SECURITY CONTEXT:

THE US–JAPAN ALLIANCE, EXTENDED DETERRENCE, AND REGIONAL FACTORS

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Japan's Future Strategic Options and the US–Japan Alliance

Sheila A. Smith

Change is the operative word today when thinking of Japan's security policy planning. Undoubtedly, the public debate in Japan about its security choices is animated and many of the ideas seem new and potentially transformative. The rhetoric of change has given way to actions that suggest a new consensus among Japan's political leaders on the need for a pragmatic—rather than an idealistic—approach to security policy and a new interest in a security strategy for the twenty-first century that reflects Japan's national interests.[1]

For the most part, this broad debate over Japan's future strategic choices is the product of changes in Japan's security environment. The US–Japan alliance remains the foundation of strategic thinking, but the tasks faced by alliance planners have multiplied over the last decade. Beyond the narrow and relatively easily defined purpose of Japan's national defense, Japanese security planners must now coordinate with Washington on a broad security agenda: the post-Cold War dynamics of the Asia-Pacific security order, the prevention of nuclear and missile proliferation by North Korea, a global war on terrorism, and post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has emerged as one of President Bush's closest confidantes in the Asia-Pacific, and has worked hard to ensure that Japan's security concerns remain high on Washington's regional policy priorities. Moreover, from being dubbed a reluctant ally and a checkbook power during the first Gulf War in the early 1990s, Tokyo has emerged today as one of Washington's closest and most reliable partners during the second Gulf War.

In the midst of these complex international currents, the security debate within Japan has been lively. One of the most notable new topics is the question of Japan's nuclear option. Indeed, some prominent political leaders in Japan—some in office and some not—have been publicly commenting on the possibility. The likelihood that Japan will opt for a nuclear future continues to

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[1] See *Basic Strategies for Japan's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy*, prepared by the Prime Minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations, released November 28, 2002. Executive Summary in English available at: www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2002/1128tf_e.html.

be small. But the signals are clear: the intermittent commentary by political leaders suggests simply that the nuclear option should not be discounted if the world should turn out to be threatening, volatile, and increasingly nuclearized.

Indeed, the distinctive dimension of today's debate in Japan is the fear of a regional nuclear arms race. China's nuclear modernization program has Japanese security planners worried about Beijing's longer-term regional aspirations. The worry is that China has decided to deploy larger numbers of nuclear-capable missiles as a way of offsetting the future deployment in and around Japan of a missile defense system. In its most recent assessment, the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) noted reasons for optimism about China's future, but also noted that China's military ambitions in the region were in question. Of particular concern to the JDA is China's nuclear modernization program.[2]

But concerns about China reverberate more broadly among Japan's political leaders.[3] China's military ambitions were the focal point of one Japanese politician's ire last year. Ichiro Ozawa, former leader of the Liberal Party and now member of the Democratic Party of Japan, suggested that "if China gets too inflated," the Japanese people will respond. He noted that it would be easy for Japan to produce nuclear weapons, and suggested that there was enough plutonium at Japan's nuclear plants to generate thousands of nuclear warheads.[4]

Just months later, Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda commented publicly that Japan's commitment to remaining a non-nuclear power was a policy choice, one that could be revisited if the Japanese people so wished. Although Fukuda's comments were far less provocative than Ozawa's, his position in the Cabinet enhanced their impact. The meaning of Fukuda's comment puzzled many as they came when India and Pakistan seemed on the brink of a nuclear test of wills and as the World Cup soccer match, cosponsored by Japan and South Korea, was opening. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi dismissed Fukuda's comments, but did not reprimand him, fueling speculation that they were deliberately timed. The governments of China and South Korea conveyed deep concern about the

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[2] The 2003 Defense Agency white paper states this concern over the ultimate aim of China's nuclear modernization program as follows: "China has been modernizing its nuclear and missile forces as well as its naval and air forces. Careful deliberation should go into determining whether the objective of this modernization exceeds the scope necessary for the defense of China, and future developments in this area merit special attention." *Defense of Japan 2003 (Summary),* Japanese Defense Agency (provisional English translation), 10.

[3] In 2001, then Finance Minister Shiokawa wondered aloud in whether or not Japan should be giving such immense amounts of development assistance to countries that point missiles at it, a direct reference to the Chinese military build-up and the threat it produces for Japan.

[4] In addition to the media attention these remarks received in Japan, Ozawa's comments were reported in a wide range of overseas media, including *Reuters Wire Service*, "Politician says Japanese nukes could counter China," on April 6, 2002; the *Singapore Straits Times*, "Japan can easily produce 7,000 nuclear bombs," April 10, 2002; and, *Business Week*, "A Japanese Nuke: No Longer Unthinkable," April 11, 2002.

remarks, and ultimately, this fed into deeper and longstanding worries about Japan's longer-term intentions. To counter regional concerns, Prime Minister Koizumi and his Cabinet endorsed a document in June 2002 that stated that the Japanese constitution forbids the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) from possessing any military arms, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which were meant to be used for the lethal destruction of foreign territory.[5] Clearly, Koizumi felt the need to reassure Japan's neighbors that it did not intend to change its nuclear policy.

But in the short run, it is Japan's volatile neighbor, North Korea, which is having the most immediate impact on Japanese threat perceptions. Much of Japan is fully within range of Pyongyang's ballistic missiles, one of which flew over the country in 1998, causing widespread concern about the adequacy of Japan's defense preparations. A more recent concern that North Korea will succeed in its effort to develop a viable nuclear weapons program has prompted much debate in the Japanese press over how Japan can defend itself against a missile attack. Interestingly, much of the debate over how to change Japanese security policies to cope with the direct threat posed by North Korea is being led by the current Director-General of the JDA, Shigeru Ishiba. His argument that Japan would need to consider a "preemptive strike" should North Korea (or any other country) begin preparations for an attack on Japan seems surprisingly forthright for a sitting Cabinet Minister. But the prescription does not seem so outrageous to many in Japan who now see that their national security policymakers seem too hesitant in considering the full range of military options available to counter direct threats to Japan.

Despite this public commentary within Japan, however, the Japanese government remains committed to working with the United States and other regional partners to manage challenges to the regional security order. While no one in the region wants a nuclear North Korea, there may be little outside forces can do to prevent it should Pyongyang move in that direction. As the countries of Northeast Asia and the United States confront a North Korea that seems determined to develop a nuclear arsenal, the idea of a nuclear arms race in the region seems less far-fetched than at any time since the beginning of the nuclear era. In a turbulent Northeast Asia, Japan's long-term security is much less certain, and its future choices—including the nuclear option—need to take into consideration a strategic setting that could change rapidly.

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[5] *Kyodo News Service*, June 12, 2002.

RHETORIC AND REALITY: JAPAN'S STRATEGIC CHOICE IN A NUCLEAR WORLD

The US–Japan alliance remains the primary vehicle within which Japan has sought to pursue its national security, and today, the Koizumi administration continues to emphasize its role as the foundation of Japan's security planning. Tokyo policymakers have long seen the bilateral alliance as the best means for contending with the nuclear revolution that redefined international security relations after World War Two. For half a century, Japan's view of that nuclear world has been viewed through the prism of its alliance with the United States. While independent nuclear policy reviews have been conducted over the years, Japan's policy of strategic dependence on US nuclear deterrence continues to emerge among Japan's senior decision makers as the best option for insuring against nuclear threats.

Japan's strategic options are not much different today than they have been over the past fifty years. Throughout the Cold War, Tokyo policymakers confronted the dilemmas of the nuclear revolution in much the same way as other US allies, but they have done so quietly. Unlike the European strategic debate over the impact of the nuclear revolution and the reliability of US nuclear protection in case of war, there has been a virtual silence on this issue in Japan. Moreover, government policy statements have not revealed the strategic calculus that is at the heart of Japan's security planning. How has Japan assessed its environment, and the nuclear revolution? How would a renewed wave of nuclear proliferation affect Japan, and its thinking about the advantages or disadvantages of nuclear weapons? So little is known about Japan's strategic assessment of the nuclear era that it is difficult to discern under what circumstances Japan might abandon its commitment to being a non-nuclear power.

Japan's political leaders have never ruled out the possibility that some day the nuclear option might become necessary "should international circumstances warrant it." Political leaders have occasionally taken issue with the prevailing conventional wisdom in Japan that the postwar constitution made this option unthinkable. The most direct effort to deny that the Constitution prevented Japan from exercising the option of acquiring nuclear weapons was Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's statement in the Diet in 1957. But it was only a decade later that another Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato announced what came to be seen as a declaration of Japan's commitment to a non-nuclear policy, the Three Non-nuclear Principles.

Japan's option of developing nuclear weapons continued to be examined by security planners, however. Indeed, Prime Minister Sato undertook one of the most extensive formal reviews that has come to public attention exactly at the

time he adopted the Three Non-nuclear Principles.[6] Since then, other major security policy reviews have occurred, some of which incorporated a review of Japan's nuclear options. These reviews have been prompted mostly by changes in Japan's environment, but the most significant nuclear policy reviews were instigated by the creation of a nuclear nonproliferation regime in the early 1970s, and its extension in the early 1990s. As Japan prepared to become a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the impact of publicly abandoning the nuclear option took on new urgency, and within the JDA and other bureaucracies, studies were initiated to ascertain the long-term consequences of this decision for Japan. While information about these nuclear policy reviews has recently made its way into the press, it is still unclear how frequently and to what degree of specificity Japanese policymakers have explored the option of a nuclear weapons program. But it is also evident that the three non-nuclear principles put forward by the Japanese government have not prevented repeated reassessment of the nuclear option.

Until the North Korean nuclear effort gained momentum in the early to mid-1990s, Tokyo policymakers had little reason to believe that Japan was under direct threat of a nuclear attack. When the Sato Cabinet commissioned its policy review, the world looked considerably different than it does today. Still there is remarkable consistency in the conclusions reached in subsequent policy reviews. Moreover, the factors that influence these conclusions are also remarkably constant over time. First, Japan's own geographic place and the lack of strategic depth afforded the island nation suggest little advantage for land-based ballistic missile systems. Second, given the fears of Japan's neighbors about the possibility of a return to a more assertive military posture, the decision to acquire nuclear weapons by Japan would trigger the security dilemma, rather than mitigate it. In other words, the option to "go nuclear" would detract from Japanese security rather than enhance it. Third, the reliability of the US–Japan security alliance provides adequate deterrence against nuclear threat or attack. US commitment to Japan's defense, and the deployment of US forces on Japanese soil, would deter aggression more effectively than any other option, including the nuclear one. Thus, the policy prescription that resulted was to ensure that the US–Japan alliance was durable. Effective implementation of the security treaty, and repeated articulations of the US commitment to Japan's defense, would deter any potential nuclear aggression.

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[6] At the request of the Prime Minister, several academic analysts were asked to consider the pros and cons to Japan of acquiring nuclear weapons. For the details of this policy review, and an analysis of Japan's strategic assessment regarding the value of nuclear weapons to its security, see Yuri Kase, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report," *The Nonproliferation Review*, (Summer 2001), Monterey Institute for International Studies.

