Future of Peace Operations Program
Peacekeeping in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities
House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa
Friday, October 8, 2004
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Full Testimony of Victoria K. Holt (pdf)
Submitted Friday, October 8, 2004
Chairman Royce, Congressman Payne, and Members of the Committee, it is an honor to be invited to testify before you today. Thank you for the opportunity to address the challenges of African peacekeeping, and to consider how United States policy can best support the success of current and future operations.
This topic is especially important and timely. The growth in African peacekeeping is unprecedented. The US has supported Security Council approval of four new or expanded African missions in the last year including Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burundi. In June, President Bush announced the $660 million Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), to help train and support African nations (and others) for peace operations. The US recently recognized genocide in Darfur, Sudan and called for global action, ten years after the Rwandan genocide where the world failed to act. African nations and organizations are moving forward to lead peace operations. Today, the State Department is hosting G-8 partners and representatives from African organizations to review the G-8’s Africa Action Plan, which aims to strengthen capacity for peace operations in Africa. Yet for all this good will there are big obstacles to overcome. Missions still need skilled troops, observers and civilian police; GPOI has not been approved by Congress; the horrific crisis in Sudan continues; African organizations are not capable of conducting operations without support; and the G-8 goals are still to be achieved.
Meeting the challenges of peace operations depends on US leadership. This Committee’s role is pivotal, especially in its oversight of the key US tools for peace operations: funding for UN operations, for training African forces, and for support to regional peacekeeping efforts. I will suggest ways that US policy could better support more effective and successful conduct of peace operations in Africa by looking at the questions posed by the Committee for this hearing:
- What are the challenges today for successful peace operations in Africa?
- What lessons have been learned over the last 15 years of peace operations?
- What US policy options address these questions, including GPOI, and are US goals being met?
Challenges
First, demand for challenging peace operations is up. The number of operations and peacekeepers [1] in Africa has grown dramatically in the last five years, a response to opportunities for peace. Today the UN leads 16 peace operations, seven in Africa: Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and the Western Sahara. These African missions account for over 80 percent of all UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide. [2] Of the seven missions in Africa, six began after 1999, supported by roughly 49,000 UN peacekeepers. More troops will be needed for a potential mission in Sudan. As a result, costs are increasing with the demand for deployments. Of the projected UN peacekeeping costs for 2004-2005, approximately 70 percent are associated with missions in Africa. In addition to the increase in missions and mission personnel, many of these operations are complex, multidimensional, and operating with Chapter VII authority.
Many recent African operations are hybrids, where multiple organizations have played a lead role in the peacekeeping mission in concert with the UN. In Liberia, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed troops in the summer of 2003, assisted by the US, and then transitioned the mission to the UN in October 2003. In Burundi, the African Union (AU) led a peacekeeping force with a deployment of 2,870 peacekeepers primarily from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique before the UN took over in June 2004. The European Union authorized a French-led force to eastern DRC in the summer of 2003 to secure the Ituri region for three months, giving time for a more robust and expanded UN force to take its place in the fall. And in Sudan today, the African Union leads an observer force, with the United Nations planning a potential peacekeeping mission there.
Second, there is an increased African commitment to peacekeeping, but African groups face major organizational and resource challenges. Within the AU and ECOWAS, political will and ambitious leadership are fueling efforts for both organizations to take on peace operations, ranging from mediation and early warning to peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention. In Africa, some leaders see peace operations as a means of putting out a fire in a neighbor’s house, both a moral instinct and recognition that such fires can devastate a region. [3] Others cite a responsibility to prevent future genocides on the continent. Alongside the rhetoric are real advances.
- The African Union, in addition to launching its first peacekeeping operation in Burundi and its second mission now in Darfur, aims to develop five regional brigades that will comprise an African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010.
- The Economic Community of West African States, which has led numerous peacekeeping operations in West Africa, is developing its regional standby force, and is moving to increase its headquarters planning and management staff.
