The Bush Administration's Record on Proliferation and Arms Control
by Michael Krepon
The Bush administration has correctly defined the central security threat of our time as terrorism, especially terrorism that seeks to produce mass casualties and acquire deadly, indiscriminate weapons. How has the Bush administration fared in dealing with weapons of mass destruction?
Before assessing the administration’s balance sheet, let’s look at recorded facts. The administration has rejected efforts to negotiate improved monitoring arrangements integral to multilateral treaties governing non-proliferation and disarmament. It has opposed the extension of deeply intrusive monitoring arrangements for bilateral arms reduction with Russia. It has insisted that the barest limits on U.S. strategic forces remain in effect for the briefest possible moment, eight years from now, after which they would lapse. It has opposed the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It has reversed six decades of presidential leadership and rejected verification arrangements for the stoppage of fissile material production for weapons. It has opposed any constraints on the flight-testing and deployment of space weapons. It has reduced funding for cooperative threat reduction programs in Russia, where programming initiatives remain tied up in bureaucratic and legal red tape. It has been slow to extend these efforts outside the former Soviet Union.
On top of this, the Bush administration has fought a preventive war against Iraq to seize its weapons of mass destruction that have yet to be found and may not exist. Meanwhile, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs have proceeded apace, unimpeded by U.S. diplomacy or military options, which have shrunk greatly with the passage of time and as a consequence of the administration’s decision to focus on Iraq.
These facts are undeniable. This side of the Bush administration’s balance sheet weighs very heavily against America’s hopes for a safer world. Since the dawn of nuclear diplomacy, no U.S. President has compiled a more negative record, or done more to obstruct multilateral efforts to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction than George W. Bush.
On the other side of the ledger, the Bush administration has successfully launched the Proliferation Security Initiative. Libya has renounced attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. As a consequence, it was no longer possible for the Government of Pakistan to deny the existence of a nuclear supply network centered around A. Q. Khan. Khan has been sidelined, and at least parts of the network have been rolled up. How much of the network remain uncovered, how easily it could be replicated, and how many others in Pakistan were involved or aware of the network remain open questions. Thanks to U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan, al Qaeda cells, which continue to seek the deadliest, indiscriminate weapons, must now do so under more difficult circumstances. While willing recruits in the Islamic world have grown, their safe havens have shrunk. And Saddam and Sons will not be around to seek nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons – although a subsequent Iraqi government might well choose to do so in response to Iranian programs.
Credit must be given to the Bush administration for these successes, even though we cannot judge their long-term effects. After all, partial successes in this business are the rule; significant progress usually comes from concerted efforts over the long haul. Success over the long haul, however, requires that treaty regimes must be strengthened from within, and not just by appurtenances devised to compensate for their weaknesses. Here the Bush administration’s efforts have been seriously imbalanced.
Nor has the administration been able to argue persuasively that its successes have made America and the world safer from the three most consequential nuclear-related threats of our time: poorly safeguarded weapons and materials, and North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs. These paramount nuclear threats do not lend themselves very well to the coercive instruments in which the administration places the greatest faith.
The administration deserves harsh grades for not according these paramount threats a higher priority. Cooperative threat reduction programs designed to prevent the most dangerous weapons and materials from falling into the wrong hands now receive one thin dime for every dollar spent on missile defenses. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein was deemed to be a far more urgent matter than stopping the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. Since January 2003, when Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there have only been three short rounds consisting of 100 hours of multilateral talks designed to stop and reverse the North Korean nuclear program. Surely, this threat deserves a higher priority, but the Bush administration did not formulate and present concrete suggestions in this regard until June 2004 -- eighteen months after Pyongyang announced its intentions to resume reprocessing of Plutonium. U.S. negotiations with Tehran have yet to begin.
Perhaps a second Bush administration, like a second Reagan administration, would be able to make significant gains in reducing these paramount nuclear dangers. We don’t know, of course, if the President will be re-elected, and if so, whether senior officials in a second administration would revert to traditional U.S. policies that stress engagement, verification, and strengthening treaties from the inside as well as by coercive actions. We can, however, surmise that a second Bush administration will face tough challenges regaining diplomatic ground lost over the past four years. Military dominance has provided only limited returns and heavy losses on the non-proliferation and disarmament accounts. Having played the preventive war card in Iraq, and having saddled America’s armed forces with the task of occupying the country, the Bush administration is poorly positioned to address the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. Preemptive strikes remain an option, but in the absence of concerted diplomatic efforts to seek rollback through peaceful means, in which the administration has shown little interest thus far, this choice would further isolate Washington.
The unbalanced approach adopted by the Bush administration has not fostered the conditions necessary for the progressive reduction and elimination of the most deadly, indiscriminate weapons. The pursuit of greater U.S. military supremacy only builds confidence in those pursuing it, but not where that dominance might someday be applied. As a consequence China and Russia are hedging their bets, and without their active support, the toughest proliferation cases will get tougher. If Beijing and Moscow perceive that the pursuit of even greater U.S. dominance is designed to negate their deterrents, they will take compensating measures. They will also confine their cooperation with U.S. efforts to stem, reverse, and eliminate deadly weapons to very narrow definitions of national interest.
Weak states that worry about U.S. power projection capabilities, like Libya, might cash in their chips. But Libya is not exactly a role model for the international community. More likely, states that seek the deadliest, indiscriminate weapons for reasons that may or may not have to do with the United States will continue to do so. Options will remain open, while surreptitious advances will continue. And in the absence of concerted efforts to strengthen treaties from within, external “fixes” will be compensatory, and not systemic. The net effect of denigrating treaties while seeking to compensate for their weaknesses through coercive measures is likely to be weaker norms and weaker compliance.
Just as a “combined arms” approach increases the likelihood of success on the battlefield, a “combined efforts” approach is needed to strengthen treaty regimes designed to rid the world of the most deadly, indiscriminate weapons. The use of force is not widely applicable to proliferation threats, and the pursuit of unfettered dominance corrodes rather than builds international cooperation. The application of power projection may well be necessary, but it usually generates more terrorist threats than it foils. It also places heavy burdens on the U.S. armed forces and their loved ones. The more the strategic concept of dominance is actually demonstrated, the more it exhausts or alienates the countries waging, receiving, and observing its effects. A more balanced approach is needed, but is unlikely as long as the value of diplomacy, alliances, treaty regimes, and verification are denigrated.
This excerpt draws from an essay written by Michael Krepon for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission headed by Hans Blix. To download the complete essay and for more information on the activities of the WMDC see www.wmdcommission.org.
