Irresponsible in Space
Michael Krepon and Michael Katz-Hyman
February 5, 2007
This editorial appeared in the February 5, 2007 issue of Defense News.
Beijing has done something very unwise and dangerous by smashing one of its satellites to smithereens. By now, the Chinese leadership has gotten a crash course about the lethal qualities of space debris. Chinese space watchers, like the rest of us, will be hard-pressed to know and track the extent to which they have made a mess of low-Earth orbit, nor how long it will take for this lethal, mutating debris cloud to burn up in the Earth’s atmosphere.
When satellites explode, the debris problem not only becomes geometrically greater, it also sets in motion a pinball effect, where the debris cloud shape-shifts and increases the potential for future collisions. For the duration of this process, one or more of the 300-plus satellites below the Chinese debris cloud, reflecting an investment of more than $100 billion, could become road kill. Chinese taikonauts, U.S. astronauts and the International Space Station will also be more endangered as a result of the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test.
All space operations produce some debris, but nothing remotely like the debris produced by smashing into a satellite. Our appreciation of this problem has grown alongside our understanding of climate change. Recent scientific reports suggest that some orbits are approaching criticality, where satellites might not be safe from debris hits. The U.S. space-tracking system currently follows approximately 10,000 potentially lethal pieces of debris. The Chinese test may increase this number by perhaps 10 percent or more. China is not the only country that has tested anti-satellite weapons. The Soviet Union has tested satellite-killing devices perhaps 20 times, half of which were considered successful. During the Cold War, the United States tested anti-satellite weapons 36 times. One of these tests, in 1985, blew up an aging meteorological satellite. Seventeen years later, the last piece of debris from this test burned up in the atmosphere. Debris from the Chinese ASAT test, which occurred at a higher altitude, will take longer to clear out.
Satellites save more lives every day than we can imagine — assisting soldiers in harm’s way, giving early warning to civilians in the path of an approaching hurricane, helping us to make emergency phone calls and guiding ambulances to those in need when every second counts. It’s hard to protect satellites, since the sensors that make them so valuable are also quite vulnerable to attack. So how can we best protect these vital national assets?
The Chinese test reminds us that satellite protection can become very difficult once weapons are introduced into space. ASATs that use kinetic energy are indiscriminate killers. The Pentagon learned this from the 1985 test, which is why it now favors using temporary and reversible effects, such as jammers and lasers, to mess up satellites that worry us. This would “solve” the space warfare debris problem — provided everybody else fights by our rules. Beijing has just indicated that it can play by different rules. Another means of asymmetric, indiscriminate warfare in space is to detonate a nuclear weapon. The United States learned this lesson in 1962, after an atmospheric test series damaged or destroyed all satellites orbiting the Earth.
At present, there are very few rules of the road relating to space. The Bush administration has adopted a muscular national space policy, and Air Force doctrine now calls for the ability to project power in, through and from space. At the same time, the administration has refused to talk about rules that could impinge upon the military uses of space, claiming that this constitutes a slippery slope to limiting U.S. freedom of action. Administration officials also have asserted that there is no military space problem that needs to be discussed.
This last argument seems particularly unsound after the Chinese test. Diplomacy certainly has its limits, and is no substitute for military preparedness, but complete freedom of action can turn space into a shooting gallery to every nation’s detriment. Avoiding diplomatic engagement usually makes tough problems much worse, and puts Washington, not Beijing, in the doghouse. Increasing the safety of vital satellites is a topic worthy of discussion. Space, like military activities here on Earth, needs a code of conduct to promote responsible activities and to clarify irresponsible ones.
President Nixon authorized then-Navy Secretary John Warner to negotiate a code of conduct governing U.S.-Soviet naval operations. President George Herbert Walker Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to a similar code for ground forces operating in close proximity. President George W. Bush has endorsed codes of conduct to counter nuclear and missile proliferation. Rules of the road also make good sense for space, especially ones that prohibit using satellites as target practice.
