Supplemental Appropriations: The Pentagon’s Ticket to
Unchecked Spending
By: David Glaudemans
March 27, 2008
The use of emergency supplemental appropriations to fund the
wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and
the “Global War on Terror” has significantly increased the defense budget,
allowing the Pentagon to spend beyond the nation’s means. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) and
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimate that Congress has appropriated
between $700 and $750 billion for the wars in Iraq,
Afghanistan
and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Of
this, $500 billion – or 70% - has been approved in supplemental and emergency
supplemental appropriations.
In past conflicts after a year or two the Defense Department
(DOD) has included the cost of the war in the base defense budget, forcing the
department to make spending tradeoffs and providing Congress with an
opportunity for deliberative oversight.
In Korea
the supplemental request was reduced from $32.8 billion in 1951 to $1.4 billion
in 1952. Similarly in Vietnam,
supplemental requests for military operations had fallen to zero by 1969. Yet, operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan
and the GWOT continue to be funded through supplemental and emergency
supplemental appropriations.
Moreover, the DOD has used these supplementals to purchase
equipment that is not directly related to the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan or the GWOT. That is, the military is not just using
supplemental appropriations to replace equipment damaged or worn-out in ongoing
military operations, they are in fact seeking to replenish and modernize the
force structure and major weapons platforms through supplemental
appropriations. Between 2006 and 2008 for
example, the DOD sought $33.6 billion in supplemental appropriations to replace
and replenish major weapons platforms such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter,
CH-47 Chinook Helicopter and C-130J transport aircraft. By doing so, the DOD has circumvented the
strategic planning architecture that determines the military’s force and
hardware requirements.
This procurement strategy and the extensive use of
supplementals to fund the military have several real consequences. First, because supplemental appropriations
are requested and funded outside the normal budget process, Congress is less
able to conduct rigorous oversight and evaluation of the request. The normal budget process is a continuum of
hearings, negotiations, and deliberative debate in Congress. Yet supplementals are often whisked through
Committee without the extensive ‘scrubbing’ process that is Congress’ prerogative.
Second, supplemental appropriations have allowed the
Pentagon to avoid trade-offs. Normally
the DOD would have to decide if it could afford to buy additional F/A-18E/F ($93.9
million per unit) aircraft for the Navy or move on to the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter ($121.9 million per unit).
Instead, the Pentagon has the room to purchase both, using the
supplemental appropriations. In a time
when our nations’ resources are scarce, the DOD has been able to avoid
difficult choices and the defense budget as grown to over $600 billion
annually.
Finally, the Pentagon’s use of supplemental funds has served
to hide the true size of the defense budget.
This year, the DOD submitted a $515.4 billion request for FY09. Yet, this figure does not include the $70 billion
requested for the GWOT, nor the additional $100 billion likely to be needed
beyond that, as the testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England
made clear. With these figures included,
the Defense Department is requesting $685.4 billion for FY09; more than double
the FY01 Defense budget.
All three current Presidential candidates have pledged to
increase the size of the military and, by implication, the defense budget. Regardless of the merits of that policy, the
next administration will face a budget process that has spiraled out of
control. Congress must take action to
reassert its appropriations and oversight responsibilities by ensuring that
funds appropriated in a supplemental are only for genuine unforeseen
emergencies. Congress can also limit
supplemental appropriations to fund only that equipment that was damaged or
destroyed as a result of ongoing operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan
and the GWOT. Building the military
through supplemental appropriations avoids the strategic planning of the
regular appropriations process, leading to inefficient use of increasingly
scarce resources.
photo credit: http://flickr.com/photos/heygirl/1013894632/
David Glaudemans is a Research Associate with the Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense project at the Henry L. Stimson Center.
