To The Brink: Indian Decision-Making and the 2001-2002 Standoff

February 01, 2008

This study of the ten-month standoff between India and Pakistan triggered by an attack on the Indian Parliament by Islamic extremists in December 2001, authored by Stimson Center Scoville Fellow Alex Stolar, includes interviews with two former members of India’s Cabinet Committee on Security, Brajesh Mishra and Jaswant Singh, as well as with other senior Indian national security officials who served during the confrontation.

The report presents four summary conclusions about the standoff: First, nuclear weapons may help stabilize an adversarial relationship but they certainly do not prevent severe crises that can lead to conflict.

Second, while notions of “limited” war are a staple of the deterrence literature, carrying out a limited military action under the nuclear umbrella entails substantial risks. Statesmen and generals considering launching a “limited war” would have to consider what factors would keep a limited military action limited, and what factors would cause a limited military action to escalate.

Third, message management during a crisis is both essential and difficult. Disciplined message management can help prevent unintended escalation during a crisis. National leaders, however, must convey information to multiple domestic and international audiences during a crisis, and doing so effectively and precisely is extraordinarily challenging.

Finally, facilitating interagency cooperation is a vital but complicated task for heads of state and principals in the midst of a crisis. Even during the best of times, coordinating complex government bureaucracies in the formulation and implementation of policy is difficult. Periods of crisis strain government bureaucracies at a time when nimble and coordinated responses to complex challenges are most needed.