Biological and Chemical Weapons
Frequently Asked Questions about the CWC (continued)
Routine Inspections
What sites are subject to routine inspection under the CWC? Sites that are declared because of their activities with Schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals as well as other chemical production facilities are subject to routine inspection. In general, these inspections are conducted in a manner that causes the least possible inconvenience to the inspected state and disturbance to the host facility. Unless otherwise agreed, the Technical Secretariat negotiates a facility agreement for Schedule 1 and 2 sites with the treaty party to delineate the specific areas within these sites where the inspection team has access. Model facility agreements were approved by the Conference of States Parties in November 1998. The inspection team focuses on verifying the accuracy of data declarations. The host state receives advance notice of a pending inspection, the site to be inspected, the names of inspectors and their assistants, and the place and approximate time of arrival of the inspection team. At the beginning of all inspections, the inspection team receives a briefing about the facility and its activities and the safety measures to be followed while on the premises. (See table 4 for guidelines on routine inspections.)
Table 4: Guidelines for Routine Inspections
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| Chemical Weapons Production | Mandatory | 48 Hours | According to facility agreement | Mandatory |
| Chemical Weapons Storage | Mandatory | 48 Hours | According to facility agreement | Mandatory |
| Chemical Weapons Destruction | Mandatory | 36 Hours | According to facility agreement | Mandatory |
| Permitted Schedule 1 Activities | Mandatory | 36 Hours | According to facility agreement | Mandatory |
| Schedule 2 | Mandatory | 48 Hours | 96 Hours | Mandatory, unless otherwise agreed |
| Schedule 3 and other chemical production facilities | Optional | 120 Hours | 24 Hours | Optional |
What rights do inspectors and hosts have during a routine inspection?
The purpose of inspections is to establish relevant facts concerning activities pertinent to the CWC. In accompanying the inspection team throughout its activities, the host state has the right to object to requests from the inspection team if it feels that a request goes beyond that purpose. The inspection team has the right of "unimpeded access" and can select items for inspection. The inspectors are allowed to bring equipment, such as a mass spectrometer or other devices, to assist them with their tasks. The Preparatory Commission and the Technical Secretariat worked to develop a comprehensive list of approved equipment to be used by inspectors. The equipment carried by the inspectors is specifically designed for the particular type of inspection being conducted. For example, a team going to a weapons storage site carries some different equipment from one going to a commercial facility.
Inspectors can interview personnel at the facility, inspect documentation and records, have photographs taken at their request, and request clarification of ambiguities that arise during the inspection. The inspectors can request that samples be taken, for example, from a reactor vessel, an effluent stream, or a bulk storage tank. The analysis of such samples is done at the site, if possible, but samples can be transferred to approved OPCW laboratories off-site for additional analysis, if needed. Should inspectors deem off-site analysis necessary, the samples are required to follow a strict chain of custody. (See Figure 1.) Before leaving, the inspection team meets with host officials to tell them the preliminary findings of the inspection and to clarify any remaining ambiguities. Final reports on inspection activities, due ten days after the inspection is completed, contain only facts pertinent to the CWC and are treated confidentially.
What are the general guidelines for routine inspections of permitted activities at Schedule 1 sites?
Schedule 1 sites include the single small-scale production facility and other medical, pharmaceutical, and protective research activities allowed under Article VI. Routine inspections at these sites are aimed at ensuring that the aggregate amount of production does not exceed one metric ton. (See the question "What activities are permitted with Schedule 1 chemicals?" in the Central Provisions of the CWC section.) The inspectors also verify that production, processing, and consumption were correctly declared and that the Schedule 1 chemicals are not being diverted for activities other than the permitted research, medical, pharmaceutical, and protective purposes. In addition to routine inspections, the Technical Secretariat may place on-site instruments at these sites to monitor events. Inspections of Schedule 1 activities began promptly after initial data declarations were submitted. Initial Schedule 1 inspections are conducted with 72 hours advance notice, while the host state receives 36 hours notice for subsequent inspections.
More specifically, how will routine inspections at chemical weapons production and storage facilities be conducted?
Inspectors ensured that all declared weapons production facilities were closed during initial inspections that took place between 90 and 120 days after 29 April 1997. The Technical Secretariat negotiated a facility agreement with state and host site officials to govern inspection activities at chemical weapons production facilities. This agreement specifies the boundaries within the overall declared site where the inspectors go about their tasks and the time limits they have to accomplish them. Weapons production and storage sites are inspected with 48 hours advance notice. The inspectors are allowed to install on-site monitoring instruments and seals to assist with continuous monitoring of weapons production and storage sites. For example, inspectors are allowed to enter all storage buildings, bunkers, and other locations and to identify weapons with seals or markers to get an accurate count of the original inventory and to maintain that count as munitions are removed for destruction. They may also install tamper-proof video cameras to monitor the facility in their absence. The same is true at production facilities, where inspectors verify that the facility has been rendered inoperable at key junctures in the production process.
