The Issue | Obstacles | Q & A | Quick Facts | Legislation | Agreements | Talking Points | Recommendations

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The Issue

The spread of deadly pathogens and the dangers of their deliberate use are arguably the most perilous yet least understood threats to American security today. Following the deliberate dissemination of poisonous chemicals on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in 1995, the fear of domestic terrorism using pathogens or chemicals has grown steadily in the United States. In 2001, this fear was magnified by the sudden spread of powdered anthrax spores through the US mail starting seven days after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Overall, anthrax-contaminated letters infected twenty-two people and caused five fatalities.[1] The American public's overall level of awareness and concern, and the precautions taken by the public in response to the attacks have increased dramatically, demonstrating that the dangers posed by pathogens have implications far beyond domestic public health.[2]

While the threat of an attack using biological weapons can incite panic in government officials and the general public alike, such an attack has never been successfully conducted on a large scale. While banned by international treaty, biological pathogens for offensive use were stockpiled during both world wars and continue to be developed as strategic weaponsthe "poor man's atomic bomb"—by a small but growing number of countries.[3] It is believed that about ten countries currently possess some form of ongoing offensive biological weapons program; five other countries have ended their programs, but may still have the capability to deploy bioweapons.[4]

The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits countries from developing, producing, stockpiling, or acquiring biological weapons or their means of delivery.[7] Any countries with bioweapons programs are also required to dispose of any weapons, toxins, or equipment within nine months of signing the Convention. However, the BWC lacks a verification system and has only rudimentary compliance mechanisms. This shortcoming has undermined the effectiveness of the treaty. It means that there is no central institution through which states can receive implementation assistance or raise or resolve compliance issues. It also reduces the likelihood that the verification and compliance challenges posed by the "dual-use"[8] application of biological research will be effectively addressed. In addition, the absence of verification and compliance measures makes it easier for countries to develop or maintain offensive biological capabilities with impunity. In 1994, BWC member states created an Ad Hoc Group to develop an enforcement protocol, which was completed in March 2001. Four months later, however, the US dismissed the protocol as "ineffective and harmful to US interests" and withdrew from the negotiations, effectively ending any chance for the protocol and the strengthening of the BWC.[9]

While it is generally agreed to be extremely difficult to build effective biological weapons capable of killing or sickening masses of people, the technology to do so is becoming increasingly available. The technologies necessary to cultivate dangerous pathogens are inherently dual-use, making it very difficult to distinguish between peaceful and non-peaceful applications. Industrial plants that produce fermented beverages and vaccines as well as hospitals and biotechnological and pharmaceutical research labs, all have the capabilities to produce dangerous pathogens for use as weapons. Monitoring and verifying the peaceful use of these technologies on a global basis is currently a practical impossibility.

Other measures to reduce the BW threat

By far the country with the most advanced program to build biological weapons was resident in the former Soviet Union. At the height of the Cold War, that country had trained more than 60,000 scientists and engineers in the biological weaponry sciences. To date, many of those individuals have not found gainful employment and, therefore, there is a serious risk that their expertise will proliferate to states such as Iran and Syria—states believed to be pursuing offensive biological programs. Intelligence gathered during operations in Afghanistan in the winter of 2002 suggests that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda are also working on developing biological weapons.

In 1991, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) was established as a series of programs to aid countries of the former Soviet Union in the destruction of weapons of mass destruction. Between fiscal years 1994 and 1999, the United States provided about $20 million to fund collaborative research projects that redirected former biological weapons scientists to peaceful research activities. For fiscal years (FY) 2004, 2005, and 2006, the United States spent almost $200 million in CTR funding alone on the Defense Department's Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention program (the State Department also provides funding for biological weapons proliferation prevention activities in the former Soviet Union). For FY2007 there was an additional $7.6 million requested for the BWPP, bringing the budget to $68.4 million from $60.8 million in FY2006.

Another dimension of the biological weapons threat is reflected in the March 2005 report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. That Commission pointedly noted that the US intelligence community lacks technical expertise regarding biological weaponry.[10] Thus, the Commission stated, "[B]iological weapons are … the mass casualty threat the Intelligence Community is least prepared to face." To begin to correct the situation regarding the lack of expertise in the United States, the Commission made a few recommendations of long-term solutions.[11] However, the Commission did not address the near-term possibility of tapping into the expertise in the states of the former Soviet Union. As a direct result of the Soviet Union's biological weapons program, Russia is host to some of the most accomplished labs in the world in critical areas of biology. If harnessed appropriately, their knowledge and activities could be used for the benefit of global public health and bioterrorism prevention.

