Biological and Chemical Weapons
Questions Frequently Asked About the Chemical Weapons Convention and Its Implementation
Amy E. SmithsonFrom Amy E. Smithson, ed., The Chemical Weapons Convention Handbook (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993)
Updated June 2001
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is perhaps the most complex arms control agreement ever negotiated. In the following pages, a number of standard questions about the treaty and its implementation are posed and answered in terms that can be readily understood by a lay audience. The intent of this presentation is to allow readers to gain a working knowledge of the CWC and issues associated with its implementation. For more in-depth knowledge, readers should consult the treaty text. The following questions can be read sequentially, or the reader can focus more broadly on areas of particular interest:
- Overview
What is the Chemical Weapons Convention?
What is a chemical weapon?
When and where have chemical weapons been used?
When did the CWC enter into force?
- Central Provisions of the CWC
What activities are prohibited by the CWC?
What are the CWC's "Schedules"?
What constraints does the CWC place on riot control agents?
What activities are not prohibited by the CWC?
What activities are permitted with Schedule 1 chemicals?
Does the CWC provide for assistance if a state is threatened with a chemical weapons attack?
- Implementing Organizations and Costs of the CWC
What was the Preparatory Commission?
What did the PrepCom decide?
What international organization now implements the CWC?
What organizations govern the Technical Secretariat's activities?
What is a "National Authority"?
Why is implementing legislation necessary?
What does it cost to implement the CWC?
- Data Monitoring Requirements
Why are States Parties required to submit data to the international inspectorate?
What are the data declaration requirements for commercial sites using Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals?
What information must be declared for individual Schedule 2 and 3 facilities?
What information must be declared about "other" chemical production activities?
What are the requirements for data declarations for permitted Schedule 1 activities?
What are the data declaration requirements for states that possess chemical weapons stockpiles?
What are the data declaration requirements for states that possess chemical weapons production facilities?
What data must be submitted if a commercial site was previously involved in weapons production?
Are data declarations required for abandoned chemical weapons or production facilities?
What are the declaration requirements for riot control agents?
- Routine Inspections
What sites are subject to routine inspection under the CWC?
What rights do inspectors and hosts have during a routine inspection?
What are the general guidelines for routine inspections of permitted activities at Schedule 1 sites?
More specifically, how will routine inspections at chemical weapons production and storage facilities be conducted?
More specifically, how are routine inspections at chemical weapons destruction facilities be conducted?
What are the general guidelines for routine inspections of commercial Schedule 2 facilities?
What are the guidelines for routine inspections of commercial Schedule 3 facilities and other chemical production facilities?
More specifically, how are routine inspections of Schedule 2 and 3 commercial facilities conducted?
More specifically, how are routine inspections at other chemical production facilities to be conducted?
How many routine inspections are conducted every year at each state's Schedule 3 and other chemical production facilities?
How many routine inspections does the Technical Secretariat conduct cumulatively and in each state per year?
- Challenge Inspections
What are the general guidelines for a challenge inspection?
What is "managed access"?
What protections are there against misuse of challenge inspections?
Will challenge inspections be frequent events?
Can a challenged state clean up incriminating evidence at a suspect site before inspectors arrive?
- Destruction of Chemical Weapon Stockpiles and Facilities
How are states going about destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles?
How soon must states possessing chemical weapons destroy their stockpiles?
What happens if a state cannot destroy its stockpile within the ten-year timeframe?
How soon must states possessing chemical weapons production facilities destroy them?
Where do responsibilities lie for destroying abandoned chemical weapons?
What type of chemical weapons stockpile does the United States have?
How is the United States destroying its stockpile?
Has the United States previously used methods other than incineration to destroy chemical weapons?
Are there alternatives to high-temperature "baseline" incineration to destroy chemical weapons?
- Special Issues Concerning Chemical Industry
Is chemical industry supportive of the Chemical Weapons Convention?
How do the Technical Secretariat and their inspectors protect sensitive or proprietary information?
How does the CWC affect the international trade of chemicals and related technology?
What is the Australia Group?
- Related Arms Control Agreements
Given widespread adherence to the Geneva Protocol, why is the Chemical Weapons Convention needed?
What are the US reservations to the Geneva Protocol?
What is the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding?
What is the Bilateral Destruction Agreement?
What assistance is the United States providing to Russia to help with stockpile destruction?
