Biological and Chemical Weapons

Overview of the CWC and Related US Agreements 

The Chemical Weapons Convention

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The CWC was negotiated over a 24-year period in Geneva by a group of 40 western, eastern, and non-aligned states. Unprecedented in its scope and complexity, the CWC is the most significant agreement to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction since the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. More than 170 countries have signed the CWC, and 145 have ratified it. The treaty entered into force on 29 April 1997.

The treaty stipulates that states possessing chemical weapon must totally destroy their stocks over a 10-year timeframe. Destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles takes place according to a "leveling out" principle, with all possessor states destroying their stockpiles at approximately the same rate. Five years after entry into force, destruction of 20 percent of the stockpile is to be completed. After 7 years, 45 percent of the destruction should be complete. States can proceed at a faster rate, as long as they destroy their stockpiles in a way that is safe and environmentally sound.

For more information, see:

The Chemical Weapons Convention Handbook 
Schedules of chemicals 
Thresholds for Annual Data Declarations and Routine Inspections 
A complete list of CWC signatories and ratifications 

Click here to read the full text of the CWC.  

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Until the CWC entered into force, the treaty established the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) as an interim political and technical decision-making entity comprised of all initial signatories of the treaty. The PrepCom, which met in the Hague, was tasked with making "the necessary preparations for the effective implementation" of the CWC. This included setting verification procedures, creating a budget, recruiting and training inspectors, and establishing the infrastructure and rules of procedure for the treaty's implementation. The PrepCom had 3 working levels in which signatories were entitled to participate: plenary, working groups, and groups of experts. When possible decisions were made by consensus.

An international monitoring agency, the Technical Secretariat, is now responsible for data monitoring and routine on-site inspections and will also conduct challenge inspections. The Technical Secretariat, headed by a Director-General, includes an inspector corps and other technical specialists. The Technical Secretariat consists of the inspector corps and support and administrative personnel, totaling about 500 individuals selected from countries that have ratified the CWC. Aside from the office of the director-general, the Technical Secretariat has divisions for verification, administration, legal issues, external relations, and technical cooperation and assistance. The first director-general is José Maurício Bustani of Brazil.

The Technical Secretariat will report to the governing bodies of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Conference of States Parties to which all treaty parties belong, and a smaller 41-member Executive Council. Chosen on the basis of regional representation, members of the Executive Council serve two-year terms. The Executive Council meets regularly for the day-to-day decision making and operational guidance of the Technical Secretariat. In contrast, the Conference of States Parties meets annually or in special session to consider compliance, inspection results, and other issues raised by the Executive Council.

The Bilateral Memorandum of Understanding

The 23 September 1989 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the USSR provided for a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange between the two countries, to be carried out in two phases. On 29 December 1989 the United States and USSR exchanged data on:

• aggregate stockpile size;
• types of stockpiled agents;
• percent of chemical agents in munitions, devices, or bulk containers;
• location of storage, production, and destruction facilities;
• types of agent and munitions at each storage facility.

Phase I consisted of a series of visits during June to August 1990 to 2 production facilities, 3 storage facilities, and 2 industrial chemical production facilities in each country. During January to February 1991, 6 additional visits of experts were conducted.

After lengthy delays attributable mostly to the disarray in the Russian government following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the implementation of a scaled-down Phase II finally got underway after Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin met in Moscow in January 1994. The two sides exchanged data in May and June. Both sides questioned the completeness of the data provided. US concerns focused on the information (or lack thereof) that Russia supplied to address allegations by former scientists from the Soviet chemical weapons production complex about ongoing Russian chemical weapons research, development, and production activities.

A series of "practice" challenge inspections took place from August to December 1994. Each side conducted 5 inspections at declared government chemical weapons facilities for the purpose of acquainting US and Russian officials with challenge inspection procedures.

The Bilateral Destruction Agreement

The most important provisions of the June 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union require both states to stop producing chemical weapons and to reduce their respective chemical weapons stockpiles to no more than 5000 agent tons by the end of 2002. The bilateral destruction process is to be verified with the continuous presence of inspectors and monitoring instruments on-site at destruction facilities and on-site inspections at storage facilities. The Bilateral Destruction Agreement also requires the United States and Russia to cooperate on establishing safe methods and technologies for destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles.

Initially, the parties were to have begun destruction no later than 31 December 1992 and completed the task by 31 December 2002. Lack of funding for the destruction program in Russia was one of several obstacles delaying this agreement's entry into force. Russia officially backed away from the Bilateral Destruction Agreement in mid-1996. The agreement is therefore dormant, and inspections of US and Russian chemical weapons storage and destruction facilities are being conducted instead under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

 

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