



FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS PROGRAM
A Better Partnership for African Peace Operations

**UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION COORDINATION
ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA**
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Peace operations in Africa have grown dramatically over the last five years, with more than 65,000 peacekeepers on the continent in missions led by the United Nations (UN) and by African regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU).¹ Africa now hosts more peacekeepers than any other region. As of mid-2007, nearly 55,000 UN peacekeepers, about 65 percent of the total worldwide, were deployed to missions in Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Sudan, and the Western Sahara. The African Union has led its own operations, including its initial peace operation in Burundi from 2003–2004 and the current, high-profile mission in Darfur, Sudan since 2004. The UN and AU now plan to transition the Darfur mission to the jointly-led United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). This will be the first such “hybrid” operation and the largest peacekeeping mission to date for either organization. The AU also began a new peacekeeping mission in Somalia in March 2007, and sent an electoral and security mission to the Comoros Islands in May 2007.²

Given the mutual efforts of the United Nations and the African Union to conduct peace operations in Africa, an institutional collaboration between the organizations would appear natural. How do they—and should they—work together to address peace and security on the continent? The question is timely, given the growth of AU missions, the UN’s focus on Africa, the limited resources of both organizations, and the comparative advantage that each possesses. Further, both institutions bring special capacities and skills to such operations. Yet debate over how the UN can best work with regional organizations has continued for more than a decade. Concrete efforts to increase UN-AU cooperation and

collaboration in peace operations, however, are just beginning to make their primarily ad hoc relationship more institutional and effective.

In analyzing the development of the UN-AU partnership on peace and security, this issue brief first considers the post-Cold War history of UN cooperation with regional organizations, especially the AU, in conducting peace operations. The UN-AU relationship is then reviewed in the context of current missions, particularly their joint efforts to find a solution to the crisis in Darfur. Finally, this brief details recent UN and AU initiatives to strengthen their relationship, and identifies options for complementing current policies and addressing remaining challenges in inter-organizational cooperation.

**Concrete efforts to increase UN-AU
cooperation and collaboration in
peace operations are just beginning.**

**EARLY CHALLENGES & CALLS
FOR REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING
COLLABORATION**

The UN Charter refers to potential relationships with regional organizations in Chapter VIII, which encourages “pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.” Debate over how the United Nations could better work with regional groups increased in the 1990s. In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called for greater UN collaboration with regional organizations in his *Agenda for Peace* report, and in 1995, the UN General Assembly issued a declaration calling for enhanced engagement with regional organizations.³ Failed UN responses to the conflicts in Rwanda, the Balkans, and Haiti, in addition to the swelling number of peacekeeping missions in the early to mid-1990s, led to a period of retrenchment and increased enthusiasm for actors in Africa and elsewhere to play a greater role in resolving regional conflicts.

IMPROVING UN-AU COMPLEMENTARITY?

The Henry L. Stimson Center and the Center on International Cooperation at New York University held a workshop on 23 February 2007 to look at the potential for better cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations in peace operations. The meeting focused on the lessons of recent experiences in UN-AU cooperation in peace operations, particularly in Sudan, as well as potential options for addressing UN-AU complementarity for peace operations in the longer-term, including proposals to have the UN assist in funding and supporting regionally-led peace operations in Africa.

Convened in New York, the workshop brought together experts and practitioners with experience within the UN, the AU, and from key African and Western member states to share insights into past and current UN-AU collaboration.

The discussion emphasized the need to glean lessons from the evolving UN-AU partnership in support of the African Union Mission in Sudan, which has served as the sole peacekeeping force in Sudan's Darfur region since conflict erupted there in 2003.



African Union peacekeepers in Darfur.

This workshop was one of six held as part of Stimson's series, *A Better Partnership for African Peace Operations*, made possible by a generous grant from the United States Institute of Peace. The series examined progress, challenges, and potential steps forward in expanding national, regional, and international capacity to lead and participate in peace operations in Africa. The six issue briefs produced in conjunction with this project provide background and analytical context for the insights gained through the *Better Partnership* workshops. Each brief also highlights workshop findings and identifies recommendations for the US, UN, regional organizations, and policymakers. For more information on this workshop and others in the series, please contact the program or visit the Stimson website at: www.stimson.org/fopo.