- Adherence and Compliance
What states have chemical weapons and have they signed the CWC?
Are all of the chemical weapons from the former Soviet Union under Russian control?
Does the CWC have to be universal to be effective?
What happens to a signatory that does not comply with the requirements of the CWC?
Overview
What is the Chemical Weapons Convention?The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The CWC was negotiated over a twenty-four-year period in Geneva by a group of forty western, eastern, and non-aligned states. Unprecedented in its scope and complexity, the CWC is the most significant agreement to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction since the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Signed on 13 January 1993, the treaty entered into force just over four years later on 29 April 1997. As of 1 June 2001, the treaty had 174 signatories and 143 full members. The list of members and signatories is contained in table 1.
Table 1: The 174 Signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention
| Afghanistan ALBANIA ALGERIA ARGENTINA ARMENIA AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA AZERBAIJAN Bahamas BAHRAIN BANGLADESH BELARUS BELGIUM BENIN Bhutan BOLIVIA BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA BOTSWANA BRAZIL BRUNEI DARUSSALEM BULGARIA BURKINA FASO BURUNDI Cambodia CAMEROON CANADA Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad CHILE CHINA COLOMBIA Comoros Congo COOK ISLANDS COSTA RICA COTE D'IVOIRE CROATIA CUBA CYPRUS CZECH REPUBLIC Democratic Republic of the Congo DENMARK |
Djibouti DOMINICA Dominican Republic ECUADOR EL SALVADOR EQUATORIAL GUINEA ERITREA Estonia ETHIOPIA FIJI FINLAND FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA FRANCE GABON GAMBIA GEORGIA GERMANY GHANA GREECE Grenada Guatemala GUINEA Guinea-Bissau GUYANA Haiti HOLY SEE Honduras HUNGARY ICELAND INDIA INDONESIA IRAN IRELAND Israel ITALY JAMAICA JAPAN JORDAN KAZAKHSTAN KENYA KIRIBATI KUWAIT Kyrgyzstan |
LAOS LATVIA LESOTHO Liberia LIECHTENSTEIN LITHUANIA LUXEMBOURG Madagascar MALAWI MALAYSIA MALDIVES MALI MALTA Marshall Islands MAURITANIA MAURITIUS MEXICO MICRONESIA MOLDOVA MONACO MONGOLIA MOROCCO MOZAMBIQUE Myanmar NAMIBIA Nauru NEPAL NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NICARAGUA NIGER NIGERIA NORWAY OMAN PAKISTAN PANAMA PAPUA NEW GUINEA PARAGUAY PERU PHILIPPINES POLAND PORTUGAL QATAR ROMANIA RUSSIAN FEDERATION |
Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis SAINT LUCIA Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa SAN MARINO SAUDI ARABIA SENEGAL SEYCHELLES Sierra Leone SINGAPORE SLOVAK REPUBLIC SLOVENIA SOUTH AFRICA SOUTH KOREA SPAIN SRI LANKA SUDAN SURINAME SWAZILAND SWEDEN SWITZERLAND TAJIKISTAN TANZANIA Thailand TOGO TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TUNISIA TURKEY TURKMENISTAN Uganda UKRAINE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES UNITED KINGDOM UNITED STATES URUGUAY UZBEKISTAN VENEZUELA VIETNAM YEMEN YUGOSLAVIA ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE |
Sources: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons What is a chemical weapon?
Chemical weapons are super toxic liquid and gaseous substances that can be dispersed in bombs, rockets, missiles, artillery, mines, grenades, or spray tanks. The four basic types of chemical agents are: blister agents that destroy exposed skin tissue (e.g., mustard gas and lewisite); blood agents that, when inhaled, block oxygen circulation within the body (e.g., hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride); choking agents that inflame the bronchial tubes and lungs, possibly causing asphyxiation (e.g., phosgene and chlorine); and nerve agents that cause the nervous system to overload, resulting in respiratory failure and death (e.g., tabun, sarin, soman, and VX). The CWC defines chemical weapons as, together or separately, toxic chemicals and their precursors, munitions and devices, and any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with these items. A precursor is a chemical that is used in the production of a chemical agent. The CWC places controls on toxic chemicals and their precursors, which are listed on three "Schedules" according to their toxicity, military and commercial utility, and risk. The schedules of chemicals can be found in table 2.
