



THE HENRY L.  
STIMSON CENTER

# NEW ANGLES ON IRAQ

Views of the Stimson Center's Experts

October 22, 2002

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Dear Colleague:

I am pleased to present a collection of short essays on various aspects of the Iraq policy challenge prepared by the Stimson Center's experts. We have drawn on the Stimson Center's distinct areas of expertise in managing threats from weapons of mass destruction and in Asian regional security to pull together some new ideas and perspectives on the Iraq policy debate.

We hope you will find here some angles that have not been fully explored. We welcome your thoughts—please feel free to communicate directly with the authors or with me. We can be reached at 202-223-5956.

Thank you and best regards,

Ellen Laipson  
President and CEO

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- Ellen Laipson

## **A Tale of Two Speeches: What Bush Didn't Say about Iraq at the United Nations**

*Victoria Holt*

President Bush's September address to the United Nations on Iraq is striking in contrast to his UN address on Afghanistan a year ago.

In November 2001, President George W. Bush went to the United Nations in support of the U.S.-led effort against a repressive regime in Afghanistan. He used the speech as a vehicle to speak broadly to the collected international leaders, as well as the publics at large. The United States had initiated military action, backed by the Security Council, and President Bush made the case for further efforts against the Taliban-led regime. As important, the President also laid out the concept of the next campaign—for reconstruction and governance of an Afghanistan rid of terrorist forces. The President detailed U.S. humanitarian efforts underway for the Afghan people (e.g., food and medicine), signaled that more aid was needed, and made it clear that a post-Taliban Afghanistan would be built with U.S. and international support:

“I can promise, too, that America will join the world in helping the people of Afghanistan rebuild their country... The United States will work closely with the United Nations and development banks to reconstruct Afghanistan after hostilities there have ceased and the Taliban are no longer in control. And the United States will work with the UN to support a post-Taliban government that represents all of the Afghan people.”<sup>1</sup>

The President's direct and forceful speech helped cement support for the U.S.-led military action and launch the effort to rebuild Afghanistan.

What a difference a year makes. Where Bush's call to action was greeted by sympathy and support two months after attacks on U.S. soil, the Administration now finds an international community reluctant to back forceful action against the Iraqi regime led by Saddam Hussein.

To build support, President Bush returned to the United Nations on September 12, challenging its members to recognize Iraq's defiance of UN resolutions and to urge Iraq to take action in five major areas. Specifically, President Bush called on Iraq to:

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<sup>1</sup> President George W. Bush. Remarks by the President to the UN General Assembly, 10 November 2001. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html>.

- Forswear, disclose, remove, and destroy all weapons of mass destruction;
- End support for terrorism;
- Cease persecution of civilians;
- Release or account for all Gulf War personnel, account for stolen property, recognize liability for losses, and cooperate with resolving these issues; and
- End illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program.

The President was clear about these requirements for the Iraqi regime. He told UN members to recognize that Iraq flouted its resolutions and not to stand for that defiance. He put forth a vision that change by Iraq is required—whether voluntarily or by force. And he asked nations to press for such change and to support action led by the United States.

The President's primary arguments echoed those against the Taliban and Al Qaeda: support for terrorism and harboring terrorists; lack of support for human rights and oppressive persecution of its own people; and the active desire to secure weapons of mass destruction and the threat of using them. In Afghanistan, the drug trade posed an added threat; in Iraq, unreturned personnel and property from the Gulf War are at issue. Both nations also faced UN sanctions.

In contrast to his speech on Afghanistan, however, President Bush's address on Iraq is striking in what the President did *not* say: what happens next if change in Iraq is initiated.

First, the President failed to say what the United States was actually offering the people of Iraq or the region. "The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people," Bush noted, simply asserting, "the United States supports political and economic liberty in a unified Iraq."

Second, the President did not ask the United Nations or the world leaders gathered there to help organize or provide assistance in crafting a strategy for Iraq if change occurred. The President merely suggested *if steps were taken by Iraq* to meet the five areas he laid down, *then* the UN *could* help in a broad sense: "If all these steps are taken, it will signal a new openness and accountability in Iraq. And it could open the prospect of the United Nations helping to build a government that represents all Iraqis—a government based on respect for human rights, economic liberty, and internationally supervised elections."

That's it. In other words, if Iraq changes on its own, the UN could help with the government. The President said nothing about what would happen after a potential use of force if Iraq doesn't voluntarily cooperate (and the Administration does not expect cooperation).

### *The Path Ahead*

Bush's lack of comment on the ramifications of forceful action against Iraq—and how such action squares with a more secure, stable, and potentially democratic Iraq—weakened his case with potential allies.

The United Nations and its members know intimately what is needed in post-conflict situations. That's the job. Daily, the UN addresses problems in former conflict zones trying to move to peace, running 15 peace operations, conducting over a dozen political missions, and running programs to demobilize militias, remove landmines, provide electoral assistance, negotiate agreements, set up anti-drug campaigns, provide relief, house refugees and internally displaced people, and rebuild communities, to name a few areas of expertise. That work is hard, success can be elusive, and the UN needs more support to assist its efforts.

In that context, Bush ignored a key concern of his audience. Failure to address what happens next implies that the United States wants the UN to support and authorize the use of force, but not to develop political, reconstruction, or humanitarian plans for Iraq. Yet in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration not only offered U.S. leadership and resources, it rightly recognized the connection between rooting out the terrorist threat and the development of a secure Afghanistan. The ramifications of military action were not ignored—they were key to winning the war. And the Administration recognized the vital role of international efforts and the United Nations in creating this success.