Calls for increased participation in peacekeeping by regional organizations grew stronger by 1999, when the UN began to expand operations again, particularly in Africa. By 2001, the number of UN peace operations had jumped to nineteen—with half of peacekeeping personnel deployed to Africa.⁴ Missions were also taking on complex new roles aimed at finding sustainable solutions to conflict.

As part of its assessment of the expanding needs of UN peacekeeping, the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (referred to as the “Brahimi Report” after Panel Chairman Lakhdar Brahimi) identified the deficiencies and gaps in the capacity of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to plan, deploy, and conduct peacekeeping operations.⁵ While not focused on strengthening institutional partnerships between the UN and regional groups, the Brahimi Report called for the UN to provide training, equipment, and logistical and financial support to build regional organizations' capacity to contribute personnel to UN-led operations and to

lead their own peacekeeping missions.⁶ The Report reflected the potential of regional entities to be a burden-sharing partner for the United Nations. The Brahimi Report's approach to expanding UN capacity to organize and manage peace operations also offered a useful framework for evaluating and supporting the development of AU peacekeeping capabilities.⁷

Emergence of the AU as a Peacekeeping Partner

In comparison with its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity,⁸ the African Union began to emerge as a more engaged actor in addressing peace and security on the continent after its creation in 2000.⁹ The AU established a Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2002, mirroring the role of the UN Security Council, to serve as “a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.”¹⁰ By February 2003, the PSC authorized deployment of 3,500 military and civilian personnel for the AU's first peace operation, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). Its mandate was to monitor imple-

mentation of a December 2002 ceasefire agreement signed among the country's warring factions.¹¹ A little over a year later, the United Nations took over leadership of AMIB, establishing the UN Mission in Burundi in June 2004.¹² By January 2007, after steady progress in Burundi's peace process, the UN withdrew its peacekeepers and transferred responsibility back to the African Union to maintain a small task force there in support of continued peacebuilding efforts.¹³

The most prominent AU mission has been its current operation in Darfur, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which began in June 2004. The most recent is the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a force that deployed in March 2007. (These missions are discussed in greater detail below.)

Having taken on peacekeeping responsibilities that might otherwise have fallen initially to the United Nations, the AU has become a more substantive actor and UN partner in addressing peace and stability on the continent. Because of the organizations' shared interest in promoting peace and stability in Africa, coordination with the AU and development of its peacekeeping capacity has become a more salient feature of UN reforms in recent years. Support from the UN has been essential to the AU's ability to respond to regional conflict. The AU also has launched its missions with the expectation that the UN will eventually take over their leadership. The UN has provided substantial assistance to not only AU peacekeeping capabilities but also to its institutional structures, through support for strategic planning, budgeting, and management.

Challenges for a UN-AU Partnership

Many hurdles in UN-AU cooperation remain, however, even with the increased interest in closer political and operational collaboration between the two groups. Fundamentally, the UN is organized to support UN-led missions and *not* designed to support development of regional organizational capacity. Further, the UN is not organized to assist in the deployment of regional forces on more than an ad hoc basis—even when the Security Council authorizes or blesses such missions. Many innovations in the UN's relationships with the AU and other organizations have thus developed through temporary responses to operational needs rather than through long-term strategic planning. For

example, in 2004, the UN sent a team to AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to help the organization plan for its initial deployment into Darfur. From the outset, however, the team was funded and staffed solely for that special effort, and was not envisioned as part of broader efforts to build AU peacekeeping capacity.¹⁴

While the African Union needs international support to organize, manage, and lead peace operations, it too is not well designed for working with outside partners.

In recent years, the AU has become a more substantive actor and UN partner in promoting peace in Africa.

This complicates, for example, the AU's ability to effectively accept needed offers of support from other entities. Gaps in AU institutional capacity also present the organization with significant challenges in recruiting and deploying personnel, meeting logistical requirements, managing mission operations, and sustaining forces on the ground. The AU has faced additional difficulties in developing doctrine and matching mandates to mission tasks.

