change in unexpectedly good or bad ways, the need for such measures will remain constant. The Stimson Center is proud to have championed all of the measures agreed upon by India and Pakistan since 1992. There is much more to do to lower barriers to trade, to encourage cross-border infrastructure agreements, and to expand people-to-people exchanges. The missile test notification agreement is far too narrow in scope. Pakistan and India might consider broadening its focus to cover cruise missiles and to limit testing to designated test ranges. We intend to keep pushing for the demilitarization of the Siachen Glacier and for a demarcation agreement for Sir Creek. Second, focus on the issue of nuclear terrorism on the Subcontinent. It is not unreasonable to expect an act of nuclear terrorism – most likely a dirty bomb attack – in South Asia within the next five years. India and Pakistan need to take additional unilateral steps to lock down dangerous materials, and they would be wise to take cooperative steps, as well. These initiatives could not only help prevent acts of nuclear terrorism, but also help with escalation control in the event of a nuclear nightmare. (The more Pakistan and India cooperate privately on nuclear terrorism before such an act occurs, the more likely it will be that denials of official collusion will be viewed plausibly, thereby providing a potential brake on escalation.) In 2003 and 2004, the Stimson Center convened workshops with influentials from both countries on nuclear terrorism, subsequently publishing computer-driven models of damage estimates of various acts of nuclear terrorism. One of our key messages has been to pay attention to dirty bomb-making material, which resides in many locations on the Subcontinent. This material is typically not well guarded, and is particularly susceptible to insider threats. Third, push the envelope for normalcy in Kashmir. Confidence building and nuclear risk reduction begins along the Kashmir divide. Escalation triggered by a major act of terrorism – whether directed at a symbolic target or involving nuclear material – will occur more quickly if violence and infiltration are on the rise in Kashmir. The best way to prevent escalation and to isolate bad actors is to promote progress toward "normalcy," and even the outlines of an eventual settlement. NGOs need to be far ahead of governments with regard to a Kashmir settlement. One of the Stimson Center’s public arguments dating back to the mid-1990s has been that if divided families could meet on the Korean peninsula, why could they not meet across the Kashmir divide? In addition, if Pakistan were so concerned about the well-being of Kashmiris, why would they not permit cross trade across between Kashmiris? These steps and many more are now underway. However, infiltration and acts of terror continue. The Stimson Center promotes a Tennessee Valley Authority-like approach to the region, which we call the Greater Kashmir Development Authority, to promote cross-border power generation, infrastructure, and trade. Fourth, adapt to changing circumstances. Stimson is now heavily involved in trying to re-shape the Bush administration’s nuclear cooperation initiative with India – an issue that was not on our programming agenda until July 2005. This plan, which was concluded at the highest levels in both governments without broader consultation, would have the unfortunate effect of pitting two highly desirable objectives – better Indo-US ties and tough non-proliferation norms – against each other. In testimony on Capitol Hill and in private consultations with the executive and legislative branches, Michael Krepon, the Program Director, is searching for ways to avoid an either/or choice. To further its objectives, the South Asia project employs several tools:
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