Science and Technology Centers (STCs)

The Issue | Obstacles | Q & A | Quick Facts | Legislation | Agreements | Talking Points | Recommendations

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The Issue

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the giant Soviet WMD complex was left in a state of dangerous uncertainty. All told, it was estimated that the Soviets had employed some 50,000-60,000 nuclear experts, 65,000 biological warfare specialists, and 6,000 chemical weapons professionals, most of whom were unable to find consistent well-paying work when the USSR fractured.[1] Within the first year after the collapse of the USSR, life for this once privileged community of scientists, engineers and technicians was irrevocably altered. Tens of thousands lost their jobs or went months without a paycheck. Even the brightest scientists and engineers were forced to seek work wherever they could get it.[2]Many were capable of spreading critical materials, components or sensitive information to hostile groups and states. Given the poor economic performance of Russia and other former Soviet Union (FSU) states, many scientists who could not find jobs elsewhere faced a literal choice: go hungry or sell their expertise to the highest bidder. The plight of the weapons community was indicative of the widespread inability of Russia and the other FSU states to support the massive Soviet weapons complex that they inherited.

Recognizing the proliferation threat posed by these scientists, engineers, and technicians, the State Department developed programming that would help eliminate the economic conditions that could drive former Soviet expertise to employment in rogue states and terrorist groups. These so-called scientist redirect programs now constitute a large, if underappreciated, portion of US cooperative nonproliferation work. The first large-scale attempt to prevent the proliferation of weapons knowledge came in the form of the Science and Technology Centers (STCs).

In 1992, in coordination with the European Union, Japan, and the Russian Federation, the State Department helped to form the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow, Russia. Additional funding parties in the ISTC now include Canada, Norway, and South Korea, while Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan now receive ISTC funding. In 1993, the State Department helped set up a counterpart institution, the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU), in Kiev with the help of Sweden, Canada, and Ukraine. Since the STCs' formation, Canada has joined the ISTC Governing Board and the European Union has replaced Sweden on the STCU's Governing Board. Recipient countries for the STCU now include Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Uzbekistan. However, in 2005, Ukraine became the first recipient country to contribute to an STC, when the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences donated $500,000 for Targeted Research Initiatives in emerging technology areas.[3]

The STCs seek to provide weapons experts in the FSU with opportunities to redirect their talents to peaceful activities, contribute to the solution of national and international science and technology problems, reinforce the transition to market economies, support basic and applied research, and promote the integration of targeted scientists into the global research community. This is achieved by providing short-term research grants to former weapons scientists to remain employed within their erstwhile weapons institutes in the region.

Among their core programs, the ISTC and the STCU offer Partner projects, which give collaborators the opportunity to fund their own projects at FSU research institutes through the STCs.[4] Partners, which must be approved by the respective Governing Board, can be a person, company, or other organization from a country that is party to the ISTC or STCU.[5] Partner institutions receive many benefits by working with the STCs. Due to the agreements negotiated by the participating governments, funds funneled through the STCs are tax-free and suffer from little of the risk associated with working in the FSU. STC staff also helps negotiate intellectual property rights, facilitate travel and logistics, match Partners with scientists that have the requisite expertise, and monitor the institutions and scientists to ensure that project deadlines are met.[6] The STCs also play a role in implementing other US nonproliferation activities. Both the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and the US Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), a public-private partnership authorized by Congress in 1995, take advantage of the STCs' tax-free status and long-standing FSU relationships to send money and equipment into the FSU.

After almost a decade and a half of activity, the Science Centers have accumulated an impressive list of accomplishments.

  • From its inception to the present, the ISTC has distributed over US$200 million to prevent the proliferation of weapons expertise.
  • ISTC officials claim to have reached more than 58,000 former weapons experts.
  • In 2005 alone, the ISTC paid out US$43.9 million worth of grants to 24,984 former Soviet weapons personnel, and further leveraged US$21.5 million from its private sector partners for new project funding.[7]
  • Since its inception, the STCU has distributed over US$150 million in grants to over 1,000 projects.[8]
  • In 2005, the STCU approved approximately $13 million in new projects, leveraging about US$4.5 million from private sector partners.[9]

Specific STC projects have also achieved great success. For example, several ISTC-sponsored projects are helping to assist Belarusian victims of the Chernobyl disaster, which spread dangerous material throughout one quarter of Belarus' territory.[10] Researchers receiving STCU grants are working to improve knowledge of "bacteriophages," which may play a role in fighting drug-resistant strains of disease-causing bacteria.[11]

While the STCs have been largely successful in keeping the scientists in place at their former weapons institutes, and providing short-term financial means to survive, efforts to find sustainable commercial opportunities for the target population have confronted an array of potentially insurmountable structural hurdles to sustainability. In large measure, this is due to a decision at the point of program inception to funnel redirect funds through the STCs and into the erstwhile weapons institutes where scientists of proliferation concern could be engaged in largely benign activities. However, since these institutes are still closed to outsiders, the resulting inaccessibility of many of the ISTC-funded scientists has given rise to suspicions within the donor community, and particularly within the US Congress, that funds are being diverted for weapons-related purposes rather than in service of the nonproliferation mission.

