Biological and Chemical Weapons
Chemical Weapons Proliferation Concerns
According to the US government, at least 16 nations currently have active chemical weapons programs. The following summary draws on open-source news reports and official government statements regarding specific countries. 1
China
China ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention on 25 April 1997, has declared possession of former chemical weapons production facilities, and has opened pertinent military and industrial facilities to international inspections. According to the US government’s assessment, China possesses chemical weapons capabilities in research and development, production, and weaponization. Primary US concerns over recent years stem from China’s contact and sharing of chemical weapons expertise with other states of proliferation concern, including Syria and Iran.1
Egypt
Egypt has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and has long appeared on various governmental and nongovernmental lists as having an offensive chemical weapons capability. Egypt is thought to possess production facilities for mustard and nerve gas and might also have bombs, rockets and shells stockpiled in limited quantities. During the 1960s Yemini civil war, there were allegations that mustard gas was used, although the stocks employed are thought to have been left behind by the British rather than developed indigenously. Egypt has an industrial infrastructure sufficient to enable rapid production of cyanide gas.1
Ethiopia
Ethiopia ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in May 1996, but has a somewhat checkered history with regard to allegations of chemical weapons use. Charges to that effect surfaced in the late 1970s and continued through the mid 1980s during conflict in Eritrea. The allegations generally mentioned incapacitating rather than lethal agents, but there were sporadic references to the use of nerve gas (supplied by the Soviet Union). The Ethiopian government adamantly denied the charges. Although some sources do not view Ethiopia as currently capable of producing chemical weapons, a 1989 compilation of open-source materials listed Ethiopia as probably either developing, possessing, or producing chemical weapons.1
India
India ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in September 1996. In June 1997, India admitted openly for the first time the existence of its chemical weapons program. Since that time, initial inspections have taken place at pertinent military and industrial sites. India has also begun to destroy its chemical arsenal under the supervision of inspections. India has a formidable commercial chemical industry, and some its exports of dual-use chemicals have drawn the attention and suspicions of the international community.1
Iran
Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention on 3 November 1997, but delayed submitting its initial declaration until November of the following year. This declaration referenced three former chemical weapons production facilities, which were subsequently inspected. No nation has made an outright public accusation that Iran is in violation of its CWC obligations, but the US government issued several statements of concerns about Iran’s past and present activities. CIA reports estimate that Iran at one time manufactured and stockpiled several thousand tons of chemical weapons, including choking, blister, and blood agents. By 1987, limited quantities of cyanide and mustard gas were loaded into artillery shells and bombs. Larger-scale production facilities were completed later, and, by 1994, production of nerve agents was underway. Iran’s annual chemical weapons production capacity was estimated to approach 1,000 metric tons. Since Iran’s efforts to obtain critical equipment and materials continued, concerns deepened that Iran’s chemical weapons program was becoming both more advanced and self-sufficient. For example, China reportedly supplied Iran with key nerve agent precursors and decontamination materials. Military training in offensive and defensive chemical warfare also intensified since the early 1990’s.1
Iraq
Iraq is known to have used chemical weapons during the 1980’s war with Iran. In an infamous August 1988 attack, Iraqi forces also released bombs containing mustard gas and sarin on their own Kurdish civilians in the village of Birjinni. Iraq produced and stockpiled mustard, sarin, tabun, and VX. Experts inside and outside of government assert that Iraq continues to maintain a chemical weapons capability, a suspicion that is based on several key revelations. First, fewer chemically armed munitions were actually used during the Iran-Iraq War than originally claimed by Iraq. Second, in the fall of 1998, VX degradation products were detected on missile fragments that Iraq claimed had been unilaterally destroyed and had never been filled with chemical agent. Moreover, chemical facilities and infrastructure destroyed during the Gulf War have since been rebuilt, leading analysts to worry that they could be diverted quickly to chemical weapons production. After the Gulf War, Iraq reportedly moved some of its chemical weapons development activities out of the reach of UNSCOM inspectors into Sudan, in exchange for financial assistance. Some estimates suggest that some 6,000 chemical munitions remain hidden in Iraq. Reports estimate that Iraq could resume chemical weapons production within a matter of weeks or months. Iraq has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.1
|
What Iraq Declared |
Unconfirmed by UNSCOM |
Destroyed under UNSCOM Supervision |
|
More than 20,000 tons of precursor chemicals |