Inspectors will monitor the destruction of all chemical weapon production facilities. All standard and specialized equipment for the production of chemical weapons, as well as specialized and standard buildings constructed for the production of chemical weapons, are to be physically destroyed. Plants that exclusively produce items related to chemical weapons, such as unfilled munitions and equipment specifically designed for direct use with chemical weapons, are also to be destroyed. The host state can also request that chemical weapons production facilities be converted for purposes not prohibited under the CWC. For example, one US site was converted to a recording studio, while a former production facility in the United Kingdom was converted to a gymnasium. If the plan for such conversion is approved by the Conference of States Parties, the site will be subject to very strict provisions and subsequent inspections.
More specifically, how are routine inspections at chemical weapons destruction facilities be conducted?
Inspectors monitor the destruction of the chemical weapons as states complete destruction of their stockpile over the ten-year timeline after entry into force. A chemical weapons production facility can be converted to a chemical weapons destruction facility. Whether the destruction facility is converted or built specifically for the purpose, inspectors visit each facility before it begins operations to assess the adequacy of the stockpile destruction plan. At that time, the inspectors also arrange for subsequent verification of the destruction process through continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and inspections. Once stockpile destruction has been completed at a site, inspectors will monitor the destruction of the facilities themselves. A destruction facility receives 36 hours notice of a pending routine inspection. The duration of destruction inspections is not specified in the treaty, but at some facilities, inspectors may be present virtually around the clock until both the stockpile and the facility are destroyed.
What are the general guidelines for routine inspections of commercial Schedule 2 facilities?
Commercial facilities that produce, process, or consume Schedule 2 chemicals in quantities in excess of the following thresholds are subject to inspection at any time: 10 kilograms of a chemical that has been weaponized, such as benzilate; 1 metric ton of highly-toxic chemicals, such Amiton or PFIB, that could be used as chemical weapons; and 10 metric tons of other Schedule 2 chemicals that have been or could be used as precursors. (See tables 2 and 3.) These facilities receive an initial inspection during which a facility agreement is to be prepared, unless otherwise agreed. The need for and frequency of subsequent inspections at each Schedule 2 site is based upon evaluations of the nature of the activity taking place and the site's risk factors. The risk criteria for this evaluation are:
- toxicity of the scheduled chemicals used at the site and of the end-product produced with it, if any;
- production capacity of the Schedule 2 plants;
- capability and convertibility of the plants for initiating production, storage, and filling of chemical weapons; and
- quantity of scheduled chemicals and of feed-stock chemicals for them typically stored at the site.
What are the guidelines for routine inspections of commercial Schedule 3 facilities and other chemical production facilities?
A commercial facility that produces an aggregate quantity of more than 200 metric tons of any dual-use Schedule 3 chemical during the past year or anticipates aggregate production over that threshold during the coming year is subject to routine inspection at any time. Schedule 3 facility inspections began in August 1998. Inspections at other chemical production facilities-sites producing by synthesis unscheduled discrete organic chemicals, especially those that contain phosphorus, sulfur, or fluorine-can occur if aggregate production per year exceeds 200 metric tons. On-site inspections at other chemical production facilities began three years after entry into force in May 2000. Inspections at both types of facilities unfold with 120 hours advance notice and last no longer than 24 hours, unless otherwise agreed. The Technical Secretariat selects sites for such inspections randomly, with an emphasis on achieving an equitable geographic distribution of inspections. No one site is required to receive more than two routine inspections per calendar year.
More specifically, how are routine inspections of Schedule 2 and 3 commercial facilities conducted?
The objectives of Schedule 2 and 3 inspections are to ensure that Schedule 1 chemicals are not being produced, check that the activities taking place are consistent with data declarations, and confirm that chemicals produced are not being diverted for military purposes. The CWC provides that inspectors' access to facilities may include:
- areas where feed chemicals or reactants are delivered or stored;
- areas where manipulative processes are performed upon the reactants before they are put into reaction vessels;
- feed lines from these areas to the reaction vessels, along with their associated valves, flow meters, and other equipment;
- the external surfaces of reaction vessels and ancillary equipment;
- lines from the reaction vessels leading to long- or short-term storage or to equipment where further processing with declared Schedule 2 chemicals will take place;
- control equipment associated with any of these items;
- equipment and areas for waste and effluent handling; and
- equipment and areas for disposition of chemicals not up to specification.
