Plutonium Disposition

The Issue | Obstacles | Q & A | Quick Facts |Legislation | Agreements | Talking Points | Recommendations

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The Issue

The United States and Russia possess a combined total of 154 tons of active military plutonium, which is over 90 percent of the world's supply.[1] This plutonium could be used to manufacture approximately 35,000 nuclear warheads. This does not account for the 102.5 metric tons which both countries have declared excess to their military stocks, which could produce an additional 25,000 weapons. Proliferation of even a modest amount of this material could provide a rogue state, or possibly a technologically sophisticated terrorist organization with the material to make a deadly nuclear weapon. For instance, four kilograms, which is approximately the size of a baseball, could produce a weapon as strong as the one that destroyed Hiroshima.[2]

Estimated Military Stocks of Plutonium, 2005[3]

Country

Plutonium (metric tons)a

Percentage of World Total

Russiab 145 56.3
United Statesb 99.5 38.6
France 5 1.9
China 4.8 1.8
United Kingdom 3.2 1.2
Israel 0.6 .2
India 0.4 .16
Pakistan  0.04 .015
North Korea 0.015 - 0.04 .005-.015

a These numbers, where official declarations of plutonium stocks have not been furnished, reflect estimates of current stocks. Accuracy is within 10-25% of figures presented.

b Some estimates put the Russian figure as high as 160 metric tons. Figures include the amounts the US and Russia have declared excess.

In September 2000, the United States and Russia each agreed to transform 34 metric tons of their excess military plutonium (approximately 28 percent of their combined stockpiles at the time) into a proliferation-resistant form over the course of 20 years.[4] Even if/when that agreement is fully implemented, the two countries will still possess enormous, unnecessary quantities of military plutonium-not to mention their large stocks of civilian plutonium that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, very little progress has been made in carrying out the agreement to eliminate the first 68 metric tons.

Russia originally intended to irradiate all 34 metric tons of the plutonium that it agreed to dispose of by burning it as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in light-water reactors, as long as international donors provide the estimated $2.7 billion to build the MOX infrastructure.[5] Mixed-oxide fuel is a combination of uranium dioxide (using depleted uranium, which has an extremely low concentration of the Uranium-235 isotope that is crucial for nuclear weapons) and plutonium dioxide.[6] Recently, however, Russia has been hesitant about using the MOX option, which it argues is inefficient. It also does not have enough power reactors in which MOX could be used.[7] Thus, it has stated that it is unwilling to move forward on the MOX option without full funding from the international community.[8] Instead, Russia has been pushing to burn some of the plutonium in its existing fast neutron reactors.[9] For this, it would provide substantial funding from its own coffers. But, using plutonium in fast reactors has raised some concerns about Russia developing a "plutonium economy" in its power industry--it will slowly destroy weapons-grade stocks, but at the same time depend on it to feed its power reactors.[10] Under the 2000 agreement, the United States planned to dispose of 25.5 of its 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium using the MOX option. The remainder is to be immobilized by combining it with highly radioactive waste and burying it deep underground. In early 2002, due to steep increases in the projected cost of underground disposal, the US announced that it would cancel the immobilization program and concentrate solely on the MOX option.

In both countries, the plutonium disposition programs are at early stages. Start-up costs of plutonium disposition are extremely high, as neither Russia nor the United States has industrial-scale MOX fuel production facilities. The Russian program is currently estimated to cost $2.7 billion, and the US program, $4 billion.[11] Several countries in the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction have pledged to contribute to Russia's disposition program, including Canada, the EU, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.[12] Also, following on the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, signed by Presidents Bush and Putin at the May 2002 Moscow Summit, a joint experts group began working out proposals on near- and long-term bilateral and multilateral means to reduce inventories of plutonium, as well as highly enriched uranium.[13]

In addition to remaining financial uncertainties about the Russian program, other implementation issues, including liability, verification, monitoring, and licensing, have greatly impeded the program's progress. Foremost among these issues was the liability dispute between the US and Russia. The US-Russian agreement governing the disposition program14] does not include a provision governing the liability of the US Government and its employees and contractors for a mishap during the conduct of the program in Russia. In 2003, the five-year liability provision governing plutonium disposition, which was included in a separate US-Russian plutonium deal, was allowed to lapse after the US called for blanket liability coverage.[15] The two governments were able to negotiate an agreement on liability after the US scaled back its demands in 2005, but that agreement was not signed until 15 September 2006.[16] Given these challenges, the plutonium disposal would likely not start until 2011 or 2012, several years past the target date of 2007.[17]

