



THE HENRY L.
STIMSON CENTER

**ENHANCING UNITED NATIONS CAPACITY
TO SUPPORT POST-CONFLICT
POLICING AND RULE OF LAW**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Police personnel play a vital and expanding role in United Nations peace operations. Their responsibilities have grown from merely monitoring host nation police forces to reforming, restructuring, and rebuilding police forces decimated or discredited by war. Where no effective local police capacity exists, UN police have assumed primary responsibility for maintaining law and order. Across all missions, they play diverse and critical roles in the effort to (re)establish the rule of law in states attempting to transition from war to a peace that produces safe and stable societies. Indeed, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno has argued that “(e)xperienced civilian law-enforcement professionals are just as vital to the success of our missions as military forces.” Yet the current system for recruiting and deploying individual police for service in UN missions consistently fails to deliver high quality personnel to missions quickly and efficiently. Resolving this long-standing problem is an increasingly urgent priority for the United Nations. This report offers potential solutions to it that are both feasible and affordable.

UN Capacity: Not Keeping Pace with Demand and Complexity

The importance of UN police in modern peace operations is reflected in the growing demand for their services. Through the 1990s, steady demand kept about 2,000 UN police (UNPOL) officers deployed. In 1999, however, demand grew dramatically and with it came new tasks. Two new complex peacekeeping missions with “executive” (law enforcement) mandates, in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, rapidly quadrupled the number of UN police deployed and gave the United Nations direct responsibility for public security in those mission areas. Other peacekeeping missions were subsequently established with significant policing and other rule of law-related elements. By June 2007, the United Nations had over 9,500 police from nearly 90 countries serving in ten peacekeeping missions (and an additional six political and peacebuilding missions) around the globe. The following month, the Security Council authorized another 3,800 individual officers and 2,500 personnel in formed police units for the African Union-UN hybrid force in Darfur, Sudan, as well as 300 police for a UN mission in Chad, driving the total authorized force to roughly 16,000.

The growing demand for international police and increasing complexity of their assigned tasks stem from the recognition of two things: that rule of law is fundamental to lasting and self-sustaining peace, and that competent, professional police—international and domestic—are essential to rule of law. Thus today, UN police not only support post-conflict public security, but usually are involved in building needed local capacity. In Timor-Leste, 1,600 UN police serve both as the primary providers of law and order and as instructors for the Timor-Leste police force. In Haiti, 1,900 UN police help combat the gangs of Port-au-Prince while simultaneously working to build up the Haitian National Police. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), roughly 1,100 UN police coordinate with the European Union and others to professionalize the large, fractious, and frequently-abusive Congolese police. UN police play similarly diverse and important roles in peacekeeping missions in Sudan, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and elsewhere.

Yet this recognition of the importance of rule of law and of UN police has not translated into necessary deployable capacity. First, the United Nations faces major and basic gaps in its ability

to recruit, prepare, and deploy qualified police to new missions in a timely manner, as well as in its ability to strategize, offer operational guidance, and effectively manage police contingents in the field. For example, Stimson analyzed rates of deployment for all UN peacekeeping operations with police components since 1989 and found deployment rates of individual UNPOL officers to be unimproved over time. After Security Council action, it still takes an average of nine months to get the authorized number of police officers to the field. This delay deprives new peace operations of public security personnel at the most critical phase of a country's war-to-peace transition: Its beginning. Stimson also found that peak demand for UN police comes in waves, every six to seven years, with Security Council authorizations rising rapidly in those years, to four or five times average annual levels. These peak-demand years further stress the ad hoc system for recruiting, preparing and deploying police to UN peacekeeping missions. That system is at the core of present problems. Police must be offered by countries, but states do not nominate officers to any sort of UN police roster and have proved quite reluctant to do so. Since all police have active "day jobs," countries find it hard to part with them. This leaves states with mostly moral incentives to contribute qualified individual officers, in contrast to the material incentives offered by the UN for both formed police and military units.

The problem goes beyond member states, however, to the UN system for managing and deploying personnel. If states did have greater incentives to contribute personnel, the United Nations would still have no advance knowledge of the pool of officers potentially available to it or their operational specialties. Further, if such knowledge were in fact made available, there are too few UN Headquarters staff to use that information effectively. About 50 professional staff—including the still-forming UN Standing Police Capacity of 25—must now cope with all of the elements of UN policing laid out above, from strategy onward, for a police force in the field that is 200 to 300 times as large, executing over a dozen different mandates.

Beyond documenting and demonstrating the urgent need for change, this report advances proposals, described below, that attempt to solve the current problem of ad hoc recruitment of personnel and to give states in all economic brackets useful incentives to contribute scarce police resources to meet widely-recognized post-conflict public security needs. We sketch each of them here, briefly.