- Other African organizations traditionally focused on development and economics are moving toward peace and security issues, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). [4] The development of an East African Standby Brigade for the African Standby Force concept was announced in September 2004. [5]
Key challenges face these organizations in their efforts to deploy peacekeepers. Most forces are not self-sustainable, many lack sufficient logistical and transport support, and some even need basic equipment, food and medical supplies. [6] The African Union, ECOWAS and other regional groups also face gaps in their headquarters and leadership capacity to organize, manage, deploy and fund peace operations. Outside partners are offering some support to African organizations and nations in funding, training and deployment support for peace operations. The United States, Great Britain and France have modest, on-going bilateral military training programs focused on selected countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The G-8 countries created an Africa Action Plan in 2002 to advance African peacekeeping efforts with financial and programmatic support.
Third, increased international capacity for peace operations may fail to keep pace with the need. Efforts to increase African capacity for peace operations and conflict resolution raise the question of whether these initiatives are aimed at building greater overall capacities to deal with conflict; or are intended to reduce the direct involvement of developed states in Africa. It is a fair question, given the overall reduction in developed states’ participation in UN-led peace operations in Africa. 100 nations contribute forces to UN peacekeeping, but contributions from developed nations have declined since the 1990s. Today the top 16 nations, those contributing more than 1,000 personnel each to UN operations, are all from developing states – led by Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Ghana. [7]
Many developed states with highly skilled armed services are stretched by their increased military commitments, such as in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet major powers have recently intervened in African conflicts, primarily to help stabilize immediate crises, such as the British deployment to Sierra Leone (2000), the French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire (2002), the French-led EU mission in the DRC (2003), and the American support to the ECOWAS mission in Liberia (2003). The Stand-by High Readiness Brigade, composed of 16 nations (mostly developed and European) played a pivotal role in setting up the UN mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (2000) and helping transition from ECOWAS to UN missions.
When developing nations provide personnel for peacekeeping missions, they frequently require outside material and financial support from the UN and bilateral partners, such as transportation, logistics, equipment, and planning and organizational support. The challenge for the AU and regional organizations is transitioning their forces to a higher level of self-sustainability and establishing their own management and planning staffs, logistics capacity, and financial strength to organize and conduct missions.
Fourth, political will determines action in hard cases – such as Sudan. UN capacity to organize a rapid and effective response to a genocidal conflict may be improved with better advance planning, logistical support, on-call and skilled personnel, mission leadership and clarity within the UN system. But member states ultimately must be willing to act – to authorize the use of force and deploy military units and skilled personnel rapidly by the UN, a regional organization or a multinational force. UN missions also need members to support clear, robust rules of engagement; offer leadership; and provide timely support. An effective response requires the Security Council to authorize UN action (or that of an operation led by a lead nation or regional organization), and to provide a clear mandate that is impartial but not neutral, with strategic guidance from the Secretary-General to the missions’ leaders on how to deal with dramatic changes on the ground. These requirements are a political call, and not easily met even in the face of dramatic atrocities.
Lessons Learned and the Brahimi Report
In 2000, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan tasked an expert Panel on United Nations Peace Operations with considering the UN failures in meeting peacekeeping challenges of the 1990s. [8] Capacity shortfalls have sometimes dogged UN missions – countries have sent personnel without proper equipment, shoes, or even rudimentary skills. UN headquarters support for operations was hindered by insufficient resources when it needed skilled personnel, planning capacity, and clear guidance. The UN had failed to act against the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. [9] Named for its dynamic chair, UN Under Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi, the Panel presented its findings in August 2000. I will review some of the lessons learned from this effort, based on findings from our Stimson Center study of its implementation. [10]
Three broad principles of the Report remain salient four years later. First, war fighting is the job of nations and coalitions, not the UN – but peacekeepers should be prepared to deal with armed groups or bandits and not get pushed around during the conduct of their mission. The UN may need to provide troops with more robust rules of engagement and specialized support to implement peace after intrastate conflicts. Second, peacekeeping and peacebuilding must go together from the beginning of operations. Security is provided temporarily by peacekeepers, which enables peacebuilding to work; peacebuilders help develop the institutions and environment that sustain security and enables peacekeepers to return home. Third, fundamentals still matter as the underpinning of UN peace operations, the support from UN, its member states, and collaboration among them all affect capacity and success.