In most instances, the ultimate purpose of funded scientific activities within the institutes remains ill-defined, and their output is seldom if ever valued by paying customers. It is even rarer that it leads to sustained employment. Most scientists thus far engaged by the STCs require additional grants in order to remain employed by their host institutes. Once donor country investments to the STCs cease-as they inevitably will-the brain drain threat from the region is likely to resurge. Unfortunately, as currently configured, the Centers lack the clarity of ownership and purpose necessary to accomplish their goal of long-term commercial redirection, which requires a customer-oriented, efficiently managed operation that neither the STCs nor the institutes that continue to house the scientists were designed to provide.

For information on the activities, research and funding processes of the International Science and Technology Center, please visit its website: http://www.istc.ru/. For information on the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, please visit its website: http://www.stcu.int/. For information about US organizations involved in the STCs as well as other Cooperative Nonproliferation Programs, please see "The Business of CNP."

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Obstacles

  • Many, if not all, of the weapons specialists involved in STC programming are inaccessible to the foreign governments that are, essentially, paying their wages. Because the specialists remain in their erstwhile weapons institutes, host governments are often unwilling to grant full access to donor government monitors or interested industry partners.
  • No systematic effort has been made to address the next generation of post-Soviet scientists in the region who may possess potentially dangerous capabilities, who are not engaged in global research networks, and who therefore may have the motivation and lack of transparency to proliferate.
  • While the private sector has been engaged with the Partners program, most companies are not seen as potential employers. For the redirection to be sustainable, these Partners must be able to hire the former weapons scientists.
  • Most scientists thus far engaged by the STCs require additional grants in order to remain employed by their host institutes. Once donor country investments to the STCs cease-as they inevitably will-the brain drain threat from the region is likely to resurge.
  • In 2005, over 48 percent of the scientists that received grants from the ISTC were redirected for fifty days or less.[12] Such temporary work does not go far toward achieving redirection goals.

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Q & A

 

Q: Which FSU countries participate in the Science Centers program?

A: Both the Science Centers have seen a steady increase in participation since their inception. Today, FSU countries involved with the ISTC include the Russian Federation, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan. The STCU works with weapons specialists from Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Uzbekistan.

Q: Have any well-known American companies participated in the STCs?

A: The STCs are open to collaborators of all sizes, and many American companies have greatly contributed to scientist redirection. Boeing, Dow Chemical, Lockheed Martin, and Proctor & Gamble have all served as both collaborators and Partners with the ISTC.[13]

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Quick Facts

 

  • The STCs also provide patenting support to FSU institutes in need of assistance.
  • Estimates of the Soviet nuclear workforce ranged from 50,000 to 60,000, the biological workforce at around 65,000, and the chemical workforce around 6,000 specialists, for a total of between roughly 120,000 and 130,000 WMD specialists. However, other research, which takes into account the workforce in Russia's closed nuclear cities, puts the number at closer to 150,000. Most of those individuals needed new work and competitive pay after the Soviet Union crumbled.
  • Working for almost fifteen years, the ISTC has provided grants for over 58,000 weapons specialists, scientists, and technicians.
  • Since its inception, the ISTC has distributed over US$200 million to prevent the proliferation of weapons expertise.
  • Since its inception, the STCU has distributed over US$150 million in grants to over 1,000 projects.[14]
  • In 2005 alone, the ISTC paid out US$43.9 million worth of grants to 24,984 former Soviet weapons personnel, and further leveraged US$21.5 million from its private sector partners for new project funding.[15]
  • In 2005, the STCU approved approximately $13 million in new projects, leveraging about US$4.5 million from private sector partners.[16]
  • Institutions in 54 countries outside the CIS have had some form of involvement with the ISTC since its founding.[17]

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Recent Legislation

 

  • N/A

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Applicable Treaties and Other International Agreements

 

 

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Talking Points

 

  • A new generation of scientists with modern scientific and technological expertise is looking for jobs in the former Soviet states. Failing to recognize and address this potential new threat could potentially be catastrophic for US national security interests.
  • Funneling funding through the STCs into the erstwhile weapons institutes prevents these institutes from shutting down or consolidating, which also delays the downsizing of the former Soviet weapons complex.
  • Industry participation in collaborative efforts funded by the International Science and Technology Center leads to excessive scrutiny by Russia's Federal Security Service due to their concern that the ISTC's non-profit, (i.e. tax free) status is being used by industry to circumvent legitimate taxation.

