



EU CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE OPERATIONS:

Development of an European Rapid Reaction Force and Civilian Capacity

The European Union's establishment of the *European Security and Defense Policy* (ESDP) in 1999 set concrete goals for an EU military role in peace operations and crisis management.¹ The United States, under both the Clinton and Bush Administrations, has welcomed European efforts to take a more active role in crisis management and peace operations and U.S. official policy under both administrations has been to support ESDP as long as it supports and complements NATO.

Under ESDP, the EU is moving to create, by 2003, specific operational components – including troops, police, and crisis management teams – able to act quickly to prevent and manage crises. This capacity will complement efforts to strengthen United Nations (UN) capabilities, as recommended by the 2000 *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations* (the “Brahimi Report”).² While the entire capacity is still far from optimal readiness, the EU will deploy civilian police to Bosnia in January 2003, and elements of an EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) may deploy to Macedonia³ in late 2002. **This factsheet reviews these developments, including the EU's goals for developing a Rapid Reaction Force and civilian crisis management capacities; their potential role in peace operations in Europe, Afghanistan, or elsewhere; and their relationship to the Brahimi Report and UN capacity.**

CURRENT EU GOALS: A NEW RESPONSE CAPABILITY FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

While heavily involved in a range of conflict prevention and crisis management efforts, the EU has never conducted peace operations on its own, nor has it contributed EU troops to an existing mission.⁴ Over the past decade, the European Union's primary contribution to peace operations has been economic and reconstruction assistance for post-conflict societies, activities often defined as development aid. Individually, however, many EU member states have contributed substantial military and civilian personnel to peace operations conducted by the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), often acting as lead nations.⁵

An EU rapid response capability has its origins in the “Petersberg Tasks,” the list of operational tasks set forth by the Western European Union in 1992, which include: humanitarian and rescue work, peacekeeping, and combat tasks related to crisis management, including what would now be termed peace enforcement.⁶ With EU absorption of the WEU, the Petersberg Tasks became the core of the EU's crisis management goals, which were elaborated in what are referred to as the Helsinki Headline Goals, the goals that set the 2003 targets for military and civilian crisis management. The linkage of Petersberg Tasks to the Headline Goals has caused broader interpretation of these tasks on the part of some EU member states to include potential use of the Rapid Reaction Force for war fighting (such as Operation Desert Storm).

Building a Broader EU Capacity. The EU is now developing its own rapid response capability, including military and police units, as well as civil administration and rule of law experts for work in crisis management and UN mandated peace operations. **Current EU goals for a military, police and civilian capacity by the year 2003 include:**

- **European Rapid Reaction Force.** Have available **60,000 troops** capable of being deployed in 60 days for one year.⁷ Prior to deployment, the EU seeks a formal agreement regarding the use of NATO planning capabilities and command assets.

- **Civilian Police.** Create a **roster of 5,000 civilian police** identified for international missions, with a capability to deploy 1,000 police in 30 days.⁸
- **Rule of Law/Civil Administration.** Build a capacity to help strengthen **rule of law** and **civilian administration** in post-conflict societies, including a roster of **200 rule of law experts** (including prosecutors, correctional staff and judges) deployable in 30 days to assist in crisis management.
- **Civil Protection teams.** Create teams including experts who can deploy on short notice for search and rescue, refugee camp construction, communication systems deployment and logistical support. New targets adopted in 2001 include creating a pool of **100 experts on 24-hour availability** deployable in teams of ten, and a roster of up to 2,000 people who can be dispatched rapidly as part of a **Civilian Protection intervention team.**⁹

Why an EU Capability? The EU represents the evolution of European political integration toward the goal of increased peace and stability in Europe. Yet Europe's inability to address the unfolding Balkan conflicts of the 1990s without American-led NATO engagement made it painfully clear that the EU lacked the mechanisms to act independently and effectively to prevent and manage crises in its own backyard. The tragedies in Bosnia and Kosovo gave impetus to the creation of a *European Security and Defense Policy* with teeth, so that when all members of NATO are not prepared to act in the European theater, the EU can do so independently.