Staffing levels at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, for example, have generally been small. In 2004, when AMIS first deployed to Darfur, headquarters personnel numbered at just around two dozen.¹⁵ Currently, the Darfur Integrated Task Force, which includes advisors from donor and partner countries, has just 30 staff members. The Strategic Planning and Management Unit for AMISOM, intended to consist of representatives from the AU, UN, and other partners, has only eight of its 35 proposed staff. The AU also has merely nine staff members in its Peace Support Operations Division, the sub-department of the AU's Peace and Security Directorate responsible for the planning, management, and deployment of AU peacekeeping missions, as well as conflict mediation and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.¹⁶

Raising funds for the AU and its peacekeeping missions is a core challenge for the organization. The African Union is unable to pay for its missions from budget support of its Member States. As a result, AU missions are heavily dependent on international

financing to maintain operations and associated logistical needs. Funding for AMIS, for example, is largely reliant on contributions from developed states, including the European Union (EU), the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan. Even with this support, reports suggest that the AU has been unable to regularly reimburse its troop contributors.¹⁷ When outside partners have offered financial support, it has tended to go for strengthening AU operations rather than for building AU institutional capacity, leaving overall organizational development somewhat uneven.¹⁸

Making Progress in Calls for Coordination

Within the international community, there is increased recognition of the need to strengthen institutional cooperation between the UN and the AU. In December 2004, for example, the report from Secretary-General Kofi Annan's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change proposed several concrete ideas to expand UN support to regional organizations with a role in peacekeeping.¹⁹ One recommendation called for the

In November 2006, the United Nations and the African Union issued a joint declaration of their commitment to enhancing UN-AU cooperation.

development of a formal agreement between the UN and relevant regional organizations to facilitate more frequent exchange of information, schedule regular meetings between relevant leaders, hold joint training exercises, and establish personnel exchanges between UN and AU peacekeeping missions. The Panel further urged the AU to list its peacekeeping capabilities in the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), and for the UN to cultivate Member State agreement to allow for lending UN-owned equipment to regional organizations leading peace operations. The High-level Panel also stressed the need for a more predictable role for the Security Council vis-à-vis regionally-led peace operations. In its most novel recommendations, the Panel urged regional groups to seek UN authorization for their peacekeeping missions and for the Council to consider funding regionally-led missions through UN assessments on a "case by case" basis.²⁰

Following the High-level Panel report, Secretary-General Kofi Annan offered *In Larger Freedom* in April

2005, outlining his highest reform priorities for consideration at the September 2005 UN summit of world leaders. He stated, "I believe the time is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships." Annan reiterated the Panel's recommendation for regional organizations to include their peacekeeping and conflict prevention capabilities within the UNSAS. He stressed the need for a ten-year plan to build capacity at the African Union.²¹ Annan also stated his intention to introduce memoranda of understanding between the United Nations and individual regional organizations to govern the sharing of information, expertise, and resources. Finally, Annan proposed that the UN peacekeeping budget be amended to allow for use, "in very exceptional circumstances," of UN Member States' assessed contributions to finance regionally-led peace operations or the participation of regional organizations in missions deployed with Security Council authorization.²²

The September 2005 UN summit carried forward Annan's recommendations for a stronger UN relationship with regional organizations and the AU in particular. The summit produced an outcome document that called for the "forging of predictable partnerships and arrangements between the United Nations and regional organizations and...a strong African Union." Echoing the Secretary-General's call, the outcome document also included a recommendation for development of a ten-year plan to build African Union peacekeeping capacity.²³ In response, the AU developed its "AU Vision 2010" document, which formed the basis of a UN-AU joint action plan elaborating the concept for the African Standby Force.

In November 2006, the UN and AU signed a joint declaration stating their commitment to enhancing UN-AU cooperation within the context of the African Union Framework, a plan for building the institutional capacity of the AU and of other African regional organizations. The UN and AU urged that the evolving framework should emphasize AU capacity in: a) institution building, human resources development, and financial management; b) peace and security; c) human rights; d) political, legal, and electoral matters; e) social, economic, cultural, and human development; and f) food security and environmental protection.²⁴ In a June

2007 report, the UN General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping noted that logistical and financial support to AU rapid deployment capabilities is "of primary importance" in strengthening African peacekeeping capacity. The Special Committee also stressed the importance of AU ownership of institutional capacity-building.²⁵