Obstacles

During negotiations in 2001 to conclude an international arrangement by which the international community could verify compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the American negotiating team highlighted several obstacles that they believed made the draft protocol unworkable. These included the belief that the draft protocol would not:

• cover enough relevant facilities and would focus its energies on Western states instead of those countries thought to be pursuing biological weapons. As a result, it was the US position that the protocol would "do little" to deter states from violating the BWC;

• improve the United States' ability to verify others' compliance with the convention or enhance US confidence that other states were complying;and

• protect adequately the secrets of the US biotech industry or US biodefense programs.

Q & A

Q: What are biological weapons?
A: Biological weapons are pathogens or toxins adapted for offensive use and intended to cause disease or death in human, animal or plant life. Pathogens multiply within their victim, and can manifest in lethal, contagious and disfiguring symptoms. Toxin weapons range in effect from disabling to acutely lethal.

Q: Are biological weapons and chemical weapons equally destructive?
A: No. Weight for weight, biological weapons are hundreds of thousands of times more potent than the most lethal chemical warfare agents, making them true weapons of mass destruction with a potential for lethal mayhem that, in certain circumstances, can exceed that of nuclear weapons.[12]

Q: Which countries have biological weapons?
A: About a dozen countries are thought by Western analysts to have clandestine biological weapons programs. Among those, China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia have also ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Others about whom there are suspicions are North Korea, Egypt, Syria, Israel, and the US, UK. and France have decommissioned their offensive biological weapons capability, but they retain defensive and research capabilities.

Q: Are biological weapons really a threat?
A: Along with chemical weapons, biological weapons have been described as "the poor man's atomic bomb." Biological weapons pose potentially devastating effects and are very difficult to defend against. These weapons are also indiscriminate; and once unleashed, can be uncontrollable. For that reason there have been growing concerns about their use by terrorist groups against civilian populations, and increased efforts to develop bioterrorism prevention, mitigation and response strategies. The Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan was experimenting with biological weapons, and made several failed attempts to use them against the general population[13]. Moreover, the perpetrator(s) of the 2001 anthrax mailings in the United States remain(s) at large. Most experts agree, however, that it is very difficult to create effective biological weapons and to deploy them with mass effect.

Quick Facts

• As a result of the anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001, some 10,000 people along the East Coast, actually or potentially exposed to virulent anthrax spores, were prescribed prophylactic antibiotics.

• At its peak, the Soviet biological weapons program produced massive quantities of biological agents annually, including: 1,500 metric tons of tularemia bacteria; 4,500 metric tons of anthrax; 1,500 metric tons of bubonic plague bacteria; and 2,000 metric tons of glanders bacteria.[14]

• These materials were produced at approximately 50 facilities scattered across Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Much of this material remains today.[15]

• According to a Russian defector who once headed up a massive biological weapons facility in the former Soviet Union, more than 60,000 scientists and technicians were formerly employed in a variety of Russian biological warfare programs. While most were absorbed back into society, a number have moved abroad.[16]

• According to the same defector, "between five and ten" of the best biological warfare scientists have been hired on long-term, top-secret contracts by Iran.[17]

• During the Gulf War, Iraq admitted that it deployed biological agent-filled munitions to airfields, and that these weapons were intended for use against Israel and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia.[18]

• A small airplane dispersing 220 pounds of anthrax spores could inflict more casualties in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area than a missile carrying a hydrogen bomb.[19]

• According to a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) study, the economic impact of a bioterrorist attack on a single American city can range from $477.7 million per 100,000 persons exposed (using aerosolized brucellosis) to $26.2 billion per 100,000 persons exposed (using aerosolized anthrax).