While most EU member states are also members of NATO,¹⁰ the EU seeks to develop a defense and security capacity outside of the NATO alliance to enable autonomous crisis management for situations where NATO is not willing or able to act.

The EU does not envision its new crisis management capacity as a competitor to NATO, the UN or the OSCE and is working closely to develop coordinating mechanisms to avoid this impression.¹¹ Development of the Rapid Reaction Force will enable the EU to take on more tasks in peacekeeping. The need for rapid deployment of civilian crisis management capacity has been made clear with the challenges posed by UN operations in Kosovo (UNMIK), East Timor (UNTAET) and potentially in Afghanistan. The civilian policing, justice and transitional administration needs of UNMIK and UNTAET were largely unmet in the early stages of these operations, due to a lack of qualified personnel in sufficient numbers, deployed in a timely manner. Soon, Afghanistan will likely need support in developing its rule of law and civilian administration. Given this need and the recommendations of the Brahimi Report, the EU has taken it upon itself to develop rosters of commonly trained experts in these areas in order to quickly support missions where these assets are required.

BEYOND GOALS: ACHIEVING A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY

An effective EU crisis management capability is at the core of the ESDP. The two main components of that capability, military and civilian, are designed with the Petersberg Tasks in mind.

Military Capabilities. The planned capability was pronounced on target for operational readiness by 2003 at the EU's December 2001 Laeken Council meeting.¹² According to EU military committee chairman General Gustav Hägglund in his address to the European Parliament on January 22, 2002, the RRF is operational for light missions such as humanitarian tasks, rescue, and classic peacekeeping, with 70 percent of the capacities needed available. It will not be ready to provide combat forces by 2003, however, nor would it have sufficient air transport capacity until 2008-2012.¹³ The first EU Rapid Reaction Force exercises are set for May 2002.¹⁴

Civilian Capabilities. New instruments here include police, other rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection.¹⁵ The EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is coordinating with the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe on rule of law capacity development, including judicial and penal capabilities.¹⁶ **The EU laid out four key areas in Civilian Crisis Management:**¹⁷

- **Police.** The roster of 5,000 civilian police will be available for deployment to assist in local capacity building, such as supporting the creation of penal codes and justice systems, as well as supporting police training in countries in crisis or emerging from crisis. The EU has identified key requirements, including common criteria for selection and training of police. In June 2001, the EU approved specific requirements for police operations, including a planned police ministers summit, development of draft “status of forces” agreements, command and control procedures, interoperability and funding arrangements.¹⁸
- **Rule of Law.** The European Commission has begun a project to establish a network of training institutions in Member States to prepare personnel for peace operations. The training modules will be collaboratively developed by EU Member States, built upon existing programs, and compatible with both UN and OSCE modules (such as the OSCE REACT program).¹⁹
- **Civilian Administration.** The European Commission is investigating areas to support civilian administration in crisis situations. The EU is committed to setting up a pool of experts in general administration, social services, infrastructure functions and common training. One area of support being investigated by the European Commission is the role of customs services in crisis areas as a means of enabling the establishment of viable local administration.
- **Civil Protection.** The European Council has adopted a “Community Co-ordination Mechanism,” which allows for coordination of national civil protection bodies (e.g., disaster/emergency response) within Europe, early warning and information exchange, cooperation in training civil protection personnel and the establishment of databases for this purpose.

NEXT STEPS: FIRST DEPLOYMENTS OF EU CAPACITIES

The EU has planned one deployment of civilian police to Bosnia in January 2003 while one likely deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force to Macedonia in late 2002 is under consideration. The first deployment of the EU Rapid Reaction Force to Afghanistan was rumored in the fall of 2001, but reality saw EU member states contributing to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on an individual basis.