In March 2007, the Security Council held a special meeting to discuss UN collaboration with African regional organizations, particularly the African Union. South Africa, which chaired the Council that month, convened the meeting and circulated a concept paper calling for UN collaboration with regional groups on peace and security, asserting that "forging close and predictable relationships and arrangements between regional organizations and the United Nations, is important in enhancing international peace and security."²⁶ South Africa also noted, "The central challenge for the Security Council is how to meet its responsibility and obligations" when the AU deploys peacekeepers to places in conflict.²⁷

At the meeting, the Council requested that the Secretary-General collaborate with the African Union

Since 2005, the UN has operated an assistance cell at AU headquarters to provide support to AMIS.

and other regional organizations to develop "specific proposals on how the United Nations can better support arrangements for further cooperation and coordination with regional organizations on Chapter VIII arrangements" on common security challenges and "to promote the deepening and broadening of dialogue and cooperation between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union."²⁸ A report on these proposals is slated for release by the end of 2007.

In May 2007, representatives from the African Union and the Group of 8 ("G8") countries—along with delegates from the UN, European Union, and Africa's regional economic communities and regional mechanisms for conflict response—endorsed the possibility of providing financial assistance to AU or AU-authorized missions through UN funding mechanisms.²⁹

Soon after, the AU Peace and Security Council and UN Security Council issued a joint communiqué in which they agreed to examine the possibility of UN financing for AU or AU-authorized missions.³⁰ The two bodies also committed to developing "a stronger and more structured relationship" on conflict management and peacebuilding and to strengthening cooperation between relevant structures within the organizations.³¹

REAL CASES? ADDRESSING AU HEADQUARTERS CAPACITY & MISSION DEPLOYMENTS

In recent years, the United Nations and the African Union have begun to coordinate their activities and to improve mechanisms to facilitate a complementary inter-organizational relationship. Since 2005, for example, the UN has operated an Assistance Cell at AU headquarters to provide technical and planning support for AMIS.³² In 2006, the UN established a Peace and Support Team (PST), the main emphasis of which is to help build long-term capacity associated with the African Standby Force and AU headquarters capacity. The PST offices are at both AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and at UN headquarters in New York, which will serve as the focal point in DPKO and at the UN for building African peacekeeping capacity. The Addis Ababa component is intended to direct implementation of a joint UN-AU plan of action for building African headquarters and field capacity for planning, deploying, and managing peacekeeping missions. In addition, the PST provides the AU with logistics and financial advice. Efforts in the latter area will include a review and assessment of the logistics bases on the continent.³³

In 2006, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping highlighted the importance of cooperation with regional organizations, welcoming in particular UN-AU partnership in peacekeeping, and commended DPKO for its efforts to "further develop the guiding principles for strengthening cooperation with regional arrangements."³⁴ A focus of DPKO support to the AU is the African Standby Force, the ambitious effort to create a continental-wide regionally-based peacekeeping force of five brigades by 2010. The ASF was born out of a May 2003 agreement and the endorsement of the African Chiefs of Defense Staff.³⁵ The ASF has completed its first phase goals to develop the necessary supporting mechanisms, such as doctrine and operating procedures. During phase two of ASF develop-

ment, the AU aims to develop the capacity to lead increasingly complex peace operations. The UN will provide strategic planning and practical support to AU headquarters. The second phase is expected to conclude with a military exercise to assess ASF operational capabilities.³⁶

The UN is also providing training to AU and ECOWAS officials in 2007 through Senior Mission Leadership Training courses. DPKO will assist the AU in facing the challenges of integrated missions and integrated planning to bring together the various actors working in the post-conflict environment and create greater cohesion throughout the planning process.³⁷ The AU is unlikely, however, to adopt wholly the UN's integrated mission planning process. For one, the AU and the UN do not have identical needs, and not all aspects of the process are appropriate for the AU. Moreover, integrated planning is still a young and evolving concept at the UN, and so is not sufficiently mature to use as a paradigm for the AU.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is another avenue for UN-AU collaboration

UN-AU collaboration rests on the idea that each organization brings comparative strengths to peacebuilding in Africa.

