CNP Crosscutting Recommendations
Recommendation #1
Prepare a Global Reassessment of Risks and Objectives
A National Security Council designee should spearhead an interagency process to reassess the global role of CNP efforts in today's context, including those that have arisen in the past few years. Such a close examination of the entire suite of programs across all relevant government agencies should strive to eliminate duplication, consolidate where necessary, prioritize activities and fill any gaps within existing efforts. Not only do the changed circumstances in Russia and the region call for a reevaluation, the role of CNP efforts beyond the FSU need scrutinizing in light of new opportunities such as the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and the recently announced Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The central objectives of this reassessment are two-fold: 1) to produce a detailed and timely analysis, including an "exit strategy" for US assistance where appropriate, and 2) to provide the foundation for an ongoing interagency process led by the NSC that involves OMB, as well as the State Department, the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration, the Defense Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and other government agencies involved in the CNP mission.
Recommendation #2
Leverage Existing Structures for Continuity and Coherence
The global reassessment of risks and objectives (see Recommendation #1) should be used to build a foundation for an ongoing process within the US Government to set priorities, ensure coherence, and streamline ongoing activities. Building this foundation and spearheading the process will require knowledgeable and active engagement by a National Security Council official. The NSC official will work hand-in-glove with the appropriate OMB, State, Energy, and Defense Department officials, and with Capitol Hill, to provide the assessment outlined in Recommendation #1 and prepare the foundation for an ongoing interagency process to implement these findings and maintain coherence and efficiency in the US Government's CNP efforts as a whole. Once the overarching strategy is determined, the NSC will serve as a "court of last resort" for disputes arising between agencies.
In addition, we recommend the creation of an office at the State Department as the US Government's "information clearinghouse" for all agencies' CNP-related activities as well as the information collection and distribution office for timely information regarding Global Partnership programs and field activities. This office will be responsible for collection and dissemination of information regarding the status, site visits and objectives of each program. The office will not have operational control over programs, but rather serve as a node for ongoing communications and information sharing.
Finally, we recommend the amalgamation of responsibility for all Cooperative Nonproliferation budget oversight within a single individual within OMB. The urgency of the threat necessitates that the sole responsibility of this office should be to ensure the systematic and deliberate prioritization of budgets based upon the security priorities as defined by the NSC coordinator in conjunction with the Departments of Energy, Defense and State as well as the intelligence community. The urgency of the proliferation threat surely justifies the creation of a special budget coordinator's office within OMB.
Recommendation #3
Leverage Synergies Across All Contributory States to the Global Partnership
The internal reassessment of US Government-wide objectives beyond the immediate nonproliferation goals of CNP (see Recommendation #1) provides a unique opportunity to highlight the synergies that states can derive in support of nonproliferation, economic development, public health, and myriad other policy objectives. The US Government should share the results of its findings and press the G8 and other contributing states parties to: (a) search for similar domestic commonalities that combine their respective Global Partnership investments with other foreign policy spending, and (b) encourage wider collaboration internationally to better leverage Global Partnership funding across national boundaries.
Recommendation #4
Promote Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540
The Cooperative Nonproliferation toolkit, made international by the Global Partnership, provides a logical platform from which to implement UNSCR 1540 and a global supply side approach to nonproliferation. In contrast to other initiatives focused on the assistance offered by CNP programming, the US Government should take the lead in coordinating a sustained program to match the expanded tools of CNP with apparent need. Coupling the Security Councilimposed mandate with a comprehensive international toolkit of resources both technical and financial would achieve an integrated framework for managing supply-side proliferation risks-including those from non-state actors.
Recommendation #5
Move from Patronage to Partnership
A reassessment of the prospects and pitfalls of US-Russian relations would presumably be a fundamental component of Recommendation #1. Not only should the radically changed economic situation provide the context for a fresh look at US Government projects with Russia, but the analysis should include concrete measures for leveraging recent US-Russian agreements and begin the transition from patronage to partnership. For example, the recent Bush-Putin announcement of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and commitments toward full implementation of UNSCR 1540 provide an opportunity to achieve a fundamental transformation in the relationship. Implementation of the Global Initiative in particular should begin with achieving consensus on the threats (internal and global), agreed upon standards for safety and security of nuclear weapons and materials, including information exchanges and reciprocal on-site visits to ensure adherence to such standards, and joint measures to assist other countries in meeting standards to combat nuclear terrorism and implement UNSCR 1540.
Recommendation #6
Manage Expectations, Buy-in, and Sustainability
At the start of any
program, the agency involved should build consensus with the respective
host country regarding the threats and ensure host country support for
the objectives and commitments to sustain the efforts after US support
ends. Ideally, the beginning of every iteration of a program would
include "training" elements for host country counterparts regarding US
processes and procedures.