More specifically, how are routine inspections at other chemical production facilities to be conducted?
Inspections for other production facilities-those that produce by synthesis unscheduled discrete organic chemicals, especially those that contain phosphorus, sulfur, or fluorine (PSF)-have the same purposes as Schedule 3 inspections. These inspections will focus on the plant or plants involved in PSF production at the site. Host officials can control the access of the inspectors using the rules of managed access. (See "What is managed access?" in the Challenge Inspections section.) If agreed, the inspection team may review records and undertake sampling and on-site analysis. As with Schedule 3 facilities, sites for inspection of other chemical production facilities will be selected randomly, on the basis of the following weighing factors: equitable geographic distribution of inspections, information on the plant site, and proposals by CWC member states. How many routine inspections are conducted every year at each state's Schedule 3 and other chemical production facilities?
The total number of inspections a state is required to host for Schedule 3 sites and other chemical production facilities can be calculated using an esoteric formula. The total number of inspections at these facilities will not be more than three plus 5 percent of the total combined number of sites declared in these two categories, or twenty inspections, whichever number is lower. For example, a state that declares twenty-five Schedule 3 sites and lists fifty sites under other production facilities would be required to receive seven routine inspections per year (5 percent of 75 = 3.75 + 3 = 6.75) at such sites.
How many routine inspections does the Technical Secretariat conduct cumulatively and in each state per year?
During its first year of operations, the Technical Secretariat conducted over two hundred inspections. By the end of the fourth year, nearly one thousand total inspections had occurred in forty-nine countries. The number of inspections conducted in each state depends on whether that state declared possession of chemical weapons and whether it has a sizeable commercial chemical industry. States that have large chemical weapons stockpiles, as well as large commercial industries, can expect dozens of inspections on a yearly basis. On the other hand, some states declared no chemical weapons capability and have few, if any, facilities that qualify for Schedule 2 inspections. In countries where the chemical industrial base is just beginning to develop, a period of a year or more may pass without a routine inspection. The CWC contains quotas and requirements for equitable geographic distribution so that the burden of inspections is not concentrated on just a handful of countries.
Challenge Inspections
What are the general guidelines for a challenge inspection?Any treaty party that suspects another CWC member of conducting activities prohibited by the CWC has the right to ask for a challenge inspection of the suspect site. To initiate a challenge inspection, the state making the request must present specific information about the site in question to the Executive Council and the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, who is under obligation to conduct the inspection without delay. The Director-General notifies the state being challenged of the location of the inspection site no less than 12 hours before the inspection team will arrive at the point of entry in the challenged state. Once the inspection team lands, the host state is obligated to transport the inspectors to the perimeter of the suspect site within 36 hours. The dimensions of the perimeter are subject to negotiation, but must be ten meters outside of any building or security structures.
Once at the perimeter, the inspectors are allowed to examine traffic logs, take photographs and videos, and go under escort to other parts of the perimeter. When agreement upon the final perimeter is reached, the inspectors are also allowed to take air, soil, and effluent samples and to use monitoring instruments within a fifty meter band around the perimeter. Host officials must allow the inspectors access inside the perimeter within 108 hours-four and a half days-after the inspection team initially arrives. Unless otherwise agreed, the inspection inside the perimeter will last no longer than 84 hours. (See Figure 2.)
What is "managed access"?
Challenge inspections will be guided by the principle of "managed access," which ostensibly allows inspectors enough access to determine whether the site is indeed involved in prohibited activity while also allowing the facility under inspection to protect sensitive information unrelated to the CWC. The extent of access to any particular place or places within the site, the exact nature of inspection activities, and the information that the host officials are to provide to the inspection team are subject to negotiations between host officials and the inspection team. Officials at the site can turn off computers, protect sensitive business or national security information, and shroud all or parts of sensitive displays, equipment, and stores of goods. Host officials can also restrict sampling to the presence or absence of Schedule 1, 2, or 3 chemicals and their degradation products. While inspectors technically have the right to go into any part of any building, in practice they will rarely cover all areas of a suspect site. In particularly sensitive situations, the inspectors may select a percentage of buildings and random areas within those buildings for inspection. Host officials may request that only an individual inspector enter especially sensitive areas. In compiling their report, inspectors will take into account the nature of the cooperation and access provided by host officials.
What protections are there against misuse of challenge inspections?
