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The Issue

Beginning in 1958, the Soviet Union, and later Russia, built over 250 nuclear-powered vessels, most of which were submarines. Of these vessels, 91 submarines were classified as "strategic" (i.e., capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles at the United States). The remaining nuclear vessels included "non-strategic" submarines (designed to hunt and destroy other submarines), four guided-missile cruisers, a small fleet for scientific research, support and space-tracking ships, and seven civilian icebreakers.

When the Soviet Union dissolved, the submarines that remained in active service faced two dangerous challenges. First, when states of the former Soviet Union declared independence from Moscow, many of these vessels lost their home ports and other related facilities in the Black and the Baltic Seas. The remaining naval bases within Russia could not handle such a large number of operational vessels, particularly when combined with additional Soviet-era diesel submarines and surface ships. Second, and more ominously, the Russian defense budget could no longer afford to keep many of the nuclear-powered submarines adequately and safely maintained-much less in active service. Without the capacity to dismantle these vessels, decommissioned submarines began to pile up around Russia's naval bases. The Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination Implementing Agreement, signed in August 1993 by the US and Russia, provided a framework for the US to aid in the dismantlement of several Russian strategic submarines.[1] The original target for submarine dismantlement under that agreement was reached in 2003, but the US has since increased the target to 39 submarines by 2012.[2]

Approximately fifty of the submarines awaiting dismantlement have highly enriched uranium (HEU) on board, making the ships extremely attractive targets for terrorists seeking material to make nuclear weapons.[3] Some submarines used weapons-grade HEU (defined as over 90 percent of the isotope ²³⁵U), which means that terrorists would need only a small amount to create an improvised nuclear device. The spent fuel in submarine reactor cores also presents a potential dirty bomb threat. Spent nuclear fuel is highly radioactive, and exposure to it poses considerably greater health risks than exposure to fresh nuclear fuel. Clearly, dismantling these submarines and safely disposing of any nuclear material onboard is in the national security interests of the international community.

In the United States, financial assistance for safe and secure dismantlement is provided mainly by the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, with help also provided by the Department of Energy's International Materials Protection and Cooperation program. The CTR program only assists in the dismantlement of submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles. The Department of Energy was charged with securing nuclear submarine fuel at the eleven Russian navy fuel sites. Security upgrades for these sites were completed in fiscal year 2004.[4] [See Issue Brief - MPC&A] However, fuel from decommissioned submarines awaiting dismantlement remains vulnerable to theft and sale on the black market.

The threats posed by Russia's nuclear submarines have also been recognized by the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction [See Issue Brief - G8 Global Partnership]. In addition to the United States, several other countries have contributed millions of dollars to help Russia secure vulnerable nuclear submarine fuel, dismantle submarines, and clean up the surrounding environment. For example, from June 2003 to June 2006, Norway spent €19.8 million (approximately $24 million) mainly to help dismantle and clean up after Russia's aging Northern Fleet of submarines.[5] In total, fifteen different Global Partnership countries[6], plus the European Union, have pledged assistance for submarine dismantlement, most of which is governed by the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) Framework Agreement. Designed to facilitate European and US projects to handle radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, the Agreement addresses all the relevant legal issues.[7]

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Obstacles

• According to the non-partisan Center for Nonproliferation Studies, three major technical obstacles currently prevent greater progress in Russian nuclear-powered submarine dismantlement efforts:
  • Inadequate storage facilities for spent fuel removed from submarine reactors;
  • Slow work pace of existing dismantlement lines; and
  • Lack of facilities for long-term storage of highly radioactive reactor compartments.[8]
• No international treaty or agreement requires Russia to dismantle and safely secure the reactors aboard its decaying fleet of nuclear-powered submarines.
• The Nunn-Lugar program is limited to assisting the dismantlement of "strategic" nuclear submarines. There are, however, many important non-proliferation, security, and environmental benefits to the timely dismantlement of non-strategic submarines. Many carry cruise missiles that could prove valuable to the missile programs of "rogue" states; and some are powered by nuclear fuel enriched to very high levels, which could pose serious proliferation risks if left unsecured.

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Q & A

Q: Why should we be concerned with helping Russia dismantle these submarines?
A: We should be concerned about Russian submarines because of the nuclear material contained within them. For a terrorist group attempting to build a nuclear weapon, acquiring nuclear material is the most difficult part of the process. The leftover reactor fuel present in Russian submarines awaiting dismantlement provides terrorists with yet another available, vulnerable source of nuclear material.

