The Human Dimension Is Key to Controlling Proliferation of WMD
April 04, 2007
In APS News, Elizabeth Turpen explains the threat posed by former Soviet weapons expertise in the race to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. She describes the various US Government programs that aim to redirect this expertise into sustainable, civilian employment that can provide external benefits such as vaccine development and pathogen detection equipment innovation.
APS News Volume 16, Number 4 (April 2007)
A publication of the American Physical Society
Click here to see the original article
If a rogue state or terrorist organization needed insider
support to acquire weapons-grade fissile materials or additional
expertise to design a nuclear device, where should it send its
headhunter? The most probable place to find applicable scientific talent
for hire would be the former Soviet Union. Described as a potential
"Wal-Mart for terrorists" by one expert and "the greatest unmet threat
to U.S. security" by a bipartisan U.S. Government commission in 2001,
the legacies of the cold war arms race-nuclear, chemical and
biological-continue to provide plenty of sleepless nights for those of
us focused on the sheer magnitude of unsecured materials and
underemployed experts that could be used to perpetrate catastrophic
terrorism. Equally disturbing is the consistent political rhetoric
regarding the number one threat to U.S. security being at the
"crossroads of technology and international terrorism" without the
corresponding political will to effectively address the most plausible
source. In addition, the proclivity to favor high-tech fixes over
addressing the enduring human dimension of the problem remains an
outstanding liability for U.S. programs.
When the Soviet Union
collapsed in 1991, roughly 20,000 weapons and stockpiles of
highly-enriched uranium and plutonium for an additional 40,000 weapons,
as well as an estimated 40,000 tons of chemical weapons and a robust
biological capability, were spread over what would rapidly evolve into
15 sovereign states spanning eleven time zones. Moreover, tens of
thousands of scientists, engineers and technicians that comprised the
backbone of the Soviets' unconventional weapons programs went from
relative riches as an elite corps of patriots to highly skilled excess
capacity residing in bloated weapons complexes throughout the region. In
response to the rapidly evolving crisis, Congress passed the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Act. Colloquially known as Nunn-Lugar
after its authors former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Senator Richard
Lugar (R-IN), CTR provided Defense Department funding and expertise to:
1) consolidate and secure weapons of mass destruction in safe areas; 2)
inventory and account for these weapons; 3) provide safe handling and
safe disposition of these weapons as called for by arms control
agreements; and 4) offer assistance in finding gainful employment for
thousands of former Soviet scientists with expert knowledge of weapons
of mass destruction or their delivery systems.
The early momentum
created by this effort laid the foundation for a broad array of
programs spawned by other U.S. agencies, especially the Energy and State
Departments, and, in some cases, pursued multilaterally by U.S. allies.
In 1996, legislative action in the form of the so-called
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici bill explicitly recognized the terrorist threat and
expanded and enhanced threat reduction activities. At the 2002
Kananaskis Summit, other members of the G-8 committed themselves to
match the United States' commitment to CTR totaling $10 billion over ten
years, an agreement initially dubbed "10 plus 10 over 10." More
recently, Congress authorized CTR activities to extend beyond the
territory of the former Soviet Union (FSU). In over a dozen years of
evolution and roughly $12 billion in U.S. security investments, these
efforts can lay claim to the following achievements: deactivation of
over 6,900 warheads, including the entire arsenals from the former
Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; destruction of
more than 2,300 delivery systems; elimination of over 290 metric tons of
highly enriched uranium; enhancements to security in transport and
storage as well as accountability for both weapons and weapons
materials; and engagement of approximately 71,000 scientists in civilian
research.
While the full roster of accomplishments is
impressive, particularly in light of the lack of focused political
commitment and relatively minuscule proportion of U.S. security
investments to achieve progress, it remains wholly inadequate. The U.S.
Government has been whittling away at the risks emanating from the cold
war legacy for fifteen years, and depending on what aspect of the threat
one is talking about and what metric for progress one applies, we are
still only about half way there. Why the slow pace to address the most
obvious source of proliferation? Certainly sufficient blame might be
laid at the feet of fickle host governments, particularly in Russia. But
a significant proportion of fault remains with the United States. The
maverick, innovative approaches in the early years of threat reduction
that yielded rapid progress have long since given way to turf battles
between agencies, insufficient high-level attention to lay the
foundation for more intensive and expeditious cooperation, and
congressional and bureaucratic propensities for muddling through,
despite the continued risk of loose materials and unemployed weaponeers.
In-depth
research regarding lessons learned and possibilities to improve these
nonproliferation efforts gives rise to the following conclusions: First,
"Cooperative Threat Reduction" is more than a group of programs to
address supply-side concerns in the proliferation equation. If applied
appropriately, Cooperative Threat Reduction can also address the
demand-side aspects of the equation. This is evidenced by the decisions
on the part of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to forego nuclear weapons
state status-respectively the third, fifth and eighth largest nuclear
weapons states upon independence-as a result of focused U.S. diplomatic
efforts and promises of assistance. Second, without White House
attention to getting the job done, these endeavors can fall prey to
pernicious bureaucratic behavior and a dysfunctional interagency
process. Third, and most importantly, whereas weapons can be dismantled
and materials controlled, the people cannot. Instead of approaching the
human dimension as a threat to be contained, it should be incorporated
as part of the strategy to address the demand-side of the equation. In
this vein, U.S. industry and academe should be brought along as partners
to achieve sustainable rollback of WMD capabilities. Each of these
lessons is part of a comprehensive approach that should be applied to
future iterations of threat reduction efforts, whether those
opportunities arise with respect to North Korea, Iran or other states
with the scientific capabilities to achieve nuclear status.
