Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP)
The Issue | Obstacles | Q & A | Quick Facts | Legislation | Agreements | Talking Points | Recommendations
The Issue
After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the threat posed by excess weapons and materials in the successor
states, while awesome in its scope, was dwarfed in its complexity by the
problem of technology transfer through under- or unemployed former
Soviet weapons experts. The plight of the weapons community was
indicative of the widespread inability of Russia and the other states of
the former Soviet Union (FSU) to support the massive weapons complex
that they inherited. Within the first year after the collapse of the
USSR, life for this once privileged community of scientists, engineers
and technicians was irrevocably altered. Tens of thousands lost their
jobs or went months without a paycheck. Even the brightest scientists
and engineers were forced to seek work where they could get it-whether
driving taxi cabs or selling their talents to foreign governments or
terrorist organizations.[1] All
told, it was estimated that the Soviets had employed some 50,000-60,000
nuclear experts, 65,000 bioweapons professionals, and 6,000 chemical
weapons experts.[2] Most
were capable of spreading critical components of sensitive information
to hostile groups and states. Given the poor economic performance of
Russia and other FSU states, many scientists who could not find jobs
elsewhere faced a literal choice: go hungry or sell your nefarious
expertise to the highest bidder.
The United States government
acted innovatively through the mid-1990s with a suite of "scientist
redirect" efforts aimed at enhancing US national security by engaging
former Soviet Union weapons specialists in peaceful pursuits.[3]
Various efforts were launched at the Department of Defense, the
Department of Energy, and the Department of State. Most of these
targeted the aging community of researchers that worked within the
Soviet weapons complexes before the USSR fell; however, that community
does not represent the only threat. According to recent analyses,
younger bioscientists in the states of the FSU who have modern
laboratory skills and direct access to biological materials at the
erstwhile weapons institutes, as well as strong financial ambitions,
pose equally daunting challenges to international security. This new
human proliferation threat necessitates the continuation (and evolution)
of post-Cold War redirect programming.
The Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program is one example of the Department
of Energy's efforts to stem brain drain proliferation. Established in
1994, IPP links American companies belonging to the United States
Industry Coalition (USIC) to former Soviet weapons institutes through an
intermediary, the US National Laboratories of the Department of Energy.
By connecting FSU scientists with US industry partners, IPP attempts to
establish commercially viable opportunities that will lead to
sustainable employment by developing new, marketable technologies.
Personnel within the National Labs, who manage the program, often retain
long ongoing relationships with personnel from individual institutes
within the FSU, and are able to recruit the corporate participants,
manage the application process, and oversee the work undertaken by the
scientists at their institute.
Due to the structure of the IPP
program, US company participants have little to no control over the
activities of the individual scientists involved. The National
Laboratories' contributions vary widely and depend largely upon the
competence and interest of the primary investigator, who manages the
daily interactions with the DoE bureaucracy and the FSU scientists.
Congress passed legislation in 1999 that limited IPP funding spent at
the National Laboratories to 35 percent of each project. This funding
restriction has led to numerous cases of lab officials finding it
difficult or impossible to perform effective oversight of the projects.
USIC,
a non-profit organization with a membership comprising businesses,
associations, and academic institutions, is the commercial backbone of
IPP.[4]
Because the business environment in the former Soviet Union is very
difficult to navigate, USIC provides companies involved in IPP with the
guidance necessary to make their projects successful. Membership in USIC
is required for any company that wishes to take advantage of IPP
funding.
The process of completing an IPP project usually takes
several years. USIC warns potential companies that every project
proposal goes through an eight to twelve month "rigorous review process"
that involves vetting by USIC, the Inter-Laboratory Board (which
represents the National Laboratories), and the Department of Energy
Headquarters.[5] Once
the project is approved and a contract is signed, another three to
twelve months are needed for contract negotiation with the targeted FSU
institute. More time is needed for necessary equipment to be sent to the
FSU before projects begin. After everything is in place, the target for
project length is two years, for a total timeline of three to five
years.[6]
While
the value of IPP is widely acknowledged, recent criticisms have arisen
about the sustainability of the jobs the IPP creates. A successful IPP
project will produce "proof of concept" for a technology or in some
cases a prototype with commercial potential. The next step is proving
this potential by engineering a commercially viable product; after this,
it is often the case that few, if any, members of the original research
team are needed. Once a new technology is produced, the technology can
be manufactured and sold with no need for an ongoing relationship with
the host institute or team of primary FSU researchers. Thus, only a
certain subset of projects leads to significant numbers of long-term
jobs for the scientists. This "technology push" model (so-called because
the technology is the driving force behind the project) is limited in
its wherewithal to create sufficient long-term commercial opportunities
for this scientific community.
