Border Security in Russia and Other States of the Former Soviet Union
The Issue | Obstacles | Q & A | Quick Facts |Legislation | Agreements | Talking Points | Recommendations
The Issue
The largest inventory of nuclear
material and weapons in the world is located in Russia. At present, it
is believed that Russia has more than 5,830 operational long range
"strategic" and short range "tactical" nuclear warheads in its arsenal.[1] Russia
also houses enough nuclear material (highly enriched uranium (HEU) and
plutonium) to produce approximately 75,000 more nuclear weapons.[2] Other
potentially dangerous stockpiles of materials are also located in other
states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), including Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Latvia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
In recent years, a number of
cases of illicit trafficking of HEU or plutonium from nuclear facilities
in the FSU have been documented, including approximately 15 incidents
in 2004 alone.[3] More
recently, in 2005, the head of the Georgian nuclear authority reported
that on several occasions his agency had interdicted smuggled,
Russian-origin HEU within Georgia.[4] While
every effort must be made to secure, account for, and dispose of this
material, significant steps must also be taken to stop the trafficking
of these materials out of the countries of origin. Heightening security
at the borders of these states is a critical second step toward a
layered defense against nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
proliferation and terrorism.
It would only take approximately
four kilograms of plutonium-enough to fill a can of Coca-Cola-or 20
kilograms of HEU to build a significant sized nuclear weapon.[5] It is
not inconceivable that such a small amount of fissile material could be
transported out of Russia or an FSU country and make its way into the
hands of a hostile state or terrorist organization. For instance, former
Iraqi officials made overtures to a Ukrainian institution that
possessed 165 pounds of HEU. They were also reportedly pursuing trade
deals with other FSU companies.[6]
Furthermore, reports of al Qaeda's attempts to purchase nuclear
materials as well as documented efforts on the part of Iran to acquire
nuclear materials in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union
make it clear that there is international demand and interest in these
materials.[7]
The
breakup of the Soviet Union left several states with stockpiles of
nuclear materials but without adequate legal and institutional
frameworks to monitor and control exports effectively and without the
infrastructure or personnel necessary to enforce such a system. In many
cases, these nations have borders that are thousands of miles long and
national governments that often do not have the ability to monitor,
patrol, or secure them. The latest estimate is that only 40 percent of
Russia's key border posts are trained and equipped to detect nuclear
smuggling.[8] Some
borders in the FSU are considered particularly sensitive, including
points of entry into Iran on the Caspian Sea and other nations.[9]
The
United States has undertaken a broad range of programs aimed at
preventing the trafficking of nuclear materials by working cooperatively
with Russia and other former Soviet states. These programs are operated
by the Departments of State, Energy, Commerce, and Defense in
partnership with the US Customs Service and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The programs provide export control assistance, including
assisting in the development of licensing procedures and establishing
legal and regulatory frameworks, or in strengthening border controls by
providing equipment and training to prevent, deter, detect and
investigate the trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials. While
the programs have made some progress in reducing the proliferation
threat, it is clear that increased efforts are necessary, as well as
improved means to measure the successes to date of these efforts. There
are still long stretches of FSU borders that are poorly monitored and
export control enforcement continues to lag in some countries.[10]
Additionally, the interagency coordination of US assistance programs has
been poor; the General Accounting Office (GAO) has recommended the
development of a government wide plan to address these issues that will
include identifying a unified set of goals, cost estimates, time frames
and performance measures.[11] The
GAO report's findings were echoed in the most recent CRS report on US
nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union. That report notes,
"Many analysts contend that coordination problems remain today, even
though each of the three key agencies - DOD, DOE and State - funds and
manages its own projects."[12]
Obstacles
- The Department of State chairs a group of six agencies charged with coordinating all US assistance efforts to enhance border security and export controls in the FSU, but the agencies do not always coordinate their efforts through this group.[13]
- Lack of overall coordination of US assistance efforts has led to an inconsistency in the quality and type of detection equipment installed at FSU borders leaving some more vulnerable than others.[14]
Q & A
Q: Why
shouldn't Russia and the other FSU states deal with border security
issues on their own?
A: The FSU states have very limited
resources for this work, which is extremely important to the security of
America and its friends and allies. Moreover, the United States has-and
for only a few million dollars a year can provide-the equipment,
expertise, and legal and regulatory experience that are essential for
effective border control programs. Failure to do so increases the chance
that a terrorist or hostile state will be able to smuggle nuclear or
radiological material out of these countries and build a weapon of mass
destruction or radiological dispersal device.
Q: Have there been any prominent successes in
these programs?