on building AU peacebuilding capacity. Through NEPAD's Peace and Security Initiative, African leaders have pledged to support the growth of good governance, human rights, transparency, and peace as necessary foundations of sustainable development. The plan includes development of regional and sub-regional organizations' capacity in 1) conflict prevention and resolution; 2) peacemaking and peacebuilding; 3) post-conflict development and reconstruction; and 4) reducing illicit trade in light arms, weapons, and landmines. The program also promotes cooperation with UN agencies working towards similar goals in Africa.³⁸ In the UN-AU joint declaration of 16 November 2006, the organizations agreed to "align the support of the organizations of the UN system for New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) with the evolving Framework," referring to the AU Framework for building institutional capacity.³⁹ Within NEPAD's Cluster on Governance, Peace and Security, DPKO chairs the sub-cluster on Peace and Security Architecture.⁴⁰

Collaboration between the UN and the AU rests, in part, on the idea that each organization brings respective strengths and comparative advantages to peacebuilding endeavors in Africa. Both have deployed special envoys for Darfur to help move the peace process forward in the region.⁴¹ Strength of the AU include its ability to serve as a peace broker with an intimate understanding of regional conflicts and challenges, as well as its credibility as an African-created organization. In addition to Darfur, the organization has led peacebuilding and mediation efforts elsewhere in Africa, such as in Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda.⁴²

Forcing Collaboration: UN-AU Cooperation in the Era of Darfur

The African Union's involvement in the Darfur conflict has evolved into a challenging and dominant test case for the UN-AU partnership, highlighting both the need for inter-organizational collaboration and underscoring the relationship's shortcomings. AMIS is trying to operate in a region where some 200,000 people have been killed and over two million displaced by conflict between local rebels and militia forces. The first AU monitors arrived in Darfur in April 2004, followed in October by a larger contingent of peacekeepers. By April 2005, the force level doubled. The AU also organized initial peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria, which led to the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.⁴³

As of July 2007, AMIS consisted of roughly 7,200 military and civilian personnel and faced severe challenges and resource constraints.⁴⁴ Shortages of equipment, for example, led to reduced patrols and diminished capacity to protect civilians. Moreover, some AU troops reportedly have not received payment for several months, and some have begun to depend upon local aid agencies for basic necessities such as soap.⁴⁵ AMIS personnel have also faced increasing dangers. Of the 19 AU personnel killed in Darfur since AMIS deployed in 2004,⁴⁶ eight of these deaths occurred in April 2007.⁴⁷ In late May 2007, three additional AU peacekeepers were wounded, and the UN suffered its first peacekeeping casualty in the region.⁴⁸

The *Janjaweed* militia, widely believed to be supported by the government of Sudan, has engaged in a systematic campaign of human rights atrocities against civilians in Darfur that the United States has classified as genocide. The conflict has also spiraled regionally into

neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic. The Sudanese government has denied any complicity in the conflict, but independent observers widely attest to Khartoum's central role. In April 2007, a report from a UN Panel of Experts documented evidence of the Sudanese government providing materiel assistance to *Janjaweed* militia members.⁴⁹ Government forces are also accused of trying to disguise their vehicles by painting them to look like those of AU military observers.⁵⁰

The experience of AMIS has highlighted the AU's limitations in leading and supporting peace operations. AU troops have been hamstrung in their capabilities from the outset. The mission initially had a weak mandate, limiting its ability to take meaningful action to protect civilian populations from attack. The AMIS mandate was later strengthened significantly to allow for the more robust physical protection of civilians, but AMIS remains constrained by gaps in AU Member States' capacity to contribute troops and equipment and by their reluctance to engage in more forceful action. There is some unevenness in the training and preparedness of AMIS troops, but first-hand observers have asserted that the forces could be capable of achieving more with greater resources. The number of troops deployed to the region is tiny considering Darfur's large size, and AMIS has needed more equipment and technology to be available to its troops.

Since 2004, the European Union has given financial support to the AU through its African Peace Facility. Through this €250 million (\$343 million) mechanism, the EU allocated €200 million (\$274 million) for financing African-led peace operations, €35 million (\$48 million) for AU capacity building, €12 million (\$16 million) for contingencies, and €3 million (\$4 million) for audits and evaluations. To encourage African solidarity, it was intended that African nations contribute to the Peace Facility as well. Although all AU Member States agreed to this in principle, legal obstacles have prevented South Africa and the nations in North Africa from making payments to the Facility.⁵¹

In December 2005, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy for Africa and decided to increase funding to the Facility over the long term. In April 2006, the EU agreed to provide €300 million (\$411 million) for an initial period from 2008–2010.⁵² In May 2007, members of the G8 and other donors agreed to establish a

fund complementary to the Africa Peace Facility.⁵³ The challenge of setting priorities remains: provide support to current AU deployments or work on longer-range capacity building on the continent?