The CWC contains several provisions against using challenge inspections as a pretext for snooping for national security or commercial secrets. If the Executive Council deems a request for a challenge inspection frivolous, abusive, or beyond the scope of the CWC, a three-quarters vote of its members within 12 hours can halt the challenge inspection. Otherwise, the challenge inspection will proceed as requested. If the Executive Council finds that a completed challenge inspection was abusive, it can require the requesting state to pay all or part of the costs of the inspection. States are obligated to request a challenge inspection only when it concerns a matter directly related to compliance with the CWC. Subject to the approval of the host state, the nation requesting the challenge inspection may send an observer-not an inspector-with the inspection team.
Will challenge inspections be frequent events?
Many arms control experts expect challenge inspections to be relatively rare events, but the ones that occur will be politically-charged and intensely dramatic. After all, the premise underlying the challenge request is that a state is cheating on its treaty obligations. For this reason, setting the guidelines for challenge inspections was one of the most difficult aspects of the treaty negotiations and execution of challenge inspections remains a closely watched aspect of the CWC's implementation. By June 2001, not a single challenge inspection had taken place.
Can a challenged state clean up incriminating evidence at a suspect site before inspectors arrive?
If a state is very well organized and intent on cheating, workers at the site could try to hide evidence before inspectors gain access to a suspect facility. Attempts to clear out or clean up a site may be observed by national technical means of verification, such as satellites, which the United States would be able to focus on a suspect site in the interim period before inspectors arrive. Moreover, telltale signs of cheating are likely to be left behind in the rush to cover up prohibited activities before the arrival of inspectors. Hiding all traces of chemical weapons production can be very difficult, especially if state-of-the-art emission controls were not used at the site. Inspectors will be able to take and analyze soil and effluent samples from around the perimeter and, with the permission of the inspected party, inside the suspect site. Given adequate access, well-trained and equipped inspection teams have the capability to detect traces of chemical weapons production even if host officials have attempted to clean up the site. The possibility of incurring challenge inspections may also deter states from attempting to establish or maintain a covert weapons program.
Destruction of Chemical Weapon Stockpiles and Facilities
How are states going about destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles?The treaty defines destruction of chemical weapons as "a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons, and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions and other devices unusable as such." Each state that possesses chemical weapons determines the specific method that it will use to destroy its stocks, but destruction must be accomplished in a manner that ensures public safety and environmental protection. Open-pit burning, land burial, and dumping weapons in any body of water are specifically prohibited as methods of destruction. Possible approaches to the full destruction of chemical weapons include incineration, cryofracture, chemical neutralization, and other thermal processes. States with chemical weapons stockpiles must present the Technical Secretariat with an overview of their destruction plans. This plan must include a general schedule of the types and approximate quantities of weapons that will be destroyed according to a set timetable, as well as a description of the number of destruction facilities planned, the plans for training personnel in destruction operations, national standards for safety and emissions at such sites, and cost estimates for the program, among other details.
How soon must states possessing chemical weapons destroy their stockpiles?
The treaty stipulates that states possessing chemical weapons must totally destroy their stocks over a ten-year period. Destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles is to take place according to a "leveling out" principle, with all possessor states destroying their stockpiles at approximately the same rate. Testing of a state's first destruction facility is to be completed within two years after entry into force. No less than one year later, chemical weapon states are to have destroyed 1 percent of their stockpile. After five years, 20 percent is to be destroyed. After seven years, the stockpile destruction is to be 45 percent complete. States can proceed at a faster rate, as long as they destroy their stockpiles in a way that is safe and environmentally sound. (See table 5.) By June 2001, the United States had destroyed around 23 percent of its stockpile and India had launched a destruction facility for unfilled chemical munitions. In addition, one Russian destruction facility is expected to go on-line in 2002 while a second one under construction is hoped to begin operations by 2006.
Table 5: CWC Timeframe for Chemical Weapons Destruction
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What happens if a state cannot destroy its stockpile within the ten-year timeframe?
If a state cannot meet the deadline for destroying its chemical weapons, it can apply to the Executive Council for an extension at least one year before the deadline expires. The request must contain the length of additional time needed, an explanation of why the state has been unable to meet the original deadline, and a detailed plan for accomplishing the destruction of the remaining stocks. The Executive Council will hold any extensions granted to the minimal additional time required, but the most additional time that a state could receive is five years. Any extensions will come with additional reporting requirements and conditions, such as the possibility of more verification measures and specific actions to be taken to correct the problems causing delays in the destruction program. Russia has had difficulty getting the destruction program underway, given the large size of its stockpile-declared at 40,000 metric tons-and its economic difficulties. In May 2000, the Conference of States Parties granted Russia an extension of the 1 percent stockpile destruction deadline.
How soon must states possessing chemical weapons production facilities destroy them?
