Biological and Chemical Weapons

GAO, DOD Question Military Preparedness for Chemical and Biological Warfare

CBW Chronicle, Volume V, Issue 1 (January 2003)

Evidence presented in a 1 October 2002 congressional hearing before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, indicates the US military may not be properly prepared in the event of a chemical or biological attack. These charges are worrisome given US assertions that Iraq still harbors such weapons and Bush Administration threats to use military force to disarm Saddam Hussein. Testimony from Defense Department Inspector General Joseph Schmitz and Raymond Decker of the General Accounting Office (GAO) suggests that chemical and biological warfare protective equipment may be insufficient to safeguard soldiers, and training programs and medical response exercises have received low priority in some branches of the service.

The Defense Department discovered in 2000 that a now-bankrupt contractor, Isatrex, had sold them 800,000 defective chemical and biological protective suits. Although a November 2001 statement from the Defense Logistics Agency reported an extensive effort to remove the defective suits from the system, it has been unable to account for approximately 250,000 suits. While the agency asserted that most of the suits have likely been discarded or consumed in training exercises, Decker believes some could still be issued to military personnel, possibly some who are currently in or headed for the Persian Gulf theater.

Inventory difficulties have caused different issues concerning the newer JSLIST (Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology) protective gear. Consisting of overgarments, boots and gloves, the suits are designed to protect against chemical or biological threats while avoiding being excessively heavy, warm or bulky. According to a GAO report, the military, mistakenly believing there was an excess of the JSLIST suits, sold many of them for $3 on eBay. Ironically, officials were simultaneously paying the contractor up to $200 for the same suits.

How did the Defense Department lose track of 250,000 defective pieces of equipment and sell critical gear for only a fraction of its value? Critics blame a faulty inventory system that makes reliable equipment tracking virtually impossible: the Pentagon does not know how many pieces of equipment it has, nor can it precisely locate that equipment. The inventory system has caused disproportionate distributions of gear among the services; even if full sets of equipment are available, there is no guarantee that soldiers can be issued appropriate sizes. The essential role each piece of equipment plays in overall protection means that a deficiency in just one piece could cause grave injury in a chemical or biological attack.

In addition to equipment and inventory problems, the GAO found chemical and biological warfare training to be inadequate in some branches of the military. Realistic field exercises are almost nonexistent in Joint training programs, and medical services remain poorly prepared to respond to a chemical or biological attack. Even the recent Millennium Challenge 2002 war games, in which 13,500 troops from all four services participated in the largest combat simulation in US history, barely employed chemical and biological warfare scenarios.

The GAO and Inspector General have made several recommendations, including establishment of an automated inventory system across all services and more extensive chemical and biological warfare training for medical personnel and soldiers. The Defense Department appears willing to meet the recommendations and, according to Decker, it "has recently proposed organization and other changes designed to address these shortcomings." However, the Pentagon has not stipulated a time frame for implementing these improvements.

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