On October 7, in Ohio, President Bush again spoke on Iraq, this time acknowledging the post-conflict question. "If military action is necessary," he stated, "the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq, at peace with its neighbors." His remarks, however, still left important questions unanswered if force is used. For example:

- *Leadership.* Who will lead an effort to build a post-Saddam Iraq? Who will head negotiations within Iraq and its diaspora to determine and develop future governance? What will create a stable regime? Who would organize the next government and elections? In Afghanistan, the United Nations took a lead role in bringing together factions, establishing a government-building process, and launching the Bonn Process and Loya Jirga. What equivalent is needed here?
- *Security.* If force is used, would a U.S.-led force stay in theater, and what would be the scope of its effort? Would American forces play a role in providing security? Who else can and would provide troops to support security? Even in Afghanistan, security is shaky, and the U.S. has not supported expanding the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) outside of Kabul. Few nations wish to volunteer additional troops for such an

operation (including the United States) raising the question of who would provide troops for an Iraq security force.

- *Financial Resources.* Even with the oil wealth of Iraq, who will pay for immediate international relief and humanitarian efforts, as well as for governance and security? Would resources be shifted from other, on-going efforts to Iraq? Will donors pledge support? Even in Afghanistan, where the international community came in side-by-side with the United States to organize the immense relief, reconstruction, governance, and security effort, challenges remain and the work is far from done. As U.S. officials have pointed out, donors have been slow in delivering on their pledges.

These are not easy questions, but UN member states—and the American public—deserve to see them addressed. Europeans, skeptics of the U.S. approach on Iraq, together foot much funding for international development, more than a third of the budget for the United Nations, and most funding for ISAF in Afghanistan. They could fear that the United States would take only half-measures in a post-conflict situation, or expect the international community to do the clean up.

The United States, of course, could take the lead on both military action and the reconstruction of Iraq. If so, the American public is ill prepared for the costs militarily, politically and financially. U.S. foreign assistance budgets are flat, and funding for Iraq could well come at the expense of other efforts in less headline-heavy areas. The largest area of U.S. discretionary spending is for defense (funding is now 15 times larger than that of the State Department and foreign assistance programs), yet it is hard to imagine that the Department of Defense will do the heavy lifting, as well as electoral assistance, relief work, and reconstruction. Budgets for foreign assistance could increase instead, but with deficit spending, where will funding be found? Even with the billions in supplemental funding for Afghanistan, only \$40 million was added to existing AID funding for reconstruction there.

Further, international toolkits designed to deal with post-conflict scenarios need added resources and capabilities, especially for new situations. Long-overdue, recommended improvements to the United Nations, as outlined in 2000 with the *Brahimi Report*, are moving apace. Nevertheless, many nations have failed to contribute to on-call lists for civilian, military, and rule of law experts, which would facilitate organizing teams for a post-conflict Iraq. Electoral assistance continues to be primarily funded via trust funds, hindering access to resources. The United States supports these and other recommendations, but has not actively championed these simple improvements to deal with crises and failed states—which could be needed in Iraq.

Afghanistan, a model for international unity and collaboration, is still in transition and requires considerable international attention, funding, and troops. Before moving forward on Iraq, the United States should assess similar post-conflict scenarios, lay out options to

assist Iraqis toward a new government, and clarify who could provide assistance. In addition, the Administration should assess U.S. material, financial and military assets; engage the United Nations and its leadership further; evaluate the role of international financial institutions; consult with NGOs working in the region; and consider what troops and police are available should an international security force be needed.

In short, President Bush should speak again, laying out a vision for a post-conflict Iraq and addressing the need for international engagement. He could seize world attention by championing a strengthening of the UN's capabilities to deal with the Afghanistans and Iraqs of the future, pushing recommendations launched with the Brahimi Report to improve the UN and its members' capacity across the spectrum of conflict. Perhaps, too, he could reassure U.S. allies on Iraq by addressing the growing security gap in Afghanistan, which sends the worrisome message that the United States doesn't deal well with tenuous, post-conflict scenarios. That's not a message the U.S. can afford to send given the President's ambitions in Iraq and the region.

## **Iraq and Transatlantic Consequences**

*Elizabeth Turpen and Caroline Earle*

Today's transatlantic tension stands in stark contrast to the unequivocal solidarity witnessed in the immediate aftermath of September 11. While the Bush Administration uses potential terrorist threats to justify more aggressive foreign policy actions, Europeans remain divided and anxious about following the U.S. lead. The bold policy put forward on Iraq has and will continue to exacerbate longstanding fissures between the U.S. and its major European allies in the near term. Success in Iraq, as in the war against terrorism, however, will require coming to terms with different perceptions of the threats and finding consensus on the appropriate means to address them.

The question of NATO's relevance to U.S. objectives in Iraq highlights several major fault lines in the alliance. U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley recently defined Iraq as a "common threat" to NATO and suggested that the November Prague Summit "will be a place where NATO must speak about Iraq" and "show allied solidarity." But the United States will neither formally ask NATO for help in military operations against Iraq nor is solidarity in Prague probable.