Chemical weapons production facilities are to be destroyed as soon as possible, with the order of destruction determined by the Executive Council. Production facilities can also be temporarily converted into chemical weapons destruction facilities, which are to be destroyed thereafter. As with the chemical weapons themselves, the leveling out principle governs the production facility destruction process. Production capacity, rather than the quantity of chemical weapons, is the factor that must be diminished on an equal basis among member states over the ten-year period. Destruction of production facilities began in 1997 and will proceed to completion after ten years with three leveling out destruction periods: years 2 through 5, years 6 through 8, and years 9 through 10. International inspectors from the Technical Secretariat and on-site monitoring instruments placed at chemical weapons production, storage, and destruction sites are on hand to monitor the destruction process very closely.
Where do responsibilities lie for destroying abandoned chemical weapons?
Article I of the CWC clearly requires the state that abandoned the chemical weapons to destroy any munitions it left on the territory of another state. Both states involved are to engage in consultations to develop a mutually agreed plan for the destruction of the abandoned weapons. For instance, Japanese authorities are working with their counterparts in China to devise a program to destroy chemical munitions that the Imperial Army abandoned in China during World War II.
What type of chemical weapons stockpile does the United States have?
Before the US chemical weapons destruction program began, the US stockpile contained more than 32,000 tons of nerve and blister agents. These agents are stored in rockets, projectiles, spray tanks, cartridges, bombs, mines, and bulk containers. Most of the stockpile is stored at eight different sites in the continental United States. (The original status of the stockpile is shown in table 6.) Another 1,700 tons of nerve agent were located at Johnston Island in the Pacific, a storage site for chemical weapons, including those withdrawn from the European theater.
Table 6: The US Chemical Weapons Stockpile
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| Tooele Army Depot, UT |
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Sarin, Tabun* | Mustard, Lewisite* |
| Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR |
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Sarin, VX | Mustard |
| Umatilla Depot, OR |
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Sarin, VX | Mustard |
| Pueblo Depot, CO |
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None | Mustard |
| Anniston Army Depot, AL |
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Sarin, VX | Mustard |
| Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD |
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None | Mustard |
| Newport Ammunition Plant, IN |
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VX | None |
| Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot, KY |
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Sarin, VX | Mustard |
Source: National Resource Council, Alternative Technologies for the Destrucion of Chemical Agents and Munitions (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993).
How is the United States destroying its stockpile?
The US Army is destroying the stockpile using high-temperature incineration in what is called the "baseline" destruction program. The baseline program uses robotics and manual techniques to disassemble the weapons before sending the different parts into four high-temperature furnaces-one for the agent, one for the explosives and propellants, one for the waste packaging, and one for the contaminated metal components, such as shells and bulk storage containers. After feasibility testing at Tooele Depot, Utah, the Army constructed a prototype incineration facility on Johnston Island in the Pacific. During operational verification testing between July 1990 and March 1993, the Army demonstrated the baseline program's ability to destroy chemical munitions without apparent fundamental safety, environmental, or process-related problems. In August 1996, the Chemical Agent Disposal Facility at Tooele, Utah, opened for operation. By June 2001, over 7,000 tons of chemical agent had been destroyed at Johnston Island and Tooele, or approximately 23 percent of the stockpile. The Johnston Atoll facility concluded operations in November 2000. The Army is currently building similar facilities at Anniston, Alabama, Umatilla, Oregon, and Pine Bluff, Arkansas. Stockpile destruction costs are expected to run over $15 billion.
Early outside criticism of the baseline program focused on concerns about escalating costs and potential risks to the public and the environment posed by the incineration process. Such concerns prompted Congress to require the Army to evaluate alternative methods of destroying the stockpile. As a result, the Army launched pilot test programs at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland and Newport, Indiana that employ neutralization-based technologies to destroy the chemical agents stored at those facilities in bulk containers. The Army is also evaluating non-incineration technologies for possible use in the destruction of assembled chemical weapons. Demonstrations of alternative destruction methods for munitions began in early 1999.
Has the United States previously used methods other than incineration to destroy chemical weapons?
Prior to 1969, the Army disposed of chemical weapons using methods that would be unacceptable in the United States by today's standards and are specifically prohibited by the CWC. The United States destroyed chemical weapons by open-pit burning, evaporative "atmospheric dilution," and placement of munitions in concrete coffins for ocean dumping. In the 1970s the Army used a chemical neutralization process-featuring alkaline hydrolysis-to destroy some 87,000 chemical munitions at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado. This technique produced large amounts of waste, which also had to be disposed of, and was considered to be inefficient. By 1982, the Army decided to abandon chemical neutralization in favor of high temperature incineration, the so-called baseline destruction program that has since been employed. Since that time, however, the Army has revisited the incorporation of certain neutralization techniques, specifically hydrolysis, into the overall destruction plan for the US chemical arsenal.
