Chemical Weapons

 

The Issue | Obstacles | Q & A | Quick Facts |Legislation | Agreements | Talking Points | Recommendations

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The Issue

Chemical weapons (CW) were recognized as uniquely cruel and indiscriminate following their widespread use in World War I. In 1925, the international community condemned the use in war of poisonous gases and certain other chemical weapons, including biological weapons, through the Geneva Protocol. (The United States did not ratify the protocol until 1975.) While the Protocol established an international norm against the use of chemical and biological weapons, it did not have provisions for monitoring or verifying compliance. Moreover, major power nations such as the US retained the right to retaliate with chemical weapons if those weapons were used offensively against them. Thus, despite the Protocol, many countries continued to develop an offensive chemical weapons capability. According to the US government, at least twenty-one nations currently have or are seeking active chemical weapons programs-some in violation of their obligations to international agreements.[1] [See table below]

To address the shortcomings of the Geneva Protocol, the international community negotiated the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It has been signed by 178 countries and ratified by 170. It is perhaps the most complicated arms control agreement ever negotiated, due in part to the "dual-use" nature of chemicals and their precursors which can have both peaceful and non-peaceful applications.[2]

The treaty prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It also requires states parties to destroy all their CW and CW production facilities, as well as any chemical weapons abandoned on another party's territory, within ten to fifteen years of the treaty's entry into force in 1997.[3] Both the US and Russia are unlikely to meet the 2012 extended deadline.[4] The US accumulated a CW stockpile of 27,768 metric tons and as of March 31, 2006, it has destroyed 10,103 metric tons of chemical agents, or 36.4% of its stockpile, at nine destruction facilities.[5]

 

 

Chemical Weapons Programs [6]

Country

Status

CWC State Party [7]

Algeria

Suspected

Yes

China

Has had

Yes

Egypt

Likely

No

France

Ended

Yes

India

Has had

Yes

Indonesia

Sought

Yes

Iran

Has had

Yes

Iraq

Ended

No

Israel

Likely

Signatory

Kazakhstan

Suspected

Yes

Libya

Ended

Yes

Myanmar

Suspected

Signatory

North Korea

Known

No

Pakistan

Likely

Yes

Russia

Known

Yes

Saudi Arabia

Suspected

Yes

Serbia

Known

Yes

Syria

Known

No

Taiwan

Likely

Not recognized

United Kingdom

Ended

Yes

United States

Known

Yes

Vietnam

Likely

Yes

 

Two additional destruction facilities are currently under construction. The US expects to spend approximately $35 billion in total for the destruction of its stockpile.[8] The State Department recently asked the CWC's governing body to grant the US an extension beyond 2012.[9]

The Soviet Union had the world's largest CW program, consisting of over 60 institutions spread across the USSR. According to a veteran of the Soviet chemical weapons program, the USSR also developed and produced "tens of tons of a few novel chemical nerve agents that are five to ten times more lethal than any other known chemicals."[10] Russia still possesses the largest declared CW stockpile with approximately 40,000 tons of agent stored at seven sites. As of March 2006, it had destroyed about 3% of its stockpile.

Beyond the legacy of the enormous physical CW stockpile, the break up of the Soviet Union left thousands of chemical weapons scientists without jobs, contributing to the larger "brain drain" challenge posed by the under-employment, poor working conditions and lack of peaceful, commercial opportunities for former WMD scientists in the region. The diversion of weapons, materials and the know-how to build them by a terrorist group could have serious security implications. For instance, in 1995, a previously obscure group, Aum Shinrikyo, achieved infamy when some of its members released sarin nerve gas into the Tokyo subway system. The attack killed 12 people and sent more than 5,000 others to hospitals.

To assist Russia with the destruction of its CW stockpile in compliance with its CWC obligations, the United States began a program in 1992 to fund the construction of a CW destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, where nearly 2 million artillery shells and missile warheads are stored. These artillery shells are portable, easy to hide and, due to weak security at the facility, vulnerable to theft. The design, site preparation, and some construction for the destruction facility have been completed, but spending for construction was delayed for three years and continues to be an issue with Congress.