The U.S. will opt for a coalition of the willing rather than NATO in taking military action against Iraq. NATO's engagement in Kosovo demonstrated to the U.S. that war by committee hinders efficient execution of military operations; it also underscored the substantial shortfalls in European military capabilities. As with Afghanistan, the balance sheet for Iraq would suggest that the U.S. has more to gain by fully flexing its military muscle outside the constraints of NATO. Although the Prague Summit is geared toward making the alliance more effective in a post 9/11 world, for the time being, NATO will not be the alliance of choice for preemptive war fighting and regime change decisions. In the foreseeable future, including Iraq, ad-hoc coalitions allow for the objectives and methods of military operations to be determined in Washington. Others can decide whether they wish to follow our lead or suffer reprisal for just saying "no." While a nod from NATO might be nice, it is certainly not essential.

Allied solidarity on Iraq is difficult for several reasons. Most European allies do not perceive Saddam Hussein as an immediate threat. Even the U.S.' staunchest ally, Great Britain, will not formally assent to regime change in Iraq as the objective. Although our European allies might be persuaded that coercive diplomacy is a reasonable approach to getting inspectors back into Iraq, they are more inclined to give a new, tougher inspections regime a chance to work. If this approach also fails, the Europeans will not agree to the use of force without a UN mandate. Lastly, the Europeans remain discomfited by the Administration's emphasis on preemption and the unanswered questions regarding post-conflict Iraq.

The yawning military capabilities gap is the most tangible fissure in the transatlantic alliance, yet it reflects directly the difference in security perceptions and corresponding spending priorities. The U.S. continues to insist that the Europeans prove their relevance through increased spending on military hardware. The Europeans, in turn, point to their substantial contributions to “soft” security issues such as humanitarian aid, development assistance, and peacekeeping. Yet in order to address the complex issues in Iraq and beyond, both sides need to move beyond fixation on what divides the alliance and recognize the need for an integrated approach, building on the strengths of both types of engagement. In Kosovo and Afghanistan, winning the peace has been just as important as the initial military success. Should force become necessary in Iraq, success will require capabilities across the full spectrum. Moreover, stability in post-conflict Iraq is not a burden that the U.S. or the European allies will be willing or able to shoulder alone.

As with Afghanistan, so with Iraq. Regardless of the method by which regime change occurs, the U.S. will need a mighty coalition of the willing to achieve post-conflict stability and better governance. As stated in the new National Security Strategy, “Effective coalition leadership requires clear priorities, an appreciation of others’ interests, and consistent consultations among partners with a spirit of humility... There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.” These passages illustrate that there are those in the Bush Administration who appreciate the importance of productive relations with the Allies.

Despite the call for effective engagement, recent U.S. policies reveal a mismatch with the stated goals of the National Security Strategy. Such inconsistent policy risks undermining the transatlantic relationship, and by extension, opportunities for success in Iraq. The Bush Administration posits the elimination weapons of mass destruction as justification for preemptive action, yet its clear preference in Iraq is regime change. Clarity on the actual priority, while not popular with the Europeans, would signal trust and respect. To build confidence and healthy partnerships, the Bush Administration would be well advised to exhibit the humility it has pledged to exercise, a “prove your relevance” approach endangers that objective. U.S. decisions regarding Iraq will have lasting consequences. The crisis over Iraq might be used as an opportunity to achieve consensus on the appropriate means to address mutual threats. If the current approach persists, however, deeper rifts will surely result, undermining the valuable partnerships the U.S. needs to face the strategic challenges of the future – in Iraq and in the war on terrorism.

## Iraq: The China Angle

*Alan D. Romberg*

China has attached great importance to seeking a political rather than a military solution to the Iraq issue and has stressed the essentiality of working through the United Nations. Having called on Iraq to comply with UN resolutions quickly, Beijing welcomed the early October “deal” with UNMOVIC on inspections. That said, China realizes that Iraq is of transcendent importance to President George W. Bush and desires to avoid a head-on confrontation. Thus, it has left open its position in the event of Iraqi non-compliance and has taken care not to say that it is unalterably opposed to the use of force.

China views management of the Iraq issue through several lenses. One is its traditional stance against interference—especially armed interference—in other countries’ internal affairs. This is both a matter of “principle” for the PRC but is also related closely to its firm opposition to others (read: the United States) interfering in China’s internal affairs.

Another lens is its opposition to U.S. unilateral actions to impose Washington’s view of world order, reflecting China’s concern that the U.S. not block China’s aspirations for a greater regional and world role. Opposing U.S. “hegemonism” also strengthens Beijing’s diplomacy and its claim to represent “third world” interests.

A third, and corollary, point is the importance China places on obtaining approval for any enforcement action from the United Nations. That not only highlights China’s role as a major player in the world, but it gives the PRC a measure of political leverage, whether demanding an explicit *quid pro quo* or not, reinforcing the importance of dealing seriously with China’s interests.

A fourth perspective, however, and one that is of special salience currently, is China’s need—and determination—to maintain constructive and productive relations with the United States. Smooth relations with Washington are vital not only to ensure unfettered access to the American market, but also to maintain the benign international security climate (and a benign view of China) that promotes the record-breaking levels of foreign direct investment in the PRC and allows a continued priority focus on economic growth.

The desire not to be on the “wrong side” of important issues in its relationship with the United States is apparent in a number of areas. Following a prolonged stand-off over Chinese non-implementation of a November 2000 bilateral agreement on steps to curb proliferation of dual-use material, equipment, and technology applicable to longer-range missiles, Beijing recently bit the bullet and went ahead to issue a new, sweeping set of export control regulations. Initial review of the regulations by non-government experts suggests that there are still some problems from the point of view of the standards applied

by members of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and especially the United States. That said, issuance of the regulations after months of unsuccessfully insisting that the United States first lift sanctions against use of PRC rockets to launch American satellites is certainly a major step forward and reflects in important part a PRC desire to ameliorate problems with Washington over what is, for the United States, a priority issue.

