Liability Issues in Cooperative Nonproliferation Programs in Russia

The Issue | Obstacles | Q & A | Quick Facts | Legislation | Agreements | Talking Points | Recommendations | Annexes

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The Issue

In July and September 2003, two important US-Russian agreements governing nuclear nonproliferation programs in Russia came up for renewal but were allowed to expire. The first, the Plutonium Scientific and Technical Cooperation (PSTC) program, pertained to scientific and technical cooperation in the management of plutonium withdrawn from Russian warheads.[1] The second, the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), was a program aimed at downsizing the Russian nuclear weapons research and production complex, converting portions of it to civilian industrial enterprises, and providing the displaced scientists and other workers with peaceful employment opportunities.[2] Both agreements had been for terms of five years. Several members of Congress and a wide array of nonproliferation experts, citing the importance of the programs to American national security, urged the Administration not to allow these agreements to expire.

The problem in both cases was the inability to reach an accord on the issue of liability for mishaps in the conduct of the programs. The original agreements had provided the United States and its personnel, contractors, suppliers, and the like with broad protections against liability arising from activities under the agreements.[3] Thus, "with the exception of claims against individuals for premeditated damage or injury," the Russian government would bring no claims against and would "provide for the adequate defense of" and indemnify the US and its personnel and contractors with respect to all claims.[4]

In the renewal negotiations, the US insisted on blanket protection that would remove the exception for "premeditated damage or injury." The precedent for that position was the 1992 US-Russian umbrella agreement for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, under which Russia assumed sole liability, with no exceptions, for damage arising from activities covered by the agreement.[5] The CTR umbrella agreement was renewed prior to its expiration in 2006. [See Annex A] US-Russian agreements covering nonproliferation programs other than NCI and PSTC have included blanket liability coverage.[6] The reasons for going to such an apparent extreme as to seek exculpation for even "premeditated" injury are two-fold. First, the US and its contractors want to preclude any opening, however limited, for a claim that they are liable because that could always allow such a contention to be raised. Second, the US and its contractors are suspicious of the Russian courts, believing they might apply the exception in an overly broad manner.

Liability for damages arising from mishaps involving nuclear weapons, other WMDs, and WMD materials can be an enormous issue. Any organization or business will understandably be reluctant to run the risk of being held liable for a Chernobyl-type incident, the detonation of a nuclear device, or the dispersion of deadly biological or chemical agents. Thus, for example, a supplier of electronic locks for a nuclear storage facility would understandably want protection from liability if a terrorist group were able to break into the facility, steal nuclear materials, fashion a crude bomb, and set it off in a city. The resulting claims could put any private firm out of business and be a major, if not overwhelming, burden for any country.

These concerns managed to derail the renewal of the NCI agreement, which did not involve the handling or security of WMDs or materials. Rather, NCI activities, which were funded under the Department of Energy's Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, focused on facilitating the conversion of excess Russian nuclear facilities into productive civilian enterprises that could employ scientists and other workers displaced from their nuclear weapons jobs [See Issue Brief - Nuclear Cities].

US liability demands have been called excessive, especially after the Russian Duma's ratification of the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) Framework Agreement and liability protocol. The MNEPR umbrella agreement is designed to facilitate European and US projects to handle radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.[7] Nine European countries, Russia, and the US signed the MNEPR agreement on 21 May 2003. The basic agreement itself does not cover the liability issue; rather, liability is covered by the Protocol on Claims, Legal Proceedings and Indemnification, which all the MNEPR parties except the United States have signed. [See Annex D] That liability protocol provides the non-Russian participants with protection very much along the lines of the expired NCI and plutonium agreements. Specifically, the protocol broadly protects the non-Russian countries and their personnel and contractors from all claims for injuries or damage except for claims "against individuals arising from omissions or acts of such individuals done with intent to cause injury or damage." The protocol also provides non-Russian participants and their contractors and personnel with the option to refer disputes to arbitration, thereby allowing them to keep their cases out of the Russian court system.

