If preventing the illicit acquisition of conventional weapons is our goal, three broad standards must be developed:

1. Regulatory harmonization and establishment of common international standards: Today’s arms market is defined by a large constellation of small producers and intermediaries. Astonishingly, the licensing and reporting rules vary widely from country to country. The inability to regulate across international boundaries means that even when one State places restrictions on arms to or from a particular destination, the diversity of supply and fluidity that characterize the market seldom prevents illicit acquisition. Preventing illicit shipments of weapons requires enhanced harmonization of national laws and the development of a set of common international standards to prevent unscrupulous actors from simply moving across the border to evade a particularly hostile government action.

2. Developing brokering controls: Any attempt to control the unchecked movement of weapons must begin with a global standard for arms brokering that provide strong internationally recognized criteria to regulate the activities of arms brokers. These norms must then be translated into strict brokering controls that can be enforced on a national basis. Unfortunately, there will always be a need for legitimate arms sales around the world, but controlling the most egregious violators will always be in every governments’ national interest.

3. Identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting violators: New standards are meaningless unless governments take comprehensive monitoring and enforcement action. This will require a level of enhanced cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies that is often lacking due to inadequate resources and lack of prioritization across even the most committed governments. States must work more closely to give precedence to weapons trafficking as a threat to international security, regional stability, organized crime, and sustainable development. If States better share detailed information about weapons flows and disreputable arms brokers, they could increase law enforcement capacity and strengthen legal and judicial infrastructures, to prevent the trafficking and transit of illicit weapons and other contraband.

As the international community meets to discuss the ATT, and to review the Programme of Action and the UN Register on Small Arms, these principles should serve as a benchmark upon which our collective objective of preventing the illicit flow of weapons around the globe can be graded. 

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On May 21, Stimson will co-host, along with the Permanent Missions of Japan, Poland and Turkey to the United Nations, the third Turtle Bay Security Roundtable meeting in New York. The theme for this meeting will be proliferation of conventional arms. The meeting will set impending discussions at the UN in a broader context by considering the underlying threats that they seek to address. It will consider the modalities and consequences of the illicit trade in weapons, with specific focus on the elements of the threat that must be addressed. It will also cover the negative impact of irresponsible use of arms that prevents sustainable socio-economic growth of UN Member States. Panels will focus on how the problems of armed violence and mismanagement of arms have been tackled through various existing tools through pragmatic approaches and what needs to be done. Attendance to this event is by invite only. For further information, click here.

Photo Credit: US Marine Corps, via Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:AKM_in_Iraq.JPEG

A selection of media organizations that have featured the study includes The Atlantic, The Washington Post’s Wonk Blog, Reuters, NPR, MSNBC, CNN Money, and The Economist’s Democracy in America Blog.

“The first quarter of 2012 paints a somewhat confusing picture with regard to the state of piracy threat in the high risk areas (HRA) of the Indian Ocean. Initially, given the low level of attacks for the first six weeks of 2012, it seemed the threat against merchant shipping had receded dramatically. However, though there were even fewer attacks in February, two hijackings of merchant vessels within a week of one another raised alarms amongst shipping companies and naval commands, and warnings to be prepared for more attacks were sent out. Nevertheless, compared to the same period in 2011, the threat of piracy attacks has indeed greatly diminished, and there has also been a notable reduction in the number of successful hijackings.

“In all of the attacks and hijackings in Q1, pirates have continued use of aggressive fire-for-effect tactics - assault rifle fire at the bridge and superstructure followed (where possible) by attempted boarding. However, the widespread use of armed security teams on board merchant vessels - many of which have been forced to return fire to deter attacks and boarding attempts - has made life difficult for the piracy attack groups (PAGs), particularly in the Gulf of Aden. To date, the only hijackings in and around the internationally recognized transit corridor (IRTC) have been trading and fishing dhows, which are highly vulnerable to hijacking as they are rarely hardened against boarding and cannot evade attackers that approach in high-speed skiffs. It is likely that several of the dhows hijacked so far this year are still being used as motherships, given the lack of merchant vessel motherships available to the pirates.”

To read more and download the full analysis, click here.

Photo Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 2nd Class Jason R. Zalasky via Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Combined_Task_Force_151_-_090212-N-1082Z-066.jpg

Tunisia’s interim coalition is comprised of the Nahda plurality (90 seats in the 217 seat assembly) and two small liberal, secular parties, the Congress for the Republic (30 seats) and Ettakatol (21 seats).  Nahda has the premiership, while the other two parties hold the leadership positions of President of the Republic and President of the Constituent Assembly.   That Troika moved smartly early in 2012 to form committees for drafting the new Constitution, consult with global experts on democratic transitions, engage the public, and build consensus for a new constitution to guide the country into a more democratic and pluralistic political life.

The Nahda party has done many things to build confidence across the political spectrum in the country, and to assure external players in Europe and the United States that it will continue to foster a moderate, tolerant brand of political Islam. 