Even on the highly sensitive issue of Taiwan, Beijing has responded moderately to statements since July by Taiwan's leader, President Chen Shui-bian, that have widely been interpreted in the PRC as promoting step-by-step independence. Beijing has several good reasons not to pick a fight with Taipei at this moment unless absolutely forced to. But keeping relations with the United States on an even keel is certainly among the most important of those.

Back to Iraq, the most likely outcome in the short run will be a PRC abstention on any new UNSC resolution, including one that can be construed as sanctioning the use of force, if—*if*—it is not blocked by Russia (or France). (In the unlikely event that a resolution that comes to a vote is blocked, China will likely join the bandwagon.) One should not be surprised if Beijing criticizes U.S. behavior that it can reasonably characterize as violating international norms, hurting the Iraqi “people,” or angering other Arab nations. But over the longer run, not only will Beijing welcome the U.S. focusing on issues other than the “China threat,” which will give it some strategic breathing space, but the PRC's desire not to confront the United States will continue to shape its responses.

## **Iraq is a Hard Place: Tokyo Torn between Pacifism and Alliance**

*Benjamin L. Self*

Tokyo is painting itself into a corner on Iraq. By urging the United States to seek international consensus in the form of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force, Japan is inadvertently raising expectations that it will provide military support. Several factors render the political constraints against Japan's participation in any use of force insurmountable: the pacifist Constitution is foremost, but Japan's strategic interests in the Middle East seem incompatible with an attack on Iraq. Japan is heavily dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, and cultivates political ties in the region that are often at odds with the aims of the United States (especially vis-à-vis Iran). Furthermore, public opinion in Japan has shifted against the Bush Administration's apparent unilateralism, eroding the solidarity that emerged in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Despite the passage of legislation allowing logistic support for America's war on terrorism, and deep desire to fulfill its obligations as an ally, Japan will not be able to provide the same level of contribution to an attack on Iraq as it has to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

The biggest danger from this is not that Japan will disappoint Washington and cause some erosion in the Alliance, although that is a serious problem. Even more basic, however, is Tokyo's tendency to rely on obfuscation and ambiguity to try to please all parties. Maintaining fictions about the military has long been a bad habit in Japan; despite its public commitments to pacifist ideals, Tokyo has quietly built a strong defense capability. This is as it should be: as the world's second-largest economy and a major pillar of the community of democratic nations, Japan's military strength contributes greatly to regional and global stability. But the Constitution has limited the role of the military to individual self-defense—indeed, the services are known as the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, rather than as Army, Navy, and Air Force.

As a member of the United Nations, Japan possesses the right of collective self-defense, the basis of collective security under the United Nations framework. Yet the Cabinet Legislative Affairs Office (*Naikaku Hosenkyoku*) argues that the exercise of this right would be unconstitutional, based on the injunction in Article 9 that "Japan will never use force or the threat of force as a means to resolve international disputes." As a result, the U.S.-Japan Alliance is not reciprocal – the United States will defend Japan from attack, but Japan can never defend another country. Yet Japan's basic foreign policy demands close cooperation with and reliance on the United States. Prime Minister Koizumi will struggle mightily to do something to satisfy Washington. Having worked so hard to realize the contributions to the operation against al Qaeda and the Taliban, Tokyo certainly wants to maintain its image as a good ally. It is the United States, more than the Persian Gulf, that will be the prime consideration for Japanese decision makers.

At the same time, the wish to avoid provoking Arab nations and domestic pacifist/anti-American sentiment will create incentives to take a vague stance. At worst, this might mean offering tangible military support to the U.S. operation against Iraq in the guise of continued support for the operation in Afghanistan. Rather than debating the collective self-defense right and Japan's obligations to international peace and security, Tokyo might try to finesse the problem and thereby deepen the gap between rhetoric and reality. Before push comes to shove in Iraq, Japan must establish clear parameters for its participation in UN-authorized military action. And the Japanese must take up the burdens of determining when the use of force is legitimate, implementing UN mandates to use force when it is legitimate, and opposing the use of force when it is not legitimate.

## **Iraq: Ramifications for South Asia**

*Kishore Kuchibhotla, Christopher Clary, and Sandhya Gupta*

India and Pakistan both oppose American intervention in Iraq, but for different reasons and with different consequences. The Indians are concerned about the adverse economic implications of a war and they object to America's unilateral approach against Iraq. However, India's confidence in the long-term positive trajectory of U.S.-India relations indicates that disagreement over Iraq will not impose any significant costs on the relationship. India also finds merit in Bush's talk of preemption. For Pakistan, the opposition runs deeper. The growing anti-Americanism would worsen if the United States attacks another Muslim state and Pakistanis worry that their newfound relationship with the U.S. will be replaced with another chapter of American disinterest. By adding to Pakistan's considerable domestic stresses and buoying India's preemptive designs, U.S. action against Iraq will likely increase regional instability and the possibility of another South Asian crisis.