Are there alternatives to high-temperature "baseline" incineration to destroy chemical weapons?
A variety of alternative destruction technologies are currently being considered as substitutes for the incineration process. Three broad categories of alternative technologies include thermal treatment; low-temperature, liquid-phase processes; and medium- and high-temperature processes. One of the better known alternatives in the first category is cryofracture, which involves the use of liquid nitrogen to freeze the weapon before crushing it and placing it in an incinerator as the final step in the destruction process. Examples of technologies in the second category include biological processes, where enzymes are introduced to degrade certain agents, and chemical hydrolysis, where the chemical agent is mixed with water or other substances to reduce agent toxicity. The final category includes plasma arc pyrolysis-the use of electric current to break down the chemical agent in a thermal plasma field at extremely high temperatures-and supercritical water oxidation-the mixture of chemical agents with water that has been pressurized and heated. The Army continues to explore alternative technologies for destruction of assembled munitions and has begun to pilot test neutralization-based technologies to destroy the bulk agent at Aberdeen, Maryland and Newport, Indiana.
Special Issues Concerning Chemical Industry
Is chemical industry supportive of the Chemical Weapons Convention?The major trade associations that represent chemical industry around the world played a key role in the negotiation of the CWC. For example, the US Chemical Manufacturers Association, as well as the major trade associations from Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan, offered industry input into key areas of the treaty, such as the confidentiality provisions, data declarations, and inspections. Some individual chemical companies also hosted National Trial Inspections to test the verification procedures while they were under development for the CWC. In the United States, the role of chemical industry associations was crucial to the treaty ratification effort. Representatives of the chemical industry have repeatedly stated that the CWC's monitoring burdens are "reasonable" and "acceptable."
How do the Technical Secretariat and their inspectors protect sensitive or proprietary information?
The CWC's verification regime seeks a balance between the need for inspectors to have enough access to detect prohibited activities and the need for countries and chemical companies to protect sensitive information. The CWC's confidentiality rules govern the data monitoring and inspection process. (See the sections on Data Monitoring Requirements, Routine Inspections, and Challenge Inspections for specific requirements of the CWC.) These guidelines are articulated generally in the CWC's Confidentiality Annex and more specifically in the confidentiality policy passed by the Conference of States Parties at its first meeting in May 1997. The Technical Secretariat is obligated to safeguard all confidential or proprietary information derived from data declarations and its monitoring activities at civilian and military facilities, just as CWC members are obligated to treat confidentially any information that the inspectorate supplies to them. The Technical Secretariat established a four-tiered a classification system and a secure storage capacity to handle sensitive information. The Technical Secretariat releases to the public general information concerning the CWC's implementation, but provides sensitive information concerning a specific activity or facility only when one CWC member involved gives express permission. While on site, inspectors ask for only the minimum amount of information and access needed to accomplish their tasks. The monitoring equipment used by inspectors, such as gas chromatographs and mass spectrometers, are designed to collect information needed to monitor compliance with the CWC without allowing inspectors to exceed their mandate and collect sensitive and proprietary information that is outside the scope of treaty-related activities. All equipment must be approved by the CWC's members and the Technical Secretariat and specifically protected against unauthorized alteration.
How does the CWC affect the international trade of chemicals and related technology?
Many developing countries are concerned that the worldwide effort to eliminate chemical weapons will generate increased controls on the exchange of chemical technology and equipment that is crucial to their continuing commercial and industrial advancement. The CWC attempts to establish a balance between ending the proliferation of chemical weapons and promoting the exchange of scientific and technological knowledge necessary for industrial, agricultural, medical, and pharmaceutical development.
Countries deciding not to join the CWC have been denied access to trade in Schedule 2 chemicals since May 2000. Treaty members may only trade in Schedule 2 chemicals with other CWC members. Regarding Schedule 3 chemicals, signatories are required to receive assurances (e.g., end-user certificates) that Schedule 3 chemicals transferred to non-signatories would not be used for purposes prohibited by the CWC. In 2002, the Conference of State Parties will weigh the application of trade restrictions on Schedule 3 chemicals, such as barring their transfer to states that have not yet joined the treaty. These trade restrictions are intended to serve both as an incentive for joining the CWC and as a punishment for not doing so.
Article XI of the CWC also encourages the "fullest possible" exchange of chemicals, equipment, and scientific information among treaty parties. As such, CWC members are not to maintain among themselves any restrictions or impediments to chemical trade, development, and promotion of knowledge for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes.
What is the Australia Group?