More specifically, meeting the challenge of peace operations requires closing gaps between goals and reality. The UN has moved to close the gap between what the Council mandates and what peacekeepers can do in the field; to improve its headquarters support for planning and supporting missions; to increase skilled mission leadership; and finally, to develop systems for more effective and rapid deployments. A few central areas parallel the challenge for African capacity today:
Skilled management of operations is central. The UN learned it needed more capacity to manage, organize and support the operations it deployed, including professional staff at UN headquarters, better leadership of missions, civilians who could deploy rapidly to the field and an improved planning capacity. Mission leaders, for example, are now brought together in advance of going to the field, to review their mandates and meet with their colleagues before deploying to the field.
Rapid and effective deployments require advance planning and support. The UN now aims to deploy a traditional peacekeeping operation within 30 days and a complex operation within 90 days of a Security Council resolution. To prevent equipment-related delays that plagued so many missions, the UN provides some funding to the Secretary General to support advance planning. The UN now has Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS), which arrange contracts and supplies in advance of deployments, coordinated through the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy.
Quality personnel matter. Skilled personnel are still the backbone of peacekeeping. UN capacity depends on the quantity and quality of troops, police and civilian personnel provided by member states. For complex operations, the skills and coherence of the force are critical, and the UN would benefit from nations collaborating in training and equipping brigade-sized forces that could deploy rapidly and be listed in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), a voluntary listing by member states of the resources they could provide to an operation. UNSAS helps to organize and deploy operations more effectively. Still missing are sufficient numbers of logistical support and other enabling units. The supply problem has plagued many missions, delaying deployment of military personnel for the DRC and of qualified police for Liberia. Over 75 percent of the police recruits for the UN mission in Liberia, for example, failed the test for basic qualifications. [11]
US Policy Options
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ only major peacekeeping role in Africa has been in Somalia. Today, US personnel serve in two African UN peacekeeping missions: 85 in Liberia (nearly all civilian police) and six observers in Ethiopia/Eritrea. US policymakers have been reluctant to lead peace operations or provide sizeable US military forces for peace operations. In an environment where U.S. military participation in or leadership of peace operations in Africa is minimal, the natural question is what else can the U.S. do to help other actors respond?
First, the US needs to increase support of its existing efforts. Within the State Department budget, two accounts are critical.
- The Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations account, requested at $104 million for fiscal year 2005 (FY05), is under funded and could easily be doubled to meet the current demand. This account is the central source for support to regional efforts and organizations, to run US training of African forces (African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, with $15 million annually), and to assist African missions (e.g., support for Ethiopia contingents to deploy to Burundi, planning support to ECOWAS, etc.)
- The Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA), requested at $650 million for fiscal year 2005, provides the US share (27%) of contributions for UN peace operations. This request is roughly half of what is required for the coming year. Further, this account is frequently without any specific funding to support initiatives that invest in capacity-building and longer-term reform efforts, which then limits the US ability to promote such reforms at the United Nations or within specific missions.
Second, the US should support capacity-building at the AU, ECOWAS and other regional and sub-regional groups for peace operations, as well as increase US bilateral training and logistical support for such operations.
- Support for GPOI. This draft initiative would greatly expand US foreign military train and equip efforts, including constabulary training for peace and stability operations. In concert with other G8 countries, this US investment could increase the ability of African nations to field more capable peacekeepers. [12] In lieu of supporting standing brigades, the Initiative focuses on training (with G8 partners) 75,000 troops over five years for peace enforcement and constabulary roles, a goal of 10 African battalions. Equipment, transport and logistical support are also central in addressing the shortage of capable personnel for such operations and could involve $660 million over five years. This Initiative would dramatically increase the small US resources now dedicated to training African militaries and assisting regional groups in Africa. The program must be integrated with AU and ECOWAS efforts as well as the UN.