India opposes unilateral U.S. action against Iraq because of its oil interests in the Middle East and its goal of maintaining American pressure on Pakistan. These concerns are genuine but, as Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha has noted, they do not threaten U.S.-India relations. The growing economic, political, and military ties prior to September 11th have only been reinforced by India's unqualified support of the campaign in Afghanistan. India remains a long-term strategic partner of the U.S., and despite grievances that may arise in the short-term, that partnership is not in jeopardy. The doctrine of preemption that motivates American intervention in Iraq, rather than the intervention itself, has far greater implications for South Asia.

India asserts that Bush's National Security Strategy lends credence to its longstanding position that preemption is a legitimate policy option. Heightened tensions remain between India and Pakistan despite the recent withdrawal of troops from the International Border. When thinking about preemption, it is clear that India does not have the conventional superiority over Pakistan that the U.S. enjoys over Iraq. Additionally, given Pakistan's nuclear deterrent, India cannot afford to threaten Pakistan as the U.S. has threatened Iraq. Even the prospect of *limited* pre-emptive strikes by India approaches Pakistan's purposefully ambiguous threshold for nuclear response; this raises the stakes of conflict in unpredictable ways.

Pakistan views any American military intervention in Iraq, not just preemptive actions, through the lenses of domestic volatility and historical abandonment. Pakistan's recent elections have catapulted a fundamentalist coalition from the fringe of Pakistani politics into the arena of political decision-making. The street protesters who chant anti-American slogans now have political allies in the state and national assemblies. It should come as

no surprise that Afghanistan borders the two provinces where the religious parties gained the most votes. With many Taliban sympathizers, both border provinces view Islamabad's courting of the United States as inimical to their core beliefs. Though this coalition is comprised of politicians who may ultimately prove flexible—and Pakistani politics can make for strange bedfellows—fundamentalist sentiments will increasingly be part of the mainstream Pakistani discourse.

The religious coalition vehemently opposes American aggression against Iraq, and such sentiment would sharpen should collateral damage of Iraqi civilians occur. Musharraf has attempted to differentiate between the United States campaign in Afghanistan and the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, but fundamentalists in Pakistan refuse to separate what they feel is a broader U.S. campaign against Muslims. The debate about Iraq is intensifying in Pakistan just as the elections have concluded and emerging democratic processes are in flux. Pakistani moderates may be drowned out by more vocal fundamentalists. Having ridden the wave of anti-Americanism this far, will the religious coalition moderate its views, be reigned in by Musharraf, or transform its fundamentalist rhetoric into substantial policy changes?

Political elites not only fear the rampant anti-Americanism but also the possibility of neglect by the United States. Pakistan's feeling of abandonment by the U.S. following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan remains ensconced in their political memory. Pakistan expects to gain significant economic, political, and military benefits by remaining America's frontline ally in the war in Afghanistan. If the focus shifts to Iraq, Pakistan fears it will soon ride the slippery slope from a stalwart ally to a forgotten friend, possibly also losing nascent U.S. interest in greater engagement in Kashmir. The urgency of the Afghan situation allows the United States to turn a blind eye to Pakistan's ailing democracy, growing anti-Americanism, and history of supporting militancy. History tells what happens when that urgency subsides.

## **And Then What Happens? Alternative Ecologies of Conflict with Iraq**

*William J. Durch*

The late Garrett Hardin, who penned “The Tragedy of the Commons,” also wrote a thoughtful monograph called *Filters Against Folly*, in which he argued that the single most useful question that a consequence-minded skeptic could pose to policy makers was, “And then what [happens]?” This essay applies Hardin’s question to the anticipated struggle with the forces of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Whether there is war, the kinds of weapons that are used, how long the conflict lasts, where it is fought, and how it is ended all will have serious consequences not just for Iraq and its immediate region but for the course of the war on terrorism and the security of America and its allies.

War may not happen. Saddam Hussein may blink hard as the United States ratchets up the political and military pressure and the UN Security Council weighs in with a tough, time-constrained disarmament mandate. But even a disarmament-focused campaign of protected inspections could degenerate into overt violence should Iraq revert to familiar tactics of delay-and-retrenchment. Depending on what British and American decision makers believe about Saddam’s willingness to share weapons of mass destruction with terrorist organizations, a disarmament effort that encountered resistance could morph rapidly either into an intense aerial bombing campaign or a ground war aimed explicitly at “regime change.”

Iraq’s infrastructure has not been destroyed by a generation of civil war as in Afghanistan or Angola. How badly it is damaged by conflict-to-come depends in part on what outsiders do—what an air or ground campaign targets—and in part on what the current regime does to defend itself or to make life difficult for its successors.

A U.S.-led military campaign might have the good fortune to focus solely on tactical and operational targets—field armies and their supply and communications lines, removed from cities and other civilian targets, and not confounded by hostages herded into target sites. But given the shellacking that Iraqi forces took out in the open against U.S. forces in 1991, they are more likely to pull back and use civilians and civilian infrastructure as cover. We will then face the choice of digging them out (the “Jenin” option), waiting them out (the “Vicksburg” option), or bribing them out. The first two promise both major urban damage and high civilian casualties, while the third depends heavily on exploiting divisions within Iraqi security forces such that the less-bad have incentives to turn against the worst.