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Recommendations

  • A National Security Council designee should spearhead an interagency process to reassess the global role of Cooperative Nonproliferation (CNP) efforts in today's context. One of the main objectives of this reassessment should be to produce a detailed and timely analysis, including an "exit strategy" for US assistance where appropriate. The role and sustainability of scientist redirect programs should be an important component in this analysis. [See Book Recommendation #1]
  • The US Government, after conducting its own reassessment, should press other "donor" states, including those involved in the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to find ways to leverage nonproliferation funding to achieve other foreign policy goals. For instance, redirected bioweapons scientists can use their expertise to help develop vaccines for infectious diseases. [See Book Recommendation #3]
  • Not only should the radically changed economic situation provide the context for a fresh look at US Government projects with Russia, but the analysis should include concrete measures for leveraging recent US-Russian agreements and begin the transition from patronage to partnership. Russia could consider following Ukraine's lead by providing funding for ISTC grants. [See Book Recommendation #5]
  • Create a bicameral congressional task force whose objective is to regularly provide briefings from a broad array of the actors involved in actual implementation of CNP initiatives such as those involved in the State Department's redirect initiatives. Congress members often fail to grasp the importance of scientist redirect programs, and State officials should have a better opportunity to present the case for brain drain proliferation prevention. [See Book Recommendation #7]
  • Channel STC projects to meet the needs of other government programs. Biological weapons scientists, for example, can use their expertise to help fight infectious diseases. Nuclear scientists can help create new safeguards equipment to aid cooperative nonproliferation programs. By coordinating programs to redirect scientists with internal US Government programs to achieve specific technological advances needed to solve our own energy, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, intelligence and other needs, the US could better achieve its existing nonproliferation goals with respect to brain drain while exploring potential technological solutions to existing security concerns at lower cost. [See Book Recommendation #8]
  • Bridge the gap between current program funding for everything up to prototype development and actual commercialization of the technology by creating an international version of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program available to collaborative efforts between industry partners and FSU scientists. [See Book Recommendation #8]
  • Provide incentives for collaborative efforts between businesses and FSU weapons expertise to meet the "market pull" of US Government efforts and joint US-Russia initiatives. [See Book Recommendation #18]
  • Engage the G8 business communities and the FSU target community in a rigorous informational exchange regarding the types of expertise available and potential advantages of employing the target community. [See Book Recommendation #24]

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Endnotes

[1] Amy E. Smithson, Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complex, (Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999), accessed at: http://www.stimson.org/cbw/pdf/toxicarch.pdf.

[2] Ken Alibek, Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999): 270-279.

[3] US Department of State, "Request by Appropriation Account: Bilateral Economic Assistance - Department of State (part 2)," FY 2007 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, accessed at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60647.pdf.

[4] International Science and Technology Center, "Your Questions on ISTC Answered," accessed at: http://partners.istc.ru/eng/about-us/faq/.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] International Science and Technology Center, Annual Report 2005, accessed at: http://www.istc.ru/ISTC/sc.nsf/html/annual-report.htm.

[8] Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, "Science and Technology Center in Ukraine," accessed at: http://www.stcu.int/.

[9] Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, Annual Report 2005, accessed at: http://www.stcu.int/documents/stcu_inf/reports/annual/2005/2005_Annual_Report_(EN).pdf.

[10] International Science and Technology Center, "International Researchers United in Assisting Radiation Victims," accessed at: http://www.istc.ru/istc/sc.nsf/stories/chernobyl.htm.

[11] Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, "Success Stories: Bacteriophages against Antibiotic Resistant Infections," accessed at: http://www.stcu.int/news/SuccessStories/index.php?id=13.

[12] International Science and Technology Center, Annual Report 2005, op. cit., note 7.

[13] International Science and Technology Center, "Partners: United States," accessed at: http://partners.istc.ru/eng/solutions/partners/us/.

[14] Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, "Science and Technology Center in Ukraine," op. cit., note 8.

[15] International Science and Technology Center, Annual Report 2005, op. cit., note 7.

[16] Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, Annual Report 2005, op. cit., note 9.

[17] ISTC, "Non-CIS Institutions by Location," accessed at: http://www.istc.ru/ISTC/sc.nsf/html/institutions-non-cis-by-location.htm.

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Last Updated on May 30, 2007