Proposal 1: Create a Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity (ROLCAP)

Stimson proposes creating a larger, standing cadre of police and rule of law experts to help plan, deploy, and fill key leadership posts of new missions in their critical first year and provide support to other, ongoing peacekeeping operations. This standing rule of law capacity (ROLCAP) of roughly 400 personnel would comprise eight teams of about 50 people each. One third of each team would be devoted to legal issues, prison support, and the justice sector. Other experts would include highly experienced police leaders capable of conducting mission needs assessments, planning for the mission, jumpstarting the reform process for local police, and running the police component of the operation from mission headquarters.

These proposed numbers are based on our analysis of recent UN mission staffing requirements and mission frequency. On average, mission police components have about 30 key headquarters personnel—from leadership to critical communications personnel—and other rule of law components (legal, judicial, and prison experts) have approximately 20 headquarters personnel,

for a total of roughly 50 key police/rule of law leadership positions per mission. To be able to meet surge period requirements, ROLCAP should be able to staff up to four new missions per year, that is, have four deployable teams of 50 people each. To sustain this capacity, the “deployment tempo” should not exceed 50 percent—serving 12 months in the field and then 12 months recuperating, being trained, and training others. ROLCAP members could, for example, train the police reserve proposed below, lead induction training for the bulk of mission police and other rule of law personnel, and be available to run training initiatives in non-mission countries, as part of DPKO’s new role as the global lead entity within the UN on police issues.

Proposal 2: Create a UN Police Reserve (UNPR)

Rather than leave recruitment of the bulk of UN mission police and rule of law personnel to the current, ad hoc system, Stimson proposes creation of a UN Police Reserve (UNPR). The reserve would be composed of officers nominated by countries for deployment in UN missions for fixed terms that are interspersed with rotations back to their home services. Improving the incentives for countries to offer skilled police is fundamental to such a reserve. Thus, we propose that police agencies be offered “retainer fees” for officers selected for the new reserve system and be reimbursed for their deployment.

The retainer would be offered in recognition of ongoing demand for police officers at home. We propose that the United Nations offer a police agency (not the national government, but the agency whose officer would be placed on the reserve roster) an annual retainer equivalent to 10 percent of the officer’s actual annual salary: Five percent to defray the costs of two weeks annual UN-related training, and five percent as an incentive fee for placing his or her name on the reserve list and committing to release that officer within 14 days of call up by the United Nations. Officers nominated for the UNPR should be screened by the United Nations (one task of the proposed ROLCAP) and once accepted, complete an initial UN-certified training program. In further recognition of domestic demand for good police, UNPR deployment tempo would be lower than that of ROLCAP, at about 33 percent (for example, six months UN duty, 12 months domestic duty; or 12 months UN duty, 24 months domestic). The size of the reserve should reflect shifting demand for police in the field, but it should be large enough to meet all demand for individual police by UN operations at the above deployment ratios.

Proposal 3: Create a Senior Reserve Roster

Finally, Stimson proposes creation of a Senior Reserve Roster (SRR) as a source of senior professionals who volunteer in advance for service in UN missions. Its membership would consist initially of retired or former police and criminal justice experts and allow DPKO to fill open senior positions in those areas quickly and efficiently. Members could fill, in particular, senior security sector reform posts where a certain amount of “grey,” especially from the mission’s region, is needed to advise local ministers, senior judges, and heads of security forces, or fill leadership positions in a mission’s following personnel rotations. A stipend could be offered to those members on the roster willing to commit to rapid call-up (on the order of 30 days notice), and that stipend might equal three percent of the salary that would be paid to them after call-up. The size of the roster and the proportion on rapid call-up could be flexible; over time, represented skill-sets could expand from rule of law to other specialties needed by UN peace operations.

Costing These Proposals

The three proposed structures would add some costs to UN operations, but their adoption would reduce UN response times and thus reduce overall mission timelines and mission costs. We estimate the start-up costs of ROLCAP itself at about \$45 million, including support infrastructure, with recurring costs of roughly \$33 million per year for its non-deployed elements, distributed across missions. We estimate that UNPR would have between \$28 and \$52 million in recurring, non-deployed costs distributed across missions (costs will depend on the ratio of developed state participation). By comparison, the approved annual UN peacekeeping budget for 2007-2008 is \$5.29 billion. The deployed costs of ROLCAP and UNPR would be part of the budgets of missions to which they contribute personnel. Using the example of the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL), we estimated their combined, incremental startup costs would have increased that mission's historical costs by 8.5 percent in its first nine months, and by about 3.5 percent in subsequent years. In exchange, UNMIL would have had professional management of its police and rule of law components, and a full complement of police and rule of law personnel, from its first month, rather than after six to nine months. UNMIL was authorized 755 individual police, several formed units, and about 15,000 troops. Incremental costs for other missions would vary with the relative size of the police/rule of law presence in their structures.

The Senior Reserve Roster, we estimate, would cost about \$9,000 per year per person to support periodic training, and another \$5,400 annually per individual designated for rapid call-up. A hypothetical roster of 100 persons, one-third of whom were on rapid call-up, would cost about \$1 million per year.