A: Yes, a number of attempts to smuggle
nuclear materials out of the FSU have been prevented by improved border
security efforts. The earlier WMD smuggling attempts are detected, the
greater the likelihood that we can prevent a terrorist attack using WMD.
Also, US export control assistance programs have helped lay the legal
and institutional basis for nuclear, missile and dual-use export
controls in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. As a result of US
interaction, Russia introduced the principal of "catch-all" export
controls in January 1998. A "catch-all" clause essentially ensures that
there is a legal basis for preventing exports of certain goods and
services, even if those goods and services are not on any control lists,
if there is reason to suspect that those goods and services will be
used to facilitate the development of weapons of mass destruction.
Additionally, the Department of Energy has installed Second Line of Defense nuclear detection equipment at 104 land sites, with plans to increase that number to around 392 by the end of 2012.[15] The State Department has provided (or requested funding for) export control and related border security assistance to 55 countries.[16] The Defense Department conducted 82 missions under the International Counterproliferation Program in FY 2006.[17]
Quick Facts
- The stockpile of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Russia is enough to produce more than 80,000 nuclear weapons.[18]
- There is substantial evidence to document at least 14 cases of theft or attempted theft of HEU or plutonium from nuclear facilities in FSU.[19]
- There is a documented evidence that for a bribe as small as $5, it was possible to gain entrance into closed nuclear cities in Chelyabinsk Oblast, Russia.[20]
- Hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials are located in over 200 buildings in Russia alone.[21]
Recent Legislation
- The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (Public Law 109-102) extended the availability of Export Control and Border Security funds in the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Fund to 30 September 2007.
- Section 3116 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163) mandated a report by the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Homeland Security, describing the roles and responsibilities of each department in US international border security programs and how to increase interagency cooperation.
- Title I of, the Cooperative Proliferation Detection, Interdiction Assistance, and Conventional Threat Reduction Act of 2005 (S. 1949, reintroduced as S. 2566) introduced 1 November 2005 by Senators Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Barack Obama (D-IL), proposed the establishment of an Office of Proliferation Detection and Interdiction Assistance Coordination to help prevent the smuggling of WMD into the US. While that specific provision was not passed, the Department of State Authorities Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-) included provisions of S. 2566 granting the President authority to provide border security and proliferation interdiction assistance.
- Rep. Adam Schiff introduced the Omnibus Nonproliferation and Anti-Nuclear Terrorism Act of 2005 (H.R. 665, not enacted) which called for the establishment of an Office of Nonproliferation Programs in the Executive Office of the President after finding many deficiencies in US nonproliferation policies, including international border security programs.
- The Nuclear and Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002 (S. 2478, not enacted), introduced by Senators Mary Landrieu and Gordon Smith on 8 May 2002, called for increased funding for the Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense Programs.
Applicable Treaties, Legislation, and Other International Agreements
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1673 (2006).
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). [See Resolution 1540 Issue Brief]
- The Department of State FY 2003 budget consolidated most export control and border security assistance previously funded in the FREEDOM Support Act/FSU account into the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account.
- The Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense Program began in FY 1998.
- The "National Defense Authorization Act of FY 1997" (Public Law 104-201) Section 1424 authorized the creation of the Department of Defense/US Customs Service Counterproliferation Program.
- The "National Defense Authorization Act of FY 1995" (Public Law 103-337) authorized the creation of the Department of Defense/FBI Counterproliferation Program.
- The Department of Energy's FSU Export Control Program began in 1995.
Talking Points
- The breakup of the Soviet Union left several states with stockpiles of nuclear materials but without adequate legal and institutional frameworks to monitor and control exports effectively and without the infrastructure or personnel necessary to enforce such a system.
- The loss or diversion of even a small amount of nuclear material to a rogue state or terrorist organization is a serious national security threat.
- As the bipartisan Baker-Cutler Task Force noted eight months before September 11, 2001, "The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-useable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home."[22]
- Less than 30 percent of Russian fissile material targeted by the US Department of Energy is in facilities that have received comprehensive security upgrades, increasing the importance of efforts to detect materials that people attempt to smuggle out of the FSU.
- While accounting, securing, and reducing weapons and materials is of the utmost importance, increasing border security in Russia and the FSU will provide a "second line of defense" against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials.
- The latest estimate is that only 40 percent of Russia's key border posts are trained and equipped to detect nuclear smuggling.[23]
- As nuclear weapons and materials travel further from their source, they become increasingly difficult to track and detect.
- Export control assistance builds a cooperative relationship between US agencies and their counterparts in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. This cooperation fosters the information and intelligence sharing necessary to successfully fight the war on terrorism.