In order to successfully prevent
the proliferation of weapons knowledge, redirect programs such as IPP
should also incorporate a "market pull" model. The FSU scientists,
engineers, and technicians all possess important skills that are
valuable to various commercial markets. For example, former nuclear
weapons engineers could be of service to a company that sells nuclear
safeguards, a research firm looking to create new types of nuclear fuel,
or a security business looking for on-the-ground expertise about
nuclear facility vulnerabilities. Other companies in energy,
environmental protection, health, and homeland security industries
(among others) can benefit from the knowledge in the FSU's former
weapons institutes. To successfully redirect this expertise, IPP must
find market gaps and provide incentives for companies to fill these gaps
by pulling expertise out of the FSU institutes and into commercial
employment. USIC's understanding of the FSU business environment,
protection afforded by the US Government, as well as financial subsidies
can likely serve as adequate incentives for companies to invest in and
employ FSU talent.
Despite the market pull shortcoming, IPP has
been a useful tool of engagement over the past eleven years. Working
with budgets that remain static at about $24 million per year, IPP has
found long-term civilian employment for over 2,800 weapons scientists.
As of September 2006, USIC had approximately 150 members that that had
engaged more than 16,000 FSU scientists since the program began.[7] USIC
projects also led to the creation of approximately 30 Eurasian or
US-Eurasian businesses in 2005 alone-business that will provide FSU
scientists with peaceful, civilian jobs.[8]
Consider the following examples of successful USIC projects:
- Thorium Power, Inc., a firm based in McLean, Virginia, used an IPP grant to promote the development of an alternative nuclear fuel. The firm is working with scientists from Moscow's renowned Kurchatov Institute on technology for a nuclear power plant that uses fuel made by mixing plutonium with thorium and uranium. "Currently, scores of former weapons scientists at Kurchatov are helping Thorium Power develop a working prototype of their design that is expected to be tested in a commercial 1,000-megawatt reactor in Russia."[9] Not only could this fuel provide energy throughout Russia and the rest of the world, it could also help dispose of Russia's vast stocks of surplus plutonium.
- Flint Hills Scientific of Lawrence, Kansas, with the help of an IPP grant and a team of scientists from Biophysical Laboratory Ltd. in Russia, has developed an alternative treatment for epilepsy that lacks the risks inherent with electronic brain stimulation. The Russian team helped develop a series of small probes that control brain temperature while minimizing risk to the patient.[10]
- For information on the activities of the United States Industry Coalition (USIC), please visit its website: http://www.usic.net.
Obstacles
- IPP generally relies on a "technology push" model rather than "market pull." Thus, instead of finding market gaps and using FSU expertise to fill them, the IPP model is largely based on pushing new technologies into the marketplace, a much less likely path to sustainable job creation for the research component involved in creation of the technology.
- Too little effort has been focused on leveraging US companies as employers rather than customers of technology and to "incentivize" their employment of the scientific capacity in the states of the FSU.
- No systematic effort has been made to address the next generation of FSU scientists who may possess potentially dangerous capabilities, who are not engaged in global research networks, and who therefore may have the motivation and lack of transparency to proliferate.
- The 35 percent cap on National Laboratory spending (out of the IPP budget of about $24 million per year) often leaves Lab project managers with inadequate funds to carry out their mandates.
Q & A
Q: How serious was the brain drain
threat when the Soviet Union collapsed?
A: It was estimated
that the Soviets had employed some 50,000-60,000 nuclear experts, 65,000
bioweapons professionals, and 6,000 chemical weapons experts.[11] All
were capable of spreading critical components of sensitive information
to hostile groups and states. The retirement and death of many of these
scientists has not reduced the threat, as a new generation with
dangerous knowledge is now looking for employment.
Q: Have any well-known American companies
participated in IPP?
A: IPP grants are not set aside solely
for small and mid-sized companies. Halliburton has teamed with a group
of Russian scientists to create a more environmentally-friendly way of
removing abandoned off-shore oil structures.[12]
Boeing's Space Systems division teamed with scientists from institutes
in Russia and Ukraine to develop and fabricate light-weight components
for airplanes and launch vehicles.[13]
General Electric and a team from Ukraine have signed up for a project
that will create new coatings, ceramics, and composites, among other
things.[14]
Q: Is the market interested in any of IPP's
projects?
A: Yes. In 2005, US companies involved in USIC
projects were able to obtain over $17 million in outside investment.