Table 2: Chemicals Controlled by the CWC
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| Amiton: O,O-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] phosphorothiolate and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts |
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| PFIB 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-1-propene |
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| BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate |
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| Chemicals, except for those listed in Schedule 1, containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded one methyl, ethyl, or propyl (normal or iso) group but not further carbon atoms, e.g.
Exemption: |
676-97-1 756-79-6 676-83-5 1066-50-8 78-38-6 944-22-9 |
| N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-PR) phosphoramidic dihalides, e.g.,
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677-43-0 |
| Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or I-Pr)- phosphoramidates, e.g.,
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2404-03-7 |
| Arsenic trichloride |
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| 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid |
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| Quinuclidine-3-ol |
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| N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr)- phosphoramidates, e.g.,
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999-81-5 100-35-6 |
| N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-ols and corresponding protonated salts, e.g.,
Exemptions: |
96-80-0 108-01-0 |
| N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr, or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-thiols and corresponding protonated salts, e.g.,
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100-38-9 |
| Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulfide |
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| Pinacolyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutane-2-ol |
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| Phosgene: Carbonyl dichloride |
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| Cyanogen chloride |
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| Hydrogen cyanide |
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| Chloropicrin: Trichloronitromethane |
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| Phosphorus oxychloride |
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| Phosphorus trichloride |
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| Phosphorus pentachloride |
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| Trimethyl phosphite |
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| Triethyl phosphite |
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| Dimethyl phosphite |
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| Diethyl phosphite |
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| Sulfur monochloride |
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| Sulfur dichloride |
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| Thionyl chloride |
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| Ethyldiethanolamine |
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| Methyldiethanolamine |
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| Triethanolamine |
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When and where have chemical weapons been used?
Primitive chemical weapons appeared on the battlefield as early as 431 BC, with the Greek use of sulfur mixtures. Chlorine and mustard gas were widely used on World War I battlefields and caused over one million injuries. More lethal nerve agents were created just before World War II, but were not used on European battlefields. Chemical weapons were used, however, in North Africa and China by Italian and Japanese forces during World War II. Use of chemical weapons since World War II has been sporadic, with the most recent case being the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s. Properly trained and equipped personnel can protect themselves from the effects of chemical weapons. Civilian populations and troops lacking training and protective gear are most susceptible to the effects of a chemical attack.
When did the CWC enter into force?
The CWC was opened for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993. It entered into force on 29 April 1997, 180 days after the sixty-fifth instrument of ratification on 31 October 1996. The interim period between signature and entry into force allowed for the establishment of the international monitoring organization. During that time, treaty signatories prepared for the CWC's entry into force by establishing national authorities to supervise domestic implementation requirements and participating in the Preparatory Commission in The Hague, which made decisions about detailed implementation procedures.
Central Provisions of the CWC
What activities are prohibited by the CWC?The Chemical Weapons Convention bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. Treaty parties are prohibited from engaging in any military preparations to use chemical weapons. They are obligated to destroy their chemical weapons and production facilities, whether those weapons and facilities are located on their territory or the territory of another treaty members. Treaty parties also undertake not to assist, induce, or encourage other states to engage in activities banned by the CWC. The treaty specifically bans all activities using the twelve super toxic agents listed on Schedule 1, with the exception of permitted research activities with these agents, which will are monitored.
What are the CWC's "Schedules"?
The negotiators of the CWC devised a system for characterizing chemicals based on their risk to the purpose and objectives of the CWC. This system places chemicals on three lists or "Schedules," according to their toxicity and military and commercial utility. (See table 2 for detailed information on the Schedules.) Schedule 1 contains military agents and super toxic chemicals with very limited commercial use. Schedule 2 chemicals have low to moderate utility in the commercial sector, but are considered high risk chemicals because they can be used as chemical weapons or precursors to chemical weapons. Examples of everyday products made with Schedule 2 chemicals include: agricultural chemicals such as pesticides and herbicides made with dimethyl methylphosphonate; ceramics made with arsenic trichloride; and the solvent in the ink for ballpoint pens made with thiodiglycol. Schedule 3 chemicals are used in large quantities by commercial industry, but also pose a risk in that they have been used as chemical weapons or precursors. Examples of common commercial products made with Schedule 3 chemicals include: agricultural chemicals, dyes, and flame retardants made with phosphorus oxychloride; plastics made with phosgene; and pharmaceuticals made with triethanolamine. Schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals will be monitored according to their risk, with the most stringent requirements applied to the chemicals on Schedule 1. The CWC allows for changes in the chemicals listed on these Schedules.
