

HURRICANE KATRINA: MANAGING MULTI-LEVEL COMPLEXITIES

**A STIMSON CENTER CONFERENCE
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The Henry L. Stimson Center

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INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, government and academic experts are analyzing a vast array of topics that require new attention, to better prepare for future natural disasters and other threats to security at home. They range from the science of climate to issues relating to social organization, human psychology, and governance in all its aspects, from local to national to international. It is the last set of issues: how government functions at different levels and between the levels that is the focus of this analysis. In early 2006 The Henry L. Stimson Center convened a group of experts, with the support of the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), to reflect on multi-level decision making and crisis management, using the Katrina case as a starting point.

The SEMA-Stimson exercise drew on the new literature that is emerging about Katrina, summarized in an inventory of post-Katrina studies. The inventory¹ identified studies that addressed decision making across levels of government, on the premise that some of the difficulties in working across local, state and federal government boundaries in the United States might be repeated in the event of a catastrophic event in Europe. The complexities of government authorities in European nations and at the European Union level could well produce some similar uncertainties or blockages as occurred in Katrina.

The exercise also attempted to grapple with the changing concepts of security: the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and its emphasis on terrorist threats did not assure for a smooth and effective response to a natural disaster. The new organization was sorely tested by Katrina, and some believe new adjustments in its mission and in its capabilities are warranted. True security requires agile partnerships, beyond national boundaries and between government and private actors, including industry, non-governmental organizations, and individual citizens.

The SEMA-Stimson workshop, held in Washington, D.C., on March 30, 2006, featured five presentations related to Katrina and its implications for the US and for Europe. This summary provides brief synopses of the presentations, and ends with an analytic conclusion that identifies key issues for further assessment, and proposed remedies that emerged in the course of the discussion.

¹ Armbruster, Benjamin. *Survey of Research: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina*. Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2006. <<http://www.stimson.org/domprep/?SN=DP200605241002>>

THE CONSEQUENCES OF KATRINA

Keith Bea, a senior analyst at the Congressional Research Service, provided a useful overview of key data relating to Katrina.² He framed the discussion by ranking Katrina relative to other natural disasters over the past quarter century. In a list of several dozen incidents, Katrina was ranked in the top three in terms of damage amounts measured in billions of dollars, along side the drought/heat wave of 1980 and the drought/heat wave of 1988. The estimate of damage in dollars for Katrina is over \$100 billion; the two heat waves were estimated at \$48 and \$62 billion.

Bea also cautioned that one of the hardest challenges of emergency management is separating the dynamic from the static. In the Katrina case, the data is not final. There are still missing persons, and the health and mental illness consequences of Katrina are still emerging. At the local level, the devastation of infrastructure to schools, roads, water and sewage systems may require total replacement, and in some areas, Katrina may prove to be permanently destructive. The likely shrinking of the population in New Orleans on a permanent basis is only one example.

Katrina affected 1.5 million people, in an area of 90,000 square miles. But nearly the entire United States (47 out of 50 states) were affected in some way. Four states were declared major disaster areas, 42 declared an emergency due to their role in helping settle evacuees and displaced persons, and two (Texas and Arkansas) were declared emergency states due to the diverse impacts of Katrina on them.

Bea referred to the enduring issue of centralization vs. dispersal of federal authority. He compared the expectations of federal support today to an earlier time, a half-century ago, when the concept of the sovereignty of the individual states was stronger. He questioned whether material and resources at the federal level would better be placed at the local and state level.

Bea linked some of the post-9/11 work on the emergency response of New York City to the new post-Katrina studies. The House Bipartisan Committee report, *A Failure of Initiative*³, and the White House's *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*⁴, are useful treatments of shortcomings at the federal level. More study is needed to fully understand some of the problems at the local and state level, and the interactions between the levels of government.

² The outline of Mr. Bea's presentation can be found in Appendix B.

³ Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. *A Failure of Initiative*. Washington DC: GPO, 2006. 19 June 2006. <http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm>

⁴ White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned* (February 2006). 19 June 2006 <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/>>

MULTI-LEVEL COMPLEXITIES: WHO IS IN CHARGE? WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

General Dennis Reimer and Dr. Peter Roman considered how Katrina relates to other disasters: is it an outlier or should lessons from Katrina be useful and applicable to the governmental response to future natural disasters? The panelists also addressed which post-Katrina lessons learned are most important or most likely to be implemented. Peter Roman examined how the federal, state, and local governments responded to Hurricane Katrina. Both addressed the performance of the National Response Plan (NRP) at length in their remarks. Each described the various lessons learned that emerge from Hurricane Katrina.

General Reimer asserted that there are no new lessons to be learned from Hurricane Katrina, only lessons to be relearned. He identified communications as a problem, not because of technological constraints, but because there are valid reasons why different first responder communities have discreet communications systems. He articulated the need for a system where certain people can access information across first responder disciplines, while avoiding transmitting too much information to people on the scene of a disaster.

Reimer pointed out that compared to some disasters, “intelligence” was available on Hurricane Katrina and was accurate. The warning was there. Imagine an earthquake or a man-made disaster where no such information was available. Unlike 9-11, poor intelligence was not the explanation for the flawed government response in the Katrina case.

The National Response Plan, according to General Reimer, was adequate but should not have been expected to be more than that. As a former military officer, Reimer reminded the participants that plans rarely survive the first encounter with the enemy. Execution of a plan always requires flexibility and the ability to adapt. For Reimer, the plan is not as important as the execution.

Similarly, Reimer did not consider the creation of the Department of Homeland Security to be the principal culprit in post-Katrina responses. Rather, he identified the failure of leadership as more responsible than any organizational chart. He judged that those responsible for the Katrina response were not adequately trained and were not familiar enough with the existing plans.

The response community also has to learn to think about *national* capabilities, and get away from the formal idea of local vs. state vs. federal agencies. There has to be an integrated system, partnering the key resources from the federal government, the states, and local communities. At present, the Department of Homeland Security has developed 35 national capabilities, through planning scenarios. These scenarios help to identify the needs for emergency response in terms of quantities of personnel and equipment, allowing decision makers to put resources against the task, at higher and higher levels of risk. He also called for more risk mitigation, and setting priorities for preparedness, since not all requirements can be fully funded.

In addition to more connectivity among levels of government, we need to recognize and appreciate the vital partnership with the business community. In the United States, 85% of the critical infrastructure is in private hands. The private sector has lots of ideas and lots of assets. There are many contingencies, such as a hostile attack on a chemical plant, where the first response would come from the industry itself, not from government. Reimer believes that lives could have been saved and property damage limited if we had known how to mobilize the skills and assets of the private sector.

Dr. Peter Roman asserted that Hurricane Katrina revealed the difficulties confronting governments as they attempt to prepare for and respond to catastrophic incidents. Before Hurricane Katrina, governments and the private sector had made important progress in emergency preparedness, especially since the September 11th attacks. These efforts, however, had not been integrated into a coherent, functioning system. This proved to be one of the major recommendations in the White House report on Hurricane Katrina.⁵ Instead, the U.S. had been preparing for a “normal” disaster, but not a catastrophic incident like Hurricane Katrina.

Like General Reimer, Roman noted that the National Hurricane Center and National Weather Service accurately predicted Hurricane Katrina’s path in the two days prior to second landfall. They issued numerous warnings about the storm’s magnitude and impacts throughout the region. This was the catastrophic hurricane scenario that had been described in the National Planning Scenarios developed by the Homeland Security Council. Further, the prospect of a major levee failure in New Orleans had been the subject of countless studies and exercises, including the “Hurricane Pam” exercise.