• In a survey conducted by the Harvard School of Public Health/Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Survey Project on Americans' Response to Biological Terrorism, on 8 November 2001, 57% of those surveyed stated that they had taken one or more precautions in response to reports of bioterrorism. A study commissioned by the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, conducted between 19 and 20 November 2002, found that 64% of respondents believe that chemical and biological weapons are the greatest threat to American security, as compared to just 7% who felt nuclear weapons posed the greatest threat.[20]

Recent Legislation

• The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188) is intended to improve the ability of government to respond to a bioterrorist attack by: enhancing detection capabilities following an attack; improving disease surveillance systems and public health laboratories; improving techniques to treat the victims of an attack; and improving hospital, state and local capacity for responding to bioterrorist attacks. This law also improves the government's ability to contain an attack by expanding pharmaceutical stockpiles and accelerating the development of new treatments, including a smallpox vaccine.

• The USA Patriot Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56), written and passed in the immediate aftermath of the October 2001 anthrax attacks, criminalized the possession of biological agents where it is not "reasonably justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose." It also prohibited "restricted persons," defined in the Act, from working with certain agents. Restrictions such as these have raised concerns in the scientific community that research on infectious diseases could be hampered.

• Each year, the Congress enacts a National Defense Authorization Act providing authorizations of appropriations, inter alia, to help Russia scale down its massive stockpile of biological weapons and re-employ that state's weapon scientists as part of CTR efforts. These programs work to ensure that weapons, materials, and expertise from Russia do not fall into the hands of terrorists or terrorist states.

Applicable Treaties, Legislation, and Other International Agreements

• The 1925 Geneva Protocol established an international norm against the use of chemical and biological weapons as a means of warfare. It remains in force today, but does not have provisions for monitoring or verifying compliance.[21]

• The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, also known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), outlaws biological weapons. The BWC was opened for signature on 10 April 1972, and entered into force on 26 March 1975. It currently has 155 states parties and 16 signatory states. However, the treaty lacks an effective means by which to verify a state's compliance.

• In 1994, BWC states parties received a report from a group of governmental experts that had been evaluating potential verification measures since 1991. The experts concluded that some verification measures could help improve the convention's implementation; with these results in mind, states parties authorized their most ambitious effort to date, establishing a body known as the Ad Hoc Group to conclude a protocol to strengthen the convention. The Ad Hoc Group met beginning in 1995 through 2001 but the process was derailed over American objections that the emerging consensus would still permit countries states parties to deceive the international community, circumvent their treaty obligations, and build biological weapons. There remain no means to verify compliance with the treaty.
• The UN Secretary-General's Mechanism was intended as a temporary mechanism to fill chemical and biological weapons (CBW) verification gaps. In 1982 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) endorsed the authority of the UN Secretary-General to investigate any situation which threatens international peace and security, with specific regard to the alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. The mechanism has been used on several occasions in the past to investigate allegations of CBW use in Afghanistan, Indochina, Iran, Iraq, Mozambique, and Azerbaijan.[22]

• The Australia Group, created in 1994, is composed of forty participants (39 countries and the European Commission) that aim to harmonize their export licensing measures to ensure that "exports of certain chemicals, biological agents and dual-use chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment do not contribute to the spread of CBW."[23] It should be noted that their controls target only the activities of state actors.

• UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was unanimously adopted in April 2004. It is unprecedented in mandating that all UN member states enact measures to criminalize non-state actor development, acquisition, manufacture, transport or transfer of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, and "to maintain appropriate physical protection measures" for these items.[24]

• The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-298) outlaws the development or possession of biological weapons.

• The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (Public Law 104-132) enhances the penalties and controls over biological pathogens.

Talking Points

• Biological weapons potentially pose greater dangers than either chemical or nuclear weapons because pathogens are so lethal on a pound-for-pound basis, their production requires a much smaller and cheaper industrial infrastructure, and the necessary technology and know-how are almost entirely dual-use and, thus, widely available.

• The devastation that could be brought about by the use of biological weapons is suggested by the fact that, throughout history, the inadvertent spread of infectious disease during wartime has caused far more casualties than actual combat. For example, some estimates of the deaths caused by the 1918 Pandemic Flu are as high as 50 million, while the total casualties (including those wounded and missing) during World War I are estimated at about 37.5 million people.

• The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), ratified by 155 countries, bans the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of biological pathogens for weapons purposes. This treaty was weakened from the start however, by the impossibility of verifying and banning all nefarious research on pathogens.