What constraints does the CWC place on riot control agents?
Riot control agents are toxic chemicals that irritate or incapacitate humans, causing tearing, sneezing, disorientation, or tiredness (e.g., tear gas). The effects of these toxic chemicals usually disappear within a relatively short time. The CWC bans the use of riot control agents "as a method of warfare," but allows their use for law enforcement purposes, including domestic riot control.
What activities are not prohibited by the CWC?
Many of the chemical ingredients that can be used to make chemical weapons are widely used for legitimate commercial purposes. Therefore, the CWC does not ban the use of toxic chemicals and their precursors for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes. The CWC permits the continued production of thirty-one "dual-use" families of chemicals, which are listed on two additional Schedules depending on their degree of toxicity and their military and commercial utility above threshold. Activities involving the chemicals on Schedules 2 and 3 must be reported and are subject to inspections to ensure that they are not being diverted from commercial to military purposes. (See table 2.)
What activities are permitted with Schedule 1 chemicals?
Article VI of the CWC allows states to produce, acquire, retain, transfer, and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for research, medical, pharmaceutical, and protective purposes. States are allowed to produce an aggregate of 1 metric ton or less of Schedule 1 chemicals for these purposes. Examples of medical and protective research include the development of vaccines and antidotes against chemical agents and the testing of protective equipment, like gas masks and other protective clothing. Production for protective purposes is allowed at only two facilities: one single, small-scale production facility, where the capacity of the reactor vessels is limited to 100 liters, and another designated facility, which can produce up to 10 kilograms of Schedule 1 chemicals. Production of lesser amounts of Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical, or pharmaceutical purposes-in excess of 100 grams per year but no more than 10 kilograms annually per facility-may take place at other declared facilities. States may transfer Schedule 1 chemicals to other facilities and treaty members for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective purposes. Only one type of Schedule 1 activity does not have to be declared and inspected: laboratories and other facilities may synthesize an aggregate amount of less than 100 grams of Schedule 1 chemicals per year per facility for research, medical, or pharmaceutical purposes. Permitted activities concerning Schedule 1 chemicals are monitored.
Does the CWC provide for assistance if a state is threatened with a chemical weapons attack?
Article X of the CWC maintains that states have the right to request assistance if they are being threatened with a chemical weapons attack or have suffered an attack in which chemical weapons or riot control agents were used. After a rapid investigation to substantiate the nature of the assistance needed, the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons would coordinate any emergency assistance forthcoming from an established voluntary program, including financial, technical, and humanitarian aid. Help provided could include protective and decontamination equipment, detection systems, and medical antidotes. Article X also stipulates the right of states to maintain a protective research capacity, as well as protective equipment. In addition to the assistance fund, the international monitoring organization maintains a database of information on protection against chemical weapons to which treaty members have free access.
Implementing Organizations and Costs of the CWC
What was the Preparatory Commission?Appendix I of the CWC established the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) as a political and technical decision-making entity composed of all initial signatories of the treaty. During the interim period between the signing of the CWC and its entry into force, the PrepCom met in The Hague to make "the necessary preparations for the effective implementation" of the CWC. The PrepCom was charged with setting procedures for verification, preparing a budget, recruiting and training inspectors, and establishing the infrastructure and rules of procedure for implementing the treaty. The PrepCom had three working levels in which signatories were entitled to participate: plenary, working groups, and groups of experts. When possible, decisions were taken by consensus. The PrepCom concluded when the treaty entered into force.
What did the PrepCom decide?
Aside from budgetary and administrative decisions, the PrepCom filled in the details of the treaty. For instance, the CWC mandates that inspections of declared facilities take place and that samples may be taken at these facilities to ensure that chemical weapons are not being produced. Information collected during these inspections must be treated confidentially. However, the CWC did not stipulate how large inspection teams should be, the specific measures to take to protect national security and commercial or what specific equipment and procedures should be used during inspections. The PrepCom weighed alternative approaches to these operational issues, tested the most promising options, and made decisions about the procedures and equipment used to implement the CWC. The Provisional Technical Secretariat, forerunner of the CWC's international monitoring agency, provided staff support for the PrepCom's consideration of technical and policy issues.