⁵ White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned* (February 2006), pp. 66-67. 16 June 2006.
<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/>>

Roman argued that Hurricane Katrina overwhelmed the national capacity to respond in every way. The nation lacked the plans, trained emergency response personnel, communications, logistics systems, supplies, and other elements necessary for a prompt and effective response to the storm. The difficulties encountered during the response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the need for all levels of government, the private sector, and the public to expand their respective preparedness efforts. Preparedness must be seen as a “national” responsibility that spans all levels of government and non-governmental entities. It cannot be expected that a single level of government, much less a single department or agency, has the expertise or capacity needed to respond effectively to catastrophic incidents. Government and non-government entities must insure that they have the trained personnel, plans, and procedures in place so that they can fulfill their responsibilities in a catastrophic incident.

Roman stated that the National Response Plan (NRP) must continue to play a central role in a national incident response. Hurricane Katrina revealed the many ways that the NRP needs to be refined. First, when Hurricane Katrina made second landfall, many Federal departments and agencies had not developed their organization’s response plans, incident-specific concepts of operations, or standard operating procedures as required by the NRP. This contributed to the disorganized federal response to Hurricane Katrina. Second, the NRP proved less adaptable for Hurricane Katrina because it is rooted in Stafford Act procedures for providing disaster assistance to states and localities. NRP mechanisms were less useful for the delivery of immediate life-saving capabilities in the early stages of the response to Hurricane Katrina. Finally, the federal government must develop the trained human capital necessary to execute the NRP through the National Incident Management System.

ACCEPTING HELP IN THE AFTERMATH OF KATRINA

Anne Richards, in her capacity as a Fellow for the Transatlantic Relations program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, reported on her research regarding the anomalous situation of the United States as aid recipient, due to the humanitarian requirements post-Katrina. The United States government was not ready to accept offers of assistance, and even lacked a procedure to consider them. At various points, different US leaders made conflicting statements publicly: the President said we did not need any assistance, while the Secretary of State said that all offers would be accepted.

It was readily apparent that the State Department understood the offers from European allies as required a diplomatic response, whereas FEMA and other agencies of the US government worked from their own perspectives, rejecting food rations as not complying with US regulations, and judging that material and goods offered would somehow not be compatible with US needs. It was difficult under the emergency conditions post-Katrina to coordinate a clear division of labor, but after an initial ten day period of confusion, a pattern was established:

- The US Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) became the point of contact for delivery and logistics.
- The Department of Defense's base in Little Rock, Arkansas, was the depot for all aid received.
- The Department of State coordinated the list of what would be useful, but without any specific quantities.

Foreign governments had real value to add: Europeans brought in water pumps and had expertise in managing flood damage. Food and building materials were offered; not all were accepted. Some had materials pre-positioned in the Caribbean that were utilized. Countries were resourceful; the Japanese allowed the US access to their propositioned warehouse in Florida and Germany was able to use an existing relationship with Pensacola to establish a hub for material moving in and out.

Several European states had specific political and cultural ties to the areas affected: Canada and France have ties to New Orleans and Cajun culture. The largest Hungarian community in the United States is in Louisiana. Some Latin leaders with scores to settle with Washington also wanted to have a hand in post-Katrina relief, including Cuba's Castro and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez.⁶

Richards made the following recommendations:

- US government policy should recognize that US can experience catastrophic disasters during which foreign assistance may be welcomed or necessary.

⁶ Castro supposedly had assembled over 1500 doctors from Cuba and equipped them with medical supplies to assist in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina according to Zunes, Stephen. "Bush Administration Refuses Cuban Offer of Medical Assistance Following Katrina." 19 October 2005. Foreign Policy in Focus. 15 June 2006. <<http://www.fpiif.org/fpiftxt/2889>>. The US government stalled acceptance, until the State Department ultimately refused, citing that the US lacks full diplomatic relations with Cuba. For more on Cuba and Iran's offers of assistance see "Cuba Offers Help for Hurricane Victims." 4 September 2005. Aljazeera.com. 15 June 2006. <http://www.aljazeera.com/me.asp?service_ID=9680>. Venezuela pledged \$1 million in aide for Hurricane Katrina, which was delivered through the Red Cross, according to the US Mission the UN in Geneva. This is confirmed by Rodgers, Bill. "US Will Accept Venezuela's Offer of Aid for Hurricane Victims." 2 September 2005. Voice of America.com. 16 June 2006. <<http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-09/US-Will-Accept-Venezuelan-Offer-of-Aid-for-Hurricane-Victims.cfm?CFID=14547791&CFTOKEN=61305976>>.