According to USIC's annual report, "Thirty-two projects generated
product sales and service revenues," while the commercialization rate
for technologies is approximately 20 percent.[15]
Quick Facts
- The average Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention project takes roughly three to five years from the initial proposal to "proof-of-concept."
- Estimates of the Soviet nuclear workforce ranged from 50,000 to 60,000. Most of those individuals needed new work and better pay after the Soviet Union crumbled.
- Working for twelve years, IPP has redirected over 2,800 weapons scientists into sustainable, peaceful employment.
- USIC currently has over 150 participating members that span the broad range of American industry: multinational corporations, small business, universities, and international business groups.
- From 1994 to 2005, IPP engaged over 16,000 scientists at over 200 institutes.
- IPP coordinates its efforts with scientist redirect efforts from other US Government Departments: the Science and Technology Centers run by the State Department; the Business Information Services for the Newly Independent States (BISNIS) and the Special American Business Internship Program (SABIT) programs at the Department of Commerce; the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program run by the Pentagon; and other NNSA nonproliferation programs.
- Wages for even the best scientists in the former Soviet weapons complex often fell below $100 per month.[16]
Recent Legislation
- N/A
Applicable Treaties, Legislation, and Other International Agreements
- The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Section 575, Public Law 103-87) appropriated $35 million for the formation of what would become the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention.
- Section 3136 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) provided that "not more than 35 percent of the funds available in any fiscal year after fiscal year 1999 for the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program (IPP) may be obligated or expended by the Department of Energy national laboratories to carry out or provide oversight of any activities under that program."
Talking Points
- By the end of the Cold War it was estimated that the Soviets employed approximately 120,000-130,000 experts on weapons of mass destruction, including 50,000-60,000 nuclear experts, 65,000 bioweapons experts, and some 6,000 chemical weapons experts.
- With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States, fearing potential "brain drain" proliferation, developed a series of programs to redirect these WMD experts to civilian research.
- IPP, housed in the Department of Energy, is one such program. It seeks to develop commercially viable products utilizing the expertise of FSU scientists.
- To accomplish its goals, IPP works through an industry group, the US Industry Coalition (USIC) which helps American companies that wish to participate in the program navigate the challenging legal frameworks of the FSU.
- A new generation of scientists with weapons expertise is looking for jobs in the former Soviet states. Failing to address this new threat could have negative consequences for US national security.
- At the current rate, it will take thirteen years for the Department of Energy to employ all of its target population of FSU weapons scientists in sustainable, peaceful employment.[17]
- IPP's industry partners program, designed to marry the FSU scientific community with the private sector, has not been able to systematically pull the target constituency out of the institutes and into commercially viable private enterprises producing technology or applications with widespread application and value.
- Without efforts to identify market gaps and bring in companies to create employment opportunities outside of the former weapons institutes, IPP will not reach its full nonproliferation potential.
Recommendations
- A National Security Council designee should spearhead an interagency
process to reassess the global role of Cooperative Nonproliferation
(CNP) efforts in today's context. One of the main objectives of this
reassessment should be to produce a detailed and timely analysis,
including an "exit strategy" for US assistance where appropriate. The
role of scientist redirect programs should be an important component in
this analysis, which should ensure that sustainability is a larger
emphasis in the programs to ensure a successful US "exit."
[See Book Recommendation #1] - NNSA should broaden the scope of sustainability efforts in
order to exploit existing programs that could enhance efforts toward
sustainability. NNSA activities should focus on the development of a
robust nuclear security supply capacity equivalent to the demand created
in over a decade of fostering nuclear security requirements in Russia.
IPP could be used to foster this capacity, and will help move the
US-Russia relationship away from patronage and toward partnership.
[See Book Recommendations #6 and #17] - Create a bicameral congressional task force whose objective is
to regularly provide briefings from a broad array of the actors involved
in actual implementation of CNP initiatives. Congress members often
fail to grasp the importance of scientist redirect programs like IPP. If
the task force idea is too ambitious, Congress should at least set up
off-the-record briefing sessions with DOE/National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) officials who can express the need for brain drain
proliferation prevention.
[See Book Recommendations #7 and #19] - Engage the G8 business communities and the FSU target community
in a rigorous informational exchange regarding the types of expertise
available and potential advantages of employing the target community.
[See Book Recommendation #8] - Channel IPP projects to meet the needs of other government
programs. Bioweapons scientists can use their expertise to help fight
infectious diseases. Nuclear scientists can help create new safeguards
equipment to aid CNP programs. By coordinating programs to redirect
scientists with internal US Government programs to achieve specific
technological advances needed to solve our own energy, nonproliferation,
counterterrorism, intelligence and other needs, the US could better
achieve its existing nonproliferation goals with respect to brain drain
while exploring potential technological solutions to existing security
concerns at lower cost.
