

57th Strategy for Peace Conference

The Stanley Foundation

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Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance: The Road to 2020

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I. Introduction

Thank you Dick (Stanley) for your kind and generous introduction. I am honored to be here and please let me begin by recognizing and extending my appreciation to you, Keith Porter, and all of your colleagues at the Stanley Foundation for this 57th edition of the Strategy for Peace Conference. Through this important annual Forum and other farsighted and far-reaching programming, the Stanley Foundation has championed a more effective United Nations and other institutions of global governance designed to grapple with the world's most pressing challenges, from nuclear nonproliferation to conflict prevention and effective climate governance. I am particularly pleased to learn of the Foundation's most recent work in promoting models of cooperative, multistakeholder action to augment the capabilities and engagement strategies of non-state actors who are increasingly critical partners with states and international organizations in tackling the dominant global governance problems of the 21st century. The rising importance of Multistakeholder Global Governance is my core message tonight and was also the focus of the report launched just last year at The Peace Palace in The Hague by the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, an initiative of The Hague Institute for Global Justice & the Stimson Center for which I was privileged to serve as co-chair, alongside my old friend and collaborator of the years former U.N. Ambassador and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

II. The Intersection of Security & Justice in Global Governance: Just Security

Tonight, I wish to refer briefly to the context of that Report and also highlight a few of its most pertinent proposals, including our thinking on a "strategy for reform" between now and 2020—the UN's 75th anniversary. During our exchange, I would also be happy to highlight some examples of modest progress in implementing those proposals thus far.

The context: Despite two World Wars and untold human suffering, during the 20th century humanity witnessed an unparalleled advance of freedom and justice with the defeat of fascism, the demise of other forms of totalitarian government, the delegitimation of colonialism, the demise of Apartheid, and the spread of democratic governance and respect for human rights. In the past two decades, the world has also

managed to reduce extreme global poverty by half, and to harness a range of new technologies in agriculture, communications, transport and health, the sum total of which makes our interconnected global economy possible.

On the other hand, in some parts of the world, populations growing faster than economies can create new tensions, and the concentration and diversion of wealth have left millions destitute and frustrated, contributing to militant extremism, not just in poorly governed spaces, where state institutions and the rule of law have collapsed, but among those poorly served by or unable to fit into their adopted states. According to the latest Global Peace Index, terrorism is at an all-time high, battle deaths—*fueled, in particular, by conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa*—are at a 25 year high, and the number of refugees and displaced people is at a level not seen the end of the second World War. Moreover, grave human rights abuse and discrimination against women, children, and minorities continue unabated worldwide. Humanity’s unplanned impact on global climate—*which is the backdrop to all other human achievement*—and the rise of new technologies offering global connectivity but also global risks, remind us daily of the need to diminish that impact and better manage those risks. But *ad hoc* groups of states—*coalitions of the fleeting*—cannot reach those ends, and our current global institutions have neither the power nor the resilience to do so either.

We can choose to manage our global affairs, in the face of such challenges and risks, in a manner that lends itself to *greater peace, fairness, and equal opportunities for all nations and their citizens*, or allow our global governance structures and mechanisms to *decay further and fail to match* the scale and complexity of present day challenges and threats.

Embracing change, members of the Commission have advocated, in our report and over the past year and a half, for the creation of better tools, institutions, norms, and networks to avoid catastrophe and build a better future. What we need most are new kinds of public, private, and mixed approaches to global governance designed to meet and master the challenges and threats and open up opportunities to thrive with dignity. We need what the Commission called “just security.”

The growing connectivity between security and justice in global affairs exhibits short-term trade-offs and tensions but can also reveal ways in which justice and are mutually reinforcing, for instance, lending urgency and fresh perspectives to long-standing climate justice concerns.