In the summer of 2005, the US and Russia were able to work out an agreement on plutonium disposition at the G8 Summit in Scotland. Rather than an extension of the liability provision contained in the PSTC agreement, the 2005 accord serves as a cover-all for US-Russian plutonium-related projects.[8] [See Issue Brief - Plutonium Disposition] The agreement, which went into effect on September 15, 2006, means the plutonium disposition program, in which the US and Russia each pledged to eliminate 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium, can get back on track after three years of delay.[9] At the signing ceremony, Ambassador Linton Brooks, the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, stated, "Signing this protocol with our Russian partners formally resolves the issue of what liability framework would apply for cooperation between the two countries to eliminate this dangerous material from Russian and U.S. stocks. We continue to work with the Russian Federation on the next steps in implementing the plutonium disposition agreement."[10] The new protocol gives the US liability protection except in cases in which Russia believes that the acts of a US Government employee or an employee of a US Government contractor "were done with intent to cause personal injury, loss of life, or damage."[11] In such cases, Russia must provide the US with written notification that describes the incident, and either country can call for consultations "to achieve mutual understanding" within 90 days.[12] If an understanding cannot be reached, the accused employee will lose liability protection [See Annex E for related excerpts].

In the Spring 2003 issue of the Nonproliferation Review, R. Douglas Brubaker and Leonard S. Spector, former Assistant Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration, suggested that the CTR umbrella agreement's liability provision is inconsistent with the purposes of CTR and nonproliferation programs.[13] Saddling Russia with the entire burden seems to emanate from a mindset that doing so is appropriate because the CTR and nonproliferation programs benefit only Russia. However, these programs are of critical importance to the security and health of the "donor" countries as well, because they are either potential targets of extremists or terrorists or so close to Russia geographically as to suffer from a WMD misadventure there.[14] Thus, the US and other donor countries have as much at stake as Russia in thwarting terrorists' efforts to obtain WMD capabilities and in preventing WMD accidents that could produce horrific health and environmental problems for them.

Moreover, the US position fails to address the difficulties that the victims of a nuclear mishap arising out of the CTR and nonproliferation programs would have in pursuing claims for compensation. Those difficulties would include, among other things, proving in court the specific actions that lead to the catastrophe; identifying and obtaining a judgment against the person(s) or entity/entities at fault; and actually recovering money from the wrongdoer(s). Only at that point, would Russia's obligation to indemnify the party/parties who had been held liable come into play. All of this would be complicated by large numbers of potential claimants from several different countries competing for damages, and by the vast array of court systems in which they might pursue their claims. In short, the current system leaves potential victims bearing much of the risk of a WMD incident.

Brubaker and Spector suggested two models for providing victims with a simplified, process for obtaining assured compensation that would require Russia and the countries funding the CTR programs to establish a comprehensive system for processing and paying claims. In the first, Russia would be liable for compensation up to a specified total (probably in the hundreds of millions of dollars); and the other countries involved in CTR programs would share the burden of the rest of the compensation through a pooling system.[15]

The second approach would entail the issuance of "catastrophic WMD incident insurance bonds."[16] Here the insurance bonds might be invested in government bonds of the CTR participants, which would pay a higher than normal rate of interest (with the excess cost being born by the participating countries as a surcharge to the CTR programs). This would create a very large pool of funds that would be available for the high-end costs of a WMD incident, and the investors in the bonds would have a low-risk investment. Both approaches would also include rules for simplifying the claims application and adjudication processes.

The creation of either type of comprehensive system would obviously be a time-consuming and challenging task involving several countries and a host of difficult details to be worked out on an equitable basis. However, resolving the liability issues inherent in both umbrella agreements and implementing agreements would be a major boon to the global CTR effort. Simply allowing programs to expire as they come up for renewal is truly an unacceptable result in terms of US national security. As the conferees on the fiscal year 2004 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill stated, allowing agreements to expire over liability disputes create, "unnecessary impediments to the effective implementation of nuclear nonproliferation programs."[17]

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Obstacles

  • Creating a common liability protocol for all cooperative nonproliferation projects would require the renegotiation of agreements and contracts among multiple countries requiring a significant amount of time over multiple agreements.
  • There are conflicting interests at stake, with potential victims worrying about compensation and liability, the governments working on nonproliferation concerned about their potential exposure, and the private companies which are seeking to avoid both actual liability and significant litigation in cases of potential liability.
  • The United States and Russia experienced a three-year impasse in their negotiations over the renewal of nonproliferation programs agreements. Although the plutonium liability agreement was resolved in summer 2005, another year passed before both governments officially signed it and the agreement entered into force.