Recommendations
- A close examination of the threat reduction programs across all
relevant government agencies should be undertaken. Redundancies in
programs should be eliminated and any gaps within existing efforts
should be filled. As threat reduction (or, more properly, cooperative
nonproliferation) has become an avenue for border security assistance,
this examination should touch on the programs involved to help the FSU
prevent trafficking.
[See Book Recommendation #1] - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 mandates that
all states improve their capacities to prevent, inter alia, the
possession, transfer, and use of weapons of mass destruction by
non-state actors. Enhanced border security is a vital part of the
resolution's objectives.
[See Book Recommendation #4] - A reassessment of the prospects and pitfalls of US-Russian
relations should also be a fundamental component to a reevaluation of
the suite of cooperative threat reduction programs. Not only should the
radically changed economic situation provide the context for a fresh
look at US Government programs with Russia, but the analysis should
include concrete measures for leveraging recent US-Russian agreements to
begin the transition from "patronage to partnership."
[See Book Recommendation #5] - To ensure host country buy-in and US understanding of host country concerns, US agencies involved in border security programs should build consensus with the respective host country regarding the threats and ensure support for the objectives and commitments to sustain the efforts after US support ends. [See Book Recommendation #6]
- For legislators and Congressional staffers, a mechanism for
receiving ongoing briefings from agency personnel involved in the
implementation of border security programs should be developed. Such
briefings would help mitigate congressional actions that create
unnecessary impediments to these programs. If such a mechanism is
politically infeasible, NNSA officials should be given the opportunity
to describe their work to congressional staffers in order to promote
better understanding of border security programs.
[See Book Recommendations #7 and #19] - Integrate the needs of government for ongoing cooperative
nonproliferation programs into an effort to create "sustainable"
employment opportunities for former weapons personnel through the
provision of products and services requisite to maintain other Energy,
Defense, and State Department funded projects in the region. Weapons
scientists, engineers, and technicians can be employed to develop
technology (radiation and pathogen detectors, for instance) that will
improve border security programs.
[See Book Recommendations #8 and #17]
Endnotes
[1] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2006," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Volume 62, Number 2, March/April 2006, accessed at: http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=ma06norris.
[2] The Henry L. Stimson Center, "The Non-Proliferation Scorecard," March 2007, accessed at: http://www.stimson.org/ctr/?SN=CT20050804895.
[3] International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database," accessed at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/PDF/itdb_31122004.pdf.
[4] Louise Shelley and Robert Orttung, "Criminal Acts: How Organized Crime is A Nuclear Smuggler's New Best Friend," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sept/Oct 2006 (22-23).
[5] David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, "Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies," SIPRI (Oxford Press: 1997), p. 8, cited in Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, "A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Non-Proliferation Programs with Russia," p. iv, January 10, 2001, accessed at: http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/rusrpt.pdf.
[6] Joby Warrick, "Nuclear Terrorism Focus Shifting to Research Facilities," Washington Post, November 28, 2002.
[7] Scott Parrish, "Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the FSU." Center for Nonproliferation Studies Issue Brief, March 2002, accessed at: http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_8a.html.
[8] Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2006, Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, May 2006, pg. 79.
[9] Senator Richard Lugar, "Statement before the Emerging Threats Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee," March 23, 1999, accessed at: http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/1999/990323rl.pdf.
[10] Vladimir A. Orlov, "Illicit Nuclear Trafficking and the New Agenda," IAEA Bulletin Online, Volume 46, Number 1 (2004), accessed at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull461/illicit_nuclear_trafficking.html.
[11] United States General Accounting Office, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning," May 2002, accessed at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02426.pdf.
[12] Amy F. Woolf, "Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington: CRS, 23 February 2007), 44.
[13] United States General Accounting Office, "Nuclear Nonproliferation... " op. cit., note 11.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Department of Energy Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2008 Congressional Budget Request, p. 474, accessed at: http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/08budget/Content/Volumes/Vol_1_NNSA.pdf.
[16] Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2007, p. 136, accessed at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60647.pdf.
[17]
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Budget Estimates, p. 435, accessed at: http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/budget_justification/pdfs/
operation/O_and_M(co)_Volume_I_PB_2007.pdf.
[18] Stimson Center, "The Non-proliferation Scorecard," op. cit., note 2.
[19] Scott Parrish, "Illicit Nuclear Trafficking...," op. cit., note 7.
[20] Shelley and Orttung, "Criminal Acts... " op. cit., note 5.
[21] Bunn and Weir, "Securing the Bomb 2006," op. cit., note 8.
[22] Baker and Cutler, "Report Card...," op. cit., note 5, p. iii.
[23] Bunn and Weir, "Securing the Bomb 2006," op. cit., note 8.
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Last Updated on May 30, 2007