CNP Department of Defense Recommendations

Back to WMD Reference Center

Recommendation #10

Refine the Master Plan for Cooperative Threat Reduction

Ideally the Pentagon's articulation of goals and an "exit strategy," where applicable, would be a subset of DoD coordination with the State Department regarding an overarching "Country" or "Master Plan" that would outline the US Government's foreign policy priorities (presumably also an objective of a coordinated interagency process as outlined in Recommendation #2). In the context of this interagency process, the Defense Department's own strategic plan for threat reduction efforts could remain a Pentagon-specific exercise that delineates its one to five-year goals regarding the myriad non- and counterproliferation initiatives with each host country. The Pentagon also should devise an easy method for ensuring that contractors operating in the CTR arena receive information regarding the overarching objectives as part of the contracting process.

Recommendation #11

Address Staff Shortfalls at the Department of Defense

The 2004 Department of Defense Inspector General report noted shortfalls in the CTR bureaucracy's capacity for efficient implementation and effective oversight of the programs under its purview and recommended that DoD perform an internal assessment of the numbers and qualifications of personnel needed to fill specific gaps. We recommend that DoD follow up on this recommendation from the Inspector General report.

Whereas the increase in military or civilian billets to obtain the needed scientific expertise would likely be cost prohibitive, the CTR Directorate could create a structure similar to other DoD offices to leverage seconded employees with technical specialties from other agencies (or utilize the Intergovernmental Personnel Act to employ personnel from US National Laboratories) to bolster its internal scientific capacity within the policymaking and implementation arena in order to bridge the gap and avoid unnecessary delays in project implementation in a cost-effective manner.

Recommendation #12

Adjust the Cooperative Threat Reduction Contracting Process

Such an immense amount of experience in the FSU region and CTR programs resides within the CTR Integrating Contract (CTRIC) companies and therefore, the CTRIC option should be maintained. However, we recommend that the CTR Directorate be given greater flexibility in the expansion of potential prime contractors beyond the CTRIC contracting pool. The CTR Directorate at DTRA should also be permitted to utilize the full range of contract mechanisms from direct contracts with other US Government entities or with host nation firms, to award/fee contracts, to fixed fee contracts, and incentive fees as needed to address changing requirements and opportunities on the ground.

Recommendation #13

Pair Program Budgets with Program Priorities

We recommend that the National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and other relevant agency officials achieve sufficient interagency coordination to address such informational gaps and/or oversights in the budgeting process. This should be achievable with the adoption and implementation of Recommendation #2.

Recommendation #14

Remove Restrictions on Cooperative Threat Reduction Expenditures

Congress should avoid imposition of a strict ceiling on annual maximum allowable increases in a particular CTR program budget. The CNP program has been most successful when afforded the longest leash on its activities. Oversight and control of budget growth can be maintained by conditioning increases above a particular ceiling on the satisfaction of specific criteria or notifications to, and approvals from, Congress prior to exceeding a particular percentage increase in an annual program budget.

Recommendation #15

Promote Transparency with Capitol Hill and the Media

As mentioned in Recommendation #7, a mechanism for receiving ongoing briefings from the agency personnel involved in implementation would go a long way in creating the needed knowledge base on Capitol Hill, provide an alternative to excessive reporting requirements that stretch limited personnel capacity, and help mitigate congressional actions that create unnecessary impediments to these efforts. In addition, the DTRA public affairs office should be encouraged to take a proactive stance in working media channels to underscore the value of these programs to a broader public and Hill audience.

 

Back to WMD Reference Center