In Section 1305 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-301), Congress prohibited the use of fiscal year 2000 or subsequent year Cooperative Threat Reduction funds for the Shchuch'ye facility, with the conferees stating concerns regarding the total costs involved and Russia's inability to fund corresponding infrastructure costs.[11]). Congress approved $50 million for Shchuch'ye in FY 2002 and revised that prohibition so as to allow funds to be used for it if the Secretary of Defense certified that six conditions were met, including certification that Russia had provided complete information regarding the size of its chemical weapons stockpile and had made a commitment to spend at least $25 million a year on the project (the full list of conditions can be found under Recent Legislation). The Secretary was unable to make those certifications, and the freeze on spending for Shchuch'ye continued. At the request of the Administration, in section 8144 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 107-248), Congress authorized a presidential waiver of the six conditions.[12] President Bush exercised this authority on January 10, 2003, thus freeing up more than $150 million that had previously been appropriated for the chemical weapons destruction facility.[13] For FY 2006, Congress authorized $108.5 million for chemical weapons destruction in Russia.[14] The Department of Defense has requested $42.7 million in FY 2007 for the Shchuch'ye facility.[15]

The United States must continue to work with states parties to the CWC, particularly Russia, to fully implement the CWC, to ensure stockpiles of chemical weapons are destroyed as quickly as possible and to support and expand programs providing peaceful employment for former chemical weapons scientists.

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Obstacles

  • The continued controversy over the funding for the Shchuch'ye plant has left the project greatly delayed. Construction on the facility is not expected to be completed until 2008.[16]
  • The sheer volume of materials that need to be destroyed makes it highly unlikely that the target deadline of 2012 will be met.

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Q & A

Q: What are chemical weapons?
A: Chemical weapons are highly toxic liquid and gaseous substances that can be dispersed in bombs, rockets, missiles, artillery, mines, grenades, or spray tanks. The four basic types of chemical agents are: blister agents that destroy exposed skin tissue (e.g., mustard gas and lewisite); blood agents that, when inhaled, block oxygen circulation within the body (e.g., hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride); choking agents that inflame the bronchial tubes and lungs, possibly causing asphyxiation (e.g., phosgene and chlorine); and nerve agents that cause the nervous system to overload, resulting in respiratory failure and death (e.g., tabun, sarin, soman, and VX).[17]

Q: What states have chemical weapons and have they signed the CWC? And which states are suspected of possessing chemical weapons but have not signed the CWC?
A: The CWC requires that all states joining the treaty declare their CW stockpiles.[18] A January 2005 report by the Congressional Research Service identified five states with known programs-the United States, Russia, Syria, Serbia, and North Korea.[19] China, India, and Iran are listed as having had a chemical weapons program in the past, leaving open the possibility that those countries are still producing offensive chemical agents.[20] Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Kazakhstan, Burma, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Sudan, Taiwan, and Vietnam all have suspected programs. Libya is thought to have produced and stockpiled chemical weapons, and Syria, Israel, and Egypt "probably possess chemical weapons capabilities."[21] France, Iraq, Libya, and the United Kingdom have ended their chemical weapons programs, while Indonesia is seeking to build a program, according to the CRS report.[22]

Q: How is the CWC monitored and enforced?
A: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established to oversee the implementation of the CWC upon its entry into force. The OPCW receives states-parties' declarations, which detail chemical weapons-related activities or materials and relevant industrial activities. After receiving declarations, the OPCW inspects and monitors states-parties' declared facilities and activities that are relevant to the convention, aiming to ensure compliance. The OPCW verifies that its member countries are fulfilling their obligations under the CWC through an intrusive, multilateral verification system including:

  • assessing declarations made by its member countries on a regular basis-this amounts to thousands of pages of documents in six languages;
  • conducting routine on-site inspections of declared military or industrial sites and/or facilities to verify the accuracy of declarations made;
  • conducting challenge inspections requested by a state party (there have been no challenge inspections to date); and
  • investigating reports of alleged CW use.[23]

The OPCW is funded by contributions from member states generally based on the UN scale of assessments, which requires financial contributions according to the relative wealth of member states. The overall budget for the OPCW in 2006 is roughly $91.6 million.[24] The OPCW has had some success-161 member states have fulfilled their treaty obligation to declare any chemical weapons and related facilities, states-parties have destroyed 13,048 metric tons of chemical weapons agents, and nearly 2.5 million chemical weapons munitions and 38 former chemical weapons production facilities have been destroyed and 15 converted for nonmilitary uses.[25] However funding difficulties have hindered the OPCW's ability to fully carry out its mandate. In 2004, "Low income-collection rates had an impact on the full implementation of activities within the Secretariat," and 20 percent of those contributions came in the final months of the year.[26]

Q: Why should we be concerned about Russia's CW stockpile?
A: The Soviet Union had the world's largest chemical weapons program, consisting of over 60 institutions spread across the USSR. That program continues to present special international security problems today. Russia still possesses the world's largest chemical weapons arsenal, with approximately 40,000 metric tons stored at seven sites.[27] These sites are poorly secured, making the stockpile particularly vulnerable to theft, and there is not an accurate accounting of what many of the sites contain. The Russian CW stockpile must be secured to ensure that these weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorist groups or states that wish to cause harm.

