CNP Department of Energy Recommendations
Recommendation
#16
Define Agency Turf and Eliminate Conflict
In order to eliminate ambiguity and promote continuity, the roles and responsibilities of each agency between the negotiation of an agreement and the program's execution must be clarified. Such clarification would flow from the ongoing interagency process outlined in Recommendation #2. With or without such a process, a vigilant and hands-on National Security Council official should be capable of playing the role of honest broker when such situations arise in order to clarify the transition of responsibilities and minimize the negative impacts on program execution.
Recommendation
#17
Promote Sustainability and Leverage Existing Programs
DoE/NNSA should broaden the scope of
sustainability efforts in order to crosslink existing programs including
MPC&A, IPP, and the Megaports Initiative. NNSA activities should
focus on the development of a robust nuclear security supply capacity to
service its own needs and the needs of the host state as DoE's programs
are sunset. This demand goes beyond spare parts and training modules to
the promotion of a security culture adequate to maintaining program
integrity once Western support is terminated. This approach requires the
creation of incentives for suppliers to enter the nuclear security
supply market and ensuring that those suppliers can meet international
standards. Existing NNSA (and other US Government) programs to redirect
scientists from weapons-related work to commercial sectors, especially
those with industry already involved, could be exploited to foster the
necessary nuclear security supply. Strategically pairing US security
equipment suppliers with appropriate Russian counterparts also has the
potential to create more competitive suppliers for the security
equipment needed. Furthermore, US companies should be incentivized to
facilitate "indigenization" of management skills and business practices
requisite to ensure the in-country capacity to supply needed products
and services. This recommendation is inextricably linked to
Recommendations #6 and #8 above as well as #18 below.
Sustainability
is not unique to DoE/NNSA efforts in Russia. Nor is it solely a concern
with respect to assistance to Russia or limited to the nuclear sector.
The recommendation above should be extended to a government-wide
approach to sustainability of all CNP efforts across the FSU. This would
require interagency consensus and ongoing collaboration (as outlined in
Recommendations #1 and #2) in order to fully explore potential
synergies and exploit existing programs to achieve US Government
nonproliferation objectives. Creating the appropriate incentive
structures to engage the US private sector as a key facilitator in
meeting US Government goals is likely to require bigger budgets or
reallocation of existing budgets in the short-term. However, increased
financial means devoted to sustainability and exploiting redirect
activities in the short-term will ensure that investments in CNP efforts
to date are not wasted and will likely prove much more cost-effective
in the long-term than alternative approaches.
Recommendation
#18
Recognize the Role of the Private Sector in Addressing the Brain Drain Threat
Immediate actions to increase the flexibility and enhance performance of the programs include:
- Congress should change the budget cap of thirty-five percent (35%) involvement of the National Laboratories in IPP due to its strain on the Labs' capacity to provide adequate technical and managerial oversight.
- Congress and the Administration should begin experimenting with new redirect models that directly involve the private sector as employers outside of the erstwhile weapons institutes.
- DoE/NNSA should examine the role of its redirect efforts in creating the capacity to produce the products and services inherent to sustainability;
- DoE/NNSA should work with Congress and potential Industry Partners to craft appropriate incentives to engage industry to contribute to redirect efforts that target the nuclear security demands;
- IPP's "technology push" model should be matched by similar efforts that exploit "market pull;" in this vein, DoE/NNSA should specifically target collaborative efforts between industry and FSU weapons experts to meet demands generated by the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, among others.
- IPP should be permitted to evolve to exploit new opportunities by making Lab participation customizable, contracting companies directly in support of US Government nonproliferation objectives, creating new mechanisms for funding start-ups or expanding existing businesses in the FSU that will hire former WMD specialists and recruiting new stakeholders such as MPC&A and SBIR.
- DoE/NNSA should commission a scoping study to determine the most expeditious path to achieving these objectives.
Recommendation
#19
Enhance Efforts to Inform Congress
NNSA's efforts would benefit from the establishment of a new bicameral congressional Task Force (see Recommendation #7). A less robust undertaking than proposed in Recommendation #7 might be led by Members responsible for NNSA authorization and/or appropriations to initiate an off-the-record briefing series for interested Members/staff with NNSA officials, National Laboratory representatives and the business actors within specific program areas. Similar to the military services' congressional liaison offices on Capitol Hill, DoE/NNSA could also spearhead its own initiative to offer routine briefings for staff.
Recommendation #20
Remedy the NNSA Contracting Bottleneck
NNSA should work with Congress to expand the capacity of the Albuquerque Service Center by increasing manpower and developing closer reporting ties between the Center and program managers within the Department of Energy.
Recommendation #21
Eliminate Unnecessary Funding Restrictions
In the mid-1990s, the Congress placed a restriction upon DoE's ability to expend funding in support of its nonproliferation agenda. Appropriations for program execution (for instance, implementation of the GIPP, HEU downblending, or MPC&A) are held separate from program direction funding (for salaries, bonuses, training, and travel). Because recent appropriations in support of program direction have been very limited, and because funds are not interchangeable between accounts, salaries are a fixed expense, and training budgets are extremely limited, when shortfalls in program direction budgets occur-as they often do-travel budgets remain the sole source to borrow against. Congress should immediately act to repeal this restriction on DoE funding.