The complete scope of **governance** encompasses informal or consensual arrangements for managing aspects of human relationships, from local and customary justice to the Montreal Protocol on global atmospheric ozone and the new Paris Climate Agreement that nonetheless have some *authoritative leverage* to encourage participants’ *compliance*—maybe not as much as *government* but enough to promote collaboration. As then Secretary-General Kofi Annan proclaimed in a commencement address in 2004 at Harvard University:

... (I)t is in the interest of every country to have international rules and abide by them. And such a system can only work if, in devising and applying the rules, the legitimate interests of all countries are accommodated, and decisions are reached collectively. That is the essence of multilateralism, and the founding principle of the United Nations.

In today's interdependent world, global governance going forward must be multistakeholder, or networked, governance with a range of state and non-state actors. Its objectives are global public goods—goods that anyone can utilize without diminishing availability to others, and that no one can be excluded from using. *Just security* aims to forge a system of accountable, fair, and effective governance of global public goods, including durable peace. It is one of the many critical elements of global government given more in-depth treatment in the companion volume to the Commission report, entitled *Just Security in an Undergoverned World*, which will be published next year by Oxford University Press.

III. Global Governance Reform Challenges and Progress at the Intersection of Security and Justice

Applying the framework of Just Security, the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance concluded that today's global challenges, from mass violence in fragile states, such as Syria, the DRC, and the Central African Republic, to runaway climate change or fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks and cyber-attacks, require new kinds of global tools, institutions, norms, and networks if they are to be effectively managed.

I wish to highlight just three sets of recommendations that the Commission made in response to such global policy challenges and to underscore how certain proposals hold deep personal meaning for me in connection with my decades of service at the United Nations.

Major Illustrative Reform Ideas from the Commission's Report

First, because global responses to managing and addressing the sources of deadly conflict remain fairly anemic compared to investments in conventional military power, we propose that the UN establish—as part of a new standing **Civilian Response Capability**—a **professional cadre of mediators and potential mission leaders** and redouble its efforts to **recruit and appoint women to senior mediation and leadership roles**.

Moreover, if the **Responsibility to Protect**, and its corollary responsibilities to **prevent and rebuild** are to be more than declaratory principles, we need to better define the implications of each, and to address the political, as well as functional, obstacles to making them operational. For example, when I led the hybrid UN-African Union Mission in Darfur—the *largest UN peace operation at the time with 27,000 peacekeepers and an*

annual budget of \$1.7 billion—I was surprised and dismayed when I learned that I could allocate only *\$4 million*, via “Quick Impact Projects,” toward anything that would help the African Union and United Nations address the root causes of conflict in war-torn western Sudan.

A second set of proposals addressed **climate governance**. Climate change is a quintessential global governance challenge, with far-reaching effects beyond the abilities of any single state or small grouping of states to contain or redress. The Commission sought to strengthen connections between grassroots action and top-down approaches to mitigate and adapt to the worst effects of climate change, proposing that **future climate agreements be open to commitments by actors other than national governments**, for example, provincial and district governments, cities, industry and professional associations, and civil society organizations, including women’s organizations. The Commission also proposed a **Green Technology Licensing Facility** (within the Green Climate Fund) to help those with the least resources better adapt to climate change, by boosting transfer of environmentally sound technologies to the Global South.

The Commission also addressed the representativeness of global governance, proposing, in this regard, the creation of a **new United Nations Parliamentary Network** to bring national parliamentarians into closer touch with the UN’s work. Established as an advisory body to the General Assembly under Article 22 of the Charter, the UN Parliamentary Network would bring together national parliamentarians to create a new platform for input and exchange, consistent with other networks in place for the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and regional organizations.

For further details on these and many other global governance reform proposals, I encourage you to consult the Commission’s report and to debate and challenge its ideas.

IV. Strategy for Reform: Towards a World Summit on Global Security, Justice & Governance in 2020 (UN 75)

Turning now to the Commission’s “Strategy for Reform”: key elements of an effective way to approach global governance reform can be represented in what I describe as a “3 + 2” Strategy: *Three* critical sets of actors and *two* major reform vehicles for channeling actors’ ideas and political support toward achievable, yet transformative goals.