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Q & A

Q: Why should the United States and other "donor" countries share any part of the burden of WMD mishaps arising from the conduct of threat reduction or nonproliferation programs? Russia is the beneficiary; shouldn't it accept the risk as the part of the price of receiving this aid?
A: The point of the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs is not to provide Russia with economic aid. The main point is to protect the participating countries-sometimes misleadingly referred to as "donors"-from the threat to their own people of allowing terrorists or rogue states to get their hands on WMDs or the material or expertise for building such weapons. These programs also provide states that are in close geographic proximity to Russia with protection from the environmental and public health hazards presented by Soviet-era WMDs.

Q: What's the thinking behind US insistence that it and its contractors be shielded from liability from "premeditated" damage or injury? Shouldn't individuals or companies that purposely harm others be accountable?
A: The purpose here is not to protect those who intentionally harm others. The purpose is to keep Russian courts-which the United States does not trust-from unfairly holding a US contractor or its personnel liable in the case of a major WMD mishap. For example, the US is concerned that a Russian tribunal might decide that if a US firm, aware of the risks involved in destroying chemical warfare material, went ahead with a program for destroying it and an accident occurred or some of it was stolen, the intentional act of proceeding with the program might be construed as premeditated action. That, of course, would be an overly broad application of "premeditated" injury, but a corrupt judge might, it is feared, make such a ruling.

Q: Is there a possibility that the countries participating in threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia could agree on an overall solution providing the financial resources and rules for damage claims that would make it possible for all such programs to proceed?
A: This would obviously be a major undertaking on the part of the countries involved. However, the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction could provide a forum for the development of a solution acceptable to all parties that would help enable such vitally important programs to proceed [See Issue Brief - G8 Global Partnership].

Q: What do the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction guidelines provide with respect to liability issues?
A: The guidelines state: "All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that adequate liability protections from claims related to the cooperation will be provided for donor countries and their personnel and contractors."[18] This leaves open the questions as to what are "adequate liability protections" and what kinds of steps could be taken to ensure that they are provided. Clearly, many options other than putting the entire burden on Russia for programs there would be consistent with this guideline.

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Quick Facts

  • The program placed at risk by the expiration of the 1998 agreement on scientific and technical cooperation with respect to the management of plutonium will help dispose of 34 tons of Russian weapons-grade plutonium.
  • The kinds of activities carried out by the Nuclear Cities program did not involve high-risk activities, such as the handling of nuclear materials. Rather, they helped Russia convert its Soviet-era nuclear weapons complex into civilian pursuits affording employment opportunities for displaced nuclear weapons scientists and other workers.
  • Nearly 750,000 people live in Russia's nuclear cities, which were built for the sole purpose of making nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Cities Initiative was the only US program focused on reducing the size of the Russian nuclear weapons complex while reducing the proliferation risks posed by desperate displaced nuclear scientists and workers.[19]

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Recent Legislation

  • N/A

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Applicable Treaties, Legislation, and Other International Agreements

  • Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of American and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, 15 September 2006. [See Annex E]
  • Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, 1 September 2000.
  • Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Nuclear Cities Initiative, 22 September 1998. [See Annex B]
  • Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Management of Plutonium that has been withdrawn from Nuclear Military Programs, 24 July 1998. [See Annex C]
  • The Cooperative Threat Reduction program "umbrella" agreement: Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation, with Implementing Agreements and Annexes, 17 June 1992, extended through June 2006 by a protocol signed 15-16 June 1999, and through June 2013 by a protocol signed on 19 June 2006. [See Annex A]

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Talking Points

  • Threat reduction and nonproliferation programs are critically important to the security of the United States. They must not be allowed to be tied up or slowed down by legal disagreements regarding liability issues.
  • To date, Russia has been saddled with the vast majority of the burden on liability issues as the United States has sought to minimize its legal risks.
  • Russia balked at this inequity, leading to a three year impasse regarding the plutonium disposition programs and the expiration of the Nuclear Cities Initiative.
  • The United States needs to work out a sustainable and long-term solution to the liability issue to ensure that the success of these programs, which are critical to US security, is not hampered in the future.

