Biological and Chemical Weapons
Editor’s Note
CBW Chronicle, Volume II, Issue 3 (October 1997)
As the Cold War began to wane, the two superpowers stepped forward to lead the international movement toward chemical weapons disarmament, but then failed to follow through on their intentions. In June 1990, Presidents Michael Gorbachev and George Bush signed a bilateral agreement to initiate destruction of the Soviet and American chemical arsenals---the world’s two largest stockpiles of poison gas---but for a variety of reasons this bilateral accord was never activated. Now that the Chemical Weapons Convention has superseded the bilateral disarmament process, the onus is again upon Washington and Moscow to reassert leadership in chemical weapons nonproliferation and disarmament.
Just five days before the CWC entered into force on April 29th, the US Senate finally ratified the CWC by a vote of 74 to 26. Congress and the Clinton Administration have since dropped the ball on passing the CWC’s implementing legislation, which is required to promulgate the guidelines for US chemical industry to comply with the treaty’s data declarations and inspections. As a result, America is in violation of the CWC. The United States has provided the new international inspectorate the data about its chemical weapons facilities, but has been unable to compile a declaration on US chemical plants that produce, consume, import, or export chemicals that the CWC controls. This dereliction in implementing the CWC fully provides an easy excuse for other countries that may seek ways to skirt the CWC’s obligations: If the United States doesn’t comply, why should they?
For its part, Russia has set a time frame to debate and vote on the CWC this fall. Russian legislators are reluctant to ratify the CWC without funds on hand to meet the treaty’s requirements to destroy Russia’s huge chemical weapons stockpile. Moscow is fiscally strapped and would like guarantees of outside financial assistance before taking the final step of ratification. Possible donor governments counter that the horse must come before the cart, that Russian ratification of the CWC must precede further aid. Russians are worried about possible penalties down the road if Russia is unable to meet the CWC’s destruction deadline. More severe penalties will come much sooner, however, if Russia does not ratify the CWC. Absent ratification, Russia’s chemical industry will suffer under the treaty’s automatic economic sanctions, and Moscow will be politically isolated, aligned with a small group of pariah nations that remain outside the treaty. Given these circumstances, Russia’s interests are clearly better served by joining the CWC.
The CWC’s debut has been an impressive one, with the majority of the world’s nations entering the treaty and half a dozen countries quickly relinquishing their chemical weapons programs to international control. However, if the CWC is to reach its full potential as an instrument to restrain and reverse chemical weapons proliferation, it must have the full participation of the world’s two largest chemical weapons possessors. To that end, Congress must swiftly pass the CWC’s implementing legislation, and Russia must ratify the CWC. The stakes are too high for Washington and Moscow to fall short again on their responsibilities to lead the global efforts to abolish this category of weapons of mass destruction.