Some 4,000 tons of precursor chemicals have been accounted for by UNSCOM; the remaining 13,000 tons of Iraq's declared amount have not been verified |
More than 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals |
|
3,850 tons of chemical agent |
More than 3,000 tons have not been verified; additional tons of chemical agent may have been produced, but the amount has not bee determined due to UNSCOM's uncertainty about Iraq's declaration of precursor chemicals |
690 tons |
|
80 special warheads produced; unilateral destruction of 45 special warheads |
Complete destruction by Iraq of 45 special warheads not confirmed; UNSCOM believes additional special warhead production not declared by Iraq |
30 chemical warheads (16 sarin filled; 14 filled with binary components) |
|
247,263 empty munitions produced and procured |
107,500 empty casings have not been located |
38,537 filled and empty munitions; approximately 17,000 of these were empty |
|
152,119 munitions filled with chemical agents or components |
Several thousand additional munitions have not been located due to uncertainty surrounding number of procured munitions |
38,537 filled and empty munitions; some 22,000 of these were filled |
|
Produced and procured approximately 750 tons of VX precursor chemicals |
UNSCOM has not confirmed Iraq's claim to have destroyed approximately 500 tons of precursor chemicals unilaterally |
UNSCOM confirms Iraq's unilateral destruction of 170 tons of the precursor chemical phosphorus pentasulphide |
|
Source: United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Commission, United Nations Security Council Report S/1997/774, October 1997. United Nations, Letter dated 19 February 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission to the President of the Security Council, United nations Security Council Report S/1998/176, February 1998. | ||
Israel
Israel has undertaken extensive research into defenses against chemical warfare agents and conducts numerous military training exercises in chemical defense. An El Al Airlines plane bound for Tel Aviv that crashed outside Amsterdam in 1992 was carrying fifty gallons of dimethyl methylphosphonate, a chemical that can be used in the production of the nerve agent sarin. The precursor chemical was destined for the Institute for Biological Research in Nes Ziona, a top secret military installation outside Tel Aviv. Israeli officials maintained that the substance was being used solely for defensive research purposes, specifically to test filters for gas masks. The institute was also responsible for producing the poison used in a September 1997 assassination attempt on a leading figure in the terrorist organization Hamas. In October 1998, a British newspaper reported that Israeli F-16 fighter planes have been equipped to carry chemical weapons at short notice. Israel has signed but not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.1
Libya
Libya has been producing limited quantities of chemical weapons since the early 1980s. Since that time, however, the production facility at Rabta--believed to be the largest such facility in the developing world--has proven to be the cornerstone of the Libyan program, culminating in a stockpile estimated to total some 100 tons of blister and nerve agents since production began in the late 1980s. If the plant were to operate at full capacity, it could yield upwards of 100 tons each year. In an attempt to hide the plant’s activities, Libya staged a fire at Rabta in 1990, painting scorch marks on the facility and creating a cloud of black smoke by burning truckloads of tires. Construction on a second plant, this time put at least 100 feet underground, began in the early 1990s at Tarhuna. Although activity there seems to have tapered off in recent years, an additional sheltered facility was reportedly under construction near Sabha. While the Libyan chemical weapons program remains highly dependent on outside assistance, indicators suggest that Libya is aiming toward indigenous production capabilities. Libya has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.1
Myanmar
In the late 1980s, Myanmar (then referred to as Burma) was characterized in testimony by US naval intelligence personnel as developing chemical weapons capabilities. Other officials later countered that assessment, saying that the case supporting the chemical arsenal development was based primarily on circumstantial evidence. Myanmar has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, but has yet to ratify the agreement.1
North Korea
Following the development of an indigenous chemical weapons production program in the 1980s, North Korea accelerated construction of its chemical arsenal during the first half of the 1990s. Its significant chemical arsenal is believed to comprise a wide variety of agents, including blood, blister, choking and nerve. Delivery means include ballistic missiles, bombs and artillery. Military personnel are provided with protective equipment and regularly conduct training missions in such gear. The Soviet Union was thought to previously have provided North Korea with chemical weapons. Reports have noted that North Korea has taken steps to market its chemical arsenal and relevant technology to other developing countries. North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.1
Pakistan
Pakistan has been importing a number of dual-use chemicals that could be diverted to produce chemical weapons. In addition, the country’s industrial chemical complex has expanded, making Pakistan less dependent on outside sources for precursor chemicals. Pakistan ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in October 1997 and submitted its initial declaration. It did not declare any chemical weapons production or development.1
South Africa