• The party permitted and then resolved debate over mentioning sharia in the constitution; in late March, the party leaders determined that the Bourguiba-era constitution in which the preface refers to remaining “faithful to the teachings of Islam” was sufficient, and that reference to sharia (Islamic law) was not necessary or desirable.
• The Nahda-led Ministry of Interior responded to Salafist violence in early 2012 by strict adherence to the law; no special treatment was accorded to their fellow Islamists.
• Nahda notables have engaged in a few acts of reconciliation by moving to close prisons housing former regime political opponents who were not Islamists, thus identifying with other victims of the old regime.

But these measures have not been sufficient to tamp down the deep anxieties of the old elite, and of the secular middle class that was apolitical in the end of the Ben Ali era.  Those middle class and professional Tunisians expected that the fall of Ben Ali would usher in a more liberal era for the country; they were quite shocked to discover the deep social and cultural conservatism of their own society, and the emerging “culture wars” over the role of women in public life, and the role of religion in public policy, are acute.  Stresses have surfaced among students, among workers and businessmen who have suffered from the continued downturn in the economy, and in the security ministries where career officers now are led by political forces they once worked to suppress and control.   

The economy is a particularly acute challenge, with 800,000 unemployed and poor prospects for any quick revitalization of tourism or trade with the weak EU economies.  Yet Tunisia is also well-placed, if its leaders think strategically, to strengthen mutually beneficial economic relations with Libya.  Broader regional economic integration, which Tunisia has traditionally favored, for now is too hard.

Another serious challenge to Nahda as the dominant political force in the country is the rise of a more doctrinaire Islamist force, the Salafis.  That political tendency, often thought of as a social movement advocating more strict adherence to Islamist values and behavior, is likely to form a political party, which will create pressure on Nahda to align with it, rather than with the smaller secular parties in the current governing coalition.  Nahda’s political philosophy, born of years in opposition, in exile and in Ben Ali’s prisons, is convincingly moderate and accepting of Tunisia’s history and evolution as a modern state; nonetheless, the emergence of Salafists as a part of the political spectrum could well create new strains within Nahda, and in its relations with other political parties.

The Nahda party and the coalition have a treacherous balancing act as they promote systemic change after years of dictatorship, but do not dismantle some of the inherent strengths of the Tunisian state.  Those strengths include proactive economic ties to Europe and beyond, investment in human capital, and promotion of moderate foreign policies in the region.  Nonetheless, the old elite had allowed economic development plans for the interior of the country to atrophy, and its declared support for a competitive and open economic system were undermined by cronyism and corruption.  The new government has to empower and mobilize long-neglected parts of the society, but somehow not alienate or disempower the talented technocrats and sophisticated business community that will be essential for the country’s further development.

Photo Credit: Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/mritems/Images/2011/11/13/2011111310814905734_20.jpg

Click here to read the article.

Unless Congress succeeds in agreeing on a new budget, current law calls for the ‘sequestration’ provision to kick in, which would cut defense spending 10 percent. Many voices on both sides of the aisle have expressed substantial concern over that prospect.

But how does the American public feel about the potential of cutting defense to mitigate the deficit? If a representative sample of Americans were at the table when decisions were being made, what would they say?

A new study conducted by the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) in collaboration with the Stimson Center and the Center for Public Integrity shows that the American public favors deeper defense cuts. A representative sample of Americans were shown the size of the defense budget from different perspectives and presented with arguments that experts make for and against cutting it. 

Other polls on defense spending have mostly asked whether respondents favor or oppose defense cuts, and generally found smaller numbers favoring reductions.  Steven Kull, director of PPC, comments, “This suggests that Americans generally underestimate the size of the defense budget, and that when they receive neutral information about its size they are more likely to cut it to reduce the deficit.”

Majorities said that defense spending was more than they expected when it was presented in comparison to other items in the discretionary budget (65 percent), to historical defense spending levels in constant dollars (60 percent), and to the defense spending of potential enemies and allies (56 percent). 

Additional findings:

• Nuclear weapons received a 27 percent average cut
• Ground force capabilities were slashed $36.2 billion
• Eight in 10 respondents favored cutting the Obama administrations proposed budget of $88 billion on war spending in Afghanistan for 2013. (Average cut: 40 percent)
• Six in 10 respondents favored reducing healthcare costs by having military families and retirees increase their co-pay for drug prescriptions

To read the full study, click here.

How the Study Was Conducted

The study was fielded April 12 to 18 with a sample of 665 American adults (margin of error plus or minus 3.8 percent, accounting for a design effect, plus or minus 4.8 percent). It was conducted using the web-enabled KnowledgePanel®, a probability-based panel designed to be representative of the U.S. population. Initially, participants are chosen scientifically by a random selection of telephone numbers and residential addresses.

Photo credit: iStock