Q: How many nuclear-powered submarines is the United States helping to dismantle?
A: The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has helped eliminate 32 strategic nuclear-powered vessels, and by 2012, aims to have helped destroy another seven. The scope of the problem is much larger, however, with approximately 90 nuclear-powered submarines awaiting dismantlement. Many more should be retired within the next decade.

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Quick Facts

• Theft of highly enriched uranium from nuclear-powered submarines or the sale of decommissioned submarines to third parties would present potentially disastrous proliferation challenges.
• Prior to 1993, Russia was disposing of liquid radioactive waste from shut-down reactors at sea, creating devastating environmental problems.
• The existing Russian dismantlement facilities-of which there are eight-can only dismantle a few boats a year, leaving the remaining vessels afloat in piers awaiting destruction. However, the infrastructure to completely dismantle submarines and store their radioactive components on shore does not exist in Russia.[9]
• Click here to see a map of Russian submarine dismantlement facilities.[10]
• As of January 1, 2005, 194 nuclear-powered submarines had been decommissioned. Of those, only 107 have been dismantled.[11]
• Approximately fifty of the submarines awaiting dismantlement have highly enriched uranium (HEU) on board, making the ships extremely attractive targets for terrorists seeking material to make nuclear weapons.[12]
• Several decommissioned submarines could potentially be reactivated or sold to a third party. As mentioned above, these ships could also be vulnerable to terrorist attack or seizure.
• According to the director of one dismantlement facility, removing the spent nuclear fuel from a submarine and destroying the rest of the ship costs approximately $7.5 million for a best-case scenario. A more realistic estimate for a nuclear-powered strategic submarine is $10-15 million.[13]
• Almost half of the 60 officially decommissioned nuclear submarines from Russia's Northern Fleet still carry nuclear fuel. Since most Russian submarines have two reactors, this means that nearly 60 nuclear reactors must be kept maintained and secured.[14]

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Recent Legislation

• The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2007 (Public Law 109-289) appropriated $15 million for the dismantling and disposal of Russian nuclear submarines and submarine reactor components in Russia's Far East as part of the $372.1 million appropriation for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program . A similar earmark has been included in previous defense appropriations bills since Fiscal Year 1998.

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Applicable Treaties and Other International Agreements

• In 1993, Russia pledged to adhere to the new protocols of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, and may no longer dispose of radioactive waste from shut-down reactors at sea. This does not address the dangerous dilemma of the decaying vessels in Russian ports that await dismantlement.[15]

• The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibits states from transmitting nuclear technologies and materials necessary to build a nuclear device to non-nuclear weapons states. However, the NPT does not apply to naval fuel sales and thus does not preclude Russia from selling proliferation-sensitive HEU fuel aboard a submarine to another country. Such sales may occur without International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.[16]

• The Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) created a framework for countries (mostly European) to provide assistance for Russian submarine dismantlement. Much of this assistance has come from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP), which created an overarching decommissioning and dismantlement plan for Russia's submarines. [17]

• The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, established at the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, is a commitment on the part of the international community to help secure weapons of mass destruction in the FSU and elsewhere.[18]

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Talking Points

• During the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed a large sub-surface nuclear force of over 250 vessels, including 91 "strategic" nuclear submarines.
• The collapse of the Soviet Union created a dual problem for the submarine fleet: the independence of the Soviet republics led to a loss of naval bases; and the severe economic downturn resulted in a shortage of funds to keep the fleet safely maintained.
• Russia found itself with a glut of decommissioned vessels and an insufficient capacity to dismantle them properly.
• Beginning in 1993, the United States began providing assistance to the Russians for dismantling strategic submarines.
• There are still hurdles which impede progress, including a lack of sufficient long-term storage, a slow pace of work, the failure of other donors to provide promised funds, and the limitation of Nunn-Lugar programs to the issue of "strategic" submarines.
• For a few hundred million dollars, a small figure compared to the overall US defense budget, the threat posed by decaying Russian nuclear-powered submarines could be greatly reduced.
• Addressing the fate of nuclear-powered submarines is a very fertile area for the US to work with allies and friends to educate them to the dangers posed by the decaying Russian war machine and to spur them to devote more funding and energy to addressing the serious threat posed.