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Recommendations

  • A National Security Council designee should spearhead an interagency process to reassess the global role of CNP efforts in today's context, including those that have arisen in the past few years. Such a close examination of the entire suite of programs across all relevant government agencies should strive to eliminate duplication, consolidate where necessary, prioritize activities, and fill any gaps within existing efforts.
    [See Book Recommendation #1]
  • In light of radically changed circumstances in Russia, particularly with respect to Moscow's ability to take ownership for its own security needs, the moment is ripe for transforming the US-Russian nonproliferation relationship from one of patronage to a true partnership. The recent plutonium liability agreement is a solid move in this direction, as it deals on the bases of reciprocity, but the US can do more to relax its liability demands in order to foster trust with Russia.
    [See Book Recommendation #5]
  • At the start of any program, the agency involved should build consensus with the respective host country to ensure buy-in for nonproliferation efforts. This can include a mutual understanding on liability issues that will prevent program delays or, as in the case of NCI, expiration.
    [See Book Recommendation #6]
  • National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) officials need a better avenue with which to transmit information to Congress in order to build support for their programs. A bicameral Congressional Task Force that provides briefings from a broad array of nonproliferation actors would be ideal, although an off-the-record briefing series run by the NNSA would also be acceptable. Better informed Congress Members could then exert greater pressure on Administration officials to prevent or resolve liability conflicts.
    [See Book Recommendations #7 and #19]
  • Clarify in detail the roles and responsibilities of each agency between the negotiation of an agreement and the program's execution. The Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) expired partially because of overlapping responsibilities and failed communication between the State Department and the Department of Energy.
    [See Book Recommendation #16]
  • Establish an "information clearinghouse" in the State Department for US Government-wide CNP activities. This could include information on previous liability conflicts so that new liability negotiations would not have to start from scratch.
    [See Book Recommendation #22]

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Annexes

Annex A | Annex B | Annex C | Annex D | Annex E

ANNEX A

Liability Provision in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Umbrella Agreement[20]

ARTICLE VII

  1. The Russian Federation shall, in respect of legal proceedings and claims, other than contractual claims, hold harmless and bring no legal proceedings against the United Sates of America and personnel, contractors, and contractors' personnel of the United States of America, for damage to property owned by the Russian Federation or death or injury to any personnel of the Russian Federation, arising out of activities pursuant to this Agreement.
  2. Claims by third parties arising out of acts or omissions of any employees of the United Sates of America or contractors or contractors' personnel of the United Sates of America done in the performance of official duty, shall be the responsibility of the Russian Federation.
  3. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the parties from providing compensation in accordance with their national laws.
  4. The parties shall consult, as appropriate, on claims and proceedings under this article.
  5. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to prevent legal proceedings or claims against nationals of the Russian Federation or permanent resident of the Russian Federation.

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ANNEX B

Liability Provisions in the Nuclear Cities Initiative Agreement[21]

ARTICLE VIII

  1. With the exception of claims against individuals for premeditated damage or injury, the Government of the Russian Federation shall bring no claims or other legal proceedings against the Government of the United States of America and its personnel or its contractors, sub-contractors, consultants, suppliers, or subsuppliers of equipment or services at any tier and their personnel, in any court or forum, for any damage, including indirect, direct, or consequential damage, arising from activities undertaken pursuant to this Agreement to property owned by the Russian Federation. This paragraph shall not apply to legal actions brought by the Government of the Russian Federation to enforce the provisions of contracts to which it or a Russian national or other legal entity is a party.
  2. With the exception of claims against individuals for premeditated damage or injury, the Government of the Russian Federation shall provide for the adequate defense of, shall indemnify, and shall bring no claims or other legal proceedings against the Government of the United States of America and its personnel or its contractors, sub-contractors, consultants, suppliers, or subsuppliers of equipment or services at any tier and their personnel, in connection with third-party claims, in any court or forum, for any injury or damage, including indirect, direct, or consequential injury or damage, arising from activities undertaken pursuant to this Agreement, occurring within or outside the territory of the Russian Federation. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as acknowledging the jurisdiction of any court or forum over third-party claims to which this paragraph applies, nor shall it be construed as waiving the sovereign immunity of either Party with respect to third-party claims that may be brought against it.
  3. The Parties may, as necessary, conduct consultations regarding claims and legal proceedings concerning this Article.
  4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the Parties from providing compensation in accordance with their national laws.
  5. Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted to prevent legal proceedings or claims against nationals of the Russian Federation or permanent residents of the Russian Federation.

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ANNEX C

Liability Provisions in the Plutonium Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement

ARTICLE 9

  1. With the exception of claims for damage or injury against individuals arising from their premeditated actions, the Government of the Russian Federation shall bring no claims or other legal proceedings against the Government of the United States of America and its personnel or its contractors, sub-contractors, consultants, suppliers or subsuppliers of equipment or services at any tier and their personnel, in any court or forum, for any damage, including indirect, direct or consequential damage, arising from activities undertaken pursuant to this Agreement, to property owned by the Russian Federation. This paragraph shall not apply to legal actions brought by the Government of the Russian Federation to enforce the provisions of contracts to which it or a Russian national or other legal entity is a party.
  2. With the exception of claims for damage or injury against individuals arising from their premeditated actions, the Government of the Russian Federation shall provide for the adequate defense of, shall indemnify, and shall bring no claims or other legal proceedings against, the Government of the United States of America and its personnel or its contractors, sub-contractors, consultants, suppliers or subsuppliers of equipment or services at any tier and their personnel, in connection with third-party claims, in any court or forum, for any injury or damage, including indirect, direct or consequential damage, arising from activities undertaken pursuant to this Agreement, occurring within or outside the territory of the Russian Federation. Nothing in this Paragraph shall be construed as acknowledging the jurisdiction of any court or forum over third-party claims to which this paragraph applies, nor shall it be construed as waiving the sovereign immunity of either party with respect to third-party claims that may be brought against it.

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ANNEX D

Excerpts from the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) "Protocol on Claims, Legal Proceedings and Indemnification[22]

ARTICLE 2

  1. With the exception of claims for injury or damage against individuals arising from omissions or acts of such individuals done with intent to cause injury or damage, the Russian Party shall bring no claims or legal proceedings of any kind against the Contributors and their personnel or contractors, subcontractors, consultants, suppliers or subsuppliers of equipment, goods or services at any tier and their personnel, for any loss or damage of whatsoever nature, including but not limited to personal injury, loss of life, direct, indirect and consequential damage to property owned by the Russian Federation arising from activities undertaken pursuant to the Agreement. This paragraph shall not apply to the enforcement of the express provisions of a contract.
  2. With the exception of claims for Nuclear Damage against individuals arising from omissions or acts of such individuals done with intent to cause damage, the Russian Party shall provide for the adequate legal defence of and indemnify, and shall bring no claims or legal proceedings against the Contributors and their personnel, or any contractors, subcontractors, consultants, suppliers, or subsuppliers of equipment, goods or services at any tier and their personnel in connection with third-party claims, in any court or forum, arising from activities undertaken pursuant to the Agreement, for Nuclear Damage occurring within or outside the territory of the Russian Federation, that results from a Nuclear Incident occurring within the territory of the Russian Federation.

* * * * *

  1. Contributors, contractors, subcontractors, consultants, suppliers or subsuppliers of equipment, goods or services at any tier and their personnel may refer any dispute concerning the implementation of obligations under this Article to arbitration in accordance with UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, if such dispute has not been resolved amicably within ninety days of its submission to the Russian Party. Any arbitration award shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute.

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ANNEX E

Excerpts from the Liability Protocol to the Plutonium Disposition Agreement

SECTION II - LIABILITY

  1. Except as specified in paragraph 3 of this Section, the Government of the Russian Federation shall bring no claims or legal proceedings of any kind against the Government of the United States of America, its personnel, its contractors and personnel of those contractors, for any loss or damage whatsoever nature, including (but not limited to) personal injury, loss of life, or direct, indirect, or consequential damage caused to property of the Government of the Russian Federation, arising out of activities undertaken pursuant to the Agreement. This paragraph shall not apply to the enforcement of the express provisions of a contract.
  2. Except as specified in paragraph 3 of this Section, the Government of the Russian Federation shall provide for the adequate legal defense of and indemnify, and shall bring no claims or legal proceedings against, the Government of the United States of America, its personnel, its contractors and personnel of those contractors, in connection with third party claims, in any court or forum, arising out of activities undertaken pursuant to the Agreement, for nuclear damage occurring within or outside the territory of the Russian Federation . . . .
  3. In any case when the Government of the Russian Federation believes that the acts or omissions of an employee of the Government of the United States of America or an employee of a contractor of the Government of the United States of America caused and were done with intent to cause personal injury, loss of life, or damage:
    1. The Russian Party shall provide written notification to the U.S. Party that identifies the employee and describes the incident, the specific acts or omissions of said employee, and the personal injury, loss of life or damage, and provides an assessment with relevant explanations that the acts or omissions were done with intent to cause personal injury, loss of life, or damage;
    2. The Parties shall as appropriate exchange information, and shall at the request of either of them hold prompt consultations and attempt to achieve a mutual understanding within 90 days of the notification;
    3. During the period specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the Government of the Russian Federation shall not be required to provide for the legal defense of or indemnify said employee in the connection with this incident; and
    4. If a mutual understanding is not reached within 90 days of the notification, paragraphs 1 and 2 of this section shall not apply to said employee in connection with this incident.
  4. The Parties shall hold prompt consultations, as appropriate or upon the request of either of them, on claims or legal proceedings arising out of activities undertaken pursuant to the Agreement.

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Endnotes

[1] Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Management of Plutonium that has been Withdrawn from Nuclear Military Programs, 24 July 1998, accessed at: http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/plutdisp/98Ag.htm.

[2] Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Nuclear Cities Initiative, 22 September 1998, accessed at: http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/nuc_city/initiati.htm.

[3] Specifically, Article 9 of the plutonium disposition technical cooperation agreement and Article 8 of the Nuclear Cities agreement provided the protections to the US government, "its personnel or its contractors, sub-contractors, consultants, suppliers, or subsuppliers of equipment or services at any tier and their personnel."

[4] PSTC Agreement, op. cit., note 1; and NCI Agreement, op. cit., note 1.

[5] Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation, with Implementing Agreements and Annexes, 17 June 1992. This agreement was extended through June 2006 by a protocol signed 15-16 June 1999. The liability provisions can be viewed in Annex A.

[6] This is because most US nuclear nonproliferation programs in Russia started out as Department of Defense programs that are covered by the CTR umbrella. The NCI and PSTC programs are exceptions; they started out as Department of Energy programs, and Russia would not accept the blanket CTR-type liability provision when the agreements on them were made. However, it should be noted that the plutonium disposition agreement, whereby the US and Russia are each to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium, lacked a built-in liability protocol. A stand alone liability agreement entered into force on 15 September 2006. See the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, accessed at: http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/plutdisp/pudispft.pdf. This agreement limits the activities to be undertaken before the liability agreement enters into force.

[7] Egil Tronstad and Cristina Chuen, "The Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR)," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, accessed at: http://cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/030604.htm#fn8.

[8] Office of Senator Pete V. Domenici, "Domenici: Long-Awaited US-Russia Plutonium Liability Agreement is Critical Step in Right Direction," 19 July 2005, accessed at: http://domenici.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=240897.

[9] US Department of Energy, "U.S. and Russia Sign Liability Protocol," 15 September 2006, accessed at: http://www.energy.gov/news/4160.htm.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, 15 September 2006.

[12] Ibid.

[13] R. Douglas Brubaker and Leonard S. Spector, "Liability and Western Nonproliferation Assistance to Russia: Time for a Fresh Look?" Nonproliferation Review, Volume 10, Number 1, pp. 2 and 22, accessed at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol10/101/101brub.pdf.

[14] Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[15] Ibid., pp. 27-28.

[16] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

[17] US House of Representatives, "Report 108-357: Making Appropriations for Energy and Water Development for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2004, and for Other Purposes," 7 November 2003, p. 161, accessed at: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_reports&docid=f:hr357.108.pdf.

[18] Group of Eight Leaders, "The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Kananaskis, Canada, 27 June 2002, accessed at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Art%2002%20gp_stat-en.pdf.

[19] Matthew Bunn, "Stabilizing Employment for Nuclear Personnel: The Nuclear Cities Initiative," Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed at: http://nti.org/e_research/cnwm/stabilizing/nci.asp.

[20] As printed in endnote 3 of R. Douglas Brubaker and Leonard S. Spector, op. cit., note 13.

[21] NCI Agreement, op. cit., note 2.

[22] Protocol on Claims, Legal Proceedings and Indemnification to the Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russia Federation, accessed at: http://www.sgpproject.org/MNEPR_Protocol.pdf.

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Last Updated on June 1, 2007