- Mechanisms that evolved in the first few weeks after the crisis should be established now and some standards set regarding the jurisdiction of federal authorities. It would be helpful to determine which regulations such as those regarding meat inspections should be waived and which should be maintained.
- The US needs to establish a pre-approved short list of useful items to assist our allies.
- For the international community, there needs to be a place where there could be discussions about 1st world disasters. What kind of standards could be established in advance and pre-coordinated? Can we pre-position readily available supplies at key locations that already meet those standards?

TRANSATLANTIC LESSONS SHARING

Jesper Gronvall of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs framed the discussion from a European perspective. It is often the case that crisis planning and organizational design are modeled after the last crisis. The United States responded to the 9/11 attacks by creating the Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Hurricane Katrina may also lead to structural changes, but it is important that these changes focus on the future, not the past.

These issues resonate in Europe. The failure to manage the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans in the 1990s led to the creation of a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which contains both military and civilian tools for external conflict prevention and crisis management. A key question is if there should be a common internal crisis management capacity at the European Union level, which is similar in certain ways to the federal level in the United States. The EU with its common market with free flows of goods, capital, people, and services (which most certainly includes flows of organized crime, narcotics, trafficking, and terrorists), may benefit from developing more integrated crisis management functions at the European level to prevent, mitigate and manage cross-border crises.

Europe also needs an informed and proactive debate about how to deal with transatlantic crises. In the interdependent and networked society of today and the future, consequences of crises can easily affect one transatlantic partner, and then spill over to the other.

Lars Hedström, the Deputy Director of the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, expressed that SEMA is deeply interested in further collaboration with American counterparts.

Sweden is crafting a "societal security" system to defend functions in society. Today, and in the future, it is less about territory, but about resilient functions vital to society. Emergency management in Sweden requires all actors to take their share of responsibility and to cooperate with each other. On the national level, Sweden is a parliamentary democracy with a large number of authorities under the control of the government. There are 21 regional authorities and 290 independent municipalities, which have responsibilities for emergency management at their levels. We realize that the best emergency management *combines* top down and bottom up crisis response.

Threats are the same in Sweden as everywhere in the world: there is concern about protecting critical infrastructure in the event of a terrorist attack, which, while a low probability today in Sweden, could become a higher probability at any time.

Emergency management in Sweden requires cooperation among all actors. SEMA promotes public-private partnerships by for example organizing lesson-sharing activities after crises. There are also activities to involve and enhance the role of volunteers in handling crises.

Sweden must take into account the European Union in each domestic sector. Sweden is aware that the consequences of a crisis can spread rapidly between countries and even continents. Within Europe, member states do not always coordinate and cooperate with each other. Some countries that are prepared to send assistance overseas are not prepared to receive it, in the event of a crisis on their territory. The structure within the EU is complex, with the Commission, the Court of Justice and continuing authorities resting in the individual states.

The main instrument for inter-European crisis management is the Crisis Coordination Mechanism (CCM). It is not yet determined how operational this body will be. Will it be mainly a conduit for information sharing? Europe also needs to improve its capacity to coordinate with NATO.

Since 9/11, the EU has taken several initiatives in the sphere of societal security: it has created a common arrest warrant and improved monitoring of diseases for early warning of pandemics through the creation of the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, which is located in Sweden. Information sharing is another area that requires increased attention on the European level. The terrorist threat has made it imperative to sanitize, unclassify and disseminate

information to the actors that are responsible for responding to such threats. Information has to be shared across borders and across sectors.

As the structures and mechanisms for Homeland Security and Societal Security are emerging on both sides of the Atlantic, it is therefore critical to promote common thinking and “mental frames” through expert meetings and lessons learned exchanges between the academic and practitioner communities in a transatlantic setting.