The *first* major set of actors, **UN Member States**, remains the bedrock of the international system, despite, as noted earlier, the diffusion of power from states in recent decades to sub-national and non-state entities. Since many of the reform ideas envisaged strike at the heart of distinctly intergovernmental bodies and the very notion of “state sovereignty,” the buy-in, or at the least agreement of states to not block progress, is fundamental to achieving global systemic reform.

The *second* set of actors, **global civil society**, encompasses non-governmental organizations, social and religious movements, community-based groups, the business community, scholars, and journalists. From the Coalition for the International Criminal Court and Jubilee 2000 Campaign to the Compact of States and Regions and their growing influence on matters of climate governance, substantive change in global governance rarely occurs without the active engagement of a diverse range of non-state actors.

The *third and final* set of actors is **international civil servants**, including especially the leadership of the next **UN Secretary-General**. Antonio Guterres will wield many tools and may choose among many potential courses of action to exert influence. When applied with courage, creativity, and political acumen, the Secretary-General becomes a protagonist for global governance reform, alongside governments and non-governmental actors.

Channeling the ideas and the political support of these three sets of actors toward achievable, yet transformative goals is the objective of the two proposed vehicles for reform. The *first vehicle*, what the Commission called “**Reform Through Parallel Tracks**,” acknowledges that different kind of multilateral reform ideas will require different kinds of multilateral negotiating forums and will proceed at different speeds. For example, specific UN task forces in New York—composed, for example, of a select group of Permanent Representatives from all major regions and co-chaired by PRs from the Global North and South—could deliberate on creating new bodies, such as a UN Parliamentary Network to advise the UN General Assembly or, as an example of reforming existing bodies, the Commission is recommending an upgrade of the UN Peacebuilding Commission into a Council. These negotiations among select PRs could precede and feed into final negotiation in the UN General Assembly or Security Council. And as I learned in creating the UN Mediation Support Unit as Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, innovation can be introduced rapidly when a few forward-leaning Member States, the Secretary-General, and non-governmental partners come together in common cause, *with uncommon funding*.

A *second reform vehicle*, and one which I believe has the potential to capture the imagination of world leaders and millions of citizens worldwide, is to organize in the run-up to the United Nations’ 75th anniversary a series of formal intergovernmental, *yet at the same time multistakeholder*, negotiations leading to the convening, in September 2020, of a heads of state and government-level **World Summit on Global Security, Justice & Governance**—ideally, as part of the traditional UN Summit planned to mark important UN anniversaries. The 2020 Summit is expected to include a five-year review of progress toward meeting the Sustainable Development Goals. A World Summit has the potential to take a step back and contemplate the international system and its institutions, anchored around the United Nations, as a whole and to adopt system-wide reforms that seek greater coherence, reduce waste and duplication of effort, and encourage mutually reinforcing linkages between several, interdependent issue areas, including global governance for improved implementation of the SDGs.

One possible model for inspiration could be the 1987 Brundtland Commission, which, through its landmark report *Our Common Future*, called for what became the 1990-1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development Conference process with four 4-week Preparatory Committee meetings, culminating in the June 1992 Rio Earth Summit. The Summit resulted in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Biodiversity and Desertification Conventions, and the Agenda 21 sustainable development action plan, which continue to have a lasting impact today.

V. Conclusion: The Future of Global Security, Justice & Governance

In conclusion, as the international community seeks to forge a mutually supportive system of good, accountable governance and sustainable peace globally through the intersection of security and justice, *just security* offers a unique prism for informing a new generation of policy-makers and scholars seeking to understand and better respond to some of the most pressing global concerns of our time. In employing this framework in our analysis and decision-making, the international community can face today's metaphorical crossroads for global security and justice and boldly embark on a course toward greater peace, fairness, and equal opportunities for all nations and their citizens, now and for generations to come.

Thank you.