The post-war landscape also would be dramatically different depending on whether the final choices of Saddam’s inner circle lean more toward the “Samson” or the “Dorothy”

Option. With the Samson Option, the regime uses its WMD not just against coalition forces but against any targets the regime can reach, overtly and covertly, at home and abroad. The petroleum industry, pre-mined, is set alight, like post-war Kuwait only more so. Tracts of Baghdad or, more likely, cities in Shia and Kurdish areas, are contaminated with persistent biological agent or low-level radioactive debris, creating major problems for post-war reconstruction and a challenge for peacekeepers who may have neither training nor equipment to operate in contaminated environments. The more that reality resembles the Samson Option, the deeper and more widespread both the self-inflicted and regime-killing damage done to the country; the greater the outside impulse for top-to-bottom housecleaning and war crimes tribunals, and the longer the period of rebuilding.

The Dorothy Option represents the other end of the spectrum: as soon as Saddam is done in by whatever means, the regime's security forces surrender as one, glad to be rid of the tyrant.<sup>2</sup> Additional damage is minimal, WMD are withheld, and oil fields remain intact. The nearer reality can be pushed toward the Dorothy Option before war occurs, the lower the likely wartime damage, but pushing outcomes toward that end of the spectrum could mean lowering going-in expectations about wholesale political housecleaning, war crimes trials, and restructuring the economy. The price of securing the Dorothy Option may be amnesty or something like it for those who help to excise Iraq's axon of evil and his deadliest weapons.

For the Bush Administration, however, this no longer seems enough. The Administration is gravitating toward a MacArthur-like military occupation to oversee a thorough housecleaning regardless. It seems to forget that, after long years of war *initiated by Japan*, after the firebombing of Tokyo and the nuclear incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Emperor Hirohito ordered national cooperation with the occupation, and it happened, because the emperor ruled a *nation* and was revered above political and military leaders. Iraq has attacked its neighbors, been pushed back, and been contained for over a decade but not pounded into surrender; it has no emperor-equivalent; and its 23 million Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, and Arab Iraqis have little experience of freedom and perhaps even less love for one another. Political, inter-communal, and criminal violence—the secondary explosions ignited by invasion and regime change—could substantially postpone or derail hoped-for political and economic transitions. Although we may have little sympathy for members of Saddam's security forces who are demobilized into the population at large, post-conflict planners should care about a lynch-mob atmosphere that could easily envelope not just those linked to the old regime but those who do not belong to the "right" ethnic or religious group, and spread to those who own stores or have a bit more wealth than the average person. Given this potential, a

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<sup>2</sup> In "The Wizard of Oz," when the Wicked Witch has melted away, her guards turn and shout, "All Hail Dorothy!" – whose bucket of water inadvertently did the deed. Sometimes it works nearly that fast in the real world, and sometimes it takes a lot longer. Last spring, after Angolan forces killed long-time rebel leader Jonas Savimbi, a man who shared Saddam's habit of preemptively killing suspected foes, his forces surrendered within weeks. On the other hand, after the death of Josef Stalin, a tyrant even more prone to lethal purges, the highly institutionalized dictatorship that he built took four decades to collapse. Since it was nuclear-armed, we did not push too hard.

substantial outside security force could be needed to maintain basic order while political transformation schemes go forward.

Who could provide these security forces in the short to medium term, while a new government forms and new local forces are vetted and trained? States who have sent peacekeepers to Afghanistan also provide 70 percent of the international security forces deployed in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Most are European. Non-European states could provide forces for Iraq, as they do for most United Nations peacekeeping missions, but their governments would need to be persuaded before the war that this is a good idea, would need to be kept on board during the war, and would need to be compensated for their efforts.

The American military itself is structured, as it likes to point out, to fight armed groups, not to rebuild societies or to hunt down individuals, which is a law enforcement task. It managed to grab Manuel Noriega in Panama but missed Mohammed Farah Aideed in Somalia, only fitfully pursued war criminals in Bosnia, and seems to have missed Mullah Mohammed Omar and Osama bin Laden. The harder it tries and misses in Iraq, the greater the risk of the Samson Option, first as a deterrent threat, then as a delivered threat. We have much more fearsome capability than Saddam does, sitting on the shelf in the American arsenal, but unlike 1945, we are not likely to use it, even against an evil clique whose members, including Saddam, emanate from one particular, targetable place in Iraq. Since the war drums are beating in large part *because* of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, this may be an appropriate moment to ask: if we're not willing to use that capability, even in the face of WMD use by Saddam, why, exactly, is it still in the arsenal of democracy? The ecology of *nuclear* conflict, and the risk of its spread, is something that few wish to contemplate, and not having to face it is an oft-stated reason for cleaning out Iraq sooner rather than later. Yet unless our logic is now wholly imperial, what goes around comes around: the weapons too dreadful to contemplate in the hands of others are, in the eyes of others, dreadful to contemplate in our hands, as well, or in Israeli, Chinese, Russian, British, French, Indian, or Pakistani hands, let alone bin Laden's.

Saddam is a villain but hardly the only one, and ending his rule doesn't end all the villainy. With the logic of war with Iraq, as mirrored in its new National Security Strategy, America is embarked, not on a limited war for limited aims, but a global crusade fired by a "doctrine of armed evangelism."<sup>3</sup> That larger vision promises—and risks—much more than just invasion of Iraq. So this might be the last good time in a long while to ask: And then what happens?

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<sup>3</sup> Michael Kelly, "A Doctrine of Armed Evangelism," *Washington Post*, 10 October 2002, p. A31.