The Push to Deploy a Hybrid Force: Developments in 2006–2007

Since the start of AMIS, it was anticipated that the UN would fold AMIS forces into a more robust UN-led mission, such as the UN role with the AU mission in Burundi. The Sudanese government, however, thwarted this plan for years by withholding consent to deploy additional peacekeepers in Darfur. Khartoum argued

A joint UN-AU assessment mission sent to Darfur in June 2006 estimated the requirements for a hybrid peacekeeping force in the region.

against any role for non-Africans in resolving the conflict, denouncing international efforts as interference in domestic affairs. Many saw Sudan's position as an effort to fend off any force capable of halting the *Janjaweed*.

In 2006, the UN stepped up efforts to breach Khartoum's opposition. In August, the Security Council approved Resolution 1706, calling for a timetable for "rehatting" AMIS forces and authorizing the expansion into Darfur of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in the southern part of Sudan, a region emerging from 20 years of war.⁵⁴ Resolution 1706 delivered the strongest political statement from the Council to date, but made little immediate impact. At the insistence of China and Russia, the Council included language "invit[ing] the consent" of the Sudanese government, and to few observers' surprise, Khartoum rejected the resolution.⁵⁵

The UN has had more success with its three-phase plan for technical and operational support to AMIS, agreed to at a high-level UN-AU meeting in November 2006.⁵⁶ Based on the recommendations of a June 2006 joint assessment mission in Darfur, the plan entails a "light" package of support, followed by a "heavy" package, and then deployment of UN peacekeepers for a hybrid force.⁵⁷ The light support package comprises about \$21 million worth of technical⁵⁸ and per-

sonnel support, including, 105 military staff officers, 33 police advisors, and 48 civilian staff.⁵⁹ The heavy support package will supply more than 2,200 troops, 350 police, and 1,100 civilian staff to AMIS, and equipment such as helicopters, at an estimated cost of \$300 million over the first six months.⁶⁰ The UN began deploying the light support package in early 2007, and in April 2007, the Sudanese government agreed to allow 3,000 UN troops into Darfur with the heavy support package.⁶¹ Full deployment of the packages is expected to conclude by the end of 2007.⁶²

After finally gaining Khartoum's agreement, the Security Council approved Resolution 1769 on 31 July 2007, authorizing the deployment of UNAMID to replace the beleaguered AMIS. This operation will consist of up to 19,555 military troops and 6,432 civilian police, predominantly from African countries. The mission is to have a unified command and control structure, with a single chain of command. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the resolution grants uniformed personnel with UNAMID the authority to use force.⁶³ The resolution also mandates the mission to

In January 2007, the AU Peace and Security Council authorized deployment of 8000 peacekeepers in Somalia. By June, only 1500 troops were on the ground.

implement the Darfur Peace Agreement; secure freedom of movement for mission staff and humanitarian personnel; provide protection to civilians; and monitor the presence of arms materiel in Darfur. UNAMID is expected to deploy by 31 December 2007 and to cost upwards of \$2 billion annually.⁶⁴

This agreement on a hybrid force represents a major political achievement for the UN and AU and ushers in a new phase in their relationship. Deployment of the force with joint command and control structures will be the most complex collaboration the UN has ever undertaken with a regional organization. Expectations for UNAMID must remain realistic, however: challenges ahead include Darfur's near absence of infrastructure, the current overstretch of many troop contributors to peace operations, and the difficulty of navigating cooperation from Khartoum. An important test for UN-AU diplomacy will be their ability to simultaneously run this mission and negotiate a political solution.