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Quick Facts

  • Russia continues to possess the world's largest chemical weapons arsenal, with 40,000 metric tons stored at seven sites.[28]
  • In the spring of 1995, a doomsday cult known as Aum Shinrikyo unleashed the nerve agent sarin in the Tokyo subway, killing 12 commuters and hospitalizing over 5,000 others.
  • There are nearly 2 million artillery shells filled with nerve gas that are vulnerable to terrorist seizure in Shchuch'ye, Russia.[29]
  • At least 15 nations currently have active CW programs-some in violation of international agreements.[30]
  • The Russian Federation missed the original CWC deadline for destroying one percent of its Category One chemical weapons by almost three years.[31]

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Recent Legislation

  • The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (H.R. 1), would repeal the restrictions of section 1305 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, described below.
  • Section 1303 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163) gives the President permanent waiver authority on restrictions on uses of threat reduction funds.
  • Section 1305 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136) provided the President with waiver authority similar to that in section 8144 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, described below, for fiscal year 2004.
  • Section 3623 of the defense authorization bill for fiscal year 2004 (H.R. 1588), as passed by the House on May 21, 2003, would have required the development of a comprehensive, detailed plan for chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union and the appointment of a senior official with sufficient staff and resources to coordinate those programs.
  • Section 8144 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 107-248) authorized the President to waive section 1305 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 with respect to fiscal year 2000-03 funds when it is "important to the national security interests." (On January 14, 2003, the President executed waivers that freed up FY 2002 and 2003 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds totaling $470 million, including more than $150 million for the chemical weapons destruction facility in Shchuch'ye.)
  • Section 1308 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-107) amended the above prohibition so as to permit the use of Cooperative Threat Reduction funds for a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia if the Secretary of Defense certifies that:
    • Russia has provided full and accurate information regarding the size of its chemical weapons stockpile;
    • Russia has made a demonstrated annual commitment to allocate at least $25,000,000 to chemical weapons elimination;
    • Russia has developed a practical plan for destroying its stockpile of nerve agents;
    • Russia has enacted a law providing for the elimination of all nerve agents at a single site;
    • Russia has agreed to destroy or convert its chemical weapons production facilities at Volgograd and Novocheboksark; and
    • the international community has made a commitment to fund and build infrastructure needed to support and operate the facility.Section 1305 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) prohibits the use of Cooperative Threat Reduction funds appropriated for fiscal year 2000 or a later fiscal year from being used "for the planning, design, or construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia" (i.e., Shchuch'ye).
  • The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (Division I of Public Law 105-277, the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999; 22 USC 6701 note):
    • Makes the development, production, transfer, acquisition, or use of chemical weapons a federal crime;
    • Places controls on the import and export of chemicals considered to pose the greatest risk;
    • Regulates the domestic possession, transfer, and use of such chemicals;
    • Requires US companies to report on their production and use of potentially dangerous chemicals; and
    • Provides for certain inspections under the CWC of chemical plants and other facilities.
    It should be noted that the legislation also allows the President, on national security grounds, to deny a duly authorized inspection under the CWC.[32] This has raised concerns that this provision may create a precedent for other countries to deny such inspections.[33]

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Applicable Treaties, Legislation, and Other International Agreements

  • UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was unanimously adopted in April 2004. It is unprecedented in mandating that all UN member states enact measures to criminalize non-state actor development, acquisition, manufacture, transport or transfer of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, and "to maintain appropriate physical protection measures" for these items.[34]
  • The India-Pakistan Agreement on chemical weapons signed on August 19, 1992: both countries agree to "never under any circumstances... develop, produce or otherwise acquire chemical weapons; to use chemical weapons; to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons." Both India and Pakistan are CWC states parties.[36]
  • The Mendoza Accord signed on September 5, 1991 by Argentina, Brazil and Chile and subsequently signed by Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay (all CWC states parties); the signatories agree "not to develop, produce, acquire in any way, stockpile or retain, transfer directly or indirectly, or use chemical or biological weapons."[37]
  • The US-USSR "Bilateral Destruction Agreement" signed in June 1990 requires both countries to stop producing CW and to reduce their respective chemical weapons stockpiles to no more than 5,000 agent tons by the end of 2002. Lack of funding for the destruction program in Russia was one of several obstacles delaying this agreement's entry into force. Russia officially backed away from the Bilateral Destruction Agreement in mid-1996. The agreement is therefore dormant, and inspections of US and Russian chemical weapons storage and destruction facilities are being conducted instead under the Chemical Weapons Convention.[38]
  • The US-USSR "Bilateral Memorandum of Understanding" was signed on September 23, 1989 and provided for a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange between the two countries to be carried out in two phases. In the first phase, the US and USSR exchanged information on their respective chemical weapons stockpiles and a series of visits to production facilities, storage facilities, and industrial chemical production facilities in each country. The second phase was stalled by the collapse of the Soviet Union but the two countries exchanged data in 1994. Unfortunately, the completeness of that data was questioned. Also in 1994 both sides conducted five practice challenge inspections at declared government CW facilities for the purpose of acquainting US and Russian officials with challenge inspection procedures.[39]
  • The Australia Group, which is an informal forum of states whose goal is to discourage and impede chemical weapons proliferation by harmonizing national export controls on CW precursor chemicals, sharing information on proliferation programs, and seeking other ways to curb the use of CW. The Group was formed in 1984 and has 40 members.[40]
  • 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, commonly known as the Geneva Protocol.[41]