SEMA is interested in promoting more information sharing through experts’ meetings and creating standards for what it calls “societal security.” It is critical to engage in bench marking by academics and practitioners, both in the United States and in Europe.

CONCLUSION

The SEMA-Stimson collaboration identified a number of issues that help explain the post-Katrina environment, and illuminate what lessons should be taken away from the Katrina experience. They are equally relevant to European crisis management.

- Bureaucratic structures do not explain sufficiently why governments respond well, or not well, to crises.
- Focusing on plans is misguided: you need to focus more on the training and resources available to implement plans.
- Katrina demonstrates the tradeoff between planning for the most likely, or the most catastrophic incident. Governments and society are responsible for choosing not to plan for the most catastrophic events.
- The role of the private sector is critical and needs to be studied more.
- The United States and Europe have a lot in common in managing all-hazards responses, and can learn from each other’s experiences.

APPENDIX A: PANELISTS

Keith Bea

*Specialist, American National Government, Government and Finance Division,
Congressional Research Service*

Keith Bea is a Specialist in American National Government in the Government and Finance Division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS). In addition to his research duties Mr. Bea coordinates the work of other CRS analysts as team leader for homeland security emergency preparedness and response policy matters. Mr. Bea received a B.A. in history from Ohio University (Athens) in 1973 and an M.P.A. from American University (Washington, D.C.) in 1978. Mr. Bea has also taught, as guest lecturer and adjunct faculty, at Washington area institutions of higher education.

Jesper Grönvall

Senior Analyst, Swedish Institute of International Affairs

Jesper Grönvall is a Senior Analyst at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. He runs a research project in Washington D.C. on Homeland Security in the US, which will provide the Swedish research community with prioritized research themes in this realm. Mr. Grönvall holds a Master's degree in Political Science, with a focus on European Politics, from the University of Stockholm. During the Swedish Presidency of the European Union in 2001, Mr. Grönvall worked as an adviser for the Swedish Ministry of Defence, specializing in the development of a civilian crisis management capacity.

Lars Hedström

Deputy Director General, Swedish Emergency Management Agency

Since July 2003, Lars Hedström has been the Deputy Director General of the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) in Stockholm. Between 2000 and 2003, he was Deputy Director General at the Swedish Rescue Services Agency. In January 2005 he was head of the Swedish rescue and support team in Thailand after the tsunami catastrophe and in October 2005 the Swedish Foreign Ministry requested his assistance in Islamabad after the earthquake in the north of Pakistan.

Ellen Laipson

President and CEO, The Henry L. Stimson Center

Ellen Laipson joined the Stimson Center in 2002 after nearly 25 years of government service. Her previous positions in various foreign policy and national security institutions include: Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (1997-02); Acting Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production (2001-02); Special Assistant to the US Permanent Representative to the UN (1995-97); National Security Council Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs (1993-95); National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia (1990-93); Specialist in Middle East Affairs, Congressional Research Service (1979-90). Laipson has written widely on the Middle East and South Asia, and she is a frequent speaker at conferences on US foreign policy, global issues, and the Middle East.

General Dennis J. Reimer, USA (Ret.)

President, DFI Government Services

General Dennis J. Reimer, USA (Ret.), assumed the position of President of DFI Government Services on September 1, 2005. From 1995 to 1999 General Reimer served as the 33rd Chief of Staff of the United States Army (CSA), capping a distinguished 37-year military career. Prior to

joining DFI, General Reimer served as the first Director of the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) in Oklahoma City. A native of Medford, Oklahoma, he graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1962. General Reimer also holds a Master of Science degree from Shippensburg State College.

Anne C. Richard

Vice President for Government Relations & Advocacy, International Rescue Committee

In 2004, was appointed Vice President for Government Relations & Advocacy for the International Rescue Committee in Washington, D.C. Ms. Richard has also been a non-resident fellow of the Center for Transatlantic Relations since 2003. From 1999-2001 she was Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's chief adviser for budget and planning. Previously, she served at the US Office of Management and Budget, Peace Corps headquarters, the US Department of State and was part of the team that created the International Crisis Group. She is a fellow of the Robert Bosch Foundation and the Council for Foreign Relations.