For these reasons, Japan's choice for the past fifty or more years has been to remain a non-nuclear power. During the Cold War, Tokyo relied on the United States to provide deterrence against nuclear threat or attack, and like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies concentrated its own national resources and planning on enhancing its own military's ability to complement US strategic power in the Asian region by providing for national defense. The basing of US air and naval forces on Japanese territory created a strong offensive capability that was to Japan's advantage. Public sensitivities to nuclear weapons focused on these US forces, and whether or not they were nuclear armed. The public debate over nuclear weapons in much of the postwar period was less over whether or not to develop Japan's own weapons, but rather to what extent the Japanese government was willing to endorse US nuclear policy priorities.

Yet, unlike the NATO alliance, Tokyo policymakers and security analysts have neither openly debated the impact of the Cold War nuclear competition on Japan's security, nor have they drawn out the implications of changes in the force postures of their ally, the United States, for the extension of nuclear deterrence to Japan. In contrast to Washington's other allies in the Cold War, there was even less support for nuclear deployments on Japanese soil as a means of demonstrating the strength of US extended nuclear deterrence. Rather, in response to intense public sensitivity over US nuclear deployments, the Japanese government in the revised bilateral security treaty signed in 1960 requested official "prior consultation" over any US decision that involved bringing nuclear weapons into Japan.[7] Moreover, a decade later, when the US agreed to revert Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, Japan's Prime Minister, Eisaku Sato, formally declared that these islands—long thought to have been storage bases for US nuclear weapons since the early Cold War years—were returned to Japan "nuclear free."

This public desire for Japanese government control over US military deployments and operations, nuclear in particular, was the impetus for the government's statement of its Three Non-nuclear Principles. Preparing to negotiate the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, Prime Minister Sato agreed in 1967 to formally adopt these principles in an effort to assure his critics that US bases in Okinawa would be cleansed of any nuclear weapons stored there. While the first two principles—that Japan would neither manufacture nor

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[7] When the bilateral security treaty was revised in 1960, the Japanese government was under intense domestic pressure to include some provision for vetoing the introduction of US nuclear forces on Japanese territory. Citizen complaints about the behavior of US forces, coupled with the desire to avoid being "entrapped" in a US war in Asia, made it imperative that the Japanese government devises some mechanism in the alliance that would allow for their voice in the deployments of US forces.

possess nuclear weapons—was of little surprise to outside observers, the Japanese government's public announcement that it would not allow the introduction of nuclear weapons by other countries (the third principle) was unexpected given Japan's dependence on the US nuclear umbrella. For decades, this principle was widely believed to constrain the Japanese government from giving the US permission to use Japanese territory as a base for US nuclear forces.

Again, at a time when Europe was beginning to consider the merits of more European involvement in and control over the doctrine that would determine when and how nuclear weapons may be used from their territory, Japan's political leaders were signaling to their citizens as well as to countries surrounding Japan that they were not interested in creating greater integration of US strategic forces with Japan's own national military. Japanese security planners treated their strategic vulnerability differently, and while domestic politics were largely responsible for this, there is also little evidence to suggest that these planners saw the dynamics of their dependence on the US nuclear umbrella in the same way as their counterparts in Europe.

There is little in the public statements that would suggest that Japanese planners ever considered the impact of nuclear weapons on their forces. This silence seems deafening in contrast to US allies in Europe, and even in the Republic of Korea (ROK), where the battlefield use of nuclear weapons could have devastating consequences. What glimpses we do have of the kind of thinking that motivates security planners in Japan, especially regarding the impact of nuclear weapons on Japanese security, are rare. This absence of a public—if specialized—strategic debate in Japan has suggested to many a highly secretive process of deliberations, one that made many worry that Japan could be on the verge of "going nuclear" and it was simply a matter of time before this became public. In fact, Japan's security choices have not been wrapped in secrecy so much as they have been embedded in the framework of the US–Japan alliance. Having embarked in the early Cold War era on a policy of strategic dependence on the United States, and on a policy of limited purpose for its own national military, policymakers in Tokyo have worked hard over the years to assure its public and its neighbors that they have no attention of deviating from this policy choice.

JAPAN'S STRATEGIC CALCULUS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALLIANCE COOPERATION

But there are other moments, and other issues, that reveal the kinds of factors that shaped Japanese thinking on the nuclear revolution. Despite domestic sensitivity to nuclear weapons, security policymakers had to confront

events that called for them to interpret their own security needs in light of US strategic competition with the former Soviet Union.

Nuclear weapons, and the global nuclear balance, had to be factored into Japanese security planning in several ways. First, Japan's military had to imagine war during the nuclear era, and had to develop a war fighting doctrine based on this vision. Implicitly, this meant that Japanese security planners had to consider other states' nuclear arsenals when they made judgments about the circumstances under which Japan might be involved in a conflict, the potential role of nuclear weapons in a contingency, and the operational doctrine and goals developed for the SDF. Second, Japan's security policymakers also had to ensure that US strategic planners represented their interests as they sought to affect the global strategic balance. During the Cold War, this took the form of ensuring a US troop presence in Asia, as well as ensuring that Washington did all it could to remove those threats that seemed particularly designed to haunt America's allies. A good example was the impact of Soviet INF (the SS-20 missiles). Like their European counterparts, Japan had to make up its mind about whether or not this new missile made it more or less vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. Finally, and most recently, Tokyo's security planners have had to think about the possibility of moving beyond the nuclear "balance of terror" that characterized the latter half of the twentieth century. The idea that missile defense—the possibility of a technological breakthrough that would mitigate the threat of nuclear weapons—could offer an avenue for avoiding the nuclear option entirely was persuasive in some quarters. But the JDA was much more cautious about the long-term significance of ballistic missile defense for Japan's security. And yet, today Japan sees a limited ballistic missile defense capability as a significant enhancement to its ability to deter—and defend—against ballistic missile attacks from rogue states, in particular North Korea. Should missile defense technology prove to be vastly more effective than it is today, it could allow Japan to escape the costly dilemma of nuclearization altogether.

Japan's War Fighting Goals in a Nuclear World

Japan's postwar defense planning has been expressed most often in terms of weapons acquisitions plans and budgets, and in terms of operational studies and exercises with US forces in and around Japan. The strategic calculus that underpinned Japan's war-fighting goals was less than obvious, but it was nonetheless discernible from the policy statements that accompanied planning revisions during the Cold War.

Public statements on Japan's defense needs made oblique reference to the nuclear era, and the public battles over policy were focused not so much on the world outside of Japan, as on the effectiveness of civilian control over the

policymaking process within Japan.[8] Moreover, the voices that might have helped clarify Japan's own strategic needs were kept out of public debates, foremost among these excluded voices were the uniformed professionals of the SDF. Thus, the practicalities of force posture design, for example, were described not in terms of their operational efficacy, but rather in terms of their budgetary impact. The Basic National Defense Plan issued in 1957 made no reference to the advent of nuclear weapons. Likewise, subsequent defense plans only made a passing reference to the kind of scenario that Japan might face should a major Cold War conflict arise, and it was in terms of a local or regional war. Thus, the aim was to build a postwar Japanese military that would be prepared to cope with a local or regional conflict "with conventional forces." The premise of this approach, of course, was that the United States would provide the nuclear umbrella within which these forces would operate.

When the next major policy statement was negotiated in 1976, termed the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), greater effort was made to lay out the logic behind Japan's defense policy. The Japanese government's assessment of the US–Soviet military balance included a reference to the stabilizing impact of their ability to deter each other from the use of nuclear weapons.[9] The nuclear balance in the region between the three major powers, the United States, the former Soviet Union, and China was also described as a source of stability. As a result of this military balance, including the capability to deter nuclear war, and of the various efforts to stabilize international relations, the NDPO stated that "the possibility that an all-out war between the East and the West, or the eruption of a major armed conflict that could lead to such an all-out war was minimal."[10] Based on this assessment, Japan's defense planners in the mid-1970s thought that their country's defenses could best be provided through a deterrent strategy that relied on the "maintenance of a reliable security relationship with the United States, and with efforts to create a force posture that could effectively implement" security cooperation within the alliance.[11] But to "meet nuclear threats, Japan would depend upon the nuclear deterrent forces of

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[8] See Sheila Smith, *Borrowed Power: The US-Japan Alliance and the Reconstruction of the Japanese State* (forthcoming).

[9] The 1976 National Defense Program Outline can be found in Japanese in the annual Defense Agency White Paper (*Boei Hakusho*) or in the annual *Boei Handobukku* (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha). The second of this policy statement focuses on the International Situation, and it is here that the US–Soviet nuclear balance is discussed.

[10] "Showa 52-nendo iko ni Kakawaru Boei Keikaku no Taiko ni tsuite [Defense Planning After Showa Year 52]," taken from *Boei Handobukku* (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, Heisei Year 9), 20.

[11] *Ibid.*

the United States."[12] It is this basic formula that has informed Japan's strategic assessment with regard to nuclear weapons ever since.

The circumstances that might suggest the need for Japan to go nuclear, however, remain somewhat vague. This is, in part, because the broader question of what factors influence Japan's strategic planning and how the process of evaluating policy choices in Japan takes place, remains poorly understood. For the first two decades of the post-World War Two era, Japan and its Defense Agency concentrated on rebuilding its national military. This rearmament process consisted of four Defense Build-up Plans, plans that were designed within the context of the Cold War. By the mid-1970s, Japan sought to create goals for this newly equipped SDF that enabled it to sustain a "peacetime" defense posture, while engaging the United States in dialogue over how the two militaries might act jointly in case of the need to defend Japan from external aggression.[13] The latter planning exercises took the form of bilateral military "studies" and exercises between the respective services of the two militaries throughout the 1980s. It was not until the Cold War ended that the two allies began to confront the need to develop more formal contingency plans in case of a crisis or war in and around Japan. This process of integrating war plans continues to be the focus of bilateral military policy today. Japan's own lack of contingency planning procedures for war fighting beyond its national territory made it necessary to pass new administrative legislation in 1999 that would create the framework for US–Japan operational planning in cases of a crisis or conflict "in the area surrounding Japan," most obviously the Korean peninsula.

Assessment of Japan's defense needs was based on a debate over how to interpret the circumstances and the likelihood that Japan would be involved in a war. And, from early on, contingency planning or "studies" as they were called within the Defense Agency, considered how conflicts elsewhere might spill over to Japan. The scale and the unfolding of this scenario was all contingent on the US response, and thus the thinking of Japan's military planners revolved around a loose geographical division of labor that had the SDF acting on Japanese territory while US forces were engaged on the front lines.

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[12] *Ibid.*

[13] The postwar development goal of Japan's Self-Defense Force was its "exclusive defense" mission. For the first two decades, the basic capabilities of Japan's postwar military had to be rebuilt from scratch. It was not until the 1970s that their operations needs and mission could be coordinated with the US military, and the defense cooperation outlined in Article 5 of the bilateral security treaty could be more carefully considered. See Sheila Smith, *Borrowed Power:The US-Japan Alliance and the Reconstruction of the Japanese State* (forthcoming).