EU Police in Bosnia: Relieving the UN. The first use of EU crisis management capacity is expected in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 1 January 2003. The EU is planning to deploy police to take over international police duties from the UN-led International Police Task Force (IPTF), scheduled to depart in late December 2002 with the end of the current UN peacekeeping mission, UNMIBH.²⁰ The mandate of the EU Police Mission (EUPM), endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1396 (March 5, 2002), is to monitor and train the Bosnian police force as well help build up its institutional structures in the context of a coordinated rule of law program.²¹ The EU has planned a 3-year mission composed of 466 police officers, 67 civil experts and 289 local staff.²²

In January 2002, the EU decided in principle to support this deployment. In February 2002 at the Council of Ministers meeting, EU members committed 14 million euros (\$12 million) from the 2002 Community budget for mission planning and equipment. The EU estimates annual mission costs for the period 2003-2005 of 38 million euros (\$33 million) per year, of which 17 million euros (\$15 million) will cover personnel and travel costs. The latter costs are to be financed individually by the countries contributing officers to the missions.

Macedonia: Filling NATO's Shoes. The first use of the Rapid Reaction Force, thus far only proposed, may be to replace NATO troops in *Operation Amber Fox* whose mandate in Macedonia ends in June 2002. *Amber Fox*, a UN-sanctioned, NATO-run mission under German command, in turn replaced NATO's *Operation Essential Harvest*, which supervised the disarmament of armed forces. *Amber Fox* provides security for international peace plan monitors from the EU and OSCE during the delicate post-disarmament phase. At the January 28, 2002 Council of Ministers meeting, the EU's President, Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar of Spain, proposed that the EU deploy the Rapid Reaction Force to take over for *Amber Fox*, arguing that it would give "credibility" to the ESDP.²³ Although no official EU policy has been announced, EU Council of Ministers President, Foreign Minister Josep Piqué of Spain noted on February 8 at the Cáceres informal meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs that a consensus was growing to use the Rapid Reaction Force in Macedonia. NATO's North Atlantic Council would have to agree to transfer the mandate prior to deployment and EU would not be prepared to deploy until after the summer, but Macedonia's President Boris Trajkovski has indicated a willingness to accept an EU RRF replacement for *Amber Fox* should NATO consent.²⁴ Meanwhile NATO has asked the Netherlands to take over command *Amber Fox* when the German mandate ends on June 26, 2002. Although no final decision on mandate extension has been reached, Dutch military have discussed a six-month mandate extension, allowing for the possibility that Dutch troops might facilitate a transition from a NATO to EU-led mission. **While some NATO commanders and European countries have registered skepticism about EU preparedness for the task, citing potential weakening of mission efficiency and concerns regarding interoperability with KFOR and SFOR, NATO Secretary General George Robertson has recently noted that NATO has "no objection in principle to the European Union taking the lead role in peacekeeping operations in Macedonia."**²⁵

Aside from operational capacity, the key factor inhibiting an EU deployment to Macedonia is Greek opposition. While Greece has no problem in principle with the RRF in Macedonia, it has objected to a deal worked out by British and American mediators with NATO member Turkey, which is not a member of the EU.²⁶ The agreement gives Turkey limited say on how the force is deployed, in return for RRF access to NATO military planning facilities. Greece opposes Turkish influence over deployment of EU forces. Greek Defense Minister Yannis Papantoniou has noted that "we set a very dangerous precedent" in abandoning the EU's right to act autonomously when using NATO equipment.²⁷ Greece's opposition must be overcome for the Rapid Reaction Forces to utilize NATO planning capabilities, as the EU has no planning capability of its own and the proposed mission cannot go ahead without those NATO assets.²⁸ The EU is seeking a formal agreement with NATO on the sharing of assets, prior to any deployment to Macedonia. As the EU would like to deploy troops after the Macedonian elections in September 2002,²⁹ the EU seeks a solution to the Greek impasse by its June 21, 2002 summit in Seville, Spain.³⁰