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Talking Points

  • While a CW attack would not be as deadly as a nuclear or large-scale biological weapons attack, the probability of a CW attack is thought to be greater than most other threat scenarios, based on the relatively low barriers to their development and dissemination. Additionally, attacks of this nature have occurred, as in the well-documented case of Aum Shinrikyo releasing sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway system.
  • While more than a handful of countries have chemical weapons to be destroyed, including the United States, the US government should concentrate the bulk of its energies on the largest part of the problem: helping Russia secure and dispose of its bloated chemical weapons stockpile, while also working to ensure that additional states do not acquire or develop chemical weapons.
  • According to the US government, at least twenty-one nations currently have or are seeking active chemical weapons programs-some in violation of their obligations to international agreements.[42]
  • The United States should work diligently to encourage the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in implementing the CWC.

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Recommendations

  • Since the introduction of the Cooperative Nonproliferation programs (CNP) in the early 1990s, there has not been a global reassessment of these programs' roles and objectives to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in the current strategic environment. A National Security Council designee should spearhead an interagency process to reassess the global role of CNP efforts in today's context, including those that have arisen in the past few years. Such a close examination of the entire suite of programs, including those that deal with chemical weapons, across all relevant government agencies should strive to eliminate duplication, consolidate where necessary, and fill any gaps within the existing efforts. [See Book Recommendation #1]
  • Define goals for chemical weapons threat reduction in the context of each participating agency's objectives as well as within the long-term strategic objectives of the US Government's foreign policy. In addition, each agency's role and relationships must be clarified. [See Book Recommendations #2, #10, and #16]
  • The US Government should press the G8 and other contributing states parties to the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to: (a) search for domestic commonalities that combine their respective Global Partnership investments with other foreign policy spending, and (b) encourage wider collaboration internationally to better leverage Global Partnership funding (such as chemical weapons destruction funding) across national boundaries. [See Book Recommendation #3]
  • United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 obligates all states to build the capacity to prevent the development, possession, use, or transfer of any weapon of mass destruction or related materials. A vital part of the resolution is its mandate to enhance export controls for dual-use equipment, which is especially relevant for chemical weapons. The US should take the lead in 1540 implementation and use the Resolution as a means to accomplish its cooperative nonproliferation objectives. [See Book Recommendation #4]
  • A reassessment of the prospects and pitfalls of US-Russian relations should also be a fundamental component to a reevaluation of the suite of cooperative threat reduction programs, included those related to CW. Not only should the radically changed economic situation provide the context for a fresh look at US Government programs with Russia, but the analysis should include concrete measures for leveraging recent US-Russian agreements to begin the transition from "patronage to partnership." The imbalanced nature of the relationship has been a systematic impediment to achieving faster progress from the very beginning of CNP efforts. [See Book Recommendation #5]
  • To ensure host country buy-in and comprehensive US understanding of host country concerns, US agencies involved in CW threat reduction programs should build consensus with the respective host country regarding existing threats and ensure support for program objectives and commitments to sustain the efforts after US support ends. [See Book Recommendation #6]
  • A bicameral congressional task force should be created to regularly provide briefings from a broad array of the programs and actors involved in the actual implementation of chemical weapons-related CNP activities. Such briefings would go a long way in creating the needed knowledge base on Capitol Hill. [See Book Recommendation #7]
  • Create an incentive structure that engages the private sector as employers of former Soviet weapons scientists, technicians, and engineers rather than as customers through short-term salary and other subsidies in order to promote sustainable commercial employment over the long-term. Integrate the needs of government for ongoing CNP programs into an effort to create "sustainable" employment opportunities for former weapons personnel through the provision of products and services requisite to maintain other Energy, State, and Defense funded projects in the region or promoting "security culture" efforts. [See Book Recommendations #8, #17, and #18]

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Endnotes

[1] Sharon A. Squassoni, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends," January 14, 2005, accessed at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL30699.pdf.