FROM "SWORD AND SHIELD" TO INTEGRATED OPERATIONS

The strategic underpinnings of Japan's security planning have long been based on a professional assessment of threat, and of the resources and capabilities that Japan could bring to bear to affect the world around it. In a nuclear world, Japan depended on the United States to perform offensive operations beyond Japanese territory, and of course, to deter nuclear threat or attack. This division of labor was referred to often as the "sword and shield" approach to operational coordination. And yet, through the late 1970s, Japanese planners had had little occasion to discuss openly with their US counterparts actual scenarios in which the alliance might be triggered. The 1978 US–Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, an agreed upon framework for bilateral coordination of defense cooperation mechanisms, signaled a turning point in the implementation of military cooperation in the alliance. It began what would become a long and sometimes frustrating process of joint studies and joint exercises that ultimately forged a common consensus between the Japanese and US militaries over the circumstances under which the two allies might need to work together.

But more than the process by which the two militaries operated, Tokyo had cast its strategic fate early in the Cold War with the United States, and this premise informed Japan's security planning for more than a half century. The operating assumption of Japan's military planning was that a conflict involving Japan would only arise in the context of a broader war. The United States, it was assumed, would already be involved in that war, and when it arrived at Japan's shores, US forces would be there to assist Japan in its defense.

Moreover, the location of US forces on Japanese territory, and throughout the Asia-Pacific region, created a framework within which Japan could concentrate on developing its own defensive military capability. Thus, strategic planning in Tokyo has been contingent on, and at times explicitly complementary to, Washington's strategic priorities and goals. But at the heart of Japanese strategic thinking was this notion of dependence on the United States, and of integrated—if nationally controlled—military operations to defend Japan's interests and territory.

The scenario that has consistently animated Japanese security planning was a crisis or conflict on the Korean peninsula. This scenario was the focal point of concern for SDF planners long before the Guidelines process was initiated. In 1968, in a celebrated Diet discussion of uniformed planning scenarios, it was publicly revealed that the Japanese military saw a conflict or crisis on the Korean peninsula as the most likely case in which Japan would be drawn into a Cold War conflict. What was striking about the study, however, was the extent to which the SDF were unaware of US contingency planning. Other US allies

during the Cold War, such as the NATO allies in Europe and the ROK in Asia, already had integrated war-fighting plans by the end of the 1960s. In part, this was due to the greater potential for the outbreak of war in these two theaters. But Japan's own restrictions with regard to its military, as well as its slow recovery of military capability in the aftermath of World War Two, made joint contingency planning impossible.

Significantly, this study also revealed how the SDF judged the outcome of a potential conflict on the Korean peninsulas. Rather than an advocacy piece for greater Japanese military capability, or for more lethal and/or further reaching weapons systems, the Mitsuya Study focused instead on how Japan could best contribute to facilitating US strategic superiority should a conflict erupt. The United States winning a conflict on the Korean Peninsula was deemed to be in Japan's own security interests, and therefore, the question became how to help US forces achieve that end. The key for SDF planners, in terms of the outcome of the conflict, was the Japanese decision on the use of US bases on Japanese territory. Thus, the Japanese government, it was argued, should give the US military unrestricted access to and use of its bases.

This basic approach to how a conflict might erupt on the Korean Peninsula, and on how the United States and Japan might work together, has not really changed. What has changed is the willingness of Tokyo to make the political decisions needed to implement this scenario. Not long after the end of the Cold War, Tokyo policymakers and their counterparts in Washington began to realize the need for a redefinition of the alliance and its goals in a post-Cold War Asia. Nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1993 and 1994, and the unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang, translated this policy goal into an agenda for alliance policy change. Again, in 1996, as the United States and the PRC put their militaries on alert across the Taiwan Strait, Japanese policymakers had to confront the possibility that they would be asked to join the United States in a regional contingency, and the possibility of that contingency seemed much more likely. While a basic consensus emerged in the case of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, there are still some reservations among Japan's political leaders as to the circumstances under which Japan might participate in a military confrontation with China should a Taiwan crisis lead to open hostilities. But in terms of policy planning goals, these regional crises prompted a process of bilateral negotiations, culminating in the new Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation. The legal changes needed to implement these Guidelines were then discussed in the Diet, and passed in 1999.

Overshadowing these post-Cold War regional crises, of course, have been the events of September 11, 2001, and the transformation in US policy that resulted. In the two years since, Japanese security planners have accelerated

their own efforts to address contingency planning problems, and have redefined the acceptable parameters for operations by the SDF in support of broader global security interests shared with the United States. This new range of common operations with the United States has significant implications for the premises of Japan's own war planning.

Today, the vision emerging in both Washington and Tokyo is a more integrated division of labor between Japanese and US military forces, and the old concept of the United States and Japanese forces acting separately as sword and shield is giving way to a search for a new operational vision. This will ultimately affect the way in which potential adversaries such as North Korea view the way in which Japan and/or the US might respond to a direct threat to Japan, either nuclear or conventional. For much of the Cold War, the nuclear division of labor for the US–Japan alliance was clear-cut, and uncontentious. The United States had long-range strategic strike capabilities (conventional as well as nuclear), and Japan provided rear-area (logistical and supply) support for these forces. The Japanese military would provide defense capabilities (all conventional forces) sufficient to protect their own country, as well as US bases located there. This sword and shield approach was designed to provide a combined military capability that would satisfy Japan's need for deterrence and, if necessary, war fighting capability. It would also satisfy domestic critics that the Japanese government continued to maintain a discrete national military dedicated solely to the task of self-defense. But at the level of operational planning, the SDF realized that this was an illogical way to consider how the two militaries might operate together in a contingency. At the level of peacetime studies and exercises, this image of distinct yet complementary military forces gave way in the latter decade of the Cold War to a more integrated conception of combined military forces. As the integrated exercises of the 1980s began to prove, the Japanese Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces were a vital part of an integrated combined military force that effectively covered Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific Ocean.

But today, the real question for Japan's security planners is the one posed by North Korea, and that is what would be the formula for a joint US–Japanese response should Japan be targeted for attack first. In the old vision of a sword and shield, it was always the United States that was engaged first in offensive operations beyond Japanese territory. To the extent that Japan became involved in war, it was gradually and later brought into the conflict. Pyongyang's development of a considerable supply of Nodong missiles, capable of reaching Tokyo, and its testing of the Taepodong over Japanese territory, presents another possibility. Japan could be the first to be attacked, rather than the last to be involved, in a conflict with North Korea. Thus, as Japan's outspoken Defense Agency Director-General Ishiba has noted recently, early and perhaps

independent Japanese military action might be called for, or a US preemptive strike might also be seen as the most desirable course of action. In either case, the creation of a new vision for the US and Japanese militaries seems to be called for, one that presents North Korea with a seemingly integrated response—neither discernible as Japanese or as American—and it is this new vision that Director-General Ishiba is beginning to advocate.

Efforts to Reduce Nuclear Threat

The US–Japan alliance has served as the foundation of Japan's strategy for more than half a century, and has provided the basis upon which postwar Japanese military planning has been revamped. But the United States and Japan have also worked together to reduce nuclear threat. And when Tokyo policymakers at times have had to advocate Japan's strategic interests in Washington, they did this quietly.

Yet Tokyo has also been discriminating in terms of its willingness to acknowledge the direct threat to Japan by nuclear states. It is worth noting, for example, that Japan's political leaders were careful during the early decades of the Cold War to avoid identifying Chinese nuclear capability as a threat. Even when China became a nuclear state, Japan's leaders were careful to articulate a cautious response. Japan's well-known security "hardliner," Yasuhiro Nakasone, when he headed the JDA in 1970, played down the developing Chinese nuclear arsenal by publicly stating that he did not believe that China intended to threaten Japan. By the 1980s, relatively late in the Cold War, Japan identified the Soviet Union and its nuclear arsenal only as a "potential threat"—despite the deeply felt antagonism towards the Russians as a consequence of their behavior in the final days of World War Two.[14] By focusing instead on the larger question of the Cold War military balance, Japan could sidestep the question of how to cope with states around it that had significant nuclear capabilities.

Not only did Japanese policymakers avoid making nuclear weapons (and the neighboring states that maintained them) into threats, they also avoided giving too much importance to the way in which the US nuclear umbrella worked. Again, unlike Europe, there was little theorizing in Japan about how to "couple" US nuclear forces to the capabilities of the SDF. In other words, the notion of an escalatory ladder of force, beginning at the conventional level and going up to the nuclear level, was not discussed as part of scenario planning. The relationship between US nuclear forces and Japan's conventional forces

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[14] Little information is known about how Japan's security planners considered the notion that the Republic of Korea was considering its own nuclear project, or if this was even a factor in Japan's assessment of its security environment.

took decades to be worked out. Still, the idea of doing whatever necessary to ensure the US commitment to Japan's defense was integral to Japanese thinking from the beginning of the Cold War. Initially, the presence of approximately 260,000 US forces on Japanese soil in 1952 meant that little else needed to be done to demonstrate the strength of the US commitment. Indeed it wasn't until 1960 that an explicit commitment was incorporated in the bilateral treaty. But tension over the location and the deployment of US nuclear forces within Japan made it implausible that large-scale deployments of nuclear and nuclear-capable forces would be used to cement US extended deterrence.

As the US and the former Soviet Union began to move in the direction of arms control, and a negotiated balance of nuclear power, Japan also had to contend with the impact of decreasing nuclear arsenals and how this might impact its security. One of the most vivid cases of Japanese involvement in the development of US arms control positions was the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement in the early 1980s.[15] The Japanese position on the relationship between nuclear forces and Japan's own security had to be considered most carefully as the US worked to remove Soviet SS-20 missiles from the European theater. This issue went virtually unnoticed by the Japanese public, but within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concern grew over whether or not the United States might negotiate an agreement that would take these new INF out of Europe but allow them to stay in Asia. For Japan, however, this was a diplomatic initiative, not one that engaged Japan's uniformed or civilian planners. Only later did the Defense Agency provide its assessment of the impact of the INF debate on Japan's security.[16]

Japan's position on these negotiations focused on the political utility of presenting the Western Alliance as a united front. Tokyo quite openly acknowledged that the new Soviet missile deployments that triggered such a sense of urgency in Europe did not produce an added sense of insecurity in Asia. Rather the concern was that Washington would sacrifice the interests of its Asian allies in its negotiations with Moscow by accepting an agreement that would limit deployments in the European theater. In other words, it was not the fear of "decoupling" the United States from its allies in Asia that prompted then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone to emphasize that the "security of the West

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[15] The crucial distinction in Japanese perception of the dictates of extended deterrence as compared to the NATO allies was in the regional conventional balance of forces in Asia. For a succinct articulation of this approach to the regional military balance, see Masataka Kosaka, "Theater Nuclear Weapons and Japan's Defense Policy," in Richard Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, editors, *The Soviet Far East Military Build-up: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security* (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1986).