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Recommendations

• A National Security Council designee should spearhead an interagency process to provide a detail and timely reassessment of the global role of nonproliferation efforts in today's context, including those that have arisen in the past few years. This strategy should include provisions on how to sustain security upgrades for nuclear material removed from Russia's submarines once US assistance ends, which will help move the US-Russian relationship away from "patronage" and toward partnership. Methods to coordinate US assistance with the G8 Global Partnership should also be explored. [See Book Recommendations #1 and #6]
• The US Government should press the G8 and other contributing states parties to: (a) search for domestic commonalities that combine their respective Global Partnership investments with other foreign policy spending, and (b) encourage wider collaboration internationally to better leverage Global Partnership funding across national boundaries. Greater cooperation on submarine dismantlement is especially important due to the large number of countries providing funding. [See Book Recommendation #3]
• At the start of any program, the agency/agencies involved should build consensus with the respective host country regarding perceived threats. The Russians have long seen the threat of decaying submarines in a different light than US Government officials. The US should do more to build consensus around threat perceptions. It should work to ensure that funding for securing nuclear submarine fuel matches mutual, sustainable goals. [See Book Recommendation #6]
• Coordinate and leverage US Government programs aimed at redirecting former weapons scientists toward peaceful, sustainable employment to meet mutually identified needs. Former weapons scientists could use their expertise to devise new technology for dismantling submarines or storing nuclear fuel. They could also help make the process less costly and more efficient. [See Book Recommendations #8 and #17]
• The Pentagon, as the lead department in warhead dismantlement efforts, should team with the State Department to create a "Master Plan" for countries involved in cooperative nonproliferation efforts. This will ensure that other foreign policy objectives (such as human rights and democracy promotion) complement and do not compete with the US's interest in dismantling Russian submarines and securing its nuclear fuel. [See Book Recommendation #10]
• The National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and other relevant agency officials should achieve sufficient interagency coordination to address such informational gaps and/or oversights in the budgeting process to ensure that nonproliferation timelines match budgetary means. [See Book Recommendation #13]
• Congressional "ceilings" on specific CTR projects should be eliminated. If Russia provides the US with an opportunity to assist in dismantling more submarines or secure more submarine fuel, the CTR program should have the flexibility to take advantage of the situation. [See Book Recommendation #14]
• Create an office at the State Department to serve as the US Government's "information clearinghouse" for all agencies' cooperative nonproliferation-related activities as well as the focal point for timely information regarding G8 Global Partnership programs and field activities. Many Global Partnership countries, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway, have provided assistance for submarine dismantlement. [See Book Recommendation #22]

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Endnotes

[1] Nuclear Engineering International, "Decontamination & Decommissioning; Subdividing Submarines," 20 February 2006, accessed at: http://www.sgpproject.org/Personal%20Use%20Only/subs2.20.06.htm.

[2] Defense Threat Reduction Agency, "Cooperative Threat Reduction: Scorecard," 10 July 2006, accessed at: http://www.dtra.mil/documents/oe/ctr/scorecard20060710.pdf.

3] Ibid.

[4] Department of Energy, "FY 2007 Congressional Budget Request," (February 2006), accessed at: http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/07budget/Content/Volumes/Vol_1_NNSA.pdf.

5] Vladimir Orlov, ed., Guidebook: Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Moscow: Human Rights Publishers, 2006).

[6] Those countries are: Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

[7] Egil Tronstad and Cristina Chuen, "The Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR)," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, accessed at: http://cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/030604.htm#fn8.

[8] James Clay Moltz, Tamara Robinson, Hilary Anderson, and Jill Tatko, "Russia: Naval Nuclear Reactors," Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library, 2000, accessed at: http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/naval/overview.htm.

[9] Tronstad and Chuen, "The Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation," CNS.

[10] Map taken from: US Government Accountability Office, "Russian Nuclear Submarines: U.S. Participation in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification," September 2004, accessed at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04924.pdf.

[11] Tronstad and Chuen, "The Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation," CNS.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Orlov, Guidebook: Global Partnership..., 2006.

[14] Foreign Affairs Canada, "Global Partnership Program: Securing the Future," 2005, p. 28, accessed at: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/global_partnership/pdf/GPX_AnnualReport-EN.pdf.

[15] International Maritime Organization, Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, accessed at: http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topic_id=258&doc_id=681#6.

[16] United Nations, The Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), accessed at: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html.

[17] Orlov, Guidebook: Global Partnership..., 2006.

18] Group of Eight Leaders, "The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Kananaskis, Canada, June 27, 2002, accessed at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Art%2002%20gp_stat-en.pdf.

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Last Updated on May 30, 2007