Prompted by the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, a number of industrialized states, known as the Australia Group, began meeting on an ad hoc basis in 1985 in an effort to harmonize their export controls to retard chemical weapons proliferation. The coordination of export control policies among Australia Group members is informal and not legally binding. In addition to a list of more than fifty precursor chemicals, the Australia Group has extended its controls to include dual-use chemical manufacturing equipment and technology, such as reactor vessels, heat exchangers, filling equipment, incinerators, and degassing equipment. Australia Group states do not ban the export of these items. Instead, they review applications on an individual basis and deny only those exports that may be used to further chemical weapons proliferation. The Australia Group pledged in August 1992 to review its export control policies with regard to CWC members that remain in full compliance with the provisions of the CWC. That pledge was reaffirmed at the Australia Group's annual meeting in October 2000. The members of the Australia Group are listed in table 7.
Table 7: Members of the Australia Group
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| Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States |
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| Norway, Portugal, Spain |
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| Switzerland |
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| Finland, Sweden |
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| Austria |
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| Argentina, Hungary, Iceland |
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| Czech Republic, Poland, and the Slovak Republic |
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| Romania |
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| South Korea |
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| Total Members |
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Related Arms Control Agreements
Given widespread adherence to the Geneva Protocol, why is the Chemical Weapons Convention needed?The Geneva Protocol is the shorthand name for the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The Geneva Protocol, which entered into force in 1928 and has over 140 adherent states, bans the use of chemical weapons, but not their development, production, and stockpiling. Accordingly, many countries reserved the right to use chemical weapons in retaliation for a chemical weapons attack. Thus, the Geneva Protocol is essentially a no-first-use agreement. The CWC takes chemical weapons arms control well beyond the limited ban on use, prohibiting not only all use but also the development, production and stockpiling of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.
What are the US reservations to the Geneva Protocol?
The United States was one of the initial signatories of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, but did not ratify the treaty until 22 January 1975. The US Senate attached a reservation preserving the right of the United States to respond in kind to a chemical weapons attack. President George Bush stated on 13 May 1991 that the United States would foreswear the right to retaliate in kind upon entry into force of the CWC, provided that the USSR, now Russia, was also a member of the CWC. In addition, the United States continues to hold that the Geneva Protocol does not apply to defensive use of riot control agents that would save lives during war. In this regard, the United States has specified the right to use riot control agents to control rioting prisoners of war; in situations where civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided; during rescue missions; and in areas outside the combat zone to protect military convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations. The Senate upheld the limited defensive use of riot control agents in war when it gave its consent to ratify the CWC on 24 April 1997.
What is the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding?
The September 1989 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the USSR provided for a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange between the two countries, to be carried out in two phases. On 29 December 1989, the United States and USSR exchanged data on their aggregate stockpile size; the types of agents; percent of chemical agents in munitions, devices, or bulk containers; location of storage, production, and destruction facilities; and types of agent and munitions at each storage facility. Phase I was completed with a series of visits to two production facilities, three storage facilities, and two industrial chemical production facilities in each country.
After lengthy delays attributable mostly to the disarray in the Russian government following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the implementation of a scaled-down Phase II finally got underway. The two sides exchanged data in May and June. Both sides questioned the completeness of the data provided. US concerns focused on the information (or lack thereof) that Russia supplied to address allegations by former scientists from the Soviet chemical weapons production complex about ongoing Russian chemical weapons research, development, and production activities. A series of "practice" challenge inspections took place from September to December 1994. Each side conducted five inspections at declared government chemical weapons facilities for the purpose of acquainting US and Russian officials with challenge inspection procedures.
What is the Bilateral Destruction Agreement?
The most important provisions of the June 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union require both states to stop producing chemical weapons and reduce their respective chemical weapons stockpiles to no more than 5,000 agent tons by the end of 2002. The agreement stipulated the continuous presence of inspectors and monitoring instruments on-site at destruction facilities and on-site inspections at storage facilities. The Bilateral Destruction Agreement also required the United States and Russia, which assumed the USSR's obligations, to cooperate on establishing safe methods and technologies for destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles. Initially, the parties were to have begun destruction no later than 31 December 1992 and completed the task by 31 December 2002. Economic difficulties in Russia prompted revised deadlines, calling for the commencement of destruction by 30 June 1997 and the end by 30 June 2004. However, Russia officially backed away from the agreement in 1996 after a dispute over production facility conversion provisions, leaving the agreement dormant. The destruction of the US and Russian stockpiles is governed instead by the CWC.
What assistance is the United States providing to Russia to help with stockpile destruction?