Experience has shown that program
execution becomes immeasurably more fluid absent unrealistic
expectations from host country participants. The problem of unfulfilled
expectations based on a glitch between agencies and/or congressional
changes to a program's parameters or budgets can be mitigated by the
proposed interagency and congressional task force processes and
structures outlined in Recommendations #2 and #7. Also see
Recommendation #5 for Russia-specific issues and proposed solutions.
Recommendation #7
Establish a Novel Congressional Mechanism for Oversight and Support
In light of the obstacles internal to the legislative branch and the need for greater communication between agency officials and their congressional counterparts, we propose the creation of a bicameral congressional task force whose objective is to regularly provide briefings from a broad array of the actors involved in actual implementation of CNP initiatives. This internal congressional mechanism would provide the necessary institutional counterpart to more coordinated interagency efforts outlined in Recommendation #2. The sponsorship of Members of Congress and a minimum of internal support could be bolstered by collaborating with a non-partisan policy institute willing to facilitate the organization of the briefings, provide synopses of each briefing and facilitate outreach beyond those in actual attendance, when necessary. Although a Nonproliferation Task Force, currently chaired by Representatives Edward Markey (D-MA) and Chris Shays (R-CT), already exists in the House, its wherewithal is limited to one full-time fellow from the American Association for the Advancement of Science who rotates annually. Also, the Russian American Nuclear Advisory Council (RANSAC) runs a very successful annual briefing series with numerous sponsors from both chambers. Similarly, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) runs an ongoing educational series on proliferation issues, and the Stimson Center's Security for a New Century program offers ongoing briefings for all interested staff on a broad array of current security challenges. The key differences between these activities and this proposed series would be its structure, the continuity provided in terms of key staffer and agency official participation, and a more narrow focus on the operational elements of CNP efforts.
Recommendation #8
Sustain Redirected Scientific Talent of Proliferation Concern
There are two obvious avenues for effectively engaging and leveraging the scientific and technical talent resident in the WMD complexes in the region. One is coordinating and leveraging government programs to meet mutually identified needs; the other is creating an appropriate incentive structure to engage potential employers (i.e. private industry actors) whenever possible. These two possibilities are not mutually exclusive, and when combined are an effective means to meet ongoing nonproliferation and threat reduction objectives as well as build the necessary political support the programs need to succeed. In order to more closely align nonproliferation objectives with the interests of industry, thereby creating employment opportunities for top-tier scientists, technicians and engineers, the US Government should:
- Engage the G8 business communities and the FSU target communities in a rigorous informational exchange regarding the types of expertise available and potential advantages of employing former weapons specialists;
- Establish an international version of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program that targets the talents of former Soviet WMD specialists in particular to service US Government needs-or alternatively, recruit SBIR grant recipients to enhance their R&D capacity by utilizing/engaging FSU scientists through existing programs;
- Create an incentive structure that engages the private sector as employers of FSU talent rather than as customers through shortterm salary and other subsidies in order to promote sustainable commercial employment over the long-term;
- Integrate the needs of government for ongoing CNP programs into an effort to create "sustainable" employment opportunities for former weapons personnel through the provision of products and services requisite to maintain other DoE and DoD funded projects in the region or promoting "security culture" efforts. Use tax incentives and other inducements to engage private industry in these efforts (see also Recommendation #18 for DoE/NNSA specific recommendations);
- Incentivize collaborative efforts between businesses and FSU weapons expertise to meet the technological demands of US Government efforts such as the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Joint Improvised Exploding Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (see Recommendation #17 for DoE/NNSA specific recommendation).
The latter two bullets parallel conceptually the Law Enforcement Targeted Initiative, the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), and the Biotechnology Engagement Program (BTEP), but numerous other new opportunities exist to go beyond these current efforts to leverage the vast scientific expertise resident in the FSU. By coordinating international nonproliferation programs that redirect scientists with domestic US Government technology/development programs that meet energy, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, intelligence and other needs, the US could more sustainably achieve its nonproliferation goals with respect to brain drain while developing technological solutions to broader security concerns at lower cost.
Recommendation #9
Establish a Business Roundtable to Identify Synergies with US Government Programming
The United States government should act to appoint an independent broker to help generate a dialogue between overworked agency implementers and currently disinterested private sector players. Through the establishment of a "business roundtable" dedicated to more effective implementation of the broad panoply of CNP programs, this disinterested third party broker would: (a) survey the landscape to define novel areas of collaboration; (b) identify the relevant players from both government and the private sector; (c) build a network to foster productive relationships; (d) act as host and moderator of a regular series of roundtable discussions; (e) provide a critically absent feedback loop between government and private industry, (f) facilitate a process of consensus building among all pertinent players in the CNP arena designed to promote the US government's broad foreign policy objectives and promote sustainability of the CNP agenda.