South Africa ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in September 1995 and has undergone inspections. Hearings under the auspices of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission shed light on South Africa’s chemical weapons program during the apartheid era. Initiated in 1983 ostensibly as a defensive research program, South Africa’s efforts rapidly went beyond a limited defensive scope, moving into offensive work with both chemical and biological agents. A series of front companies masked the true nature of the project. The program was dismantled in 1993 just before President Nelson Mandela came into office. Some analysts worry that individuals involved in the apartheid-era program might have shared expertise with potential proliferators, such as Libya.1
South Korea
South Korea has long been referred to as a probable possessor of chemical weapons, although detailed publicly available information on the program is not plentiful. For decades, South Korea has maintained active chemical defense program, importing equipment and running training exercises and courses. In addition, South Korea has a sizeable industrial infrastructure that could be diverted. South Korea ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention on 28 April 1997. In accordance with the treaty, South Korea declared its chemical weapons stockpile.1
Sudan
Sudan has reportedly received assistance from Iraq in the development of its chemical weapons program, allegations that resurfaced in the wake of the August 1998 US bombing of the Al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Factory in Khartoum. Sudan acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention in May 1999.1
Syria
Syria is believed to have actively pursued a chemical weapons capability since the early 1970s when it acquired some chemical arms from Egypt. Production of nerve agents, such as sarin, began during the mid-1980s and continued into the next decade, with development of VX reported to have begun in late 1996 at a facility outside Damascus. Another site is believed to be under construction near Aleppo. Some experts estimate a poison gas stockpile of 500 to 1,000 metric tons. Press reports link Syrian and Russian scientists on chemical weapons development and dispersal. June 1998 accounts noted that Syria has armed missiles, planes, and artillery shells with sarin. Intelligence officials have testified that Syria still depends on foreign sources for key elements of its chemical weapons effort, including precursors and equipment. Syria has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.1
Taiwan
In the late 1980s, US government officials testifying before congressional committees highlighted Taiwan as either developing or having already developed a chemical weapons capability. Taiwan has not appeared on more recent lists of suspected proliferators. The international status inhibits the country’s ability to join the Chemical Weapons Convention.1
Vietnam
Vietnam ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in September 1998. Seven years earlier, a US Naval Intelligence assessment cited Vietnam as a probable possessor of chemical weapons.1
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 2000. When Yugoslavia dissolved in 1991, the remnants of the Yugoslavian chemical weapons program fell under the control of the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Yugoslavia launched a chemical weapons program in the 1960s, a program that matured in the late 1970s to include weaponization with artillery shells, mines, and rockets. By 1991, the program encompassed four research, production, and storage facilities. Sarin and mustard had been made, as had the incapacitating agents BZ and CS. Small quantities of the nerve agents tabun, soman and VX are also reported to have been produced, and there are unconfirmed allegations about the existence of binary sarin munitions. Since 1989, the media has reported links between Iraqi chemical weapons experts and the Yugoslav army.1
Sources: Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review Briefing (9 January 2002), available on the web at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/g020109-D-6570C.html. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad, hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 22 February 1996 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996); Countering the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat in the Post-Soviet World: Report of the Special Inquiry into the Chemical and Biological Threat, House Committee on Armed Services, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993); Proliferation Threats of the 1990's, hearing before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 24 February 1993 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993); Statement by George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World," 7 February 2001; US Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2001); Unclassified Statement for the Record by John A. Lauder, Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Nonproliferation, on the Worldwide WMD Threat to the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 29 April 1999; US Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 1998); US Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2001); CIA Nonproliferation Center, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 January Through 30 June 1998; CIA Nonproliferation Center, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 July Through 31 December 2000; CIA Nonproliferation Center, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 January Through 30 June 2000; Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993)