Afghanistan: First EU Deployment? Since autumn of 2001, there have been rumors of potential EU Rapid Reaction Force engagement in both Afghanistan and Macedonia. At the December 2001 Laeken EU Summit, Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel enthusiastically, though prematurely, characterized the European-pledged contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as an all European effort and "a turning point in the history of European Union," giving the impression that ISAF was the first deployment of the EU Rapid Reaction Force.³¹ EU (CFSP) High Representative Solana and other EU member nations quickly corrected this statement, noting that while the vast majority of ISAF forces are from European nations, these forces are individual national contributions to ISAF and not part of a common EU RRF. However, the experience gained by the largely European ISAF will arguably impact development of RRF with regard to lessons learned in the areas of coordinated response with other EU states as well as non-member state force participants and other international actors such as the UN.

EU CAPABILITY & THE BRAHIMI REPORT: ADDRESSING GAPS WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM

The *Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (the "Brahimi Report"), commissioned by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and released in August 2000, recommended a wide range of changes to improve UN peace operations capability and response time. The EU crisis management capability addresses and often parallels key Brahimi recommendations with both its military and civilian components.

The recommendations in the Report that relate to EU crisis management plans include reforms in the areas of prevention, early-warning capacity, improved mission planning, better integration of peacebuilding into peace operations, and rapid and effective deployment capacity. The intersection of EU plans with these recommendations is summarized below.

Improving Prevention & Planning, Integrating Peacebuilding

The EU has stated its commitment to conflict prevention and as such supports information sharing and building a better early warning capacity. The EU plans to develop improved analysis capacity as well as conflict indicators and early warning systems, enhanced through better coordination with the UN and OSCE. In order to meet these needs, the European Commission created a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit within which it has established a Crisis Management Cell, which will coordinate EU initiatives as well as provide a focal point for the Council's Situation Center.³² The Situation Center is open 24 hours, with duty officers and a small staff. The Situation Center/Crisis Cell is the operational contact for EU High Representative Solana, and is tasked with providing a common platform to collect information streams from national intelligence, military intelligence and member state reports.

The EU early warning/conflict preventive capacity parallels Brahimi recommendations for greater information sharing and analysis within the UN.³³ The EU has committed to exchanging information with the UN, co-operating in fact-finding missions and coordinating with the UN in field training, as well as to increased cooperation in election assistance and monitoring.³⁴ This coordinated approach bolsters the Brahimi Report recommendation to integrate the planning and implementation of peacebuilding activities (such as election monitoring and civilian crisis response) into peace operations.

Rapid & Effective Deployment Capacity

Deploying within 30, 90 days. EU plans call for deploying the Rapid Reaction Force within 60 days and up to 1,000 civilian police personnel in less than 30 days. To enable these deployment timelines on the civilian side, the EU has initiated a new financing arrangement, known as the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, which allows for flexible funding arrangements as well as access to emergency reserve funds.³⁵ These deployment timelines are consistent with the Brahimi Report recommendation of deployment within 90 days for a complex mission.

Setting Training Standards. The EU has committed to coordinating with the UN with regard to training standards for both EU military and civilian capacities as well as planning and implementation of crisis management missions.

U.N. Standby Arrangements and On Call Lists. The EU held a Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels on November 20, 2000, to gauge specific national commitments to contribute to the Rapid Reaction Force as well as gather member state agreements to improve their own capabilities. These voluntary contributions are listed in a "Force Catalogue" that currently includes a pool of 100,000 people and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels.³⁶

The EU has also committed to create a database of civilian police capabilities. Police targets include early identification and common training of a large pool of police, with expertise in a variety of fields of police work. These targets are set to meet the goal of deploying commonly trained, integrated, flexible and interoperable civilian police units. Paired with these targets, the EU is looking at ways to deploy legal experts to help support local judicial and penal systems.