[16] For a full public account of that assessment, see "Seniki Kaku to Nihon no Anzen Hosho," in *Boei Nenkan* (1984) (Tokyo: Boei Nenkan Kankokaihen, 1984), 1-117.

was indivisible" at the Williamsburg Summit in 1984. It was the fear that Japan's superpower ally would act on behalf of European security interests to the detriment of Asian security interests that motivated Japan. The early US position did nothing to prevent Moscow from moving SS-20 missiles away from its borders with Europe, and redeploying them to the Soviet Far East. Tokyo wanted to ensure that any agreement with the Soviet Union on the INF would apply globally rather than only in Europe.[17]

Today, this challenge of making sure Washington attends to Tokyo's security concerns in negotiating a reduction in threat is visible once again in the conversation with North Korea. And once more the focus of the Japanese government's attention is on missiles (delivery capability). At the end of the Clinton Administration, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang to talk about a nonproliferation agreement for North Korean missiles. At the time, the US government was primarily concerned about the longer-range Taepodong missile (both the Taepodong I tested in 1998 and the Taepodong II under development). From Tokyo's vantage point, the shorter range Nodongs were also a problem as they could reach most of metropolitan Japan. This small—but significant—difference in emphasis reveals again how slight differences in perspective on arms control issues can have a major impact on Japan's security perceptions.

Japan has also sought to negotiate directly with North Korea. When Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang in September 2002, he carried with him a request for a moratorium on missile testing. Granted, Koizumi's agenda was full, and the missile issue was not foremost in the minds of the Japanese public. The abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents in the 1970s was the central concern that needed to be addressed by Kim Jong-Il at the summit meeting. Nonetheless, in the communiqué issued at the end of their meeting, missiles and nuclear proliferation were included.

Beyond the case of North Korea, Japan has little interest in seeing more states become declared nuclear powers. In a post-Cold War world, the image of a stable nuclear balance of power has been marred by the prospect of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), nuclear being primary among them. Japan has strongly advocated nonproliferation, and joined with the United States to sanction India and Pakistan in 1998 when they declared themselves nuclear states. Beyond government circles, there was no strong voice of approval of the India and Pakistan decision, nor of the goal of breaking the barriers to nuclear possession by an Asian state. But proliferation in South

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[17] For the impact of the INF negotiations on the US-Japan alliance, see Sheila A. Smith, *At the Intersection of the Cold War and the Postwar: The Japanese State and Security Planning* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, 1996), Chapter Six.

Asia did occasionally warrant a healthy debate among academics and policy analysts of the consequences of global nuclear proliferation for Japan. More than the North Korean case, the decision by India and Pakistan to declare themselves nuclear states stirred concern in Japan, both within and outside of government. But that concern was less about whether or not Japan should begin to consider the nuclear option. Rather it energized the debate within Japan over how to create a more effective NPT regime, one that would include greater incentives for non-nuclear states to remain that way.[18]

JAPAN'S NEW SECURITY DEBATE: NEW INTENTIONS OR MORE VOICES?

Japan's security planners have for some time considered many of the issues that have recently come to the forefront in the public policy debate, and the nuclear option has been discussed intermittently since the postwar began. Cabinet Secretary Fukuda's press statement to the effect that Japan's non-nuclear policy was simply that—a policy choice, and therefore subject to change if needed, caused a minor media sensation. And yet, he was only repeating what many Japanese leaders have noted in the past. Japan has chosen not to develop nuclear weapons. That choice has been revisited many times, as Prime Ministers Kishi, Sato, Nakasone and perhaps others have sought to clarify the national security needs of Japan.

What gave many outside Japan pause as Fukuda's statements were reported, however, is the widespread belief that Japan must change its approach to security in order to develop a credible and effective policy to deal with its changing strategic environment. Indeed, many of the norms typically associated with Japan's postwar security policy have been scrutinized in light of the Cold War's end and the changing global and regional security trends that have characterized the "post-Cold War" decade. Multilateral institutions for the region have given way to a more energized and deliberate effort to integrate Japan's security planning with that of the United States. Yet there is also new attention to the notion that Japan is on its way to becoming a "normal state," a state that is less strategically dependent on the United States and more capable of ensuring its own security. While the term is vague, and subject to various interpretations, it suggests greater autonomy, and the emergence of a more "muscular"—or militarily active—Japan.

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[18] For a discussion of Japan's new enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament, and the new activism that has emerged since 1998, see Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, "New Ambitions, Old Obstacles: Japan and Its Search for an Arms Control Strategy," *Arms Control Today*, (July/August 2000).

Indeed, there is greater receptivity in Japan today to a thorough debate and explanation of government security policy decisions. This too can be seen in the relatively small sensation caused by the Cabinet Secretary's remarks. Prime Minister Koizumi, when questioned about them, shrugged them off as nothing new, and of little importance to Japan's policies today. And that ended the story. What is new today is the diminished sense of surprise or shock at the notion of having a debate over the nuclear option. The infamous taboos of postwar Japanese political discourse—rather than what might provide an effective policy response to Japan's external environment—made previously a public policy debate over the logic of Japan's choice not to acquire nuclear weapons impossible.

Security planners have long thought that nuclear weapons would detract from Japan's national interest, and would jeopardize Japan's security rather than enhance it. The logic of the nuclear revolution, however, was never part of the public discussions of Japan's security options. Unlike the European countries, or even the United States, where the ins and outs of nuclear deterrence theory and practice were available to the public and debated in editorial pages and television documentaries, Japan's citizens had little information about the consequences of the nuclear era.

Today, however, the idea that Japan is threatened by North Korea, and that North Korea might be on its way to developing a nuclear arsenal, creates a new interest among the Japanese public in revisiting some of the premises of Japan's security planning. There are few advocates within Japan of the nuclear option. And, for the most part, the United States is seen as a reliable ally. Thus, the postwar formula of alliance is still widely supported in Japan. Quite novel, however, is the scrutiny being given to the effectiveness of Japanese government planning. Government officials are also being asked to move quickly to consider how to respond should North Korea use force. For now, negotiation with Pyongyang, via the current six-party framework, remains the key to Japan's approach to confronting and constraining North Korean missile and nuclear proliferation. But the Japanese public seems unlikely to support a position that caters too much to Pyongyang. The abductee issue has soured public tolerance for North Korea, and even more so than in the past, the Japanese government will need to demonstrate its ability to gain the security concessions it needs. It will also need to urge Washington to heed to Tokyo's concerns as it too seeks some sort of negotiated solution with North Korea.

CONCLUSION

The strategic choices facing Japan today are not that different from those faced in the past. In a nuclear world, some insurance against nuclear threat is necessary, and the option of allying with the United States still provides Tokyo with the best insurance. An independent nuclear capability today would bring Japan little added security. Barring the full nuclearization of the countries of Northeast Asia, there would be little advantage to a full-scale nuclear development program even should North Korea decide to declare itself a nuclear state. The issues that confront Japan today regarding possible nuclear threat are familiar ones.

What is new is the level of public debate over the nature of the threat posed by North Korea, and the variety of voices that are in that debate. What was once a quiet and relatively circumscribed conversation within the Defense Agency, and ultimately among the members of the Prime Minister's National Defense Council, is now an open debate, one that includes not only government officials but also opposition politicians and public intellectuals. Still, there is little enthusiasm for nuclear weapons in Japan, and here the policymakers and the public are probably in agreement, if for different reasons. While at times uncomfortable, Japan's choice fifty some years ago of strategic dependence on the United States remains the best option for contending with nuclear threat. Moreover, the framework of cooperation—both in terms of war-fighting should a conflict emerge or in terms of reducing the level of nuclear threat—crafted with the United States still offers the best avenue for coping with that threat.

Moreover, Japan's security policy today is so embedded within the framework of strategic cooperation with the United States that it seems impossible to consider what circumstances might change the benefits associated with the alliance. The alliance itself would have to be deemed ineffectual to change the strategic calculus in Tokyo. And at least to date there is no sense that Japanese government policymakers view the alliance as less effective in providing for Japanese security. Change in policy remains framed within the US–Japan alliance. Indeed, many of the changes suggested by officials such as JDA Director-General Ishiba and others continue to be framed within the context of US–Japan security cooperation. And yet, the question remains: what might lead Japanese security planners as well as the Japanese public to determine that the alliance is not up to the task of providing for Japan's security? Neither Ozawa, Fukuda, nor Ishiba openly alluded to a Japan that might stand alone without the United States, but the tendency has been for those who discuss the nuclear option for Japan to see it as an alternative to the alliance. Several suggestions have been made recently that point to concerns over the different threat perceptions that might exist between the United States and Japan.

Washington's current willingness to consider "negative security assurances" to North Korea have some of Japan's more conservative defense analysts worried. Nishihara Masashi, the President of Japan's Defense Academy, openly warned Washington of Pyongyang's effort to gain a non-aggression treaty with the United States.[19] Policymakers in Tokyo and Washington will need to take particular care now regarding the way in which their security cooperation is viewed within Japan. The alliance's ability to provide for Japan's security is being tested in the public eye, and therefore actions taken jointly will need to be crafted so as to reassure Japan's citizens.

The new security debate in Japan today is not simply a reflection of new Japanese interest in security. It is also a reflection of the changing dynamics of Japan's security environment. The incentive for cooperation with the United States today is even greater than it was during the Cold War. The continuing problem of how to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the effort to constrain global terrorist networks, has created new urgency for the US–Japan alliance. While Japan's strategic calculus—particularly with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons—remains basically the same, the prescriptions for addressing these new security concerns have become more varied. Japan has taken an active role in the US war on terrorism, including sending forces to work alongside US military forces in the Indian Ocean and Iraq. Japan is also cooperating in cutting off financial flows to potential terrorists, and participating in the new Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to shut down the transport of dangerous materials on the high seas. In mid-November, Japan also hosted the first meeting of the Asian Senior-Level Talks on Nonproliferation, the first effort to organize an Asian forum to strengthen cooperation among countries in the region in preventing the proliferation of WMD. Japan's political leaders have made it very clear over the past several years, however, that they are much more inclined to a direct military response to North Korean provocation than at any time in the past.

Beginning with the Taepodong missile launch in 1998, Pyongyang has tested Japan's military readiness, and indirectly, has tested the US–Japan alliance. More than the prospect of nuclear proliferation by North Korea, the ability of the United States and Japan to act jointly should Pyongyang appear willing to test Japan's defenses will be a critical juncture in terms of shaping Japanese attitudes towards the alliance. For the first time, Japan today looks to the United States to act to protect it from a direct threat to its territory. While many see Pyongyang's behavior as bluster, the possibility that North Korea would use force cannot be ruled out. For policymakers in Tokyo, another

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[19] Masashi Nishihara, "North Korea's Trojan Horse," *Washington Post*, August 14, 2003.

missile launch would be a serious concern, and the ability of the Japanese and US militaries to act together effectively to monitor, and if need be, minimize the threat of another missile launch will be watched carefully by the Japanese public. Moreover, a significant increase in North Korea's missile capability would also confound Tokyo's efforts to plan for adequate defenses. Like their analysis of China's threat, it is the increase in ballistic missile capability, more than the nuclear weapons program itself, that worries Japanese planners. The decision to proceed with the introduction of two missile defense systems developed in the United States was prompted by these concerns.[20] Japan's leaders will be working with Washington to try to contain North Korea's military activities, but they will also be watching closely to ensure that Japan's own security is adequately represented in any regional negotiations.

Just as in the past, the US–Japan alliance will be the critical determinant of Japan's security. Japanese security planners and political leaders see a *new* threat, and to a certain extent Pyongyang's behavior reflects the broad changes that have occurred in the wake of the Cold War. But from the perspective of Tokyo, the basic task for the US–Japan alliance remains unchanged. The alliance provides the framework within which Japan imagines a response to aggression, nuclear or conventional. But perhaps even more importantly today, it is the vehicle for reducing the possibility that nuclear weapons will ever be used.