Debating the MOX option

There remains considerable debate over whether it is safer and more economical to dispose of the excess military plutonium using the MOX option immobilizing it, or using another disposal method. In the words of the Nuclear Control Institute, which opposes the MOX option, "Immobilization is far less costly than the MOX approach, could be started and completed more rapidly, and poses far fewer security, health and environmental risks."[18] The MOX method has considerable challenges to overcome before it can be implemented. First, it is expensive. It requires conversions of the fuel into mixed-oxide and time-consuming and costly modifications of the reactors which do the processing.[19] While initial estimates for the MOX program put its total cost between $5.8 and $6.5 billion, some experts predict it to rise to more than $10 billion.[20] Second, proliferation challenges still remain as MOX produces 2/3 as much plutonium as it burns (i.e., it could burn 500kg per fuel cycle and there would still be 333kg of plutonium left); the concern is that the residual plutonium could be extracted and used to make a nuclear device.[21]

While the MOX option was initially favored because it was thought that MOX would make plutonium unusable in nuclear weapons, reports have shown that spent MOX fuel does contain plutonium that can, with sophisticated technology, be separated and used in nuclear weapons.[22] According to the Congressional Research Service, some MOX critics argue that using it sets a dangerous precedent for other countries. "From this point of view, nations that do not possess nuclear weapons could use a plutonium-based power fuel cycle as a cover for developing nuclear weapons."[23] In addition to the MOX and immobilization options, there are other disposition technologies under consideration, including the aforementioned use in fast neutron reactors and the thorium cycle.[24]

In the fast-neutron reactors, spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed to collect all of the transuranic elements (i.e., plutonium, americium, etc.) and uranium, removing the "ash" from the initial fission reaction. This material is then used in a reactor moderated by a liquid metal instead of water, resulting in greater reaction efficiency. The advantage of this process is that it can be used to reduce the stocks of weapons-grade plutonium significantly as the reaction product is too impure for weapons use.[25] But, the fast-neutron reactor also has the potential to be run in a manner which would allow it to produce plutonium. Consequently, there is some concern regarding its potential for proliferation purposes. The thorium cycle, a new technology emanating from research in Russia, involves the mixing of plutonium with the element thorium to create fuel. When this fuel is used in the reactor, it creates a burn rate of 80% (as compared with the 33% of MOX) meaning that in a 700kg fuel cycle, it would eliminate as much as 560kg of the plutonium. The remaining 20%, unlike with MOX, cannot be reprocessed. It also has the added advantage of not requiring significant modification to existing plants and permitting more fuel to be reprocessed per reactor per fuel cycle.[26]

The Department of Energy, which implements the Plutonium Disposition program through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), has run up against other significant obstacles. Many in the US Congress, especially those of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, are deeply suspicious about the value of the program.[27] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 calls for the Secretary of Energy to submit a report that details US assistance for Russia's plutonium disposition. The Act also freezes US funding for the construction of a MOX fabrication facility in Aiken, South Carolina (known as the Savannah River Site) until the Secretary of Energy submits a cost estimate for the US disposition program, written certification that the US will use MOX regardless of Russia's disposition method, and a "corrective action plan" to address the numerous concerns raised regarding the US program.

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Obstacles

  • Russia continues to hedge against the MOX option, demanding full international funding. While the government has not decided on the process it wants to use to dispose of the plutonium, several reports suggest that Russia favors the fast reactor approach.[28]
  • Hundreds of metric tons of "civilian plutonium," both separated and un-separated, are part of the global nuclear power industry.[29] Even if all the military plutonium is eliminated, these civilian stocks will remain proliferation risks.
  • Several members of Congress continue to be skeptical of the plutonium disposition program. They worry that the MOX option is too expensive, the program is inefficient, and that the Russians will abandon MOX, making US funding for a Russian MOX facility worthless.

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Q & A

 

Q: Is it technically possible to dispose of excess military plutonium? If so, how much will it cost?
A: Considerable work still needs to be done to develop the means to dispose of the huge plutonium stockpiles in the US and Russia. This effort will cost billions of dollars, but this is a small investment compared to the damage that even a small amount of loose plutonium converted into a nuclear weapon could do.

Q: Is there really a risk of this material proliferating out of Russia?
A: Yes. Fifteen years have passed since the United States and Russia began working to reduce the threat posed by potentially loose Russian nuclear weapons and materials, and only 49% of Russian fissile material is in sites that have received some form of a security upgrade.[30] A February 2002 CIA report on the Russian nuclear weapons complex stated that "undetected smuggling has occurred."[31]

Q: Wouldn't it be difficult to use plutonium to make a bomb?
A: While it would be much more difficult to use plutonium to create a nuclear bomb than highly enriched uranium, the technical expertise for turning plutonium into a nuclear weapon is widely available, in particular from now under-employed scientists who previously worked in the Soviet nuclear weapons program. Barring its creation into an actual bomb, there is also a threat from much less quantities of material being use in a radiological weapon, i.e., a "dirty bomb."