EVALUATION: PROGRESS & QUESTIONS

It is still too early to fully gauge the effectiveness of EU efforts in developing crisis management and rapid reaction capabilities. The upcoming January 2003 deployment of police in Bosnia-Herzegovina will provide the first test case for evaluation but major questions remain: **will the new tools of ESDP work? If so, after Bosnia, under whose mandate and leadership will the EU deploy next, and where?**

Will the New Tools of ESDP Work?

Key factors influencing the success or failure of the new EU capacities include member state political will, appropriate coordination with external actors,³⁷ and availability of appropriate capabilities (equipment) in a timely manner.

Political Will. The issue of political will relates to EU member state willingness to surrender some element of national sovereignty to EU coordination and implementation. To allay member states' concerns about sovereignty issues, ESDP is designed in such a way that commitment and deployment of national troops is based on sovereign decisions taken by member states.³⁸ While the decision to deploy EU police in Bosnia was reached without strong vocal opposition by member states, it remains to be seen whether commitment and deployment of Rapid Reaction Forces will run as smoothly.

Coordination. Coordination of EU capabilities in relation to the UN, NATO and OSCE is necessary to promote effective action as well as avoid duplication of effort. While the EU has expressed intent to coordinate action with these international bodies, it appears to have done more consulting than actual coordination. This reflects in part the lack of actual EU deployment to date, but a certain amount of operational coordination is implied in the implementation of ESDP.

The EU has promoted ESDP as a vehicle for action where NATO has chosen not to engage, and coordination with NATO is implicit in the EU's policy to refrain from deploying the Rapid Reaction Force without agreement on the use of NATO planning and command assets. While EU-NATO consultation is ongoing, such an agreement has not yet been reached (due to the impasse with Greece, mentioned earlier). EU policy also states that ESDP crisis management activities are to be executed in compliance with the principles of the UN Charter and under the guidance of the UN Security Council.³⁹ This implies EU action only under UN mandate, which is the case for the upcoming EUPM in Bosnia.

The EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is, however, committed to coordinate with the UN and OSCE on rule of law (including civilian police) capacity development and seeks to develop training standards compatible with those of the UN and OSCE. Steps toward developing compatible training standards were taken at the UN's spring 2002 Helsinki Civilian Police conference attended by EU, UN, and OSCE representatives. Several European analysts have noted, however, that the EU's relationship with the OSCE presently entails more competition than coordination.

The following questions remain: **how will the EU coordinate action on the ground? Will the EU undertake police missions in place of, or addition to UN or OSCE deployments? Does this mean a division of labor where, for example, one organization does policing, while the other provides rule of law experts? What about coordination between civilian and military actors? How will EUPM coordinate with SFOR for security needs? How would an EU deployment in Macedonia coordinate with other NATO forces in the Balkans?**

Capabilities. The EU's ability to act autonomously in crisis management as well as to support and complement NATO is closely tied to the issue of ESDP capabilities. At the Washington NATO Summit in 1999, member states endorsed the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI).⁴⁰ DCI was developed to close the widening technology gap between the United States and its European allies, which, during the operations in Kosovo, led to problems in alliance interoperability and burden-sharing. European allies were unable to take a

lead role early on in the Kosovo campaign and remained largely dependent upon the U.S. for strategic lift. The very capabilities lacking are ones that require increases in and reprioritization of defense spending by European allies.

Not addressing the capability gap risks the creation of a two-tiered alliance where the Europeans address only peacekeeping and low intensity conflict and the United States handles everything else. This situation is acceptable neither to the United States nor, ostensibly, to the Europeans. Yet, in order to reach parity and more equitable burden-sharing in crisis management, the EU must have the capacity to take the lead in more complex operations. Lord Robertson notes, “In the real world, capabilities cost. And there will be costs associated with meeting the headline goal and fulfilling the Defence Capabilities Initiative. Investment will be needed in key areas such as command, control and information systems, airlift and enhanced precision strike capabilities. In other words, Europe’s policy goals will have to be matched by Europe’s defence budgets.”⁴¹ These areas of investment recommended to meet NATO DCI goals coincide with the needs of an autonomous EU Rapid Reaction Force.