## What about Inspections?

*Amy E. Smithson*

While it is by no means certain that United Nations inspectors will be reinserted into Iraq, all signs seem to be pointing in that direction. If the Iraqis give the inspectors truly unfettered access—and given past Iraqi behavior that is a big IF—some may be expecting the inspectors to track down various weapons and weapons components quickly. Others may think the inspectors will come up empty handed even if the Iraqis roll out the welcome mat at all presidential compounds. The truth probably lies somewhere in between, and the actual inspection results will depend on several factors, not the least of which will be the quantity and quality of Iraq's cooperation and the scale, caliber, and intensity of the inspection effort mounted.

Even setting inspection priorities will be difficult. Remaining Iraqi ballistic missiles need to be eliminated because they can carry both conventional and unconventional payloads into neighboring countries. Previous UN inspections discovered that Iraq was headed toward a nuclear weapons capacity and arrested that program. Now, inspectors will need to reassess what progress Iraq has made since 1998, destroying equipment and infrastructure that would support nuclear weaponization. Tracking down any remaining chemical munitions is important because Iraqi armed forces gained actual experience with using these weapons during the Iran-Iraq War and against Iraq's Kurdish civilians. Banking on such experience, Saddam Hussein could turn first to poison gas if he decided to employ unconventional weapons. UN inspectors did destroy a major portion of Iraq's chemical arsenal, but significant numbers of chemical munitions—filled and unfilled—as well as over 3,000 tons of the nerve agent VX could still be at the disposal of Iraqi forces. Moreover, Iraq could have manufactured additional poison gas from the more than 18,000 tons of precursor chemicals that Iraq declared, but that inspectors did not find.

Lastly, Iraq's biological weapons capabilities are a primary concern because UN inspectors unmasked what the Iraqis denied for several years. Iraq weaponized several human, animal, and plant diseases (e.g., anthrax, camel pox, wheat smut). Iraq could have viable stockpiles of biowarfare agents at the ready because much of the agent that Iraq produced remained unaccounted for when inspectors departed in 1998, including over 22,000 gallons of anthrax and 1,000 gallons of botulinum toxin. Furthermore, inspectors did not locate more than 20 tons of complex growth media, which Iraq could have used to produce more biological agents.

If the past is prelude, UN inspectors will have their work cut out for them. The inspectors should have a comparatively easier time piecing together the status of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and missile weapons efforts than of Iraq's bioweapons program. Nuclear, chemical, and missile programs of a militarily significant size require a fairly large and

distinct infrastructure, but impressive quantities of biowarfare agents can be made in relatively small, nondescript settings. Reconnaissance images will therefore help inspectors hone in on locations that could be connected to nuclear, chemical, or missile weaponry. That alone does not guarantee that the inspectors will hit pay dirt at such sites, but at least they will have more reliable starting points for their investigation. Their biological weapons hunt will be particularly vexing, especially in view of intelligence reports that Iraq has mobile biowarfare production capabilities.

Chief inspector Hans Blix reportedly plans to have his teams pore over at least 300 sites at the outset. Inspectors will search for unaccounted for munitions and hundreds of pieces of equipment that their predecessors had tagged as useful for weapons manufacture. Any weapons located will be destroyed, but at the end of the day, the inspectors will not be able to destroy what they cannot find. This painstaking process will take many, many months. Blix estimates that several weeks will pass before he can even report to the Security Council on Iraq's level of cooperation. Reports on Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions could be one or two years in the making.

Those beating war drums need to pause and consider how truly ill advised it would be to slight inspections. First, the inspectors will make headway even if the Iraqis are not that cooperative, just as a strongly supported UN Special Commission did in the face of Iraq's camouflage, concealment, and deception efforts after the Gulf War. Any progress that the inspectors make will reduce Iraq's ability to employ ballistic missiles and unconventional weapons in a future conflict or to share such capabilities with terrorists. Furthermore, inspection progress prior to a war would position the inspectors to finish disarming Iraq afterwards, a job best accomplished swiftly given the possible instability of a post-war setting. Second, should Iraq again defy UN inspectors, the U.S. case for harsher measures would only grow stronger, winning sorely needed explicit and tacit allies for a military attack.

Finally, U.S. policy makers should tread carefully when it comes to undercutting an international process that could serve future U.S. security interests unrelated to Saddam Hussein. Iraq is not the only nation harboring weapons of mass destruction programs and lending terrorists a helping hand. Powerful as it may be, the United States cannot single-handedly fight all of the international community's reprobates.

## **Risking a Repeat: Export Controls and Post-Conflict Iraq**

*Kate Walsh and Jon Davis*

A U.S.-led war with Iraq that ends with relative military ease, minimal casualties, and Saddam Hussein's removal from power could yet leave the United States at considerable risk. Although seemingly paradoxical, one need only look to the first Gulf War to see why. Without a coordinated plan to control the flood of foreign investment likely to pour into a post-Saddam Iraq, the United States, its allies, and partners risk repeating the mistakes of the past and exacerbating—rather than alleviating—the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in this volatile region.

Among the difficult discoveries made in the aftermath of the first Gulf War and subsequent UN inspections was the revelation of the ease with which Saddam Hussein acquired WMD-related technology and know-how. As it turned out, many of these international transactions were overt, licensed, and legal. More disturbing still was the source of many of these exports. Prior to the Gulf War, U.S. firms and companies from nearly two-dozen mostly Western, allied countries competed to sell Iraq goods and technologies that, in many cases, also happened to have a dual use in WMD applications. As a result, it was the West that largely assisted Iraq's weapons buildup and that would later shoulder the burden of disarming Saddam once he turned these capabilities against his neighbors and then coalition forces. The question we must ask now is whether history will be repeated once Saddam leaves the scene, who never that may be.