Peter J. Roman

Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center

Peter J. Roman is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center where he works on emergency preparedness and terrorism issues. He has published widely on homeland and national security issues. His articles have appeared in *Security Studies*, *Political Science Quarterly*, *Orbis*, and the *Journal of Strategic Studies*. Dr. Roman served as a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the National War College, Washington, DC and taught at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of Alabama, the University of Colorado-Boulder, and Duquesne University. Dr. Roman earned his MA and PhD at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

APPENDIX B: PRESENTATION BY KEITH BEA

Hurricane Katrina Consequences

Keith Bea

March 30, 2006

Health/Mortality Indicators

- Deaths — Over 1,400; 2,000 still missing
- Persons saved — Roughly 40,000 individuals rescued by Coast Guard and Search and Rescue teams
- Illness/lack of well-being — 7,500 reports of health-related illness or injuries at participating facilities
- Up to 500,000 persons may need substance abuse or mental health aid

Community Effects

- 17 hospitals evacuated or temporarily closed
- 370,000+ school elementary/secondary school children displaced, roughly 30 higher education institutions severely damaged, 100,000+ higher education students displaced
- Complete destruction of infrastructure in some communities along the Gulf Coast
- SBA approved over 70,000 loans totaling \$4.6 billion to homeowners

Economic Effects

- From August to September, three Gulf Coast states lost almost 300,000 jobs, with LA and MS losses statistically significant
- Between 300,000 and 500,000 jobs affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, many permanently
- SBA approved \$1.4 billion in loans to over 16,000 businesses
- Total estimated damages of almost \$100 billion

Scope of Impact

- Roughly 90,000 square miles, 1.5 million people affected
- More than 80 million cubic yards of debris removed
- Approximately 2 million people displaced
- 47 states declared: four major disaster (LA, MS, AL, FL), 42 emergency (evacuation), and 2 emergency (TX, AR impacts)

State and Community Consequences

- Continuity of Government — \$750 million in federal loans to replace tax and other revenue (P.L. 109-88) another \$300 million pending (H.R. 4939)
- Quality of plans and preparedness activities questioned
- Decisions/leadership of officials questioned
- Mitigation and prevention priorities reexamined

Federal Consequences

- Federal appropriations exceed \$88 billion (P.L. 109-61, 109-62, 109-148, annual appropriations) another \$20 billion pending (H.R. 4939)
- Tax relief roughly \$8 billion (P.L. 109-73, 109-148)
- Extensions of assistance — employment (P.L. 109-91), income support (P.L. 109-68), student aid (P.L. 109-66, P.L. 109-86)

- Flood insurance borrowing authority raised (P.L. 109-65)
- Future directions and lessons learned
- House Bipartisan Committee report Failure of Initiative
- White House report The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina
- Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs report forthcoming with recommendations
- [building upon 9/11 Commission report]

House Failure of Initiative

- Weather forecasts +
- Simulation quality +
- Levee capability –
- Complete evacuations –
- National Response Plan implementation –
- DHS and state preparation –
- Communications backup –
- Command and control –
- Coordination with military –
- Local public safety –
- Medical care and evacuation preparation –
- Emergency shelter and temporary housing –
- FEMA logistics/contracting –
- Capabilities of non-profits –

White House Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina

- 17 critical challenges and lessons learned, 125 recommendations
- National preparedness
- Integrated use of military capabilities
- Communications
- Logistics and evacuation
- Search and rescue
- Public safety and security
- Public health and medical support
- Human services
- Mass care and housing
- Public communications
- Critical infrastructure and impact assessment
- Environmental hazards and debris removal
- Foreign assistance
- Non-governmental aid
- Training, exercises, and lessons learned
- Homeland security professional development and education
- Citizen and community preparedness

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Report

- Forthcoming with recommendations
- Need for policy changes? Some might be:
- Stafford Act

- Homeland Security Act, Title V
- Structure of DHS
- Centralization vs. dispersal of federal authority

APPENDIX C: CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

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