[2] Amy Smithson, ed., "The Chemical Weapons Convention Handbook," Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993, updated June 2001, accessed at: http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/the-chemical-weapons-convention-handbook/.

[3] "WMD verification and compliance: The state of play," submitted by Foreign Affairs Canada to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, prepared by the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), October 2004, accessed at: http://www.vertic.org/assets/No19.pdf.

[4] Report to the US Senate, "Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD needs more reliable data to better estimate the cost and schedule of the Shchuch'ye facility," Government Accountability Office (GA)-06-692), May 2006, p 3.

[5] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Request to Extend Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Deadline for Complete Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks," US State Department, April 20, 2006, accessed at: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/64874.htm.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Membership of the OPCW: Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention," accessed at: http://www.opcw.org/html/db/members_ratifyer.html.

[8] US State Department, "U.S. Requests Chemical Weapons Destruction Deadline Extension," USINFO, July 7, 2006, accessed at: http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=
July&x=20060707151007adynned0.418194
.

[9]Ibid.

[10] Amy Smithson, "Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes," The Stimson Center Report No. 32, December 1999, p. 9.

[11] Conference Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (H. Rept. No. 106-301), accessed at: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_reports&docid=f:hr301.106.pdf.

[12] US Congress, "Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003," (H.R.4546, P.L. 107-314).

[13] Peter Eisler, "Bush Frees Cash to Secure Soviet Arms," USA Today, January 14, 2003.

[14] US Congress, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Section 1302," (H.R. 1815, P.L. 109-163).

[15] Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Volume I, Justification for FY 2007: Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide," February 2006, accessed at: http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/budget_%20justification/
pdfs/operation/O_and_M(co)_Volume_I_PB_2007.pdf
.

[16] Nuclear Threat Initiative. "Russia Blames CW Disposal Delay on the West," Global Security Newswire, January 17, 2006, accessed at: http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2006_1_17.html.

[17] Amy Smithson, ed., "The Chemical Weapons Convention Handbook...," op. cit., note 2.

[18] Arms Control Association, "Fact Sheet: The Chemical Weapons Convention at a Glance," accessed at:

http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcunderstanding.asp.

[19] Sharon Squassoni, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons...," op. cit., note 1.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "The Organization at a Glance: Verification," accessed at: http://www.opcw.org/profiles/html/prof_en_5.html.

[24] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Instant Briefing: The Basics," March 25, 2006, accessed at: http://www.opcw.org/ib/html/ib_main_frame.html.

[25] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Instant Briefing: Results," March 25, 2006, accessed at: http://www.opcw.org/ib/html/results.html.

[26] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2004," November 2005, accessed at: http://www.opcw.org/docs/csp/csp10/en/c1004.pdf.

[27] Amy Smithson, "Toxic Archipelago...," op. cit., note 10, p. 11.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Foreign Affairs Canada, "Global Partnership Program: Chemical Weapons Destruction,", accessed at: http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/globalpartnership-en.asp.

[30] Sharon Squassoni, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons...," op. cit., note 1.

[31] General Accounting Office, "Nonproliferation," March 2004, accessed at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04361.pdf.

[32] Section 307 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998.

[33] Senator Joseph Biden, "Statement," 105 Congressional Record 5078 (May 23, 1997), accessed at: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/index.html.

[34] Scott Jones, "Resolution 1540: Universalizing export control standards?" Arms Control Today, May 2006.

[35] "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC)," accessed at: http://www.opcw.org/docs/cwc_eng.pdf .

[36] India and Pakistan "Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons," August 19, 1992, accessed at: http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?sn=CB20011221163.

[37] Declaration One of "Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons (The Mendoza Accord)," September 5, 1991, accessed at: http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?sn=CB20011221165.

[38] The Stimson Center, "Overview of CWC and Related US Agreements," accessed at: http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?sn=CB2001121896#bimou.

[39] Ibid.

[40] The Australia Group, "Origins of the Australia Group," accessed at: http://www.australiagroup.net/en/origins.htm.

[41] "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological ethods of Warfare," accessed at: http://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/more/geneva_protocol.html.

[42] Squassoni, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends," op. cit. note 1.

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Last Updated on May 30, 2007