Currently, arms trade with Iraq is prohibited by the UN, while dual-use items are permitted once vetted under the recently established "Goods Review List." As the extensive debate over these "smart sanctions" demonstrated, achieving international consensus on what goods and technologies to trade with or keep from Iraq has proven extremely difficult, even while Saddam remains in power. In the event of a more friendly, post-Saddam regime, international and even allied support for these ad hoc export control measures will undoubtedly falter if not evaporate. Therefore, prior to a U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, it is incumbent on the Bush Administration, allied leaders, and other major powers to consider what rules will govern trade with Iraq once the conflict ends. Without a strategy going in, it is unlikely that the United States and even our allies will agree, *ex post facto*, on a coordinated approach to restricting trade with the new Iraqi regime, which could yet prove unstable and short-lived. Consequently, we risk *déjà vu* and the continuation of a destructive arm-disarm cycle of relations with Iraq and the region.

Additionally, even under a more positive scenario of a well-functioning new government in Baghdad, Iraq will remain a key transit point for legitimate trade as well as illicit trafficking in the region and will require close and coordinated monitoring by the

international community long after it has been fully disarmed. Among the issues, therefore, that should be included in planning for a post-Saddam Iraq is the provision of Western aid and expertise for establishing a new Iraqi export control system. To date, the Administration appears to have given little if any thought to this post-conflict concern.

While Iraq is not the only instance where U.S. and allied views on export controls at times diverge, how the international community chooses to address trade with a new government in Baghdad will have long-term repercussions for global efforts to stem WMD proliferation. Will the West quickly revert to business as usual (to pre-Gulf War practices) or take a more cautious, coordinated approach to trade with an unproven, successor regime in this critical corner of the globe? The rest of the world will be watching and will follow suit. Controlling trade with a post-Saddam regime is not only necessary to prevent the re-emergence of WMD threats in Iraq, but also presents an important opportunity for the United States to re-engage its allies in strengthening multilateral export controls to diminish the future proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (and their precursors or delivery systems) in the region.

## **The Day After: What about Regional Security?**

*Ellen Laipson*

The Iraq problem—an aggressive and unreliable regime with advanced capabilities—must be seen in its context, and policy choices to resolve it must take the broader picture into account. We have considered the consequences of policy options on Iraq for the UN, for relations with key allies and Asian powers, and for important instruments for managing security threats such as inspections and export controls. Let us now look at the regional security situation in the aftermath of change in Iraq.

Relations among key Middle Eastern states have been unstable for decades, and the rivalries and ideological clashes have led to a series of destructive wars. Every decade since World War II has witnessed a major war. The region's oil wealth has permitted states to accumulate sophisticated weaponry, and charismatic or autocratic leaders have generally brought their populations along to fight wars in the name of nationalist ideas and grievances. The regional organizations—the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Gulf Cooperation Council—have proven woefully inadequate at managing disputes among the regional players and at building a more positive and constructive security psychology.

Should the Administration succeed in creating international support for strong inspections with the use of force if they fail, the policy package needs to address not only the disarmament of Iraq but also how to integrate Iraq in its new status into a more promising regional arrangement. How will Iraq's neighbors view their threat environment and what opportunities are there to push for new security policies across the region? Will governments have a different view than their publics, creating an uncertain security environment for U.S. forces and possible threats to regimes allied with the anti-Saddam action?

For two decades, Iraq has been an aggressor, and its Arab neighbors are less sure than they used to be that Iraq should play a leadership role on the basis of its military prowess. The Arabs will most likely accept an Iraq with reduced strategic capabilities, so long as other threats—from Iran, from Israel, even from instability in South Asia—are taken into account. Iran for its part will have serious security concerns deriving from the proximity of American forces to its east in Afghanistan and its west in Iraq. It will need assurances about our intentions to prevent it from becoming even more reliant on building its own military capabilities, even though its historic Arab foe will have been weakened.

Israel too may see the broader regional environment improved by the fall of Saddam, but will still see Iran's ambitions as an existential threat, and will focus on the enduring struggle with the Palestinians as grounds for continuing its exceedingly tough and

unsentimental security policies. Nudging Israel and the Arabs back to the logic of engagement on security that prevailed for a brief time in the Madrid-Oslo period will be hard but necessary to give the possible success in Iraq enduring value. Both Israel and Iran must be convinced that some early steps towards greater transparency—willingness to discuss security with past or potential foes—are necessary, even if both will remain quite closed about most aspects of their national security requirements.

Over a decade ago, Secretary of State James Baker spoke eloquently about the post-war period, even before Saddam was ousted from Kuwait. He identified principles that would underlie a new security environment: deterrence of aggression from any quarter, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, and peaceful resolution of disputes. He imagined the regional organizations, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in particular, playing an important role in reinforcing a network of new and strengthened security ties, and he expected both post-war Iraq and Iran to be contributors to this effort.

These ideas deserve renewed and urgent attention. Not just the architecture of an inclusive security dialogue but the agenda, including proliferation and arms sales, needs to be bold and ambitious. The international community must work together to reduce arms flows and to forego the economic competition that the Gulf's security marketplace has stimulated in the past.

The United States may, probably correctly, expect to have considerable leverage over the security policies in the region, should change occur in Iraq that meets American demands. It will need to use that leverage wisely, not only to celebrate the demise of a dictator, but to listen to the needs and concerns of Iraqis and their neighbors, and to work hard to build a more constructive security environment across the region.