Building Responsive and Flexible UN Field Capacity in Police and Rule of Law

This report's proposals aim to overcome the chronic and systemic shortcomings that hobble the UN's current ability to carry out its post-conflict policing and rule of law support mandates in a timely and effective manner. These shortcomings include a lack of clear guidance and strategy; insufficient planning for the police component of new operations; and slow deployment times. The lack of timeliness is tied in part to the UN's present inability to pre-identify and pre-qualify officers for its missions; to the uneven quality of police personnel that are offered to missions by UN member states; and to continuing mismatches between missions' needs and the skill-sets of state-offered personnel.

Implementing these proposals requires new and solid commitments of support by member states. Nations must be willing to trade short-term costs for continuing and longer-term benefits in mission planning, execution, and achievement of mandated objectives. Present trends suggest that demand for qualified police officers and other rule of law personnel is unlikely to slow appreciably in the near future. Taken together with the critical nature of UN work in providing and supporting law and order in post-conflict settings, a long-term boost in UN capacity to do that work should more than offset the short-term investment costs necessary to build that capacity, and the ongoing costs to maintain it. The sooner these investments begin, the sooner UN police and other rule of law personnel will begin to meet the performance standards that UN staff and member states alike expect of them, and the sooner security can be improved for the victims of violence in the countries where UN peacekeepers serve.

Summary Chart: Proposals for Enhancing United Nations Capacity for Post-Conflict Policing

Proposals	Description	Primary Challenges this Would Overcome	Primary Tasks	Size
UN Standing Rule of Law Capacity (ROLCAP)	A permanent, standing cadre of police and rule of law experts available for rapid deployment to new missions. Rapid Deployment Teams of 50 would serve as mission leadership during first 12 months of a new mission.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Slow deployment - Uneven quality of police and ROL personnel - Lack of pre-deployment training - Lack of strategic planning - Incomplete needs assessment - Lack of institutional memory - Need for integrated Rule of Law Approach 	<p><u>Non-deployed:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Vet and train new recruits for reserves - Conduct lessons learned analyses - Refine ROL doctrine, guidance, and policy - Plan for anticipated missions <p><u>Immediately pre-deployment:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mission-specific training - Participation in strategic needs assessments and initial mission planning. <p><u>Deployed (within 7-14 days of mandate):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Headquarters setup, advanced operational planning, including security sector reform planning; - Reception, final training of ROL/police personnel arriving from reserves. 	<p>400 persons (275 police experts, 125 other ROL experts)</p> <p>Deployable in teams of 50 or as needed</p>
UN Police Reserve (UNPR)	Replaces current recruitment of individual UN police officers with a system whereby contributing member states are offered financial incentives for placing specific officers on reserve. The employing agencies would receive retainers equal to 10 pct of officers' actual salary (5 pct to cover annual training and 5 pct incentive fee) and UN reimbursement when officers deploy that is comparable to that given for troops and police in formed units. Officers selected would receive general and pre-deployment training and be available for rapid deployment. Deployed officers would continue to receive UN Mission Subsistence Allowance, as at present.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Slow deployment of individual UN police - Uneven quality of those that do deploy - Uneven UN access to needed specialties - Lack of pre-deployment training prior to arrival in mission - Lack of institutional memory 	<p><u>Non-Deployed:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Must be certified prior to joining reserve, through completion of UN basic police training program - Availability for 2 weeks of annual refresher training <p><u>Immediately pre-deployment:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mission-specific training <p><u>Deployed (within 14 days of call-up):</u></p> <p>UNPR officers would conduct all activities currently carried out by individual UN police (i.e., monitor and report on local police; reform, restructure, rebuild local police; conduct joint patrols, assist local law enforcement; and carry out law enforcement, in executive missions). Emphasize end-of-mission reporting to capture experiences, and lessons learned.</p>	<p>Flexible, based on level of demand, but with two officers in reserve for every officer deployed, with slight cushion for illness, etc.</p> <p>Based on UN individual police deployments as of late 2006, that would mean roughly 5,000 officers deployed and 11,200 officers on reserve (not deployed) at any given time, assuming that time in field is balanced with twice that amount of time serving with their home law enforcement agency (e.g., 6 months deployed, 12 months at home; 12 months deployed, 24 months at home).</p>
UN Senior Reserve Roster (SRR)	A roster system where senior (retired) police and rule of law experts receive a modest annual stipend in exchange for being willing to deploy on short notice if needed. Only a fraction of the roster is anticipated to be on short (30-day) notice and thus on retainer.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Poor Availability of Police Leadership - Lack of institutional memory - Need for integrated Rule of Law Approach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Serve as ROL Mission Leadership, usually second and later rotations; sometimes as initial leadership - Lead reform efforts of local police, prisons, and court systems, with sufficient seniority and experience to be credible mentors and advisors to senior host state counterparts - Conduct post-mission debriefings to inform future efforts 	<p>Variable.</p>