Improving Prospects for Space Diplomacy

Those who still seek an ambitious military space diplomacy initiative during the Obama administration would do well to dwell on New START.  President Obama, already tackling half a dozen outrageously hard problems, has to work overtime to convince two-thirds of the Senate to consent to ratify a modest but essential treaty. Senate Republicans (including deficit hawks) have held him up for ransom, and Republican presidential hopefuls have been Palinized. Republican Senators will be more numerous after November 2^nd, and any Republican who claims to be worried that New START confines U.S. missile defense options would be apoplectic about a treaty banning weapons in space.

Moscow and Beijing can read these tea leaves, so will they continue to champion an unverifiable space treaty whose scope far exceeds the ABM Treaty? Here is the key provision of their proposed treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT):

“States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kind of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, and not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner; not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects; not to assist or encourage other states, groups of states or international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by the Treaty.”

The PPWT’s definition of “weapons in outer space” is “any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, specially produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal function of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in its air, as well as to eliminate population, components of biosphere critical to human existence or inflict damage to them”

As for the “use of force” or “threat of force,” the PPWT defines these as “any hostile actions against outer space objects including, inter alia, those aimed at their destruction, damage, temporarily or permanently injuring normal functioning, deliberate alteration of the parameters of their orbit, or the threat of these actions.  The PPTW makes no mention of ground-based ASATs.  Verification measures are not integral to the proposed treaty, but may be considered later in an additional protocol.

If Beijing and Russia stick to their guns, they would doom a rare opportunity to accomplish something modest but essential and doable. The Obama administration, unlike its predecessor, is willing to engage seriously on military space diplomacy. The necessity to do so is obvious: Major space-faring nations have experienced four wake-up calls in close succession between January 2007 and February 2009 -- a successful Chinese “hit-to-kill” ASAT test; another major debris-causing event, the break-up of a Russian missile body; a U.S. shoot down of a dying satellite, ostensibly for safety reasons; and a collision between a dead Russian and a functioning U.S. satellite. The need for rules of the road relating to debris mitigation – including ASAT tests -- and space traffic management, have never been clearer.  More ambitious approaches, such as a complete ban on ASAT testing or “weapons” in space, would be desirable, but are impractical and unverifiable.  (How would you deal with “shoot-to-miss” ASAT tests?)

The last Really Big Space Treaty -- unless you want to count the ABM Treaty, which banned the development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems or components -- was the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. To understand how the Kennedy administration wisely laid the groundwork for the OST by means of a UN General Assembly resolution, check out the inestimable Ray Garthoff’s article in the Winter 1980/1 issue of International Security, “Banning the Bomb in Outer Space.” 

The OST, which is known as the Magna Carta for space, codified some essential norms, but is greatly in need of updating. This is hard to do because Presidents always have higher treaty making (i.e., nuclear) priorities. As I have written here before, problems of scope, definition and verification related to military capabilities in space are damn-near intractable. And when, on those rare occasions when negotiations begin, somebody overreaches badly.  The last time the United States was ready to discuss ASATs, during the Carter administration, one of the Kremlin’s opening gambits was to define the space shuttle as an ASAT.

The European Union has an alternative to the PPWT.  It is placing the finishing touches on a Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations that would update the OST’s norms.  The previous draft of the EU’s Code of Conduct, released in December 2008, included the key principles of "the responsibility of States to take all the appropriate measures and cooperate in good faith to prevent harmful interference in outer space activities," and "the responsibility of States, in the conduct of scientific, commercial and military activities, to promote the peaceful exploration and use of outer space and take all the adequate measures to prevent outer space from becoming an area of conflict."

The EU Code of Conduct’s “general measures” include:

• “The Subscribing States will establish and implement national policies and procedures to minimise the possibility of accidents in space, collisions between space objects or any form of harmful interference with other States' right to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space”
• “The Subscribing States will, in conducting outer space activities: refrain from any intentional action which will or might bring about, directly or indirectly, the damage or destruction of outer space objects unless such action is conducted to reduce the creation of outer space debris and/or justified by imperative safety considerations”
• “Take appropriate steps to minimise the risk of collision”
• “When executing manoeuvres of space objects in outer space, for example to supply space stations, repair space objects, mitigate debris, or reposition space objects, the Subscribing States agree to take all reasonable measures to minimise the risks of collision”
• “The Subscribing States resolve to promote the development of guidelines for space operations within the appropriate fora for the purpose of protecting the safety of space operations and long term sustainability of outer space activities”

With respect to debris mitigation, the EU’s draft Code of Conduct calls on participating states to “refrain from intentional destruction of any on-orbit space object or other harmful activities which may generate long-lived space debris.”

After publishing its draft Code of Conduct in December 2008, EU officials went on the road to solicit comments from countries not directly involved in the drafting process.  A final version of the EU Code incorporating some of these inputs should be approved this fall.  Then what?

The EU Code needs to be “de-regionalized.” But how?  The Obama administration is likely to look kindly on the EU’s efforts, but if other major space-faring nations outside of Europe – especially India, Japan and Brazil – are not on board, Russia and China will have cover to remain holier than thou. The steps taken by key European capitals and Washington between the release of the EU’s final product and a UN General Assembly resolution will matter greatly. The challenge for Tokyo, New Delhi and Brasilia will be to step up to their responsibilities as major space-faring nations. The challenge for Beijing and Moscow is to agree to the essential rather than to insist on the impractical.