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Quick Facts

 

  • Four kilograms of plutonium, which is about the size of a baseball, could be turned into a bomb about as powerful as the one that destroyed Hiroshima.
  • Russia possesses the largest stockpile of military plutonium, 56% of the world's total. The US possesses 38%.
  • Russia's approximately 145 metric tons of plutonium (including its excess stocks) is enough to build over 35,000 warheads.
  • Plutonium-239 has a half-life of 24,100, meaning that immobilization options need to be designed to withstand at least that much time.[32]

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Recent Legislation

  • The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364) This bill freezes funding for the US MOX fabrication facility and calls for the Secretary of Energy to provide Congress with information on US and Russian disposition plans.
  • The Omnibus Nonproliferation and Anti-Nuclear Terrorism Act of 2005 (H.R. 665) This bill, which was not enacted, made a Congressional finding that, as a result of the linking the US and Russian plutonium disposition programs, both programs have suffered significant delays.

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Applicable Treaties and Other International Agreements

 

  • Joint Statement on the U.S.-Russian Excess Weapon-grade Plutonium Disposition Program, 13 July 2006[33] This declaration reaffirmed the joint commitment of the United States and Russia to the September 2000 Agreement regarding the disposition of 34 metric tons of military plutonium into a proliferation-resistant form.
  • Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, 24 May 2002.[34] The Joint Declaration established broad guidelines for cooperation between the United States and Russia on a variety of issues of mutual strategic importance. The section on weapons of mass destruction creates a broad framework for cooperation. It reaffirms the efforts to reduce "weapons-usable fissile material." The agreement is not, however, specific regarding the means the program should use to accomplish that goal. Instead it calls for "joint experts groups to investigate means of increasing the amount of weapons-usable fissile material to be eliminated, and to recommend collaborative research and development efforts on advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies."
  • Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, September 2000.[35] In September 2000, the United States and Russia each agreed to transform 34 metric tons of excess military plutonium (approximately 29 percent of their combined stockpiles at the time) into a proliferation-resistant form over the course of 20 years. The Agreement provides for 3 methods to be used to accomplish its goal, irradiation, immobilization, or another mutually agreed upon means.
  • Joint Statement of Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin Concerning Management and Disposition of Weapon-Grade Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required For Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, 4 June 2000.[36] This statement outlines the broad points of agreement between Russia and the United States which form the basis of the later Agreement Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation.

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Talking Points

 

  • The United States and Russia combined 244.5 metric tons (269.5 tons (US)) of plutonium. That amounts to roughly 95% of the world's supply of plutonium and is enough to produce 59,000 nuclear warheads.
  • Russian plutonium, in particular, poses a significant proliferation risk due to the insecurity of the facilities in which it is stored. Moreover, nuclear weapons expertise is not in short supply.
  • Both the US and Russia have agreed to get rid of 34 tons of plutonium each. But, implementation of their agreement has been slow. With insecure facilities, and state and non-state interest in developing a nuclear capability, this is to the detriment of national and global security.
  • The Agreement has been delayed by debate over the technical means by which the effort is to be carried out. The US favors MOX and Russia favors alternative methods which would give it continued energy capabilities with limited infrastructure changes.
  • As of now it appears that 2011 will be the earliest date by which plutonium disposition activities will commence due to the infrastructure modifications and international disagreements.

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Recommendations

  • A National Security Council designee should spearhead an interagency process to reassess the global role of CNP efforts in today's context. Such a close examination of the entire suite of programs across all relevant government agencies should strive to eliminate duplication, consolidate where necessary, and fill any gaps within the existing efforts. One such gap is the slow rate of progress with the plutonium disposition program. [See Book Recommendation #1]
  • At the start of any program, the US agency involved should build consensus with the respective host country to ensure buy-in. The plutonium disposition program has been plagued by disputes of all kinds. From the liability conflict that froze the program for three years to the continued debate over the utility and cost-effectiveness of MOX fuel, the plutonium disposition program serves as a constant reminder of the need for consensus at the beginning of any project. [See Book Recommendation #6]
  • Create a bicameral congressional task force whose objective is to regularly provide briefings from a broad array of the actors involved in actual implementation of nonproliferation initiatives. If such a task force proves politically infeasible, Department of Energy (DoE) officials should at least be allowed to brief members of Congress, especially on controversial projects like the plutonium disposition program. Getting Congress and DoE on the same page will greatly improve project implementation. [See Book Recommendations #7 and #16]
  • Clarify in detail the roles and responsibilities of each agency between the negotiation of an agreement and the program's execution. The Russian plutonium disposition program was frozen for three years partially because of overlapping responsibilities and failed communication between the State Department and the Department of Energy. [See Book Recommendation #16]

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Endnotes

[1] The term "military plutonium" is used to differentiate plutonium devoted to military purposes from that used in nuclear power production, known as "civilian plutonium." The primary focus of this document is "military plutonium," though there is some discussion of "civilian plutonium."