• At its peak, the Soviet biological weapons program produced massive quantities of biological agents, and annually employed more than 60,000 scientists and technicians. Today, while the Russian economy is recovering, Moscow does not possess the resources to safely maintain stockpiles, ensure the physical security of research facilities or researchers, or secure peaceful employment for former weapons scientists. More must be done to ensure that weapons, materials, and expertise do not fall into the hands of those that wish to cause harm.

Recommendations

• While proliferation threats emanate from across the spectrum of WMD specialties, former biological weapons specialists, particularly in the states of the FSU, pose a particular challenge owing to the inability of current nonproliferation regimes to detect and prevent the development of weaponized pathogens. Since the introduction of the Cooperative Nonproliferation programs (CNP) in the early 1990s, there has not been a global reassessment of these programs' roles and objectives to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in the current strategic environment. A National Security Council designee should spearhead an interagency process to reassess the global role of CNP efforts in today's context, including those that have arisen in the past few years.Such a close examination of the entire suite of programs, including those that deal with biological weapons, across all relevant government agencies should strive to eliminate duplication, consolidate where necessary, and fill any gaps within the existing efforts. [See Book Recommendation #1]

• Define goals for BW threat reduction and redirect programs in the context of each participating agency's objectives as well as within the long-term strategic objectives of the US Government's foreign policy. In addition, each agency's role and relationships must be clarified. [See Book Recommendations #2, #10, #16]

• The US Government should contributing states parties to the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to encourage wider collaboration internationally to better leverage Global Partnership funding across national boundaries. Significant work to secure and destroy the Russian BW arsenal remains, and other Global Partnership countries may be able to accomplish more than the US. [See Book Recommendation #3]

• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which mandates that all UN Member States must implement a set of supply-side controls and criminalize proliferant activities within their territories, is a useful tool for reducing the BW threat. Because 1540 covers all three types of WMD (nuclear, chemical, and biological), states without controls on dangerous pathogens or dual-use biotechnology are legally obligated to create such controls. [See Book Recommendation #4]

• A reassessment of the prospects and pitfalls of US-Russian relations should also be a fundamental component to a reevaluation of the suite of cooperative threat reduction programs, including those related to BW. Not only should the radically changed economic situation provide the context for a fresh look at US Government programs with Russia, but the analysis should include concrete measures for leveraging recent US-Russian agreements to begin the transition from "patronage to partnership." The imbalanced nature of the relationship has been a systematic impediment to achieving faster progress from the very beginning of CNP efforts. [See Book Recommendation #5]

• To ensure host country buy-in and comprehensive US understanding of host country concerns, US agencies involved in BW threat reduction programs should build consensus with the respective host country regarding existing threats and ensure support for program objectives and commitments to sustain the efforts after US support ends. [See Book Recommendation #6]

• A bicameral congressional task force should be created to regularly provide briefings from a broad array of the programs and actors involved in the actual implementation of biological weapons-related CNP activities. Such briefings would go a long way in creating the needed knowledge base on Capitol Hill. [See Book Recommendation #7]

• The bioweapons-related scientific and technical talent resident in the WMD complexes in the states of the FSU must be effectively engaged and leveraged. This can be done by channeling government programs to meet mutually identified needs; as well as by undertaking a serious effort to create an appropriate incentive structure to engage potential employers, i.e. private industry actors. The emphasis of existing programs on scientific collaboration or technology development only too infrequently creates sustainable employment. [See Book Recommendations #8, #23, and #24]

• Congress should avoid imposition of a strict ceiling on annual maximum allowable increases in a particular CTR program budget. The CNP program has been most successful when afforded the longest leash on its activities. Access to former bioweapons facility is rarely granted by FSU officials. Should the opportunity to operate threat reduction programs inside such a facility, DoD should have the ability to divert necessary funding. [See Book Recommendation #14]

• The State Department should create an "information clearinghouse" for US Government-wide CNP activities. Its function would be to provide a focal point for collection and dissemination of information pertinent to all agency officials regarding the activities of their counterparts in other parts of the US Government. As both the Department of Defense and the Department of State operate large-scale biological threat reduction programs, an information-sharing office would prove valuable. [See Book Recommendation #22]

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Last Updated on May 30, 2007