[See Book Recommendation #8 and #17] - Create an appropriate incentive structure in IPP to engage
potential employers (i.e. private industry actors) whenever possible.
Emphasis on technology development rarely creates numerous sustainable
jobs, most of which are the result of serendipity. Tax incentives and
other inducements could be used to engage private industry in redirect
efforts.
[See Book Recommendation #8 and #18] - The United States government should act to appoint an
independent broker to help generate a dialogue between overworked agency
implementers and potential private sector players. Through the
establishment of a "business roundtable" dedicated to more effective
implementation of the broad panoply of nonproliferation programs, this
disinterested third party broker would: (a) survey the landscape to
define novel areas of collaboration; (b) identify the relevant players
from both government and the private sector; (c) build a network to
foster productive relationships; (d) act as host and moderator of a
regular series of roundtable discussions; (e) provide a critically
absent feedback loop between government and private industry, (f)
facilitate a process of consensus building among all pertinent players
in the CNP arena designed to promote the US government's broad foreign
policy objectives and promote sustainability of the CNP agenda. This
roundtable is especially important for redirect programs such as IPP.
[See Book Recommendation #9] - IPP's "technology push" model should be matched by similar
efforts that exploit "market pull;" in this vein, DoE/NNSA should
specifically target collaborative efforts between industry and FSU
weapons expertise to meet demands generated by the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership and the Global Nuclear Terrorism Reduction Initiative,
among others.
[See Book Recommendation #18] - Congress should change the budget cap of 35 percent involvement
of labs in IPP due to its strain on the labs' capacity to provide
adequate technical and managerial oversight.
[See Book Recommendation #21]
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Endnotes
[1] Ken
Alibek, Biohazard (New York:
Random House, 1999): 270-279.
[2] Amy
E. Smithson, Toxic Archipelago:
Preventing Proliferation from the former Soviet Chemical and Biological
Weapons Complexes (Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center,
1999), accessed at:
http://www.stimson.org/cbw/pdf/toxicarch.pdf.
[3]
United States Industry Coalition, "The Program," accessed at: http://www.usic.net/usic/test1.nsf/Links/The+Program.
[4] USIC,
"About USIC: Promoting Peace through Technology Commercialization,"
accessed at: http://www.usic.net/usic/test1.nsf/Links/Promoting%20Peace%20through%20Technology%20%20Commercialization.
[5] USIC,
"IPP Program: Project Review Process and Timeline," accessed at: http://www.usic.net/usic/test1.nsf/Links/Project%20Review%20Process%20and%20Timeline.
[6] Ibid.
[7] USIC,
"USIC: Advancing Nonproliferation through Leadership and
Collaboration," Annual Report 2005-2006, accessed at: http://www.usic.net/UserFiles/File/AnnualReports/2005-2005_Annual.pdf.
[8] Ibid.
[9] USIC,
"Thorium Power," accessed at: http://www.partnershipsforprosperity.net/success_story/thorium_power.html.
[10]
Alex Reed, "Flint Hills Scientific," accessed at: http://www.partnershipsforprosperity.net/success_story/flint.html.
[11] Amy
Smithson, Toxic Archipelago.
[12]
USIC, "Rarefaction Shock Wave (RSW) Cutter for Offshore Oil-Gas Platform
Removal," (July 2003), accessed at: http://cisa1.lanl.gov/Forms/Eposters/Halliburton.pdf.
[13]
USIC, "Advanced Welding and Fabrication Techniques for AI-Li Alloys,"
(August 2006), accessed at: http://cisa1.lanl.gov/Forms/Eposters/Boeing.pdf.
[14]
USIC, "Next Generation EB-PVD Apparatus," (October 2003), accessed at: http://cisa1.lanl.gov/Forms/Eposters/GeneralElectric.pdf.
[15]
UISC, Annual Report 2005-2006.
[16]
Jonathan B. Tucker and Kathleen M. Vogel, "Preventing the Proliferation
of Chemical and Biological Weapon Materials and Know-How," The Nonproliferation Review (Spring
2000): 89, accessed at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol07/71/tucker71.pdf.
[17]
National Nuclear Security Administration, FY 2007 Congressional Budget
Request, (Department of Energy: Washington, 2006): 497, accessed at: http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/07budget/Content/Volumes/Vol_1_NNSA.pdf.
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Last Updated on June 1, 2007