The success of ESDP is tied to the ability of EU member states to modify their defense budgets in order to finance the logistical and transport needs required for independent action. Although Lord Robertson and U.S. leaders have continued to encourage European NATO member states to address defense spending shortfalls in critical areas, it is not clear that increases will occur in time to finance truly autonomous capacities for EU action by the 2003 target date. A step in this direction, however, was the March 2002 decision by eight nations (seven EU countries⁴² plus Turkey) at the EU defense ministers meeting in Zaragoza, Spain, to develop a new military transport plane to be built by Airbus, the A400M.⁴³ This project has been hampered by problems, particularly German parliamentary objections at the national level.

Deployment: Under Whose Mandate and Leadership?

While the EU has indicated an intention to deploy under UN-mandated conditions, it is not clear whether the ESDP will develop solely as an alternative to NATO-led action or whether the EU will be able and willing to contribute troops and capacities to UN-led missions. The Spanish presidency of the EU has indicated a commitment to working in support of the Brahimi Report recommendations, yet the nature of this support is not defined. To deploy to UN-led missions, the EU would need a mechanism to do so, as one does not currently exist.

Where To Deploy?

Finally, it remains to be seen whether EU crisis response capacities will be able – politically or militarily -- to deploy outside of Europe, and if so, how far. On the military side, deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force will depend upon operational capacity (filling the command, control and communications as well as the heavy transport gaps listed above) and the evolving definition of European security interests. On the civilian side, the EU must evaluate whether it is able to provide effective and culturally accepted assistance outside of Europe. When reviewing current security postures and capabilities, as well as prevailing views of European analysts, it appears the most likely area of operation for ESDP will remain in the Balkans for the near future.

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NOTES

¹ The seeds for EU joint military action under a future common defense policy were planted at Maastricht and came to fruition with the *European Security and Defense Policy* (ESDP), which is the security and defense component of the EU *Common Foreign Security Policy* (CFSP). See “CFSP Basic Facts” on the Council of the European Union website, <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/default.asp?lang=en>.

² The Brahimi Report set out 28 concrete recommendations to improve the capacity and effectiveness of UN peace operations. The recommendations include a call for member states to cooperate in regional groupings to develop and train coherent capacities for military and civilian police for UN peace operations, with standardized regional training and rosters of troops as well as police, penal

experts and judicial experts able to deploy rapidly to those operations. General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809), 21 August 2000, can be found on both the UN website (http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/) as well as the Future of Peace Operations project at the Henry L. Stimson Center website, <http://www.stimson.org/fopo/>. Follow-on implementation documents are also linked from Stimson Center website.

³ In the interest of brevity, this factsheet will use Macedonia in place of the official name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”

⁴ For more on the range of EU activities in conflict prevention and crisis management see “Conflict Prevention & Civilian Crisis Management” in the External Relations section of the European Commission website, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/index.htm.

⁵ According to March 31, 2002 contributor data from the UN website, EU member states together contribute 10% of the total personnel (military observers, CivPol and troops) for UN-run operations. EU member states are also major contributors to UN-mandated, NATO-run SFOR, KFOR and Amber Fox operations in the Balkans. Additionally, as of March 2002, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan is almost exclusively made up of EU member states (13) with contributions from only four non-EU countries. EU member states are present in all fifteen current UN peace operations as well as the three NATO-run Balkan missions, SFOR, KFOR and Amber Fox. Examples of current peacekeeping operations led by EU member states include: U.K. in ISAF, Germany in Macedonia (NATO-run *Amber Fox*), Sweden in the Golan Heights (UNDOF), Belgium in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the Netherlands in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE), and France in Kosovo (NATO-led KFOR). Past peace operations where EU countries had force command include France in Rwanda (*Operation Turquoise*) and Italy in Albania (*Operation ALBA*).

