Key Element: Abstaining from Flight Testing and Deploying Space Weapons

The flight testing and deployment of space weapons by the United States would surely prompt low-cost, low-tech countermeasures in the form of space mines and other anti-satellite (ASAT) devices, just as the flight testing and deployment of space weapons by other countries would surely prompt a vigorous response by the United States.  A situation in which satellites orbiting the earth are interspersed with objects designed to destroy or disable them is inherently destabilizing, given the vulnerability of satellites and the ease with which they could be harmed.  Potential adversaries in space would be faced with the dilemma of shooting first or risking the loss of critical satellites. 

While asymmetric warfare can be carried out in space, it is more easily and effectively waged on the ground. And unlike the superpower competition in the Cold War, when space warfare had the potential to alter the terms and outcomes of conflict, space warfare initiated by a weaker foe will not alter the outcome of a conflict with the United States.

A Space "Pearl Harbor" cannot be automatically dismissed. But a military readiness response in the form of space weapons would do far more harm than good. A surprise attack in space is far less likely than a surprise attack against soft targets here on earth and would subsequently generate a response no less resolute than previous surprise attacks in December 1941 and September 2001. Furthermore, such a response would be carried out most effectively here on earth, and not in the Heavens. Nonetheless, to further clarify the penalties to others for the first use of space weapons, the United States would be wise to adopt a hedging strategy that includes research and development – but not the flight testing and deployment – of space weapons.

Other nations are similarly also engaged in research and development programs relating to space warfare.  There is no compelling need, however, to engage in the flight testing and deployment of dedicated space weapons, in part because the United States and many other nations already possess military capabilities designed for other missions that could, in extreme circumstances, serve as a response to the first use of space weapons by another state.  Such "residual" space warfare capabilities have paradoxically served as a brake against the flight testing and deployment of space weapons in the past.

The weaponization of space is not inevitable.  If it were, this would have occurred during the Cold War.  Rather than to engage in such a competition now, a far wiser course would be to strengthen efforts to promote space assurance.