On 30 July 1992 the United States signed an agreement with Russia concerning the safe, secure, and ecologically sound destruction of Russia's chemical weapons. This agreement outlined several types of technical assistance for the Russian destruction program, including material, training, and services, that the Department of Defense would make available to the Russians at no cost. The original value of the assistance to be provided was not to exceed $25 million. US and Russian experts have engaged in a series of bilateral activities to test and select the technologies to be used in Russia's destruction program, including the joint evaluation of Russian neutralization and bituminization technologies. A US contractor was retained to help the Russians lay plans to destroy their stockpile, which is spread among seven different sites. Congress added another $30 million to that amount in 1994 for the construction of an analytical laboratory to support the Russian chemical weapons destruction program. In 1996, Congress earmarked $78.5 million to build a pilot destruction facility at the Shchuchye storage site in Russia. However, in fiscal year 2000, Congress zeroed out funding for destruction facility construction at Shchuchye. From 1992 to1998, the United States set aside some $192 million in the Cooperative Threat Reduction funds to assist in the management and destruction of the Russian chemical stockpile.
Adherence and Compliance
What states have chemical weapons and have they signed the CWC?The CWC requires that all states joining the treaty declare their chemical weapons stockpiles. Only the United States and Russia declared possession of chemical weapons stockpiles prior to 29 April 1997. The United States holds approximately 30,000 metric tons of chemical weapons agent in bulk and munition form. Russia has declared a stockpile of 40,000 metric tons. In the months following entry into force, an additional two countries-India and South Korea-declared chemical weapons stockpiles.
Iraq's known chemical weapons stockpile was destroyed under the supervision of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in accordance with the terms of Security Council resolutions following the Persian Gulf War. UNSCOM continued to investigate the full extent of Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities, including Iraq's possible weaponization of the nerve agent VX, until its withdrawal from the country in December 1998. According to US intelligence estimates, Libya is also thought to have produced and stockpiled chemical weapons and Syria, Israel, and Egypt "probably possess chemical weapons capabilities." In addition, Iran is believed to have "an active chemical weapons program" and is thought to have produced chemical warfare agents. Iran ratified the CWC and declared having only former chemical weapons production facilities. According to expert testimony given before the House Armed Services Committee in February 1993, as well as subsequent Congressional testimony, executive branch reports, and a study by the now defunct Office of Technology Assessment, outside experts list an additional nine states as "probable" developers, producers, or possessors of chemical weapons. These sources also identify fourteen more states as "possible" chemical weapons possessors or seekers of a chemical weapons production capacity. Of the states in these categories, Angola, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, and Syria have not signed the CWC.
Are all of the chemical weapons from the former Soviet Union under Russian control?
The Soviets listed no chemical weapons storage facilities outside what is now Russian territory in the data they exchanged under Phase I of the 1989 Memorandum of Understanding. (See "What is the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding?" in the Related Arms Control Agreements section.) Most analysts do not believe that former Soviet states other than Russia possess chemical weapons.
Does the CWC have to be universal to be effective?
As with the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), some states may not join the CWC. The NPT is widely perceived to be an important and useful agreement despite its holdouts. Although universal adherence to the CWC remains the goal, near-universal adherence can also serve important purposes, such as establishing a global norm against the possession, use, and proliferation of chemical weapons. Universal adherence therefore does not appear to be a prerequisite for combating chemical weapons proliferation, proceeding with the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, and strengthening global norms against the possession and use of chemical weapons. With over 170 signatories and 143 ratifying states, nations who opt against joining the CWC are likely to find themselves increasingly isolated. (Table 8 lists some states that have not yet signed the CWC.) However, universal adherence to the treaty remains one of the most important goals for treaty members as implementation continues.
What happens to a signatory that does not comply with the requirements of the CWC?
The Executive Council will give a CWC member that does not quickly and satisfactorily resolve compliance concerns remaining after a challenge inspection a limited amount of time to comply. If the offending party fails to do so, the Conference of States Parties, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, may restrict or suspend the violator's rights and privileges under the CWC. A non-compliant state may lose access to the Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals otherwise traded between CWC parties. This state may also forfeit its right to defensive assistance against a chemical weapons attack, as well as its right to request challenge inspections. In serious cases of noncompliance, the Conference of States Parties may recommend that CWC members take collective action against the noncompliant state. No particular actions are specified, leaving the door open for a variety of collective economic and political sanctions. The CWC specifies that grave violations of the treaty are to be brought to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council for further action.
Table 8: Non-Signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention
| Angola Antigua and Barbuda Barbados Belize Egypt |
Iraq Kiribati Lebanon Libya North Korea Sao Tome and Principe |
Solomon Islands Somalia Syria Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu |