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Expert Brief | Yuki Tatsumi on Japan-China Tensions over Senkaku/Daoyutai Islands

September 11, 2012

Tension over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands is casting a long shadow over Japan-China relations.  During the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Vladivostock over the weekend, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and Chinese President Hu Jintao did not hold bilateral talks.  On September 8th, Chinese Foreign Minister Spokesman Qing Gan suggested that it was Japan's fault that the Noda-Hu meeting did not happen, denouncing Japan for not "squarely considering China's position on its territory and our determination." 
 
It is clear Qing refers to the moves by the Japanese government to nationalize the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands for the last several months.  In particular, China is reacting to the reporting made by major Japanese newspapers on September 5th that the Japanese government will purchase a part of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri, Kita Kojima, and Minami Kojima) for a reported 2.05 billion yen.      
 
The Senkakus/Diaoyutai Islands consist of five islands (Uotsuri Jima, Kuba Jima, Taisho Jima, Minami Kojima, and Kita Kojima), and three rocks (Okino Kitaiwa, Okino Minami-iwa, and Tobise) that are close to the Chinese mainland, Okinawa, and the Taiwanese coast.   The islands have been under the administrative control of Japan and have been highly contested since 1968. 

Yuki Tatsumi, a Senior Associate at Stimson, offers the following observation on the recent tension between Tokyo and Beijing over the Senkakus:

1. The management of this issue has been particularly challenging for Tokyo and Beijing.  In the past, Japan and China managed the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands by essentially "shelving" the issue and by not overtly asserting its claimed sovereignty over these islands.  Whenever Japanese authorities detected Chinese fishing vessels entering the waters near Senkaku, it quietly captured the ship and set them home.  The Chinese government, on its part, did not get involved in activities by their fishing vessels.

2. This practice of "shelving" the issue changed in September 2010, when a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) vessel.  When the captain of the trawler was arrested, the Chinese government retaliated by limiting the export of rare earth minerals to Japan.

3. The governments in both Tokyo and Beijing cannot afford to lose public support for their respective domestic political reasons and have little incentive to pursue a non-confrontational alternative approaches at the moment.

In the absence of an official announcement by the Japanese government, the details of the reported purchase is unknown.  "What is also unclear is what the Noda government plans to do with the three islands after it purchases them," Tatsumi argues.  She also has stated, "Now that the historical 'shelving' approach is no longer a viable option, the governments in both Tokyo and Beijing will be hard pressed to find a new approach towards the Senkaku/Diaoyutai issue.  The two governments must be careful not to let their public opinion dictate their policy towards one another.  Leadership in both governments should do its utmost to explore an alternative framework to engage one another on the Senkaku/Diaoyutai issue.