New Challenges: The AU in Somalia

In January 2007, the African Union further expanded its peacekeeping agenda by authorizing deployment of 8,000 peacekeepers with AMISOM, a mission to replace Ethiopian forces sent to Somalia to counter Islamist militias. AMISOM's mandate is to support the efforts of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government towards stabilizing the country and promoting reconciliation; facilitate humanitarian assistance; and "to create conditions conducive" for long-term stabilization and reconstruction.⁶⁵ The AU reauthorized AMISOM for another six months in July.⁶⁶

AMISOM has faced difficulties from its start. In March 2007, insurgents launched mortar attacks and fired machine guns on the airport in Somalia's capital of Mogadishu on the same day that the first AU contingent arrived.⁶⁷ Despite authorized force levels of 8,000, moreover, AMISOM consisted of merely 1,500 Ugandan troops after five months of operation, and the AU lacks additional willing troop-contributors and resources.⁶⁸ Support within Uganda for its participation also appears weak, especially after four Ugandan peacekeepers were killed in May 2007.⁶⁹

The AU deployed troops to Somalia with the assumption that the UN would take over with its own peacekeeping mission.⁷⁰ In February 2007, the Security Council authorized AMISOM and requested a technical assessment mission to report on transitioning the mission from AU to UN leadership.⁷¹ At the AU's request, DPKO sent a team to Addis Ababa to assist the AU in planning for AMISOM.⁷²

The deployment of UN troops to Somalia is tenuous, however, given the country's lack of political process and resulting absence of conditions typically in place before the UN authorizes a mission. Added to these challenges are the UN's peacekeeping overstretch and the legacy of unsuccessful attempts by both the UN and the US in the 1990s to restore peace in Somalia.

IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS, LOOKING FOR SOLUTIONS

The African Union and the United Nations are likely to remain engaged in promoting development throughout Africa in the decades ahead. The AU's involvement in peacekeeping is a welcome step towards building the capacity to respond to crises within Africa. But the AU faces significant challenges and gaps, which will take time to address and should temper the high expecta-

tions for its missions. Some observers argue that the West has encouraged the AU to take on the burden of peacekeeping in places where Western forces are not willing to deploy and to take on tasks beyond the AU's capabilities. The African Union could become more wary of such complex missions as Darfur and Somalia in the future. Moreover, the UN faces its own overstretch in peace operations, especially in Africa, as it faces unprecedented requirements to deploy and manage multiple, complex peace operations.

While UN mechanisms for cooperating with the AU and other organizations have evolved in recent years, new efforts are needed to make the relationship and collaboration predictable, systematic, and mutually beneficial. A more institutionalized, strategic partnership between the two organizations—one that recognizes their shared goals—will be essential to the sustained success of their peace support activities. Among the many areas of the UN-AU relationship that deserve attention, a few key themes and recommendations stand out from discussions of their work in peace operations.⁷³

Strengthen the UN-AU partnership by developing a shared vision. Efforts to strengthen the UN-AU relationship have in the past failed to reflect shared priorities and goals for capacity building in AU peace operations. The AU, for example, has desired greater emphasis from UN efforts on conflict prevention measures and strengthening human security. With the 16 June 2007 PSC/Security Council communiqué outlining plans for a stronger inter-organizational relationship, the two bodies hopefully are moving towards a more coherent institutional division of labor, in line with political realities and their respective capacities, and thus, more predictable responses in the future. The UN and AU will have to continue to clarify their roles and develop a common strategic framework. Calling for the UN and AU to share information regarding conflicts on their respective agendas,⁷⁴ the communiqué also opens the door for the organizations to adopt a common approach to capturing lessons learned, predicting realistic outcomes of missions, and evaluating and revising strategies implemented. It is vital that the UN and AU maintain the current momentum and strong political will to act on the promises of the communiqué. A better UN-AU partnership also should actively engage other African regional organiza-

tions, such as ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community, and African civil society.

Improve systematic communication to foster improved recognition of respective concerns. For the UN and the AU to develop a shared vision for future cooperation, effective communication is needed. Decision-making in the UN Security Council and the

The UN-AU partnership should be strengthened by developing a shared vision for future operations.

AU Peace and Security Council has sometimes revealed poor coordination and disparate working cultures, resulting in inconsistent policies and divergent expectations. Disjointed procedural guidelines at each organization, for example, can produce obstacles to information exchange and policy development. More organized communication between the UN and AU is also crucial for giving appropriate weight to the considerations of both groups and for creating a genuine partnership. In the 16 June communiqué, the Security Council and the PSC made an important step towards harmonizing their operational requirements and broader capacity-building needs by pledging to hold a joint meeting at least once a year.⁷⁵ Communication between the two bodies should not take place only at annual meetings, however, as discussions throughout the year are essential to ensure adequate information sharing and dialogue. The UN and AU may also need to expand military and political advisors at each others' offices, for example.