[20] For a cogent update on Japan's missile defense thinking, see David Fouse, "Japan Gets Serious about Missile Defense: North Korean Crisis Pushes Debate," *Asia-Pacific Security Studies*, Volume 2, Number 4, (June 2003).

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Rethinking Japanese Security: New Concepts in Deterrence and Defense

Ken Jimbo

EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN THE NEW CONTEXT

During the Cold War, the reliability of extended deterrence in the US–Japan alliance was based upon the following assumptions: 1) the credibility of US engagement measured by the presence of forward deployed conventional forces in Japan; 2) avoiding the unnecessary provocation of potential adversaries into threatening a nuclear, chemical, and biological assault against Japan; 3) and the credibility of nuclear retaliation in the event that such attacks are anticipated against Japan, based on Article 5 of the US–Japan Security Treaty.[1]

Tetsuya Umemoto argues that while the Atlantic alliance focused on reinforcing the credibility of escalation arrangements, extended deterrence over Japan during the Cold War rested primarily on the mechanism of "existential deterrence."[2] China and North Korea were always the object of concern, but the nuclear umbrella focused mainly on the Soviet Union as the prospective attacker. Thus, the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence was founded upon the consolidation of the political bond between Washington and Tokyo to convince Moscow of the possibility of US retaliation with strategic weapons.

The nature of extended deterrence has changed considerably given the new strategic context after the end of the Cold War and since the emergence of new asymmetrical threats. The prime focus of the US–Japan alliance has shifted from the large-scale aggression of the USSR to regional-scale contingencies and the *capability* that potential adversaries might employ to attack Japan, the United States, and its allies. The former includes potential theater conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait, and adversarial nuclear relations

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[1] Tetsuya Umemoto, "Missile Defense and Extended Deterrence in the Japan-US Alliance, *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.12, No.2, (Winter 2000); Morton Halperin, "The Nuclear Dimension of the US-Japan Alliance." A paper commissioned by the Nautilus Institute for the project on Security and Sustainable Development. Available at: http://www.nautilus.org/nukepolicy/Halperin/.

[2] *Ibid.* Existential deterrence is supposed be available based on the mere fact that the United States had nuclear weapons and had a treaty commitment to Japan. This created the possibility that the United States would use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack on Japan, even if it was not committed to doing so.

with China. The latter focuses on the emergence of non-state actors and their possible linkages with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). China's limited nuclear forces and the potential for nuclear, chemical, and biological threats from North Korea are both asymmetric to US strategic force. The threat of non-state actors lies at the extreme end of asymmetric threats. Thus the logic of nuclear and conventional engagement had to be adjusted in the new context, where existential deterrence would not always apply as it had in the Cold War context.

How has the policy of extended deterrence in the US–Japan alliance changed in the context of the post-Cold War? How did reconstruction of the alliance after the Cold War impact Japan's defense concept? How did the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in 2002 affect extended nuclear deterrence? How will developments in US–Japan cooperation on missile defense influence Japan's weapons choices and nuclear strategy? This paper will examine these issues and will especially focus on the impact of: 1) the development of post-Cold War alliance relations on Japan's concept of defense; 2) the 2002 NPR on extended deterrence; 3) missile defense developments on US–Japan strategic coordination; and 4) analysis of the North Korea nuclear challenge and US-China nuclear relations on Japan's strategic options.

By responding to the questions above, this paper explores the durability of extended deterrence in the US–Japan alliance as well as the US nuclear umbrella. The basic findings are as follows:

1) The emerging "relative" concept of defense policy in Japan may increasingly encourage policymakers to prepare for a multi-dimensional approach to deterrence that includes missile defense (denial deterrence capability), indigenous offensive strike capabilities (indigenous deterrence capability), and even a tacit approval to include a nuclear option on the national security agenda;

2) Despite the fact that the 2002 NPR has encouraged promoting the credibility of the extended nuclear deterrence in the US–Japan alliance by adapting it to new asymmetrical threats, the fragility of deterrence remains. This reality may require the need for a "multiple deterrence" concept that relies on both offensive and defensive forces; and

3) missile defense would supplement both conventional and extended nuclear deterrence in the US–Japan alliance by providing a damage confinement/ denial deterrence capability, thus mitigating Japan's own nuclear desire. The complexity that missile defense places on the ratio of offensive-defensive forces with adversaries, however, could accelerate a security dilemma, especially with China.

The North Korea nuclear development will be the key variable for short-term security consideration that will affect the factors above. The expansion of China's nuclear capability will also affect the extended nuclear deterrence within the framework of future US–China nuclear relations. It is crucial for the US–Japan alliance to prepare for the new strategic contexts of North Korea and China. Greater attention should be given to alliance management of multiple deterrence based on the emerging relative concept of defense of Japan.

EMERGENCE OF THE RELATIVE DEFENSE CONCEPT IN JAPAN AFTER THE COLD WAR

The concept of deterrence has never been consolidated as a Japanese national doctrine in any official documents. The defense policy pursued under the Japanese constitution is based on the Basic Policy for National Defense (BPND), adopted by the National Defense Council in May 1957. Under the BPND, Japan has made efforts on its own initiative to build a modest defense capability under the Constitution in accordance with the fundamental principles of maintaining an "exclusively defense-oriented" policy (*Senshu Boei*) without becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries.[3] Japan's exclusively defense-oriented policy suggests that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) may not be employed unless and until an armed attack is mounted against Japan by another country, in which case its forces may be used to the minimum level necessary to defend itself.[4] This exclusively defense-oriented policy takes a passive approach to defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution. The concept of "basic defense force" *(Kibanteki Boeiryoku Kosou)*, conceptualized in the first National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1978, further consolidated Japan's defense agenda by declaring the right to possess a minimum defense capability necessary for an independent country to prevent a power vacuum.

The "absolute" concept (maintenance of a low-profile capability) of Japan's defense posture has co-existed with the relative concept (context-dependent threat-based capability) during the postwar period. However the former usually predominated the latter by limiting the geographic scope of Japan's right to exercise individual self-defense and by minimizing the acquisition of offensive capabilities. These legal interpretations were essential for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—the dominant political party in postwar Japan—in order to save face with the opposition party. Thus, Japan's concept of basic defense was a manifestation of political correctness rather than a result of

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[3] Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2002 (English Edition)*, 93.

[4] *Ibid.*

strategic calculation, and the framework under which it had to explain the credibility of extended deterrence.[5]

The modest Japanese posture of adhering to an exclusively defense-oriented policy, however, was by and large an adequate stance for the durability of the alliance at the time when an attack on Japan by the Soviet military in the Far East was the dominant contingency scenario. Japan's enhanced ability to conduct anti-submarine patrols (P-3C airborne patrol) to detect Soviet Navy maneuvers and radio transmissions in the Pacific Ocean were essential components of the alliance function throughout the Cold War years.

In this context, the Alliance management during the Cold War could be characterized as "balanced asymmetry."[6] The United States provided the strategic guarantees of extended deterrence, power projection forces, and a context for a bilateral alliance of regional and global engagement. Japan provided for its own defense, US bases in Japan, and financial host nation support (HNS). By design, combined US–Japanese planning, coordination, and decision-making were structurally precluded where the absolute concept of Japanese defense could play a role.[7]

The absolute concept of Japanese defense and alliance management under balanced asymmetry, however, has been challenged since the end of the Cold War in the following three ways. The first challenge was the process of alliance reconstruction in the 1990s. Given the post-Cold War changes in the Asia-Pacific region, cooperation in "situations in areas surrounding Japan" according to Article 6, became increasingly vital to the US–Japan alliance. Under this situation, Japan's modest defense-oriented role would become irrelevant under alliance management. In September 1997, the revision of the Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation—the basic rules and regulations that had governed day-to-day military collaboration since 1978—was announced. Besides further outlining bilateral cooperation during normal circumstances and for the defense of Japan, the new guidelines provided the basis for more effective bilateral cooperation during a regional crisis "that affects Japan's peace and security."[8] The new guidelines also set forth a more definitive role for Japan in responding to situations in areas surrounding Japan. For instance, it is

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[5] Akihiko Tanaka, *"Anzen Hosho: Sengo 50-nen no Mosaku" [Security: A Search for Fifty-years of Post War History], Yomiuri Shimbun*, 1997. 231-264.

[6] Paul S. Giarra and Akihisa Nagashima, "Managing the New US-Japan Security Alliance: Enhancing Structures and Mechanisms to Address Post-Cold War Requirements," Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin eds., *The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Guideline for Japan-US Defense Cooperation.* Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html.

indicated that Japan will provide "rear-area support" to US forces responding to a regional contingency. This support may provide access to airfields, ports, transportation, logistics, and medical support. Japan would also be able, as applicable, to cooperate and coordinate with US forces in conducting missions and functions such as minesweeping, search and rescue, surveillance, and inspection of ships to enforce UN sanctions.

A second challenge for US–Japan relations and Japan's concept of security was the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Not only did the terrorist attacks highlight non-state actors as part of the core agenda for international security, it also indicated a paradigm change in US–Japan security relations.

The paradigm of the US–Japan Security Treaty (concluded in 1951 and revised in 1960), was primarily a defense arrangement for the security of Japan, especially from the Japanese perspective. The spectrum of regional security cooperation, such as the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East and beyond, was also highlighted. However, this cooperation was limited according to the framework of the bilateral treaty that was relevant for the national defense of Japan and the security of the Far East to the extent that it was linked with the security of Japan. The 1960 US–Japan Security Treaty states:

> Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories *under the administration of Japan* would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. (Article 5)
>
> For the purpose of *contributing to the security of Japan* and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. (Article 6) [9]

Even with a broader interpretation of the treaty as an instrument of the alliance between the two countries, the enhanced scope of US–Japan cooperation did not did not extend to the maintenance of the broader international order. In 1997, the bilateral defense guidelines successfully made a breakthrough by adopting the concept of "situations in areas surrounding Japan," which suggests that the focus of the concept for bilateral cooperation is "not geographical but situational."[10] The Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan

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[9] *The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America*, January 19, 1960. Available at: http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/anpo.htm.

Bill (*Shuhen Jitai Hou*) in 1999, however, carefully limited its geographical scope by its definition:

> This bill aims to contribute to ensuring the peace and security of Japan…in situations in areas surrounding Japan, that could seriously affect the peace and security of Japan, such as a situation which could lead to the direct military attack against Japan if solely ignored. (Article 1) [11]

In this context, the Afghanistan operation in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, created a new situation in which US–Japan bilateral cooperation expanded beyond the hypothesis of the new US–Japan defense guidelines in 1997. The Koizumi administration took an extraordinary step by enacting new legislation, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which enabled the SDF to cooperate with US forces operating in Afghanistan, but confined them to logistic activities in the Indian Ocean. This was neither an operation under the US–Japan Security Treaty, nor an operation under the authorization of the United Nations; rather, it was a voluntary operation involving the participation of the SDF and was confined to logistic support. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law exceeded the geographical constraints of the SDF that were confined to participation in regional missions, except in the case of peacekeeping operations. The Iraq Special Measures Law, established in July 2003, also falls into this category.