What international organization now implements the CWC?
An international monitoring agency, the Technical Secretariat, is responsible for data monitoring and routine on-site inspections. The Technical Secretariat would also conduct challenge inspections when necessary. The Technical Secretariat, headed by a Director-General, includes an inspector corps and other technical specialists and is divided into two units: the Verification Division and the Inspectorate. The Technical Secretariat's main operations are conducted by two units. The Verification Division consists of four branches covering declarations, chemical demilitarization, industry verification, and policy and review. The Inspectorate division houses operations and planning personnel, as well as the actual corps of inspectors. The inspectors have backgrounds in areas ranging from chemical munitions to industrial and analytical chemistry. The Technical Secretariat's multinational inspector corps currently stands at around two hundred, not including support and administrative personnel. In total, the Technical Secretariat is staffed by close to five hundred people from more than sixty-five member states.
What organizations govern the Technical Secretariat's activities?
The Technical Secretariat reports to the governing bodies of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW): the Conference of States Parties to which all treaty parties belong, and a smaller forty-one member Executive Council. Chosen on the basis of regional representation, members of the Executive Council serve two-year terms. The Executive Council meets as needed, approximately four times a year, or when emergency meetings are called. It is responsible for the day-to-day decision making and operational guidance of the Technical Secretariat. In contrast, the Conference of States Parties meets annually or in special sessions to consider questions about compliance, inspection results, and other issues raised by the Executive Council. The Conference of States Parties has met six times: May 1997, December 1997, November 1998, June 1999, May 2000, and May 2001.
What is a "National Authority"?
The treaty requires participating states to establish a National Authority to be the main point of contact with the OPCW. The Technical Secretariat notifies a country of a pending inspection through the National Authority, which in turn provides the escorts for inspections and submits required information on CWC-related activities to the Technical Secretariat. The National Authority is responsible for ensuring that government and civilian facilities within a state's jurisdiction comply with the treaty. Some countries house their National Authority in their defense, foreign affairs, or commerce ministries, while others have formed an interagency committee to be the National Authority.
Why is implementing legislation necessary?
While governments are the entities that are legally bound by the CWC's provisions, corporations and individuals involved in activities related to the treaty also need to be subject to its provisions. Therefore, the CWC requires states to pass implementing legislation obligating individual citizens and corporate entities to abide by the treaty. One of the primary features of implementing legislation is the establishment of penal codes for individuals within a state's jurisdiction found to be in violation of the CWC. Also included are regulations requiring the reporting of controlled activities to the National Authority, the acceptance of routine and challenge inspections, and the harmonization of export control laws in accordance with the CWC's objectives.
What does it cost to implement the CWC?
The costs of CWC implementation can be separated into two general categories: 1) destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles; and 2) monitoring of other, mostly commercial activities. The CWC specifies that states with chemical weapons stockpiles are responsible for the costs to destroy their stocks and to have the Technical Secretariat monitor that destruction. Destruction costs vary greatly depending upon the size and nature of the stockpile. For example, the US Army estimates that it will cost over $15.3 billion to destroy the US stockpile using high-temperature incineration and neutralization technologies. Russia estimates its destruction costs to be approximately $7 billion. Some destruction activities require around-the-clock monitoring by inspectorate staff throughout the process, an expense shouldered by treaty members. A formula agreed upon by the Executive Council in September 1998 ironed out which costs associated with the monitoring of destruction programs must be reimbursed to the Technical Secretariat by members possessing chemical weapons arsenals.
Costs for routine inspections of declared sites and challenge inspections are financed by all CWC members generally based on the United Nations scale of assessments, which requires financial contributions according to the relative wealth of member states. Consequently, the United States pays for 22 percent of OPCW operations, Japan close to 20 percent, and Germany nearly 10 percent. According to this formula, most participating states pay approximately one percent of the OPCW's operations. The overall OPCW budget for 2002 comes to roughly $52 million.