Support AU capacity-building efforts with funding, headquarters capacity and sustainable deployments. In the past, gaps in financial and materiel resources have hampered the AU's ability to initiate and sustain peace operations, as well as to develop institutionally and to lead its programs. As a young organization, the AU is building its headquarters capacity, and must find capable military planners and headquarters staff. When the AU agreed to deploy peacekeepers to Darfur, for example, its staff capacity for pre-mission operations and deployment to Darfur was limited to roughly two dozen people. Designating a cadre of African leaders and experts to steer planning might be one way to help keep AU capacity building on track. A key challenge in this area stems from donors' requirements to release funding only upon AU development of

a mission plan, when, at times, the AU depends on outside funding to be able to produce a plan. The EU's Peace Facility helps in financing AU-led peace operations over the long term but does not allow for responding to short-term or sudden requirements. While the G8 proposal to establish a complementary Peace Facility helps to fill this gap, it is not a complete solution. To lend autonomy and flexibility to mission start-up processes at the AU, the organization needs more reliable and predictable funding mechanisms. This is crucial if the AU is to have the capacity to respond effectively to regional crises.

Formalize UN support and collaboration with regional organizations. As recent events have shown, building long-term AU peacekeeping capacity will run in parallel with support to existing and new AU operations—even as the UN faces its own overstretch in peace operations. Strategies are needed to ensure adequate support and funding for both UN and AU efforts, despite the potential trade-offs. Taking a step in the right direction, the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping has endorsed a proposal from the Secretary-General to establish a dedicated capacity for coordinating “all issues related to cooperation with regional arrangements” to help streamline multilateral efforts.⁷⁶ As recommended by the High-level Panel, the UN could also develop a mechanism that generates financial and resource support for regionally-led peace operations, authorized by the Security Council on a case-by-case basis. The UN could use citation of Chapter VIII as a trigger for such funding support, for example, through assessed contributions, as it does for UN-led peace operations. This approach would enhance the UN's longer-term ability to work with regional organizations such as the African Union, and potentially other regional groups. With the frequent “hand-offs” of regionally-led missions to UN leadership, this mechanism could potentially assist in earlier planning for such transitions; harmonize collaboration in areas such as deployments and logistics; and better support planning and peacebuilding efforts that involve both organizations.

CONCLUSION: SETTING PRIORITIES—LONG-TERM CAPACITY, SHORT-TERM MISSIONS?

A strong UN-AU relationship will be indispensable for effective peace operations and for addressing current and future African conflicts. Development of a better UN-AU partnership will not proceed in a vacuum,

however. After more than a decade of debate about the right relationship, practical mechanisms are needed to facilitate more effective institutional collaboration.

The UN is still identifying ways to work with regional organizations such as the African Union. Its operational relationship with the AU has developed through immediate, if temporary, efforts to support AU mission needs rather than through longer-term strategic planning. Likewise, the African Union is not well designed for working with outside partners, despite its reliance on international support to organize peace operations. Expanding awareness in Washington and other capitals about the AU's actions on the ground could further bolster international financial support and appropriate assistance, and enable improved harmonization of support as well. Renewing governments' financial, political, and operational support to the UN's peace operations and its headquarters ability at this time of stress will further assist the institution to manage its missions and to work well with its partners in Africa.

Addressing the systemic challenges described here—from financing to personnel, from logistics to political challenges—will help both institutions and their Member States to have more success in mitigating regional conflicts. Improved cooperation should further facilitate sustainable growth for the African Union and its efforts on the continent. Countries that back the United Nations and regional peace operations in Africa should work to support these systematic changes. This emerging capacity is essential for the UN and AU to become more equal partners, as well as for the AU to be able to respond independently to peace and security challenges and for the UN to work well with regional organizations overall.

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The **Future of Peace Operations** program evaluates and helps advance US policy and international capacity for peace operations, and is co-directed by Stimson senior associates Victoria K. Holt and William J. Durch. The program team includes research assistant Katherine Andrews, research associate Alix Boucher and research associate Joshua Smith. Founded in 1989, the **Henry L. Stimson Center** is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through rigorous analysis and outreach. For more information, call 202.223.5956.