⁶ The Petersberg Tasks come from the Western European Union's response to the Treaty of the European Union, signed in Maastricht, Netherlands, in 1991, which expanded upon the European Economic Community with political and social components, including the goal of a “common foreign policy.” Meanwhile, the WEU began to evolve its relations with the EU and NATO, declaring intent to develop into the defense component of the EU as well as open WEU membership to both EU members and European members of NATO.

⁷ A “Headline Goal” for the military component was set at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting to establish an EU Rapid Reaction Force with 60,000 troops deployable in 60 days for one year by 2003. See also “CFSP Basic Facts.”

⁸ At the 2000 Feira European Council meeting, the European Union set an immediate goal to develop a roster of 5,000 civilian police officers prepared for international missions, 1,000 of which could be deployed within less than 30 days, by the year 2003.

⁹ “EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management,” International Crisis Group (ICG) Report No. 2., June 26, 2001 (Brussels), p. 32.

¹⁰ EU members Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden are not members of NATO. Member states of EU: Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden. Member states of NATO that are also EU members: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.

¹¹ Under CFSP, ESDP allows for a common defense of the EU should the European Council decide and the 15 member states adopt and ratify this decision. The ESDP does not interfere with individual member state security and defense policies and is compatible with NATO policy. For more information see “CFSP Basic Concepts.”

¹² “EU Council of Ministers: Presidency Rejects Any Link Between Enlargement and CAP Reform,” *European Report*, February 6, 2002.

¹³ “Top EU military: EU force fully ready in 10 years,” *EU Observer*, January 23, 2002 and “NATO chief urges EU to improve capabilities,” *EU Observer*, February 3, 2002, downloaded March 1, 2002 from <http://www.euobserver.com>.

¹⁴ “Top EU military: EU force ready in 10 years,” *EU Observer*, January 23, 2002.

¹⁵ “Civilian Crisis Management,” European Commission External Relations website, November 2001, downloaded February 6, 2002 from http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cm.htm.

¹⁶ “Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy,” *European Union Press Release*, 4/12/2000- Nr: 14056/2/00, from the European Union website, downloaded January 18, 2001, <http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.cfm?MAX=1&Doc=!!!&BID=75&DID=64256&GRP=3020&Lang=1>.

¹⁷ See “Civilian Crisis Management,” November 2001.

¹⁸ ICG, “EU Crisis Response Capability,” p. 31.

¹⁹ The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has developed a crisis response capacity of its own, called the OSCE REACT program. REACT, the acronym for Rapid Expert Assistance Co-operation Teams, is a pool of skilled personnel ready for rapid deployment to current and future OSCE missions in crisis areas. Those in the database are applicants from participating OSCE member states who have been screened and selected work in the areas of Human Rights, Rule of Law, Democratization, Elections, Economic and Environmental Affairs, Press and Public Affairs, Media Development, Political Affairs, Administration and Support, General Monitoring, Military Affairs, and Civilian Policing. See OSCE REACT website for more detail: (<http://www.osce.org/react/>).

²⁰ See Council conclusions on International Police Task Force (IPTF) follow-on in “2406th Council meeting-General Affairs-Brussels, January 28, 2002,” Council of Ministers Press Release, *Commission of the European Communities RAPID*, DN: PRES/02/16, January 28, 2002, downloaded from http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=PRES/02/16|0|RAPID&lg=EN&display=

²¹ “Security Council Welcomes European Union Offer to Provide Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1 January 2003, Resolution 1396 (2002) Adopted Unanimously,” UN Security Council Press Release SC/7319, March 5, 2002, downloaded from UN website on March 6, 2002 from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7319.doc.htm>.

²² “EU agrees to take on international policing mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” from EU Spanish Presidency website, downloaded February 20, 2002 from <http://www.ue2002.es/portada/PlantillaDetalleImprimir.asp?opcion=1&id=702&idioma=ingles>.