Data Monitoring Requirements
Why are treaty members required to submit data to the international inspectorate?Initial and annual data declarations form the basis upon which the international inspectorate monitors the destruction of chemical weapons and associated production facilities, guards against the diversion of commercial dual-use chemicals to prohibited chemical weapons production, and oversees permitted activities. Inspectors spend most of their time correlating activities at declared sites with the data submitted about them. If inspectors find anomalies between the declared data and activities at a site, further investigation could follow. The data submitted helps the Technical Secretariat focus its inspections on "high risk" sites, such as a weapons storage facility or a commercial plant that uses large quantities of Schedule 2 chemicals. The requirement for states to provide this data also means that states share the burden of verification with the international inspectorate. States must provide accurate data about their military and commercial activities on a timely basis in order for the CWC's monitoring provisions to work properly.
What are the data declaration requirements for commercial sites using Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals?
Within thirty days of entry into force, states were required to declare the nature of the activities at commercial industrial sites that produce, process, or consume the dual-use chemicals on Schedules 2 and 3. After the initial declarations are submitted, states are required to update them annually. The follow-on declarations are due within ninety days of the end of the previous calendar year. In these initial and annual declarations, states must report the aggregate national amount of each Schedule 2 chemical produced, processed, consumed, imported, and exported. The same aggregate reporting requirement exists for each Schedule 3 chemical produced, imported, or exported. These aggregate national declarations must include each country involved, as well as the quantity of chemicals exported or imported.
States must submit data about an individual commercial facility when yearly production, processing, or consumption of Schedule 2 chemicals or production of Schedule 3 chemicals exceeds certain threshold quantities. For high risk Schedule 2 chemicals that have been weaponized, such as Quinuclidinyl benzilate, the threshold is set at 1 kilogram. The threshold for Schedule 2 chemicals that are highly toxic and could be used as chemical weapons, such as Amiton or PFIB, is 100 kilograms. A threshold of 1 metric ton has been set for the other Schedule 2 chemicals, which have been or could be used as precursors. (See tables 2 and 3.) Initial data declarations must be made for any commercial facility that produced, processed, or consumed a Schedule 2 chemical above the specified threshold amount within the three previous calendar years or will produce, process, or consume more than threshold amounts in the coming year. Similarly, initial declarations must be made for sites that produced more than 30 metric tons of a Schedule 3 chemical during the previous calendar year. Declarations are not required when facilities produce mixtures with Schedule 2 or 3 chemicals in low concentrations. Separate annual declarations are required sixty days before the beginning of the calendar year for anticipated plant activities above the thresholds during the coming year.
Table 3: Thresholds for Annual Data Declarations and Routine Inspections
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| Schedule 1 | Production, processing, consumption, acquisition, import and export data | 100g | 100g |
| Schedule 2 | Production, processing, consumption, import and export data | 1kg benzilate
100kg (Amiton, PFIB) 1 metric ton for other Schedule 2 chemicals |
10 kg benzilate
1 metric ton (Amiton, PFIB) 10 metric tons for other Schedule 2 chemicals |
| Schedule 3 | Production, import and export data | 30 metric tons | 200 metric tons |
| Other chemical production facilities | Production data for previous calendar year only | 30 metric tons for discrete organic chemicals containing phosphorus, sulfur, or fluorine | 200 metric tons |
What information must be declared for individual Schedule 2 and 3 facilities?
The information that must be provided for individual commercial facilities declared under these guidelines includes the name of the plant site and its ownership, the precise location of the facility, the number and precise location of plants within the declared site, their main activities, chemical names, common or trade names, structural formulas, and Chemical Abstracts Service registry numbers, if assigned. For Schedule 2 plants, the declaration must also include a description of the declared activities (e.g., production capacity, dedicated or multi-purpose plant). Statements about the anticipated production, processing, consumption, import, and export of Schedule 2 chemicals must include the purpose of the activity, the product types involved, and information about the sale or transfer of the chemical to another industrial facility, trader, or state. Declarations about the nature of anticipated production of Schedule 3 chemicals can be made in ranges, such as 30 to 200 metric tons. Plant sites that previously produced Schedule 2 chemicals for weapons purposes must declare such activities, providing information on the plants and chemicals involved, the dates and quantity of production, the receiving parties, and the end product, if known.
What information must be declared about "other" chemical production activities?