The third challenge for bilateral relations and Japan's defense concept emerged from the intensification of the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula—in particular, after North Korea's acknowledgement of its nuclear weapons development program during negotiations with the United States in early October 2002. North Korea further exacerbated tensions by withdrawing from the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and threatening to reactivate its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. Prior to its self-revelation, North Korea's nuclear program has long been suspected to be active after the signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994. US intelligence estimates that North Korea has acquired at least one or two nuclear weapons using plutonium produced before 1992.

There are two distinctive differences between the crisis in 1994 and in 2003. In the 1994 crisis the North Korean nuclear threat escalated greatly, but was limited to the local theater. North Korea did not produce enough plutonium to either conduct a test explosion or to transfer materials to a third party. The Nodong missile was successfully tested as early as in May 1993, but it was

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[10] *Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperatio*n, New York, New York September 23, 1997. Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/namerica/us/security/guideline2.html.

[11] *Shuhen Jitai ni Saishite Wagakuni no Heiwa Oyobi Anzen wo Kakuho Surutameno Sochi ni Kansuru Houritsu* [Bill Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations Surrounding Japan]. Available at: http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H11/H11HO060.html.

estimated that it could not be armed with a nuclear warhead. The proliferation risks to third parties were recognized, but the focus was on the North's missile capabilities, not the fissile materials.

The nature of North Korean threat in 2003 changed considerably. First, the range of its ballistic missiles has expanded since the success of the 1998 Taepodong missile launch. The Taepodong II is estimated to have a range of 2,500km, which can easily reach US bases in Okinawa. North Korea is also preparing to test the advanced version of the Taepodong, which could expand its range up to 6,000-10,000km, placing at risk western US territory in an arc extending northwest from Phoenix, Arizona, to Madison, Wisconsin.[12] Second, with North Korea's steady development of its nuclear program, there have been growing risks of proliferation of nuclear materials not only to other rogues states but also to non-state-actors like Al-Qaeda. By reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods, it is estimated that North Korea could obtain enough plutonium to produce more than five to six nuclear bombs. Third, there is growing recognition of the threat of the Nodong missile and its capacity to transport nuclear weapons, especially in Japan. Although both China and Russia have expressed doubts that the North Korea has the technical capacity to construct a working nuclear warhead, there are indications that they successfully completed the high-explosive tests necessary for triggering a nuclear weapon.[13] North Korea appears to be capable of at least developing a small nuclear arsenal.

These developments in the North Korea nuclear crisis has forced the US–Japan alliance to adjust to the following factors. First, the absolute concept in the US–Japan alliance has been fundamentally challenged, especially because US homeland defense—namely, the consideration of global US security interests—has become important in the context of alliance management. US–Japan security relations, as designed to manage the security of Japan and situations surrounding Japan, have expanded its scope after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the globalized nature of the North Korean threat. Thus, global crisis management inclusive of US homeland defense has become an increasingly important part of alliance management.[14]

Second, Japan's exclusively defense-oriented policy has also been challenged by the threat posed by North Korea and the increased prospect of a

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[12] The Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, *Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*, July 15, 1998.

[13] Monterey Institute, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, *Factsheet on North Korea nuclear Reprocessing Statement,* Updated April 23, 2003. Available at: http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/repro.htm.

[14] Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan-US Summit Meeting (Summary)" October 17, 2003. Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/summit0310.html.

nuclear-armed Nodong missile launched towards Japanese territory. Faced with the imminent threat of a single missile, retaliation *after* the attack may not be feasible in the Japanese political context. However, Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba recently emphasized the right to strike against an enemy's missile site when an attack against Japan is anticipated, indicating the prospect of Japanese preemptive strikes in response to the nuclear threat posed by North Korea.[15]

The absolute concept of Japan's defense framework has increasingly been challenged by new security circumstances. The emerging relative concept, emphasizing Japan's enhanced ability to handle its own defense and utilization of the US–Japan alliance functions in the event of a crisis, has gained greater attention on Japan's political agenda. If Japan moves further in this direction, extended deterrence will become merely a component of multiple deterrence functions, although it will remain most important. In this context, it will be important to address how the United States will tackle newly emerging threats with its allies. The supplementary roles of denial deterrence and Japan's indigenous deterrence capability will become more important in the event that traditional extended deterrence is not always credible.

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

In January 2002, the Bush administration unveiled the NPR through official means as well as through leaks of confidential sections to the press. The NPR claims that it puts in motion a major change in the US approach to offensive nuclear forces in deterrence strategy and presents the blueprint for transforming US strategic posture.[16] The basic logic of the NPR is built upon the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which suggests introducing a "capability-based approach" in response to changes in the strategic environment.[17] Intellectual continuity exists with the QDR and NPR in terms of adapting US defense strategy to the new strategic environment through ongoing defense transformation.

The scope of the NPR encompasses the future reduction of US dependence on nuclear weapons and the added importance of a non-nuclear strike force, including conventional strike and information gathering capabilities, in dealing

[15] The option of resorting to preemption, for which Ishiba has gained so much publicity lately, was enunciated as early as 1954.

[16] Excerpts from the *Nuclear Posture Review* are available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm; J. D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, Department of Defense, January 9, 2002. Available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html.

[17] The US Department of Defense, *The Quadrennial Defense Review*, September 30, 2001. Available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.

with a wider range of threats. The report claims that these new initiatives will lessen the dependency on nuclear forces in order to provide an offensive capability. Critics, however, underscore the importance of flexibility in US strategic posture and advocate the development of new types of nuclear weapons. They claim that an enhanced role for nuclear forces in countering the threat of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) would make the threshold of the nuclear option lower than during the Cold War.

In contrast to the Cold War, when nuclear deterrence against a single adversary was the core assumption, the United States now faces multiple potential opponents and conflicts, giving rise to a wider spectrum of contingencies in which deterrence policies might not always apply. This change of the strategic environment, in terms of potential nuclear adversaries, could be categorized into the following five groups:

Category I:	Major Power	(Russia)
Category II:	Challenger I	(China)
Category III:	Challenger II	(India, Pakistan)
Category IV:	Rogue States	(Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya)
Category V:	Non-State Actors	(Terrorists)

Nuclear relations between the United States and category I (Russia) have entered into a new period of mutual reduction of nuclear forces. The US-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, also known as the Treaty of Moscow) on May 24, 2002, declared that both parties build "new qualitative relations" and reduce the strategic nuclear force levels to 1,700-2,200.[18] President Bush's "new framework" speech on May 1, 2001, suggested that the mutually assured destruction (MAD) is no longer an appropriate basis for US nuclear requirements. Nuclear force planning and posture over the next decade, however, will continue to be driven by Russian nuclear force levels and the scenario of large-scale nuclear attacks against Russia. Nuclear deterrence and the mutual ability to inflict massive damage with assured retaliatory capabilities will continue to be the governing principles of the US–Russian nuclear relationship.[19]

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[18] The US White House, "Text of Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty." Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-3.html.

[19] Richard Sokolsky, "Demystifying the US Nuclear Posture Review," *Survival*, Vol.44, No.3, (Autumn 2002).

The deterrent calculus of the US–Russian relationship, however, may not apply to the following categories. In category II, nuclear relations with China will not be determined easily since China's self-declared perception of "minimum deterrence" has not been mutually reaffirmed by the United States and other nuclear states. China lacks the capacity to launch an attack capable of destroying the US capacity to retaliate and it does not have enough credibility or survivability for a second-strike. Moreover, the dynamics of China's missile modernization program and the US deployment of missile defense systems will further complicate future bilateral nuclear relations. Unlike the US–Russian relationship, the concept of deterrence has not been clearly shared in US–China relations (This aspect will be analyzed in the later part of this paper).

Category III illustrates de-facto nuclear states; however the threat is marginalized in its region and is not a direct concern to the US homeland or its assets abroad. As noted in the concept of "regional security complex," which emerged from the analysis of South Asian security dynamics, the escalation of conflict with this group of states is expected to be limited to the theater level rather than in a global scale.[20] The direct threat to US interests may be minimal unless either country intends to proliferate fissile materials to third parties or develop longer-range missiles that can reach the vital US assets.

The most significant actors in this new strategic environment are ones in the category IV (and V). There are growing incentives for hostile regional powers and "rogue states" to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to upset the geopolitical order. Leaders of these countries, however, may not be irrational or undeterrable, since regime survival is the supreme objective in most cases.[21] But they may wish to use WMD as a last resort when they perceive their own national security or regime survival to be at stake. Moreover, by threatening to use chemical or biological attacks, a state might try to prevent the United States and its allies from intervening in regional conflicts. Chemical and biological threats could also be used against the United States and allied expeditionary forces to delay or disrupt coalition military operations in a particular theater or to prevent defeat or regime-change during a conventional war.[22]

The NPR proposes two distinct cases for dealing with category IV (and V) countries. One is the deterrence of chemical and biological attacks. This measure has already been implemented during the Gulf War, when a senior

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[20] Patrick M. Morgan, "Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders," David Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, *Regional Orders*, 1997.

[21] Scott D. Sagan, "More will be Worse" in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz eds., *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995).

[22] Richard Sokolsky, "Demystifying the US Nuclear Posture Review."

Bush administration official indicated that the United States reserved the option of using nuclear weapons in response to Iraq's use of CBWs.

The second and more controversial case in dealing with this threat category is the development of low-yield and more accurate nuclear weapons—so-called "mini-nukes"—to destroy hard and deeply buried targets. Under the heading of the "Advanced Concepts Initiative," the NPR calls for "improved earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the increased use by potential adversaries of hardened and deeply buried facilities." This would entail the use of nuclear forces in a tactical scenario. Several countries in this category rely on hard and deeply buried targets to protect strategic capabilities such as CBW production, assembly, storage and deployment, ballistic-missile delivery system, and leadership and command, control and communication assets.[23]

How is the policy of extended deterrence affected by the NPR? In theory, the NPR enhances the credibility of extended deterrence by allowing for a wider variety of responses and should convince those hostile to the United States and its allies that it has responsive options, including defensive and conventional weapons.[24] In this context, the new NPR is most likely to solidify Japan's non-nuclear posture by maintaining the validity of the nuclear umbrella.

First, the capability-based approach put forth by the NPR gives rise to more flexibility in dealing with a wider range of threats with friends and allies.[25] Placing value on flexibility will strengthen the credibility of extended deterrence, since the US commitment would be based on the flexible assessment of threat and not on a single target threat-based approach. Although the balance of power is still a characteristic of strategic relations in Northeast Asia (i.e., the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait), the importance of dealing with asymmetrical threats and various types of contingencies in Northeast Asia is growing.

Second, the "new triad"' and flexible use of nuclear weapons as stated in the NPR further increases the credibility of extended deterrence. The new triad will improve the chances that the US and allied forces will have the means to meet an unexpected threat, and thereby diminish the likelihood of its emergence.[26] Leaks of the confidential portions of the NPR are also important in informing opponents that nuclear options are operationally available for use against countries such as North Korea and China. Excerpts from the NPR state:

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[23] *Ibid*, 139.