Third, the US should increase its efforts to improve UN capacities for peace operations.
- Support more rapid and effective deployments. The stocks at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy should be expanded to sustain deployment of more than one major peace operations each year. [14] Given the UN’s lack of enabling units, logistical support and transport for its missions, for which it depends on member states – the United States and other G8 nations should work to match their air and sealift capacity, key transportation and logistical support, to help deploy and sustain peacekeepers and civilian specialists in crisis areas. Better participation in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System would help match contributors’ capabilities during the planning stage for more effective deployments. [15]
- Increase international pool of skilled civilian police, rule of law experts and peace-building capacities. The need for qualified and skilled civilian police (CivPol), and rule of law experts (judges, corrections, penal and human rights) outpaces their availability for operations in Africa. The UN is shorthanded at headquarters, as fewer than 30 staff tries to recruit and manage nearly 6,000 CivPol in the field. African organizations have little to no capacity. Creating a certification process with EU, AU, and ECOWAS members to identify and standardize the characterization of qualifications and skill levels for those offered by member states as CivPol (and rule of law experts) would help support more effective deployments in the field.
NOTES
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Peacekeepers include troops, military observers and civilian police. These numbers do not include additional civilian staff required in the field or in headquarters for peace operations.
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Numbers as of August 2004, when 48,864 of the 60,731 UN peacekeepers were deployed in Africa alone. As of early October 2004, the United Nations had authorized an increase in the DRC mission numbers by another 5,900 troops.
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Reflects comments by Ambassador Raph Uwechue, ECOWAS official, Stimson Center Roundtable, January 2004.
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Other actors in the region include: Economic Community of Central African States, East African Community, Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States and the Arab-Maghreb Union.
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OCHA, “East Africa: Eleven nations to provide troops to AU Standby Force,” IRIN News, 14 September 2004.
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Some troops were deployed to Burundi and reportedly not provided with sufficient food or medical supplies.
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UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 31 August 2004.
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Panelists included Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), Mr. J. Brian Atwood (United States), Mr. Colin Granderson (Trinidad and Tobago), Dame Ann Hercus (New Zealand), Mr. Richard Monk (United Kingdom), General Klaus Naumann (Germany), Professor Hisako Shimura (Japan), Ambassador Vladimir Shustov (Russian Federation), General Philip Sibanda (Zimbabwe), Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzerland).
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UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/55, entitled “The fall of Srebrenica,” A/54/549, 15 November 1999; and UN Security Council, Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, enclosing the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257, 15 December 1999.
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William Durch, Victoria Holt, Caroline Earle, and Moira Shanahan. The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations (The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC), November 2003 at www.stimson.org/fopo.
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Interview, UN DPKO, October 2003.
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Many questions remain about this initiative and its operational aspects, including what doctrine would be used, what equipment is provided, how countries are chosen, how standards are set, and what gaps are being closed, etc.
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The primary funding source for direct US bilateral support to African military training is through the ACOTA program which is funded at $15 million in FY04, with $15 million requested from Congress for FY05. Additional support to ECOWAS is provided through the Africa Regional program (State Department budget); funding for this area was $9 million in FY04 and is requested at $45 million in FY05. The Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program supports training to militaries including Africa, but less than $2 million as requested for its FY05 budget.
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The UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, is currently configured to support deployment of one new complex UN peacekeeping operation annually. Given the current pace of UN operations, this is not sufficient in 2004.
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The UNSAS system is based on volunteer pledges by Members States to contribute specified resources within agreed response time for United Nations peacekeeping operations. When necessary, they are requested by the Secretary-General, and, if approved by the Member States, are deployed.