Despite
global public opinion polls regarding declining U.S. popularity,
America's scientific and business acumen is respected and coveted
worldwide. This tool in our foreign policy approach to reversing the
proliferation tide is not being used effectively. Never mind that
oftentimes industry is leagues ahead of federally-funded research and
development efforts, especially in the most innovative or ethically
complicated aspects of "high-tech," and yet is regarded as an outsider
or peripheral to government policies in the day-to-day discussions
inside the DC Beltway. The U.S. Government has yet to grasp the key
point-and this is relevant to the cold war legacy as well as to
combating terrorism more generally-"it's about the people, stupid."
Economic opportunity has a key role to play in potentially reversing
"rogue" states' proliferation calculations and offering opportunities to
those thus far marginalized by globalization.
With respect to
the enduring threat of WMD proliferation from the FSU, however, this
lesson remains vital. We have consistently downgraded efforts to provide
stable commercial opportunities to the scientific capacity-due to the
long-term nature of such efforts and the fuzzy metrics which must be
applied with respect to "conversion" of human capacity-in favor of the
more easily quantifiable aspects of dismantling weapons and securing
materials, despite the obvious issue that any progress made would be
readily reversible without sustainable, civilian employment. In
addition, with few exceptions, these efforts have only in retrospect
tried to address the need for stable employment, not to mention the
opportunity to address U.S. foreign policy objectives of economic
development, integration into the global economy, and rule of law. Had
we thought about the human dimension of proliferation as an opportunity
rather than a risk and offered industry sufficient incentives to
participate in creating sustainable commercial job opportunities in
these fledging democracies, we would be measurably farther along in
advancing our nonproliferation and many other vital national interests.
What
has happened by accident in a handful of cases illustrates what is
feasible by design. A high tech company based in Albuquerque, New Mexico
works with a group of highly skilled specialists at the General Physics
Institute in Moscow for different aspects of design and improvements to
the company's nuclear safeguards equipment. This same safeguards
equipment is utilized by the Department of Energy's Materials
Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program to contain and
account for weapons-grade materials in the FSU. Collaboration between a
California biotech company and a team of former biological weapons
scientists has yielded a new vaccine for treatment of Hepatitis C, an
increasing public health threat in Russia and globally. In an early
iteration of programs, the Defense Department contracted a New York
company to convert a factory producing nuclear-tipped torpedoes in
Kazakhstan to civilian production. This $3 million investment resulted
in a cryogenic vessel production facility to service the rapidly growing
oil and gas industry in the region. In addition to providing
sustainable employment to the lion's share of workers at the former
torpedo factory, this facility later became the primary supplier of
equipment for the cylinders requisite to DOE's efforts to secure
plutonium bearing fuel assemblies in Kazakhstan upon closure of a
breeder reactor. Moreover, this case provides a concrete example of the
"secondary" benefits of such efforts with respect to achieving other
foreign policy objectives in the course of addressing the possible risk
of know-how proliferation. Beyond sustainable employment and providing
products needed by a Department of Energy nonproliferation program, the
transfer of business management skills, training in quality assurance
and quality control, and the positive economic impact on the region,
this factory's management became a vociferous agitator for the rule of
law in an otherwise hostile business environment.
In the Stimson
Center's survey of the U.S. Government programs geared toward addressing
the know-how proliferation threat, two shining examples not left to
serendipity do exist. First, the Defense Department's Biological Threat
Reduction Program has teamed with the Centers for Disease Control to
leverage the scientific capacity of former biological weapons scientists
in Central Asia and the South Caucasus to build a network for
infectious disease surveillance across the region. Second, modeled after
a program created in the mid 1990s to promote economic diversification
among the DoE laboratory complex, the Law Enforcement Targeted
Initiative (LETI) is a partnership to promote development of civilian
law enforcement technologies by former Soviet WMD institutes. Under this
arrangement, law enforcement agencies, in Russia and beyond, are the
customers of Russian institutes R&D services.
A train is
bearing down on the threat reduction activities funded by the United
States. Policymakers at the agencies and many members of Congress are
looking for an "exit strategy" from threat reduction engagement in the
region. This is particularly true as Russia flaunts its petrodollar
wealth, and the escalating costs for the war in Iraq begin to squeeze
all other aspects of our national security budget. Unfortunately, an
exit strategy that does not ensure an indigenous capacity to sustain the
measures that the U.S. has so painstakingly put into place may render
fifteen years and the expenditure of billions of dollars moot. More
frighteningly, a premature exit greatly increases the risk of WMD
terrorism through the seepage of materials or know-how to any
well-endowed source willing to bid.
As Sam Nunn repeatedly puts
it: "We're in a race between cooperation and catastrophe, and the
threats are outrunning our response." Our response to the most likely
source of materials or know-how that could contribute to catastrophic
terrorism has been dangerously inadequate. Addressing the human
dimension of the threat is not only the lynchpin to sustainability of
these efforts, but represents underexploited potential to achieve a
whole host of U.S. foreign policy interests. Moreover, an opportunity
exists to address public health, energy, environmental and
nonproliferation needs through more efficient leveraging of the
scientific and technical talent in the region of the former Soviet
Union. Through innovative engagement of U.S. industry and academe as
partners in achieving U.S. policy goals, not only can we better address
proliferation challenges but also provide attractive incentives to
induce a different calculation by states flirting with the WMD option
and reduce the risks of know-how proliferation to the highest bidder.