In addition to Schedule 2 and 3 activities, each treaty member is required to prepare an initial list of "other chemical production facilities" that must be annually updated. Facilities in this category are not actually producing any of the chemicals on Schedules 1, 2, or 3, but have the potential to do so. The plant sites that must be listed are those that during the previous calendar year produced by synthesis either more than 200 metric tons of unscheduled discrete organic chemicals or more than 30 metric tons of an unscheduled discrete organic chemical containing the elements phosphorus, sulfur, or fluorine, which are the basic building blocks for making chemical agents. The plant name and ownership, precise location, main activities, and approximate number of plants in the site producing the above chemicals must be declared for these sites. Declarations about the aggregate amount of unscheduled chemicals produced at these sites can be made using ranges. States are not required to list plants that exclusively produce explosives or pure hydrocarbons.
What are the requirements for data declarations for permitted Schedule 1 activities?
States that produce Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective purposes allowed under Article VI must make declarations regarding the single small-scale facility, as well as other facilities engaged in production. (See "What activities are permitted with Schedule 1 chemicals?" in the Central Provisions of the CWC section.) These declarations include the amount of Schedule 1 chemicals produced, consumed, or stored at the facility, along with a detailed technical description of the facility and its precise location. The aggregate annual amount of Schedule 1 chemicals each state acquires through production, withdrawal from chemical weapon stocks, or transfer cannot exceed 1 metric ton. Facilities that produce more than 100 grams of Schedule 1 chemicals annually must declare their activities.
What are the data declaration requirements for states that possess chemical weapons stockpiles?
States that possess chemical weapons and joined the treaty had to declare the size of their stockpile, the types of weapons and a general destruction plan therein no later than thirty days after the CWC's entry into force on 29 April 1997. This declaration includes the aggregate quantity of each chemical declared and the precise location and a detailed inventory of each weapon storage facility. Among other details, states must enumerate the associated equipment, munitions, and sub-munitions, as well as the toxicity of the chemicals and their structural formulas. In addition, states that either transferred or received more than 1 metric ton of chemical weapons, in bulk or munition form, since 1 January 1946 were required to declare the specifics of such activity, including the size and types of weapons, the dates of the transfers or receipts, the names of supplier and recipient countries, and the precise location, if possible, of the agents concerned. As of June 2001, four countries-India, Russia, South Korea, and the United States-had declared chemical arsenals.
What are the data declaration requirements for states that possess chemical weapons production facilities?
States that joined the CWC and possessed chemical weapons production facilities had to halt production on 29 April 1997 and declare the name, precise location, ownership, parties responsible for operating the facility since 1 January 1946, as well as the type of activity that took place at every such facility. For example, the purpose of the facility could have been to manufacture bulk agent, to fill munitions, or both. These declarations are also to include laboratories and test and evaluation sites. Among the requisite details are the types of agents handled at each facility, the dates of operation, the production capacity of each facility, site diagrams, and the present status of the facility. States were also required to declare their activities regarding any transfers or receipts of chemical weapons production equipment that have taken place since 1 January 1946. Article I of the CWC requires signatories to destroy all chemical weapons production facilities. As of June 2001, nine countries had declared possession of existing or former chemical weapons production facilities. These countries are China, France, India, Iran, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
What data must be submitted if a commercial site was previously involved in weapons production?
If a commercial site at any time since 1 January 1946 produced a Schedule 2 or 3 chemical for chemical weapon purposes, the nature of that activity must be stated in the initial data declaration. Information submitted for such sites must include the name of the facility, its ownership and precise location, and the specific plants within the site involved in the declared activity. For each Schedule 2 or 3 chemical produced for weapons purposes, the chemical name, common or trade name, structural formula, and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number must be provided. In addition, the declaration must include the dates when the chemical was produced, the quantity produced, the location to which the chemical was delivered, and, if known, the final product.
Are data declarations required for abandoned chemical weapons or production facilities?
States that left chemical weapons and production facilities on the territory of other CWC members are required to make declarations about the abandoned munitions and facilities. Any CWC member finding chemical weapons or production facilities abandoned by another state on its territory must also submit available relevant information to the Technical Secretariat. As of June 2001, seven countries-Belgium, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom-had declared that chemical weapons were abandoned on their territory.
What are the declaration requirements for riot control agents?
Within thirty days of entry into force, states were required to specify each riot control agent held in their possession for riot control purposes. The declaration includes the chemical name, structural formula, and, if assigned, the Chemical Abstracts Service registry number. States must update this information no less than thirty days after any change in holdings.