[24] Baker Spring, "The implications of the Nuclear Posture Review for extended deterrence," Statement before the Conference on US-Japan Cooperation on Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Verification, March 27, 2002.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] *Ibid.*

> …US nuclear forces still require the capability to hold at risk a wide range of target types. This capability is a key to the role of nuclear forces in supporting an effective deterrence strategy relative to a broad spectrum of potential opponents under a variety of contingencies.[27]

The United States largely justifies continued reliance on nuclear weapons on the grounds that its policy of deterrence contributes to nuclear non-proliferation. Further, it helps to convince Japan that it has no need to develop an indigenous nuclear capability.

Does the NPR sufficiently address new asymmetric threats? There is uncertainty about how the United States would handle these new concerns compared with the symmetrical balance of power concerns at a theoretical level. There is a fundamental difference between how the United States would handle the two. While establishing "mutual deterrence" was the goal during the Cold War, the United States, as indicated by the NPR, now aims to deter opponents with its capabilities, but does not expect to be deterred in return. There has never been a political manifesto to co-exist with nuclear-armed rogue states in order to have strategic stability. Small nuclear states, however, rely on asymmetry as well as the unpredictability and irrationality of their threat to adversaries. Few would disagree that to achieve a credible deterrence, it is not necessary to equal the arsenal of the adversary. As P.K. Ghosh argues, "…a state with a larger nuclear weapon arsenal may at times succeed in politically coercing another nuclear capable state with a smaller arsenal but a survival credible deterrence due to the typical conventional weapons psyche that is difficult to obliterate."[28] In this context, the NPR does not sufficiently address new nuclear threats, especially from Category IV (and V) states, although it might promote the utility of US nuclear weapons and bolster the credibility of US–Japan extended deterrence. The NPR also notes the following:

> US nuclear forces, alone are unsuited to most of the contingencies for which the United States prepares. The United States and allied interests may not require nuclear strikes. A "new mix" of nuclear, non-nuclear, and defensive capabilities is required for the diverse set of potential adversaries and unexpected threats the United States may confront in the coming decades.[29]

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[27] Excerpts from the *Nuclear Posture Review, op.cit.*

[28] P K Ghosh, "Deterrence Asymmetry and Other Challenges to Small Nuclear Forces" Paper presented at the Mountbatten Ceter International Missile Forum (MCIMF) Review Meeting, Southampton, UK, May 25-29, 2002.

[29] Excerpts from the *Nuclear Posture Review, op.cit.*

MISSILE DEFENSE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EXTENDED DETERRENCE

While US President George W. Bush called for a new framework of international security based on the concept of deterrence that relies both on offensive and the defensive forces, the strategic adjustment of extended deterrence and the US–Japan alliance were also highlighted.[30] These remarks signified a greater integrated approach that combines national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD), which are likely to pose new elements of political, strategic, and technological challenge to US–Japan alliance management.

Japanese official statements often indicate that Japan's commitment to ballistic missile defense (BMD) is not directed against any third country because of its defensive nature.[31] The logical implication of BMD deployment, however, would be far more profound than applying the argument for BMD to Japan's exclusively defense-oriented doctrine. In this regard, explicit analysis should be made of Japan's interest in BMD and implications for extended deterrence in the context of US–Japan strategic coordination and alliance management. The strategic coordination for the US–Japan alliance on BMD must take into consideration threat estimation, cost/benefit analysis, technological feasibility, and regional implications of the system deployment. The alliance management of BMD cooperation will be challenged by the adoption of system components, interoperability between US forces and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and the coordination within the JSDF itself.

Until the mid 1990s, Japanese interest in BMD remained cautious. Several concerns caused uncertainty about BMD. First and most significantly, is the cost/benefit analysis of the missile defense system. From the perspective of cost, at a time when the Japanese economy is perennially stagnant, appropriating large sums of yen for new defense systems will be a tough sell, both to members of the Diet and to the Japanese public. Further, the proposed Navy Theater Wide (NTW) BMD is not yet a proven technology. After many Theater High Area Altitude Defense (THAAD) system test failures and questions about the Patriot system's performance in the Gulf War, confidence in the ability of the United States to build an effective missile defense system has not been shared by Japanese experts.

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[30] US Office of the Press Secretary, *Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University* (May 1 2001).

[31] Japan Defense Agency, "Dando Misairu Boei (BMD) ni Kansuru Kenkyu ni Tsuite" [The research on Ballistic Missile Defense]. Available at: http://www.jda.go.jp/j/library/archives/bmd/bmd.pdf.

Second, there are legal and constitutional issues that could complicate bilateral cooperation on missile defense. These derive from Japan's ban on arms exports and the government's decision not to exercise the right of "collective defense," activities that might include cueing—a battle management function of coordinating information between sensors, control locations, launchers, and other aspects of missile defense operations.[32]

Third, Japan is equally concerned about the political fallout of the deployment of BMD in East Asia. The China factor has been a major quandary for Japanese policymakers, thus it would be likely that Tokyo would prefer to avoid China's strong reaction. On one hand, there is a genuine concern about China's rise as a major power center, armed with WMD and a variety of ballistic missiles and economic vibrancy. On the other hand, there is also the feeling that China's rise is inevitable, and hence, taking an accommodative approach rather than developing a confrontational attitude would be the most constructive way to avoid triggering more rapid development of China's missile and nuclear weapons inventory.

There is also a growing understanding among security experts that joint-missile defense deployment will greatly enhance the strategic coordination of the US–Japan alliance in the following ways:[33]

Assuring Japan's security: The BMD system can negate hostile states' attempts to discourage US friends and allies from cooperating with US forces through intimidation by ballistic missiles armed with WMD;

Assuring US forward deployed forces: Although adversaries possessing theater ballistic missiles equipped with WMD may threaten or use these weapons to deter or constrain US military operations, a missile shield covering forward-deployed US forces can lower such risks;

Enhancing US–Japan technology cooperation: US–Japan joint technology research on BMD will deepen military technology cooperation between the two countries and thus strengthen the foundation of the US–Japan alliance;

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[32] Michael J Green and Toby F. Dalton, "Asian Reaction to US Missile Defense," *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (November 2000).

[33] This analysis is particularly evident in the following articles: Shinichi Ogawa, "TMD and Northeast Asian Security," a paper presented at the conference on East Asian Regional Security Futures: Theater Missile Defense Implications, The United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, June 24-4, 2000.; Tetsuya Umemoto, "Missile Defense and Extended Deterrence in the Japan-US Alliance"..., Satoshi Morimoto, *Anzen Hoshoron: 21 Seiki no Kikikanri*, PHP Institute, 2000.

Strengthening extended nuclear deterrence: The BMD system coverage of Japan and other US allies in East Asia could supplement the US nuclear umbrella;

Reducing the risk of an unauthorized launch: BMD can counter the potential danger of accidental or unauthorized missile launches, which becomes higher with the proliferation of ballistic missiles; and

Enhancing the effect of non-proliferation: As a side-benefit, a BMD system protecting US allies could contribute to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Missile defense, coupled with US extended deterrence, could contribute to reducing a state's desire to acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. BMD could also enable the United States to reduce its reliance on nuclear deterrence in a regional contingency, thereby marginalizing the significance of nuclear weapons.

1990 marks the approximate turning point when the government of Japan shifted its stance toward BMD from a "politically driven" to a "threat-driven" approach. Iraq's use of short-range Scud ballistic missiles during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, coupled with North Korea's test of the Nodong missile into the Sea of Japan in 1993, presented clear evidence of the threat of theater ballistic missiles to the US–Japan alliance. After the Nodong launch, the Japanese government began to consider further upgrades to its Patriot system, expressed interest in THAAD, and commenced official discussions on a joint TMD program with the United States. Accordingly, in 1994, the Japanese and US governments recast TMD as an alliance management issue with the establishment of the bilateral US–Japan Theater Missile Defense Working Group (TMD-WG).

The Japanese concern over regional missile proliferation further increased in the mid 1990s. First, weeklong Chinese military exercises and firing of ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 on the eve of Taiwanese presidential elections pressured the Japanese government to prepare for the potential scenario of a Taiwan Strait missile crisis. Second and more symbolically, North Korea launched a Taepodong I missile in August 1998 that flew over Japan. This incident had the effect of drastically broadening the support for BMD in Japan beyond just defense experts. The public became particularly aware of the dangers Japan faced because of the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the region. This particular event was instrumental in compelling Japan to look at US proposals to jointly develop missile defense systems.

In December 1998, Japan agreed in principle to participate in the research on, and understanding of, the issue of missile defense in a memorandum of understanding signed with the United States on "joint technology research for

the NTW." The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) separates the research, development and procurement/deployment phases. From the US perspective, there is no separation between research and development; this has allowed the US side to include Japan in its research and development phase, while Japan officially commits only to joint research.[34]

The agreement called for the two countries "to conduct analysis, preliminary design, and certain risk reduction experiments. This would lead to the design specification and technology selection of the four agreed missile sub-components due to be integrated into the Standard missile's latest derivative, the Standard missile-3 (SM-3)."[35] Based on the data provided through a bilateral TMD study initiated by the Working Group, as well as reflecting Japanese industry and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) preferences, the JDA concluded internally by 1997 that the most logical area for bilateral technological cooperation would be in the NTW program. This appeared to be the system capable of defending Japan most effectively.[36]

Since 1999, Japan has started joint NTW technical research on the design of four components—the interceptor missile, the-infrared homing device/kinetic warhead/ second-stage propulsion, the nose-cone, and the trial production of an infrared homing device. It was reported in February 2001 that the TMD joint study, which was originally envisaged to be completed by 2003 or 2004, had been extended for three more years, until 2006, because of delays in US tests of a Navy-based missile defense system.[37] In the summer of 2003, the JDA requested 200 billion yen (US $1.7 billion) for the fiscal years of 2004 and 2005 to buy the US Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system as well as the US SM-3 system, while continuing US–Japan joint research on the advanced version of SM-3s.

THE NUCLEAR CHALLENGE OF NORTH KOREA: IMPLICATIONS FOR EXTENDED DETERRENCE

North Korea has acknowledged its nuclear development program of uranium enrichment in negotiations with the United States in early October 2002. It was the first time that North Korea officially acknowledged that it had

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[34] "Theater Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region," A Henry L Stimson Center Working Group Report, Report No. 34 (June 2000).

[35] Memorandum for Correspondents, US Department of Defense, August 16, 1999.

[36] Patrick Cronin, Paul Giarra, and Michael J. Green, "Theater Missile Defense and US-Japan Alliance," 172.

[37] "Theater Missile Defense Study Extended until 2006," *The Japan Times*, February 17, 2001.

continued its nuclear program after the signing of the US–DPRK Agreed Framework in 1994. Prior to North Korea's self-revelation, its nuclear program was long suspected to have continued after its signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994. US intelligence has estimated that North Korea acquired at least one or two nuclear weapons using plutonium produced before 1992. The latest Central Intelligence Agency analysis also added that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational, possibly by mid-decade.[38] If the DPRK continues the production of plutonium, the reprocessing spent reactor fuel in storage at Yongbyon could recover enough plutonium for six to seven more nuclear weapons.

As mentioned earlier, the crisis in 1994 and in 2003 differ in nature. In short, the 1994 North Korea nuclear crisis was limited to the local theater. However, in 2003, the range of North Korea's missiles, their capacity to carry nuclear warheads, and the risk of the proliferation of nuclear materials to third parties—both state and non-state actors—had increased. These developments in the North Korea nuclear crisis posed two significant challenges to the management of the US–Japan alliance. The absolute concept in the US–Japan alliance and Japan's exclusively defense-oriented policy both had to be reexamined. (See above for details of this discussion).

In this context, there are emerging voices of anticipation that Japan might develop nuclear capabilities if North Korea declares itself to be a nuclear state.[39] But these observers had envisioned that such developments might be realized, should the US nuclear umbrella against North Korea lose its credibility.[40] These scenarios may be mitigated by the strengthening of extended nuclear deterrence according to the ideas put forth in the US NPR and supplementing it with denial deterrence vis-à-vis missile defense. Even faced with a nuclear North Korea, Japan could pursue multiple deterrence consisting of: nuclear and conventional extended deterrence; denial deterrence through missile defense deployment; and indigenous deterrence by way of Japan's conventional capability. Thus even while Japan may keep open the option of going nuclear in the future, its priority would be to pursue the rational option of strengthening its multiple deterrence functions.

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[38] "CIA says North Korea could Produce More Nuclear Arms," *Reuters*, November 22. Available at: http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20021122/wl_nm/korea_usa_nuclear_dc_1.

[39] Charles Krauthammer, "The Japan Card" *The Washington Post*, January 3, 2003.; Harrison, *et.al.*

[40] Selig Harrison, "Japan and Nuclear Weapons," in Selig Harrison ed., *Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security*, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1996).

IMPLICATIONS OF MISSILE DEFENSE VIS-À-VIS CHINA: A NEED FOR US–CHINA "ASYMMETRIC STRATEGIC STABILITY"?

China and North Korea have denounced the US plan to deploy missile defense systems in East Asia and the US–Japan joint research on an NTW defense system. Despite its signing of the 1997 TMD demarcation agreements that paved the way for the development and deployment of TMD systems, Russia has joined China and North Korea in their criticism of the NTW defense system since the late 1990s.[41]

China and Russia often claim that an offensive/defensive arms race is a likely consequence of US deployment of missile defense. If the United States chooses cap China's growing arsenal, for example, this will be intolerable for China as the credibility of its deterrent will be lost.

There will be net trade-offs between the benefits and drawbacks of missile defense. Even with the potential drawbacks of Russian and Chinese resistance, many benefits would be gained at a time of WMD aggression by a country like North Korea. Missile defense may be a catalyst for China to increase the size and pace of military development. But China is already rapidly getting bigger. This idea is especially true with regard to medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). However, it is the case that Chinese missile development is also driven by domestic political status and not only by the relative strength of its deterrence.[42]

There is a remarkable divide between academics over the strategic consequences of missile defense deployment. Some argue that it might provoke an arms race, while others claim that missile defense can be used as a tool for persuasion, and even arms control. This notion depends on how one estimates the quality of the technology—namely the interception ratio—and how the system would affect the opponents' strategic perception. This calculation is determined by the ratio of offensive/defensive deterrence. The likely strategic implication of missile defense from this offensive/defensive balance sheet will determine a major security concept for the coming decade.

If the US decision for missile defense has already gone beyond the point of no return, China and the United States may need to seek a new framework of offensive/defensive strategic stability. If the new framework were the strategic *fait accompli* in the near future,[43] US–China mutual recognition of the deterrent,

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[41] "China Russia Presidents Sign Joint Statement on ABM Issue," *Peoples' Daily*, July 19, 2000.

[42] Brad Roberts, "US Ballistic Missile Defenses: Implications for Asia," Paper presented at the Second Cooperative Workshop on East Asian Security Futures, Nautilus Institute. http://www.nautilus.org/nukepolicy/workshops/shanghai-01/robertspaper.html.

[43] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), "China's Response to Missile Defences: Confronting a Strategic Fait Accompli," *Strategic Comments*, Vol. 8, No. 1, (January 2002).

although based on the asymmetrical nuclear balance, would greatly enhance the strategic calculation, and reduce the threat perception of missile proliferation.

VARIATIONS OF US-CHINA NUCLEAR RELATIONS

There are several variations of the future course of US–China nuclear relations as follows:

Scenario 1: Maintaining Minimum Deterrence

The first scenario indicates that Chinese strategic forces will maintain a capability for minimum deterrence, even under the new framework. According to this scenario, China's build-up of its nuclear capability either by quantity (i.e., 70 to 80 CSS-4s) or quality (i.e., multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRVs) or countermeasures like decoys, chaffs, balloons, etc.) may increase the credibility of minimum deterrence even if the United States deploys the missile defense systems against the mainland. A preemptive attack of China's nuclear forces could significantly reduce, but probably not deny, a Chinese retaliatory attack because of the likelihood that the United States may not be able to locate and target all of their nuclear forces.

Scenario 2: Minimum Deterrence to "Theater Deterrence"

The second scenario indicates that minimum deterrence would deteriorate because of missile defense and US preemptive capability, thus the focus would shift to "theater deterrence," or deterrence at the theater level. China might emphasize its short to medium range missile capabilities that target US forward deployed forces, Japanese territory, and Taiwan to deter and intimidate US aggression. Chinese MRBMs, intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) are as modernized as solid propulsion systems, which have high survivability enabling a delayed second strike and launch on warning capability. If China accelerates the shift to the theater level, its official doctrine of no first-use and negative security assurances may have to be modified.

Scenario 3: Minimum Deterrence to "Asymmetrical Deterrence"[44]

The third scenario suggests that China could shift its deterrence concept to be asymmetrical in nature. The validity of "asymmetrical deterrence" rests on China's escalation control and asymmetrical retaliation capabilities. The former indicates that China could conduct limited military attacks against Taiwan and that the United States would refrain from taking military action against it. The

[44] Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching up: China's Rise and Challenges for US Security Policy" *International Security*, Vol.25, No. 4 (Spring 2001); Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: The Theory of Asymmetric Conflict" *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001).

latter suggests China's retaliatory capability both by nuclear and conventional weapons to target various assets of the United States and its allies will prevent US intervention to Taiwan and other concerned areas. These capabilities include cruise missiles and small-scale operations.

Scenario 4: Minimum Deterrence to "Limited Deterrence"[45]

The assumption of scenario four rests on the doubt that China continues to maintain a minimum deterrence doctrine. Alaster Iain Johnston argues that China's nuclear modernization program may be geared toward developing a capacity to move from a nuclear strategy based on minimum deterrence to "limited deterrence."[46] Limited deterrence entails the capability to deter a conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear war, and to control escalation in the event of a nuclear confrontation. Under a limited deterrence doctrine, China would need to target nuclear forces in addition to cities, which would require expanded deployments.[47]

Scenario 5: No Deterrence (Neutralized)

Some analysts suggest that China could virtually lose its deterrent capability under a new framework with the United States. The current Chinese nuclear doctrine is based on the *ambiguity* of its nominal force capability. Hence, minimum deterrence relies on maintaining the mere possibility of a second strike capability. Therefore, China may lose such minimally necessary conditions for deterrence under the following cases: 1) the technology of missile defense greatly advances, especially in the boost-phase and space-based system; and 2) US preemptive strike capability becomes more credible due to its precision guided munitions.

POLICY CHOICES FOR US-CHINA NUCLEAR RELATIONS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS TO US–JAPAN ALLIANCE

How would these scenarios affect extended nuclear deterrence in the context of the US–Japan alliance? There will be four policy options that could be pursued toward achieving strategic coordination:

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[45] Alaster Iain Johnston, "China's New Old Thinking: The Concept of Limited Deterrence" *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96); You Ji, "Nuclear Power in the Post-Cold War Era: The Development of China's Nuclear Strategy," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 18, No. 3,1999.

[46] *Ibid.*

[47] *Ibid*. Nautilus Institute, "China's Attitude towards Nuclear Deterrence." Available at: http://www.nti.org/db/china/deterpos.htm.

Policy Option 1: Establishing US–China Asymmetrical Strategic Deterrence

The first option suggests that the United States should openly or tacitly admit that China's strategic forces are a deterrent against the United States. Under this scenario, China may increase its comfort level on maintaining minimum deterrence and slow down the speed of nuclear and missile modernization. It will be, however, extremely difficult to create such a political statement toward China, since the US Congress and analysts may see such a development as an indication of the vulnerability of US defense against Chinese strategic forces.

Policy Option 2: Maintaining the Ambiguity of Strategic Deterrence

The second option is to seek to maintain the ambiguity of Chinese strategic deterrence. Under this scenario, both parties should not mention whether Chinese nuclear forces have a second strike capability under the new framework. During a trip to China, US Secretary of State Colin Powell mentioned that US missile defense capability might not harm China's strategic deterrent.[48] This statement neither confirms nor denies the durability of China's strategic force, thus preserving the ambiguity of the US position.

Policy Option 3: Negating China's Strategic Force

Some suggest that the United States should negate China's nuclear capability by using advanced technology including missile defense and preemptive strikes. Under this policy option, the United States will pursue every resource to strike and defend against China's strategic and tactical forces. Such options, however, will be possible when US technology is able to detect, locate, strike, and intercept almost all of the capabilities that China may develop in the coming decade.

Extended deterrence in the US–Japan alliance will be affected when China makes its strategic shift to Scenario 2, 3, and 4 by focusing on theater deterrence. Under this scenario, the major target of Chinese nuclear forces will be US forward deployed bases and Japanese territory. The US–Japan alliance will face a new context of managing their extended deterrence. In this regard, missile defense development and deployment in Japan will have crucial importance in Scenario 2 and 4. The emergence of the relative concept in Japanese defense policy may also be accelerated by these scenarios. Whether Japan moves towards creating a credible multiple deterrence function in order to

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[48] "China Firm on Missile Defense Opposition," *Washington Post*, May 16, 2001. "Powell Outlines Missile Defense to China Leader" *Associated Press*, July 29, 2001.

adapt to the scenarios above will be an important parameter for Japan as it examines its policy options under the relative concept of defense.

CONCLUSION

Emergence of the relative concept in Japanese defense may increasingly encourage policymakers to prepare for indigenous strike capabilities, including the tacit maintenance of a nuclear arms option on Japan's defense agenda. The Japanese nuclear option, however, will not be seriously pursued on the political agenda if the multiple deterrence function, consisting of offensive and defensive capabilities, sufficiently deals with emerging new threats—especially North Korean and Chinese nuclear forces—in the new strategic context.

Despite the fact that the 2002 NPR tried to reinforce the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence by adapting to new asymmetrical threats, the fragility of deterrence remains. Missile defense will supplement both conventional and nuclear extended deterrence in the US–Japan alliance by providing a damage confinement/denial deterrence capability, thus mitigating Japan's nuclear desire. The complexity of the ratio of offensive/defensive forces with adversaries, however, could accelerate the security dilemma. North Korea's development of its nuclear program will be a key short-term variable that affects the above determinants. The expansion of the Chinese nuclear capability will also affect extended nuclear deterrence within the framework of future US–China nuclear relations.