Biological and Chemical Weapons
Weapons Inspections Resume in Iraq
CBW Chronicle, Volume V, Issue 1 (January 2003)
On 5 February 2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell presented the United Nations (UN) Security Council with specific evidence meant to garner international support for military action against Iraq. Touching on Iraq’s biological, chemical, missile and nuclear weapons programs, as well as on its links to terrorism and history of human rights violations, Powell provided intelligence gathered from satellite photos, intercepted communications, and human sources.
The majority of the intelligence detailed Iraqi efforts to deceive inspectors and conceal weapons of mass destruction. Intercepted communications included a discussion between Iraqi officials on the "evacuation" of incriminating materials from sensitive sites; satellite photos of facilities thought to house chemical and biological weapons – those at Taji, al Fatah, al Musayyib and Amiriyah – show efforts to sanitize sites before the inspectors arrived.
Powell also described intelligence and defector accounts of mobile biological weapons production labs, which are housed in approximately 18 trailer trucks and move constantly throughout Iraq. According to Powell, these labs, and others hidden in railroad cars, can quickly produce large amounts of biological agent but are next to impossible to locate. Powell also asserted that Saddam Hussein not only possesses weapons of mass destruction, but that he is prepared to use them. Some human intelligence sources relate that Saddam has already authorized field commanders to use chemical weapons in case of war; others indicate that he has been testing biological and chemical weapons on deathrow prisoners.
In November 2002, UN inspectors returned to Iraq for the first time since 1998. Resumption of the search for weapons of mass destruction was authorized by UN Security Council resolution 1441, which required Iraq to submit a "full, final, and complete declaration" of its weapons programs to the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in early December. According to UNMOVIC Chairman Hans Blix, the 12,000 page, 12 CD-ROM document failed to answer many outstanding questions about its weapons activities and included little information beyond what Iraq had submitted prior to 1998.
Previous UN inspections in the 1990s uncovered information on Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programs, but Iraq’s noncompliance during that time raised issues that remain unresolved today. Evaluating the current status of Iraq’s weapons programs remains challenging. Although resolution 1441 provides access to areas that Iraq had previously kept off-limits, including presidential palaces and private residences, UN inspectors have not made any public statements that they have discovered revived weapons activity.
The most significant find to date has been a dozen 122mm chemical warheads – which were empty but in good condition - found in a bunker at the Ukhaider Ammunition Storage Area south of Baghdad. The Iraqis claimed that the warheads had simply been "forgotten," and on 20 January 2003, they produced four additional chemical warheads that they stated had been discovered in unopened boxes in a storage area.
On 27 January, Blix and International Atomic Energy Agency Director Mohamed ElBaradei presented a progress report to the Security Council. Although both indicated that the Iraqis were cooperating to greater extent than in previous inspections, Blix presented several areas of continuing concern.
Citing the discovery of 3000 pages of nuclear related documents in the home of Iraqi scientist Faleh Hassan Al Basri, Blix charged that Iraq is likely concealing documentation of its programs. He contended that Iraq has neither been forthcoming about identifying scientists, nor has it encouraged scientists to engage in private interviews. Of primary concern are items that Iraq is believed to possess but has not accounted for, such as large quantities of VX nerve agent precursors, 6500 chemical bombs, 8500 liters of anthrax, and 650 kilograms of bacterial growth media.
Blix’s report served as confirmation of White House beliefs that Iraq has not and will not cooperate with inspectors. While Colin Powell’s presentation provided evidence to support military action, several members of the Security Council advocated allowing inspections more time to be effective. Powell made it clear, however, that the US would not hesitate much longer. "Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option," he said. "Not in a post- September 11th world."