²³ Judy Dempsey, “Spain Urges EU to take over NATO military operations in Macedonia,” *Financial Times*, February 2, 2002.

²⁴ “Piqué Optimistic regarding possibility of EU taking on first military mission in Macedonia after summer,” interview with the President of the EU Council, Josep Piqué, Spain 2002-Presidency of the European Union website, August 8, 2002, downloaded on

February 8, 2002 from <http://www.ue2002.es/portada/PlantillaDetalleImprimir.asp?opcion=1&id=idioma=ingles>, and Paul Ames, "Macedonia's president says he would accept EU force, NATO has doubts," *Associated Press Worldstream*, March 7, 2002.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, and "NATO has no objection in principle to EU lead role in Macedonia mission," *Agence France Presse*, March 11, 2002.

²⁶ Katja Ridderbusch, "The Phantom of the EU Rapid Reaction Force: the way to employment of a European army is still long," *Die Welt*, April 3, 2002.

²⁷ "Defence: Greece Still Blocking Deal with Turkey on NATO Co-Operation," *European Report*, March 27, 2002.

²⁸ Breffni O'Rourke, "EU: Rapid Reaction Force Set for Macedonia, But First Must Make Peace with Greece," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, March 27, 2002, downloaded from <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/03/27032002095101.asp>. Citing EU High Representative Javier Solana.

²⁹ Michael Evans, "EU gets ready for Balkan peace role," *The Times (London)*, March 23, 2002.

³⁰ Paul Ames, "EU sets June target for resolving dispute over NATO and launching Macedonia mission," *AP Worldstream*, March 22, 2002.

³¹ T.R. Reid, "EU Scuttles Report on Joint Afghan Force," *The Washington Post*, December 16, 2001.

³² Speech by Rt. Hon Christopher Patten, "Debate on Conflict Prevention/Crisis Management," External Relations Commission, European Parliament Plenary, Strasbourg, from the European Commission website, March 14, 2000, downloaded February 6, 2002 from http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/ip_01_123.htm.

³³ For more on implementation of the Brahimi Report recommendation for the creation of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) see: Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, "Resource requirements for implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," (A/55/507), October 27, 2000, Section II, paras. 9-13; and Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, "Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," (A/55/977), May 28, 2001, Section VI, paras 290-307 and Annex C.

³⁴ "Press Release: EU General Affairs Council in Goteborg" 2356, Council-General Affairs, June 11, 2001 downloaded from European Union website on February 7, 2002 from <http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/loadDoc.asp?max=1&bid=71&did=66759&grp=3552&lang=1>.

³⁵ "Financing of EU Civilian Crisis Management Operations," IP/01/1684-Brussels, from the Conflict Prevention & Civilian Crisis Management section of the European Commission website, November 28, 2001, downloaded on February 6, 2002 from http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/ip01_1684.htm.

³⁶ "EU Military Structures: Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration," from the Council of the European Union website, November 20, 2000, downloaded January 31, 2002 from <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/CCC.htm>. Note that Denmark has opted out from participation in the force catalogue.

³⁷ The author recognizes that internal coordination provides significant challenges as well. For more detail see ICG, "EU Crisis Response Capability," June 26, 2001 and its update ICG, "EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update," April 29, 2002.

³⁸ For more information see "CFSP Basic Concepts."

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ For more on NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative see NATO Fact Sheet, "NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative," NATO Online Library, April 2000, downloaded from <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-dci.htm>.

⁴¹ NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, "Europe's new defence era," Speech by the Secretary General at the 5th Forum Europe Defense Industries Conference, Brussels, NATO On-line Library, May 23, 2000, downloaded from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000523a.htm>.

⁴² The eight countries are Germany, Britain, France, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Turkey and Luxembourg.

⁴³ Paul Ames, "EU pushes ahead with preparations for Macedonia force, welcomes progress on military Airbus," *AP Worldstream*, March 23, 2002.