[2] David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, "Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies," SIPRI (Oxford Press: 1997): 8, cited in Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, "A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Non-Proliferation Programs with Russia," (10 January 2001): iv, accessed at http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/rusrpt.pdf.

[3] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Fissile Materials of Special Concern: In-Country Stocks of Separated Plutonium and Total Stocks of HEU, ISIS Estimates," Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, 24 June 2005, accessed at: http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/summary_global_stocks.pdf.

[4] Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, September 2000, accessed at: http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/us_plut_dis.shtml.

[5] Sebastian Sprenger, "U.S., Russia Closing in on Deal to Extend Cooperative Threat Reduction," Inside the Pentagon, viewed in Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) Nuclear News 8 April 2006, accessed at: http://www.ransac.org/Publications/News/Nuclear%20News/47200624220PM.html#3F.

[6] Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Frequently Asked Questions About Mixed Oxide Fuel," (3 May 2006), accessed at: http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/mox/faq.html.

[7] Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2006: The New Global Imperatives (Washington: Nuclear Threat Initiative and Harvard University, July 2006): 39.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Sebastian Sprenger, "U.S., Russia Closing in on Deal to Extend Cooperative Threat Reduction," op. cit., note 5.

[10] Amy F. Woolf, "Arms Control And Nonproliferation Activities: A Catalog Of Recent Events," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, (Washington: CRS 19 January 2006).

[11] Sebastian Sprenger, "U.S., Russia Closing in on Deal to Extend Cooperative Threat Reduction,"

[12] Strengthening the Global Partnership, "Project Area: Plutonium Disposition," accessed at: http://www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/ProjectAreas/PU.html.

[13] "Joint Statement of Secretary Abraham and Minister Rumyantsev," 16 September 2002, accessed at:

http://moscow.usembassy.gov/bilateral/joint_statement.php?record_id=24.

[14] The Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, September 1, 2000.

[15] Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (Washington: Nuclear Threat Initiative and Harvard University, May 2005): 71.

[16] Sean McCormack, Spokesman, "Signing of US-Russian Plutonium Disposition Liability Protocol," US Department of State 15 September 2006, accessed at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/72291.htm.

[17] Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005..., op. cit., note 16.

[18] For arguments in favor of immobilization, see Nuclear Control Institute, "Plutonium Disposal," accessed at: http://www.nci.org/nci-wpu.htm.

[19] Adolfo Reparaz, Paul Rogers, "Between MOX and a hard place," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 5 (September 2003): 46-51.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Charles Digges, "Thorium-Based Fuel May Play Role in Plutonium Disposition," Bellona (8 May 2003), accessed at: http://www.bellona.org/english_import_area/international/russia/nuke-weapons/nonproliferation/29510.

[23] Amy F. Woolf, "Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington: CRS, 26 June 2006): 40.

[24] For more information on the thorium cycle option, see Thorium Power's website: http://www.thoriumpower.com/.

[25] William Hannum, et. al. "Smarter Use of Nuclear Waste," Scientific American 293, no. 6 (December 2005), pp 84-91.

[26] Adolfo Reparaz, Paul Rogers, "Between MOX and a hard place," op. cit., note 8.

[27] Amy Woolf, "Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance. . .," op. cit., note 24.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Nuclear Control Institute, "The Plutonium Threat," accessed at: http://www.nci.org/new/nci-plu.htm.

[30] Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2006, (Washington: Nuclear Threat Initiative and Harvard University, July 2006): 48.

[31] Central Intelligence Agency, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces, February 2002, accessed at: http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/icarussiansecurity.htm.

[32] Environmental Protection Agency, "Plutonium," 6 October 2006, accessed at: http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/plutonium.htm.

[33] Department of Energy, "Joint Statement on the U.S. - Russian Excess Weapon-grade Plutonium Disposition Program," 13 July 2006, accessed at: http://www.doe.gov/news/3837.htm.

[34] White House Office of the Press Secretary, "The President's Trip to Europe and Russia," 24 May 2002, accessed at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-2.html.

[35] Agreement..., op. cit., note 4.

[36] White House Office of the Press Secretary, "The President's Trip to Europe: Portugal, Russia, Germany, Ukraine," 4 June 2000, accessed at: http://clinton3.nara.gov/WH/New/Europe-0005/factsheets/js--weapon-grade-plutonium.html.

[37]Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Management of Plutonium that Has Been Withdrawn from Nuclear Military Programs, July 20, 1998, accessed at: http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/plutdisp/98Ag.htm.

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Last Updated on May 30, 2007